3 1761 05323974 5

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/campaigninvirgin01stevuoft

Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy

THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA 1781.

An exact Reprint of Six rare Pamphlets on the

CLINTON-CORNWALLIS CONTROVERSY

with very numerous important

UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT NOTES

By SIR HENRY CLINTON K.B.

And the Omitted and hitherto Unpublished portions
of the Letters in their Appendixes added from the

ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

With a SUPPLEMENT containing

Extracts from the Journals of the House of Lords.
A French translation of papers laid before
the House

And a CATALOGUE

of the Additional Correspondence of Clinton and
of Cornwallis, in 1780-81: about 3456 papers relating
to the Controversy or bearing on
Affairs in America

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL I

Compiled, collated, and edited
(with biographical notices in a copious index,)
by BENJAMIN FRANKLIN STEVENS

LONDON: 4 TRAFALGAR SQUARE, CHARING CROSS

1888

16 | 681
6 | 5 | 21

Copyrighted according to Act of Congress in the year 1887 by
Benjamin Franklin Stevens of Vermont,
Temporarily residing in London, England.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

Abbreviations	*pp.*	vi
Introduction	„	vii to xxix
Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative	„	1 to 58
Earl Cornwallis's Answer	„	59 to 94
Clinton's Observations on Answer	„	95 to 132
Correspondence of Clinton & Cornwallis..	„	133 to 136
Themistocles' Reply to Narrative	„	137 to 172
Parting Word on Controversy	„	173 to 206
Chronological Correspondence, 17 May 1780 to 31 May 1781	„	207 to 507

ABBREVIATIONS.

AL	AUTOGRAPH LETTER.
ALCALÁ	ARCHIVO GENERAL CENTRAL, ALCALÁ DE HEÑARES.
ALS	AUTOGRAPH LETTER, SIGNED.
ARC	CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. 4 VOLS.
BM	BRITISH MUSEUM, HALDIMAND COLLECTION.
CP	NARRATIVE OF CLINTON'S CO-OPERATION WITH SIR PETER PARKER AND VICE-ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT. PRINTED.
DC	DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 6 VOLS.
ECA	UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, CAMBRIDGE, AUCKLAND MANUSCRIPTS.
ELS	SHELBURNE MANUSCRIPTS IN LANSDOWNE HOUSE.
ERNad	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, ADMIRALTY RECORDS, ADMIRALS' DISPATCHES.
ERTC	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, BOARD OF TRADE, CANADA.
ERTpg	RECORD OFFICE, BOARD OF TRADE, PLANTATIONS GENERAL.
FEH	ARCHIVES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES, HOLLANDE.
FEU	ARCHIVES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES, ETATS-UNIS.
FG	ARCHIVES DU MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE.
FM	ARCHIVES DE LA MARINE.
GW	WRITINGS OF GEO. WASHINGTON. BY J. SPARKS.
HC	LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
HL	LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.
HSR	RIJKS ARCHIEF TE 'S GRAVENHAGE, SECRETE RESOLUTIEN.
LS	LETTER SIGNED.
MEMS	MEMORANDUMS RE TREATMENT OF THE ARMY RESPECTING PLUNDER. PRINTED 1794.
PA	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE OF ENGLAND, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES SERIES.
RI	ROYAL INSTITUTION.
RODNEY	LETTERS FROM G. B. RODNEY TO H.M.'S MINISTERS, &c., 1784.
SAC	SACKVILLE MANUSCRIPTS IN DRAYTON HOUSE.
SIMANCAS	ARCHIVO GENERAL DE REINO, SIMANCAS.
SSI	ARCHIVO GENERAL DE INDIAS, SEVILLE.

INTRODUCTION

These two volumes relating to the military controversy between Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis will be found a valuable contribution to the history of the American campaign of 1781, by which the independence of the United States was virtually secured. They comprise:—

1. Reprints of five exceedingly rare pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, published in London in 1783, and a sixth with the official correspondence between these commanders, privately printed at New York in 1781. These six pamphlets are of such rarity that only one library, that of the Department of State at Washington, possesses all of them, and of the 'PARTING WORD' no other copy is known. All were purchased at the auction sales of two portions of Sir Henry Clinton's library in 1882 and 1884.

2. Innumerable important and hitherto unpublished Manuscript Notes made by Sir Henry Clinton in many separate copies of the pamphlets and in other books.

3. The full text of the omitted portions of the one hundred and eighty-three documents in the six pamphlets, now for the first time published, entire whenever possible, from the manuscripts in the Public Record Office, the Royal Institution, the House of Lords, the bureaux des Affaires Etrangères, de la Marine, and de la Guerre, Paris, and in the private collections of the Marquis of Lansdowne, Mrs. Stopford Sackville, and Lord Auckland.

4. A supplement containing:—*a*. Extracts from the Journals of the House of Lords from 27 Nov. 1781, to 6 March 1782. *b*. The preface to a surreptitious

French translation of the official correspondence laid before the House of Lords, with a list of the papers published therein. *c.* A Catalogue of the official correspondence of Clinton and of Cornwallis in 1780 and 1781, numbering about 3456 papers, more or less relating to their controversy, and all bearing upon affairs in America.

Before proceeding to a bibliographical description of the pamphlets, it will be convenient to give a very brief sketch of the campaign of 1780-81, in order that the points at issue betweeen Clinton and Cornwallis may be distinctly apprehended.

Sir Henry Clinton had been commander in chief of the British forces in America since 8 May 1778. His first act had been to evacuate Philadelphia, and concentrate his forces at New York, and he had afterwards mainly carried on the war by predatory expeditions, which had always been successful, but which could not possibly be attended by decisive results. Cornwallis had been so dissatisfied with this policy that shortly after Clinton's appointment he had sent in his resignation, which the King refused to accept. He had then returned to England on account of the illness of his wife, and arrived again at New York in July 1779, as second in command, and provided with a commission entitling him to succeed Clinton in the event of the latter's death or incapacity. He now urged his views more strongly, and in 1780 Clinton consented to invade the Southern colonies. Charlestown was taken May 11. Clinton then returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis in command. The latter maintained his ground until January, 1781, when he determined to march northward into Virginia, hoping to effect a junction with Clinton on the Chesapeake, and subdue the State. After various turns of fortune he successfully effected his junction at Petersburgh May 20 with a detachment of Clinton's army under Arnold, the command having again devolved on him by the death of General

Phillips May 13. Cornwallis still found himself too weak to attempt anything of importance. He urged the evacuation of New York, and the concentration of the entire British army in Virginia, to which Clinton would not listen. On August 2 he established himself at Yorktown, was invested there in September by Washington, who had received large French reinforcements, and surrendered on October 19, exactly six years and a half after the first blood shed in the war by the skirmish at Lexington. On the very same day Clinton sailed from New York with seven thousand men to relieve him, and arrived at the Chesapeake on October 24, to find himself too late.

Such a series of transactions evidently opens the way for abundant controversy and recrimination between the officers concerned. Was Cornwallis's march through the Carolinas and Virginia undertaken with Sir Henry Clinton's approbation or consent? Upon his arrival in the Chesapeake, ought Clinton to have strongly reinforced him, even at the cost of abandoning New York? or to have withdrawn his forces while there was time? or, as he actually did, to have awaited events? Was the unfortunate selection of York Town as headquarters the fault of Cornwallis? or was he constrained by Clinton's instructions to occupy and fortify a good harbour? Could the defence have been better conducted? and did Clinton use all possible expedition and diligence in coming to Cornwallis's relief? These were the questions chiefly agitated in the pamphlets of which I have now to give a bibliographical account.

They are as follows.

1. "NARRATIVE of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. relative to his Conduct during part of his command of the King's Troops in North America; Particularly to that which respects the unfortunate Issue of the Campaign in 1781. With an Appendix, containing Copies and Extracts of those Parts of his Correspondence with Lord George Germain,

Earl Cornwallis, Rear Admiral Graves, &c. Which are referred to therein. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (successor to Mr. Almon) opposite Burlington-house, Piccadilly, 1783." 8*vo. Half title, title and pp.* 115, *Slip of Errata.*

Six editions of the NARRATIVE were issued in 1783, a seventh edition in 1785, and a reprint limited to 200 copies 8°, 75, 4°, and 25, f°, by John Campbell, Philadelphia, 1865.

The NARRATIVE was first published in January 1783. Earl Cornwallis received a copy on January 15.

The Monthly Review for January 1783 p. 89 gives this notice:—"It had been happy for this country [we are to write now in the preterpluperfect tense], that the conduct of our commanders had been so clear and decisive as to save them the trouble of penning narratives and defences. Ill success is the parent of accusation, exculpation, and recrimination; and in this detail Sir Henry Clinton acquits himself of all share in Lord Cornwallis's misfortune; leaving that general to answer for misconceptions of the orders sent him, and for the choice of the post which he was reduced to surrender. A counter representation may probably follow from the other side; and such is all the satisfaction we have, and are likely to have, for the loss of America!"

The Gentleman's Magazine February 1783 p. 147 says of the Narrative:—"Painful is the detail of such a losing game as our American warfare. It is like tearing open a wound never to be healed. The principal view of the late commander-in-chief, like that of his predecessor, is to exculpate himself. For that purpose he contends, that a desultory war in Virginia, the taking possession of the posts of York and Gloucester (at least without objection), the undertaking operations in the Chesapeak, without having a naval superiority, &c. were measures far from being advised, always disapproved by him.

"To the latter (he says), 'Perhaps alone are we to impute our late misfortune (Lord Cornwallis's) in that quarter.'—An impartial reader, on perusing this Narrative, will hardly think that Sir Henry Clinton has exculpated himself from directing the Earl to take post at York and Gloucester.—His Lordship's Answer will be noticed in p. 155."

2. "AN ANSWER to that part of the Narrative of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Which relates to the Conduct of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, during the Campaign in North America,

in the year 1781. By Earl Cornwallis. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (Successor to Mr. Almon,) opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly, M.DCC.LXXXIII." 8*vo. title, pp. xvi.; "Contents,"* 3 *leaves, pp.* 260, *Slip of Errata.* An edition of 200 copies 8°, 75, 4°, and 25, f°, was reprinted in Philadelphia, 1866.

The Gentleman's Magazine February 1783 p. 155 gives this notice of the ANSWER:—"EARL CORNWALLIS has made as gallant a defence here as he did at York Town, with this material difference: he was there obliged to surrender an indefensible post to the far superior forces of his enemies; but in this entrenchment, we think, he has been able to repulse the warm attacks of his commander in chief. In short, from an impartial perusal of the correspondence here exhibited, we are clearly of opinion (to adopt his Lordship's words in his Introduction) 'that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part;—that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded;—that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which would not admit of *his* waiting for the approbation of the commander in chief;—that *he* did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it;—that *he* occupied the posts of York and Gloucester, and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief uniformly held out to *him* by the commander in chief;—and that, during the considerable interval between *his* arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, *his* corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas; and, consequently, that *his Lordship's* conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.'—That Sir H. Clinton is blameable, does not, however necessarily follow. Various other causes, which might be assigned out, and may be easily collected from this correspondence, contributed to the failure of our arms in that inauspicious war; in which we constantly seem, under every commander, however successful on other occasions, to have swum, as it were, against the stream. *The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.* One of these was the false hopes continually held forth by pretended or lukewarm friends. 'I have experienced the distresses and dangers (says Lord Cornwallis from Wilmington) of marching some hundreds of miles in a country chiefly hostile, without one active or useful friend.' In consequence of this his brilliant successes at Camden and Guildford were as unproductive and indeed ruinous as defeats. After the latter he says, 'Many of the inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us, and to hear that we had beat Greene, and then rode home

again.'—Another cause seems to have been the want of harmony and concurrence in the sea and land departments. 'Our Admiral,' says Sir Henry Clinton, 'is grown, if possible, more impracticable than ever:' and afterwards he laments the want of 'a co-operating naval chief,' mentions his 'strange conduct,' &c. When the General wanted him to escort troops to the Chesapeak, he was determined, it seems, to cruize off Nantucket, thus reminding us of what Shakespeare's Richard the Third says of his 'cold friends':

—'What do they in the North,
'When they should serve their sovereign in the West?'

The sailing of another convoy with stores, &c. he stopped, 'without assigning any reason,' &c. &c. A third, and perhaps principal, cause of failure was the want of a naval superiority, which Sir H. Clinton had reason to expect, and was promised by the minister. Thus, in one letter, he says, 'Sir Geo. Rodney will of course follow De Grasse hither:' in another, 'I learn, from the minister, that three battalions are to accompany Sir Geo. Rodney, in case De Grasse comes on this coast.' Instead of which, Sir George went home, and detached Sir Samuel Hood with only fourteen ships, and two battalions, one of them serving as marines. Had he followed De Grasse (as expected) with his whole force, the disgraceful affair off the Chesapeak, and the consequent surrender at York-Town, would probably have been prevented. Adm. Digby also was expected in force. Instead of which, he brought only three ships, and that not till Sept. 24.—The second sailing of the fleet too was strangely delayed. 'There is every reason,' says Sir Henry Clinton, 'to hope we start from hence *the 5th October*.' Afterwards, 'I have reason to hope, from the assurances given me by Admiral Graves, that we may pass the bar by *the 12th of October*.' Lord Cornwallis did not capitulate till *the 17th*. But the fleet did not sail till *the 19th*. Too mean an opinion of the American prowess seems also to have prejudiced the commander in chief. Thus he speaks of 'a small body of ill-armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia of the Southern provinces.' But Lord Cornwallis, who knew more of those provinces, aptly replies, 'The list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.' Other causes might be mentioned, independent of any misconduct in the Generals. And on the whole, of Earl Cornwallis, in whose sensibility, as a soldier and a man, we most sincerely sympathise, and of whose integrity and abilities we have a just opinion, we are disposed to say, with Virgil's Hector,

Si Pergama dextrâ
Defendi possent, etiam hâc defensa fuissent."

The ANSWER is also noticed in the Monthly Review March 1783 p. 266 as follows :—"From the tendency of Sir Henry Clinton's relation of facts, the appearance of an exculpatory state of transactions was naturally to be expected; the claim of which to the public attention, is now,

alas! merely on private considerations, that characters may, if possible, be fairly estimated. This answer consists of the chain of correspondence between the two Commanders, during the campaign referred to; which, as Lord Cornwallis has summed up the whole in his Introduction, is to shew, 'that our failure in North Carolina, was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part, that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded, that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief,—that I did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it,—that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order; and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief,—and that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas,—and consequently, that my conduct and opinions were not the cause of the catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.'

"So far from pretending to decide on the complicated circumstances of difference between these noble Commanders, we shall leave them to the judgment of their military Peers, with only this remark; that the vicissitudes attending the joint operation of detached armies, will frequently furnish occasions for ill-humour, that would never have discomposed their minds had their endeavours been crowned with success."

3. "OBSERVATIONS on some parts of the Answer of Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative. By Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. To which is added an Appendix; containing Extracts of Letters and other Papers, to which reference is necessary. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (Successor to Mr. Almon,) opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly. M.DCC.LXXXIII." 8*vo*. *Half-title, title, pp.*35 *&* 113 *and folding sheet "View of the Strength of the two Armies."* A reprint limited to 200 copies 8°, 75, 4°, and 25, f°, was issued by John Campbell, Philadelphia, 1866.

The Monthly Review April 1783 p. 362 contains this notice of the OBSERVATIONS:—"After much rejoinder, about the times of sending orders, receiving dispatches, producing and withholding letters, &c.

which the parties concerned will understand much better than any of their readers; Sir Henry Clinton repeats that Lord Cornwallis misconceived his orders and intentions; that 'it will appear from the correspondence, that his Lordship's discretionary powers were unlimited from the first moment of his taking charge of a separate command: and it will, I believe, be admitted, that his lordship acted in most cases as if he considered them as such.' Upon this ground, Sir Henry declares, 'I will frankly own that I ever disapproved of an attempt to conquer Virginia, before the Carolinas were absolutely restored. However, when I saw that Lord Cornwallis had forced himself upon me in that province, I left him at liberty to act there as he judged best.' He closes these observations with the following paragraph: 'I shall now beg leave to conclude with an opinion, which I presume is deducible from the foregoing (I trust candid) review of circumstances: which is, that Lord Cornwallis's conduct and opinions, if they were not the immediate causes, may be adjudged to have at least contributed to bring on the fatal catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.'

"It is to be hoped, an altercation, from which the Public have nothing to hope, will not be any longer continued."

The Gentleman's Magazine April 1783 p. 334 says of the OBSERVATIONS:—"The former publications of these brave but unsuccessful warriors were reviewed by us in pp. 147 and 155. In this Sir H. Clinton complains of three of his letters being with-held from the House of Lords and the publick, whilst those to which they were answers were long suffered to operate to his prejudice, and also of the publication of his *secret and most private letter* to Gen. Phillips, dated April 30. The want of co-operation, which Lord Cornwallis experienced from the Loyalists after the victory of Guildford, Sir Henry attributes to their past sufferings and disappointments, and to 'the melancholy scene his Lordship's camp, *encumbered with a long train of sick and wounded*, exhibited to their view.' Lord C's 'next object,' he thinks, 'should have been *to secure South Carolina*.' And this, he says, was his Lordship's own opinion, expressed in a letter of Dec. 12, 1780. In consequence, Sir Henry reprobates the march to Wilmington from Cross Creek, when Camden and South Carolina were so much nearer; and even, when at Wilmington, the not retiring to Charles-Town, by Lockwood's Folly and the Waggamaw, which, he insists was practicable. And thus, he adds, Lord C. 'would have saved South Carolina, and avoided the fatal catastrophe in the Chesapeak.' Lord C's occupying York and Gloucester, it is also here asserted, 'was entirely at his own motion and choice,' and not justified by his instructions.—We shall wave entering farther into this now fruitless and unavailing controversy, than to add, that Sir H. Clinton's deduction from the whole is, 'that Lord Cornwallis's conduct and opinions, if they were not the immediate causes, may be 'adjudged to have at least contributed to bring on the fatal

'catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781;' and to observe, that nothing is more easy, and at the same time more fallacious, than opinions formed by or from events."

4. "CORRESPONDENCE between His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis." [New York 1781] 8*vo. pp.* 70. *In some copies a leaf is inserted between pages* 54 *and* 55 *and in some copies pages* 71 *to* 76 *are added by insertion.* This CORRESPONDENCE has no imprint. Copies of it are in several Libraries, but I find no notices or reviews.

5. "A REPLY to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative. Wherein his numerous errors are pointed out, and the conduct of Lord Cornwallis fully vindicated from all aspersion: including the whole of the Public and Secret Correspondence, between Lord George Germain, Sir Henry Clinton, and his Lordship; as also Intercepted Letters from General Washington. Audi alteram partem . . Non fumum vendo, nec fucum facio. London: Printed for R. Faulder, New Bond Street, and J. Debrett, Piccadilly. MDCCLXXXIII." 8*vo pp.* 109. [Signed at p. 61 "Themistocles," and so catalogued in the British Museum.] The authorship appears to be unknown; it was certainly unknown to Sir H. Clinton, as evinced by his annotations. A second edition was issued in 1783.

The Monthly Review February 1783 p. 183 thus notices the REPLY:—"In this anonymous Reply, Lord Cornwallis is vindicated from the misconception of orders, and discretionary conduct, stated in Sir Henry Clinton's narrative; and Sir Henry is charged with holding out delusive promises of succour to his Lordship. It is not always easy, after reading both sides, in such complicated transactions, clearly to determine where the blame rests; but it is easy to see who is best acquainted with decency; and we cannot avoid remarking, that Sir H. C. relates his story in a plain modest stile, that gives dignity to his narrative: whereas every page in this reply is debased with such illiberal epithets and sarcastic turns of expression, as (whatever may be the concealed writer's intentions) are very far from doing any service to the cause he has undertaken."

6. "A PARTING WORD; or, a Summary Review of the Controversy between Sir Henry Clinton and

Earl Cornwallis. Occasioned by the Observations lately published by that Gentleman on his Lordship's Answer. London: Printed for R. Faulder, New Bond Street; and J. Bew, Pater-noster Row. MDCCLXXXIII." *8vo.*

I have not been able to find another copy of this pamphlet in any Library, or any mention of it. It is here reprinted from the Copy in the Library of the Department of State at Washington.

In these six pamphlets and their appendixes there are altogether 183 letters printed entirely or partially. Many are repeated fully or in extracts in two or more of the six pamphlets: and some of them, complete or in excerpts, are printed in one or more of the following three books, all of which contain many and copious Manuscript Notes by Sir Henry Clinton hitherto unpublished:—

7. "CORRESPONDANCE du Lord G. GERMAIN, avec Les Généraux Clinton, Cornwallis & les Amiraux dans la Station de l'Amérique, avec plusieurs lettres interceptées du Général Washington, du Marquis de la Fayette & de M. de Barras, chef d'Escadre. Traduit de l'Anglois sur les originaux publiés par ordre de la Chambre des Pairs. Je ne sais où je vais; humains, faibles humains, Réglons-nous notre sort? Est-il entre nos mains? Irene de Voltaire. Londres et Versailles, chez Poinçot, 1784." *Sm. 8vo. pp. xvi. and* 304; *two folding tables.*

These papers were never published by order of the House of Lords as stated on the title-page. The active and intelligent collector of Secret Intelligence for France was so ingenious as to get access to and to copy, translate, and print many of the papers laid on the Table of the House of Lords. This book was probably printed by our Allies, the French, in 1782 to influence the Peace Negotiations going on in Paris. It is not in the Library of Parliament, nor was I able to find a copy in any Library in London till one was very recently procured by the British Museum. Several

Libraries in America possess it. The State Library of Berne has it. The copy containing Manuscript Notes by Clinton, now in the Library of the Department of State at Washington, has the above imprint, and a portrait of Washington; others bear the imprint Berne, Chez la Nouvelle Société Typographique, 1782.

8. "A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America. By Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, Commandant of the late British Legion. London: Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand. MDCCLXXXVII." *Quarto. Title, Contents, pp. viii. and* 518. *With Maps and Plans.*

Colonel Tarleton in his 'Campaigns' lays the blame on Lord Cornwallis, who in a letter to the Bishop of Lichfield, dated Calcutta, Dec. 12, 1787, says with reference to that work: "Tarleton's is a most malicious and false attack; he knew and approved the reasons for several of the measures which he now blames. My not sending relief to Colonel Ferguson, although he was positively ordered to retire, was entirely owing to Tarleton himself; he pleaded weakness from the remains of a fever, and refused to make the attempt, although I used the most earnest entreaties; I mention this as a proof, amongst many others, of his candour."

9. "Observations on Mr. Stedman's History of the American War. By Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. London: Printed for J. Debrett, opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly, 1794." *Quarto. Title. Observations pp.* 1 *to* 34. *The title (reverse blank) and pages* 33 *and* 34 *form the wrapper to eight quarto sheets pp.* 1 *to* 32. *Some copies were issued with a two page Preface, i. and ii., inserted with wafers. Fifty copies were privately reprinted by F. S. Hoffman for presentation, Philadelphia* 1864, 4°.

This Preface reads:—"It has been a fashion with many (owing to what cause I will not pretend to say) to declare, that in losing America, we have neither lost commerce, military character, or consequence. Tho' I had differed in opinion respecting all these, I know full well that until this country felt some dire misfortune, in consequence of the loss of that, I should meet with few advocates for my opinion. Alas! has not that dire misfortune now befallen us? Notwithstanding the zealous, officer-like, and successful exertions of our land and sea chiefs, and their gallant navies and armies, these last are reduced

by sickness to a debility the more alarming, as it cannot, I fear, diminish, but must increase. Had we possessed the continent of America, our fleets and armies might have retired to its ports during the hurricanes and sickly season, attended to their sick, recovered and recruited both navy and army, and returned to the West-Indies with the means of further exertion. Where have we now a healthy safe port? Halifax is almost as far as Europe; while in the American ports the tri-coloured flag flies triumphant, and scarcely a British ship is to be seen except as capture. If appearances are so unpromising now we are said to be in alliance with America, how it will happen, should we unfortunately add them to the number of our enemies, I need not predict. Altho' I had received my Sovereign's fullest approbation of my conduct during that American war, as will appear by my correspondence with His Ministers, contained in my narrative, &c. published in 1783, and in the following pamphlet, yet, considering every person employed in so important a command as accountable at all times for their conduct, I conceive myself called upon by a recent publication, which has misstated material facts, whether from error, or a desire of courting a late Governor General of India,* I will not pretend to determine; but at a time when my services were actually called for, and these more than insinuations may make an impression on the public, it is my duty to refute them; I therefore submit the following observations on Mr. Stedman's History of the American War, to the candid and impartial public, who will, no doubt, give me credit for my forbearance in not troubling them on such a subject until forced into it by an unprovoked attack. H. C."

I have reproduced the pamphlets in their present order because I think Sir Henry Clinton used them in this order in making his MS. notes; and it was more convenient to begin with the Narrative.

If arranged chronologically the contents of these two volumes would have run:—

Correspondence (New York, Dec., 1781).		vol i.	133
Lords' Journals, Feb. and March, 1782.		ii.	251
Correspondance du Ld.G.Germain, 1782.		ii.	301
Narrative	January 1783	i.	1
Reply	1783	i.	137
Answer	1783	i.	59
Observations	1783	i.	95
Parting Word	1783	i.	173
Chronological Correspondence	vol i. 207 to	ii.	250
Catalogue of Additional Correspondence		ii.	321

* *Some copies read* courting the Marquis of Cornwallis on his return from India, *and others* courting A Govr General on his return from India. B.F.S.

In the next place, an account must be given of the copious Manuscript Notes made by Sir Henry Clinton in various copies of the above-mentioned publications. Between 1783 and his death in 1795 he thus annotated no fewer than eighteen copies of the Narrative; four of the Answer; six of the Observations; eleven of the Correspondence; nine of the Observations on Stedman; and one copy each of the Reply, Parting Word, Tarleton, and the surreptitious French translation of the papers laid before the House of Lords. The same note is often found in several copies of the same pamphlet, and in other pamphlets. Sir Henry would appear to have lent these copies to persons interested in the Controversy; for on the half-title of the copy of the Narrative which I have called the fifth, and marked e, is written "With S. H. Clinton's Compliments to Capt. Duncan this is the best Noted Narrative, June '86;" and other copies appear to have been lent to Gen. McLean, Major Taylor, and Colonel Goate. It is possible that other annotated copies may have been lent, and not returned: but this collection contains all that came to light at the sale of Sir Henry Clinton's library. All these were purchased by the Department of State at Washington, where they now are.

It will be seen that it can have been no easy matter to present in a clear and intelligible form documents characterised by such repetition and intricacy. I have now to explain the steps which I have adopted to this end.

I have collected and collated all of Clinton's Manuscript Notes in the several copies of the six Controversial Pamphlets, and I have added such of his Notes from the French translation of the House of Lords papers, and from Tarleton, and Observations on Stedman, as were made on any of the 183 letters that are in the six pamphlets.

I have arbitrarily called the several copies of the Narrative a b c d e etc., and the same with the other

pamphlets; and I have printed Clinton's Manuscript Notes in double columns, and have numbered the notes on each page for convenience in reference.

I have added to the number of the note the indicating letter of the pamphlet that contains it.

When the same Manuscript Note is found in several copies of any pamphlet I have indicated which of the several copies a b c d e etc. contain it by adding the arbitrary letters to the number of the note. Thus note 5 on page 7, "Lord C's going to India," is written in the eleven copies of the Narrative called c f i k l n o p q r s.

In a few cases it has been convenient to use the plus + mark in the pica text in conjunction with the arbitrary letter calling for the first book, and to set out only in the note all the copies containing the same note, as on page 8, note 10 f+ in the pica text and 10 f i k l m n o p q r s in the note.

I have carefully followed 'copy,' but in my reprint I have inserted head lines throughout the book, the pagination of the original pamphlets in square brackets, and I have interpolated superior figures and letters calling for Clinton's Manuscript Notes, which are always printed in two columns in bourgeois.

When the text calls for foot notes with * † ‡ &c, such foot notes are printed across the page and come from the original pamphlets, but the words in italics are modifications by me. For instance, on page 9 the asterisk in the original edition calls for extracts of letters which I have printed in full in the Chronological Correspondence.

The limits of the extracts are indicated where the letter itself is printed.

There were tables of errata in some of the pamphlets: I have everywhere followed 'copy' as corrected by such errata.

There were six editions of the Narrative issued in 1783 and a seventh edition in 1785, and perhaps more than the editions already indicated of some of the

other pamphlets; hence there may be variations in the text that I have not noted.

In the Appendixes to the Narrative, to the Answer, to the Observations and the Reply, and in the Correspondence and the French translation of the Lords papers, and sometimes elsewhere, I have given the heading of the document as it is in the original edition, and at the end of each title I have stated in italics where the letter is here printed.

I have put the pagination of the original pamphlets in square brackets in these title headings, for greater convenience in referring to them.

I have in this manner preserved the sequence of the pamphlets, and wherever the same letters are printed in two or more of them I have, by putting all the correspondence into one chronological arrangement, avoided the necessity of printing any letter twice. At the end of each letter I have given full particulars of duplicates &c.

The next division of this compilation consists of the Chronological Correspondence, comprising the 183 letters in the six pamphlets, completed, where possible, from the original manuscripts existing in the public and private archives already referred to. I have carefully included the very numerous and sometimes extensive portions omitted in the pamphlets, and have indicated all additions. I have also indicated the pamphlet or pamphlets in which each letter occurs, and the text which I have followed. It has not been thought necessary to reprint the numerous duplicates *in extenso*, but all variations have been carefully noted in the margins; and I have given the endorsements and other memoranda found on the manuscripts. Clinton's Manuscript Notes on each of the 183 letters in the six pamphlets and the other volumes annotated by him, are here repeated in conjunction with the letter itself.

The Supplement consists of :—

I. Full extracts from the Journals of the House of Lords from November 1781 to March 1782, in so far as

they relate to the operations of Clinton and Cornwallis, vol. ii. p. 251.

II. The preface, in the original French text with an English translation, of the very rare book "Correspondance du Lord G. Germain," together with the headings of the documents published in it, vol. ii. p. 301. This, it will be recollected, is a spurious publication in so far as it professes to translate documents published by authority of the House of Lords, the House having authorised no such publication, and the statement to the contrary on the title page is a deliberate untruth. The documents themselves are, nevertheless, perfectly genuine. Copies would seem to have been obtained by some agent of the French Government in England.

III. Catalogue of Additional Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 321.

As above stated, the Chronological Correspondence between Clinton and Cornwallis in the six pamphlets contains 183 letters. Some are covering letters without their enclosures, and some are enclosures without their covering letters. These letters are distributed as follows through the several pamphlets.—The NARRATIVE Appendix contains Clinton's Correspondence with Lord George Germain, Earl Cornwallis, Rear Admiral Graves, &c. which is referred to in the Narrative. The ANSWER contains Correspondence between Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, K.B., Commander in Chief, and Lieut.-Gen. Earl Cornwallis:—Relative 1, to the Campaign in North Carolina; 2, to Earl Cornwallis's March into Virginia; 3, to the Operations in Virginia; 4, to occupying an Harbour for Line of Battle Ships; 5, to the Defence of York in Virginia; and 6, Letters from Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, delivered at New York a month after Earl Cornwallis's surrender. The OBSERVATIONS Appendix contains Extracts of Letters and other Papers to which reference is necessary. And the REPLY includes the whole of the Public and Secret Correspon-

dence between Lord George Germain, Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis, as also Intercepted Letters from General Washington.

The CORRESPONDENCE between Clinton and Cornwallis, privately printed New York 1781, seems to suggest that the entire Correspondence was then given; the NARRATIVE and OBSERVATIONS are stated to contain the Correspondence to which reference is necessary; the ANSWER seems to cover a much wider field; and the REPLY definitely states that it includes the whole Correspondence, &c. *Notwithstanding these statements I have found in the European Archives, in the course of my search for the original manuscripts of the* 183 *letters printed in the six pamphlets, about* 3456 *additional letters to and from Clinton and to and from Cornwallis with enclosures, during the years* 1780 *and* 1781. All these papers more or less touch on the subject of the Controversy, and all bear on affairs in America.

The Catalogue of this Additional Correspondence forms part of the Supplement. I have attempted to include in this Catalogue all letters written by Clinton or Cornwallis and all letters written to either of them in 1780 and 1781 with all enclosures and sub-enclosures so as to chronologically indicate the information and papers in the possession of the respective authors.

In cataloguing the letters I have stated where each of them is to be found, and if printed where printed. The value of this mass of historical information, now for the first time made accessible to the student, must be obvious.

The contents of this Compilation and Supplement afford materials to assist in tracing the true origin of, and the growth and development of the strained relations between Clinton and Cornwallis in this Controversy, and to define the real responsibilities of each of them and of the Ministers.

Earl Cornwallis, in writing to Lord Rawdon from

Portsmouth, Virginia, 23 July 1781, had said "C. is determined to throw all blame on me."

Cornwallis arrived at New York 19 Nov. 1781, and met Clinton. The discussions were principally on:— 1, the policy of the March into Virginia ; 2, on whom rested the responsibility of the Chesapeake affair ; and 3, on the alleged promises to Cornwallis of succour.

Cornwallis sailed from New York for England, 15 December 1781, on the 'Robust,' 3rd rate, 74 guns, 600 men, Capt. Phs. Cosby, convoying a fleet of 120 merchantmen. On Dec. 25 the Robust sprang a leak, and made for the West Indies.

The Log of the Robust says: "Thursday 27 Dec. fresh gales and hazey, made the Sig^{l} to bear up and bore up and made the Greyhounds Sig^{l} to follow us . . . pumps constantly going . . . 28 Dec. (a.m.), left the Ship to Go on b^{d} the Greyhound Lord Cornwallis. . . . cheer'd him. . . . Bearings at Noon, Bermudas 61° W, Dist. 113 Leagues."

General Benedict Arnold accompanied Cornwallis, and took charge of Clinton's dispatches to Lord George Germain. It is curious to note parenthetically that the 'Greyhound' was chased by a French privateer and obliged to run into Penzance, so escaping capture by our allies, the French.

Luzerne, the French Ambassador at Philadelphia, wrote 9 Jan. 1782 to Castries, Minister of Marine, that a Merchant fleet of 150 sail set out from New York the 15th of last month, "it will probably arrive in Europe before this letter. A part of the vessels return in ballast according to custom, the remainder are laden with tobacco and merchandise from the islands, taken from prizes. A considerable number of Americans, partisans of England, have taken this opportunity of going over, the success in the Chesapeake having deprived them of the hope of recovering their confiscated possessions, and of being re-established in their own country by the superiority of the English arms. This fleet is convoyed by the Robust

of 74 guns and two frigates. The Robust is in such a bad condition that it has been necessary to take out all the guns but 12."

Castries, Paris, 24 Jan. 82, wrote to Hector, Intendant de la Marine at Brest:—"It appears that the Convoy from N. York, escorted by the Robust has been dispersed off the English coast, it is unfortunate that we were not able to profit by it."

Isaac Corry, London, 22 Jan. 1782, wrote to Rt. Hon. William Eden:—"Lord George is not yet formally disembarassed of his office, but the thing is to happen: he seems to cut not over graciously, & I believe it will appear that the King thinks so: Carleton it is concluded will immediately go out to America: Lord Cornwallis is expected to arrive this morning in town, & it is said will further as much as in his power an enquiry into the plann & the conduct of the southern campaign, in the former of which he was not consulted—Sir Henry Clinton is hardly spoken of—Lord Cornwallis very highly reported by Dundass, Tarleton, Lake, the post at Yorktown seems to have been in opposition to Lord C's opinions."

Two copies of the CORRESPONDENCE between Clinton and Cornwallis, vol. i. 133, privately printed in America, were sent to the Right Hon. William Eden, at that time chief Secretary in Ireland.

Clinton, New York, 7 Dec. 1781, wrote to Eden:—"You will have heard of our Misfortune in Chesapeak. . . I send you two pamphlets the CORRESPONDENCE with L.C. . . we are most unfortunate! what can our Country now do? Can you replace the Veteran army we have lost, where are your allies? the American M——rs Conduct has been most unaccountable, his treatment of me without example. Why did they not at first permit me to resign to L. C——s? They drove me to the wall by instructions, & every sort of ill treatment, till June, & in July the tone was altered, without my being able to account for the one or the other. I was too

late, & I was forced to the necessity of concluding my letter when I was starting to attempt to succour L.C. with telling the M——r I should if I succeeded resign the command to his Lordship. I should have done so in June had I not reduced this place (at that time threatned with a siege) to a garrison very feeble indeed, nor have I ever repeated my wish to resign, for tis probable long before I could obtain leave, we shall have met our fates, good or bad. . . . I doubt you being able to read my scrawl, perhaps tis well you do not, *car je parle un peu trop a cœur ouvert.*"

The distribution of this CORRESPONDENCE by Sir Henry Clinton presumably induced Earl Cornwallis and his attached friend Lord George Germain to urge a general enquiry in the House of Lords.

The House of Lords, 7 Feb. 1782, resolved "to enquire into the causes of the great Loss which the Nation has sustained by the Surrender of the whole Army under the Command of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis at York Town and Gloucester, in the Province of Virginia, as Prisoners of War."

In February the House ordered to be laid on its table and referred to the Committee of the whole House Copies or Extracts of all Instructions or Orders from any of His Majesty's Ministers to Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis in the Years 1780 and 1781; all Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and the Earl Cornwallis, touching the Operations of the Army under the Command of the Earl Cornwallis, and particularly relative to his Lordship's taking Post at York Town and Gloucester, his remaining and fortifying himself there, and the Expectation of Relief; all Instructions and Orders from the Admiralty to Admirals Rodney, Parker, Graves and Arbuthnot, touching the Reinforcements intended to be sent to the Fleet in North America in 1781; all Correspondence between any of the Generals or Admirals employed in North America or the West Indies and any of His Majesty's

Ministers and the Secretary of the Admiralty touching the giving succour to the Army under the Earl Cornwallis 1781 ; a State of the different Corps employed under Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis in 1781 ; and other papers.

The Committee of the whole House was in Session on February 27 and 28 and on March 1, 4 and 6.

As the proceedings are frequently referred to in this Controversy and in Clinton's Notes, I have for ready reference given full Extracts from the Journals of the House of Lords of all particulars bearing upon this subject, vol. ii. 251.

The Right Hon. Welbore Ellis was, 11 Feb. 1782, appointed Secretary of State for American Affairs *vice* Lord George Germain, who was on that day created Viscount Sackville of Drayton and Baron Bolebrook. Viscount Sackville took the Oaths, 12 Feb., and was placed on the lower end of the Viscounts' Bench. Lieutenant General Sir Guy Carleton was appointed to succeed Sir Henry Clinton, as Commander-in-Chief, 23 Feb. 1782. He arrived at New York 5 May, and General Sir Henry Clinton left New York 13 May, arriving in London 14 June.

Sir Henry Clinton had temporarily turned the command over to Lieutenant-General Robertson, who acted as Commander-in-Chief until the arrival of Genl. Sir Guy Carleton.

On the 27th of March, 1782, Lord Shelburne became Secretary of State for Home, Irish, and Colonial Affairs, and relieved the Right Hon. Welbore Ellis. The separate office of Secretary of State for America was not again filled.

Cornwallis's reception at home was far better than usually falls to the lot of defeated generals. Neither the government nor the nation blamed him for the disaster that had overtaken his command: and in less than two years he was pressed to accept the office of Governor General of India, to which, after a year's delay, he in 1786 reluctantly consented. He returned

to England in 1793, was made lord-lieutenant of Ireland in 1798, was again appointed Governor General of India in 1805, and died the same year at Ghazapore. No public censure was passed on Clinton either, and, according to his own account, which is fully trustworthy, he had a very kind reception from the King. He was not, however, again employed in the field, nor did he receive any command until, on the death of Sir Robert Boyd, he was made Governor of Gibraltar, 2 July 1794 (gazetted 22), at a salary of £750 per annum, but remained in England until his death, 23 Dec. 1795. The Lieutenant Governor, Lt. Gen. Charles O'Hara, was on the same day appointed to succeed him, (gazetted 26).

The questions between Clinton and Cornwallis may be left to the determination of the readers of this collection, who are for the first time, provided with the most complete materials to be obtained. As regards their respective plans of campaign, it may be said that each was right from his own point of view. Clinton's was safe, and, so far as it went, successful: but it did not go far. Cornwallis was justified in his expressions to General Phillips: "If our plan is defensive, mixed with desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to steal tobacco." But his own bold and comprehensive plan could only succeed if undertaken with a much larger force than was at any time available, and its failure entailed the ruin of the British cause. The anonymous French editor of the "Correspondance du Lord G. Germain" seems to have judged fairly when he wrote: "L'un mettoit trop de lenteur dans l'exécution de ses plans, et l'autre trop de vivacité dans la poursuite des siens." We may agree with him that things would have gone differently "si le comte Cornwallis avoit eu le flegme de Sir Henri Clinton," or "si le chevalier Clinton avoit eu l'ardeur et l'activité du lord Cornwallis." Considering, how-

ever, that the obstacles to be encountered were fully as much moral as military, some may question his opinion that "si les Anglois avoient eu un Washington à la tête de leur armée, il y a longtemps qu'il ne seroit plus question de guerre sur le continent de l'Amérique."

In conclusion, I have to express my very great obligation to the authorities of the House of Lords, British Museum, Public Record Office, Royal Institution; of the bureaux des Affaires Etrangères, de la Marine, and de la Guerre, Paris; of the Spanish archives at Seville, Simancas, and Alcalá de Heńares; and of the Dutch archives at the Hague; to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Mrs. Stopford Sackville, Lord Auckland, Oscar Browning, Esq., M.A., and also to the Department of State at Washington, for the facilities and assistance accorded to me in my researches.

In the copious Index many biographical notices are given, and for some of the facts I thankfully acknowledge my indebtedness to Ross's Cornwallis (by courtesy of Mr. Murray), to the Westminster Abbey Registers and various biographical dictionaries; but the bulk of information has grown out of my own memoranda and indexes of American correspondence and documents in the European Archives.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN STEVENS.

1 January 1888.

NARRATIVE

OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

1e with S. H. Clintons Compts to Capt Duncan this is the best noted Narrative June 86.

2f Biron

3g For my old Friend Col Goat's Reading

4n Major Taylor, who is requested to return it when he has perused it as there are private notes in it. H. C.

5o Gen. McLean

6d Sir H. Clinton need only refer to Lord Cornwallis letter in his Reply to prove that his Lordship came into Virginia without S. H. Clintons approbation and advised solid operation there, pages 49. 51. S. H. C. narrative &c. 48. 49. L. C. Reply—the letters pages 8 & 10 S. H. Clinton's Narrative are prooffs that the admiral in the West Indies had been positively, and repeatedly ordered to follow de Grasse & cover those operations; & this is sufficient to prove that S. H. C. could be no ways responsible for the misfortunes of the Campaign 81. but S. H. C cannot content himself barely with proving He is not to blame, he thinks it a duty to point out who is.

7e Some short queries in consequence of the following fact.

The Rebels having put the fate o both Carolinas on that of C. Town, and a fortnight after its surrender L. Corns informed S. H. C. there was no longer opposition in S. Carolina, how came that province to be in the state it was at the close of Campn 81.

1st because his Lordship trusted the Militia by themselves without regular support by which that brave officer Ferguson & his corps was lost, all the Militia disheartened and disarmed, & the whole province thrown back in rebellion.

2dly because L. C. did not cooperate with Tarlton at Cowpens which he might have done by a very short march and if he had Morgan was lost at his passage of Catawba.

3dly because when at Croscreek in March 81 instead of falling back upon S. Carolina as he was directed and had promised he went to Wilmington, and afterwards into Virginia, contrary to the wishes of his Comr in chief, at the risk of Carolinas and Georgia (which nothing but Lord Rawdons gallantry & abilities saved for that moment) at the risk of all the corps concerned in the move, without a plan when he came there, & not chusing to follow that he found G. Phillips had been ordered to carry into execution. If it is necessary to explain how the fatal catastrophe of York Town was brought forward, informed me his post would be fortifyed after regular survey (and plans) in 6 weeks & when attacked in it 5 weeks and five days after, retires without firing a shot to Gloster which post had been surveyd or examined which was taken up in a hurry. after the french did arrrive in Septr and which was ill chosen, ill constructed, commanded, and infiladed & he was reduced to extremity in 7 days open trenches. if still another cause is wanted look for it page 193 to 197 incluve in L Cornwallis reply to my Narrative.

NARRATIVE

OF

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

RELATIVE TO HIS

CONDUCT

DURING

PART OF HIS COMMAND OF THE KING's TROOPS

IN

NORTH AMERICA;

Particularly to that which respects the unfortunate Issue of the Campaign in 1781.

WITH AN

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

COPIES and EXTRACTS of those Parts of his Correspondence

WITH

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN,

EARL CORNWALLIS,

REAR ADMIRAL GRAVES, &c.

Which are referred to therein.

LONDON:

Printed for J. DEBRETT, (successor to Mr. ALMON,) opposite Burlington-house, Piccadilly, 1783.

NARRATIVE

OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, &c.

BEING conscious, that during my command in North America, my whole conduct was actuated by the most ardent zeal for the King's service,[1h] and the interests of the public, I was exceedingly mortified, when I returned to England, after a service of seven years in that country, to find that erroneous opinions had gone forth respecting it; and that many persons had, in consequence, admitted impressions to my preju[2]duce. Anxious, therefore, to explain what had been misinterpreted or misrepresented, (as indeed might well be expected, from the publication of Lord C.'s letter of the 20th of October,[2ab.3d.4h.5c.6l.7k] without being accompanied

1h which His Maj's. ministers had repeatedly ackd

2ab Which Ld George Germain was requested to Publish but did not.

3d Which the Minister was requested to publish but did not

4h of 4 letters between L. Cornwallis and S. H. C. on the Subjt. of L. C. surrender at York Town those of L. C. they only were published

5c All Lord Cornwallis letters were read in the House of Lords, and none of mine either, to the Minister or His Lordship were produced, so that his letter of the 20th October containg insinuations and assertions not founded (the most material of whch he has acknowledged were not) but that letter was published without mine in answer.

6l which his Lordp had in his possession when he desired Lord Townsend to call in the house of Lords for his reply to it, to be read altho the mine to which it was an answer had not been read nor did his Lordship produce my answer to the minister after a letter which I sent to him in answer to that of the 20th of October of Lord Cornws altho I had requested it might be published.

7k Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th of October giving an

by my answer to it)[1m] I had proposed taking an opportunity, in the House of Commons, of saying a few words on such parts of my conduct as seemed not to be sufficiently understood: and I flatter myself I should have been able to make it appear, that I acted up to the utmost of my powers, from the beginning to the end of my command; and that none of the misfortunes of the very unfortunate campaign of 1781 can, with the smallest degree of justice, be imputed to me.

But I arrived here so late in the session, that I was advised to defer it; and it was judged that the gracious reception I had just met with from my Sovereign rendered an immediate explanation unnecessary.[2m·3b·4a·5c·6h·] I was [3] not, however, apprised to what degree the public prejudice had been excited against me[7a] else, I should probably have been induced to have taken an earlier opportunity of offering to Parliament what I have to say on the subject. But the late change in public affairs,[8a] furnishing so much more important matter for their deliberation, deprived me of the opportunity I thought I should have had: and, as by the present

account of the loss of York-Town was read in the House of Lords, while the letters I wrote in answer to it both to the Minister and Lord Cornwallis were not called for, but Lord Townsend strange as it may appear was desired by Lord Cornwallis, to call for his answer to those letters, to be read in the house of Lords.

1m which L G G. had been desired to publish & had not done.

2m the K— approved of my whole Conduct & told me "*all* my plans either had succeeded or would have succeeded."

3b His M. Expression was that all Sir H. Clintons Plans either had succeeded or would have succeeded.

4a who was pleased to approve my whole conduct and to say that "all my plans during that war either had or would have succeeded

5c who approved of my whole conduct, and told me that all my Plans during that war either had, or would have succeeded.

6h who had in the fullest manner approved of my conduct, and added that all my Plans either had or would have succeeded.

7a owing to misrepresentation.

8a the Peace

recess it is probable that I may not be able to execute my intentions before a late period, when perhaps[1b+] peculiar circumstances[2a.3bm.4d.5cfiklnopqrs.6h] might force me through delicacy to decline it, I beg leave to lay before the public the following plain Narrative, which will, I trust, remove prejudice and error.

I have much to regret that, when this business was discussed in the House of Lords last session of Parliament, the whole of my correspondence, with the late American Minister, Lieutenant General Earl Corn[4]wallis, and the Admirals commanding on the West-India and American stations, was not produced, or at least such parts thereof as, being necessary to explain my conduct, might have appeared consistently with state policy.[7m.8d.] Because the letters which com-

1bfhiklmnopqrs peculiar circumstances *underlined.*

2a Lord Cornwallis talked of for India

3bm Lord Cornwallis going to India which was expected every day.

4d Lord Cornwallis had offered himself to go to India.

5cfiklnopqrs Lord C's going to India

6h Lord C. was going to India.

7m Instead of which such parts only were introduced as gave his reasons for coming into Virginia contrary to my orders & his own promises and the unfortunate conclusion of that Campaign witht a line of mine on either subject.

8d The Minister knew there was blame somewhere that it lay between Lord Cornwallis for coming into Virginia contrary to any orders, or the Cabinet for approving of that Plan till *too late* or the Admiral S. G. Rodney for not following de Grasse as he had been ordered—he did not chuse to take his share of blame, nor did the Cabinet theirs—he did not chuse to blame L. Cornwallis, because He was on the spot to retort—nor S. G Rodney because his brilliant victory of the 12 April had made him too popular, altho he knew L C letter of the 20th Octr contained insinuations and assertions not founded in fact, he suffered it to go forth, without mine in answer depending on the old proverb qui les absens ont toujours tort ; not recollecting that on ne pouvent en donner a S. H. Clinton effectivement. if all those insinuations and assertions had been as well supported as they were ill-supported no blame ought to fall to S H C share. He was forced into Operations in Virgina. He pointed out the danger of them without a fleet to cover them. We were proposed one by Minister and Admiral he had it not but notwg

pose that correspondence, being written to the moment as events happened, are certainly the most faithful records of my actions and intentions; and are consequently the clearest, fairest, and most unexceptionable testimonies I can adduce in their support. I hope, therefore, I shall stand exculpated from the necessity of the case, for any impropriety there may be in my annexing to this letter such of them as I may judge most requisite for that purpose. Three of them indeed will, I presume, be found very material, (Appendix, No. IX.)[1ab] as they contain my answers and observations upon Lord Cornwallis's letters[2b] of the 20th of October and 2d of December on the subject of [5] the unfortunate conclusion of the last campaign in the Chesapeak;——[3c] which latter I am sorry to observe, were given to the public, while mine in answer[4c] were withheld from it;- - - [5ab] I hope without design.[6ab·7m·8h·]

Although I never dared promise myself that any exertions of mine, with my very reduced force (nearly one-third less than that of my predecessor) could bring the war[9ab] to a happy[10f+] conclusion;[11fiklnopqrs·12m] yet

did all that depended on him to succour L Cornwallis & relieve him from a Galére his own imprudence had embarked him in; if we consider this for a year we can say no more.

1ab Page 71

2b Both these letters were called for & read in the House of Lords, but neither of S. H. Clintons in answer.

3c [—] both

4c [answer] to them

5ab I hope *to* design *underlined.*

6ab But evidently with Design

7m But Sir clear with design

8h such letters as contained his Lordsps reasons for going into Virginia, for chusing York river in preference to James & *his* account of the Catastrophe of York Town were produced in the House of Lords by the then Minister but not one of S. H. C. in answer.

9ab While that of the Enemy was increased in Number & Discipline & afterwards assisted by a French Army, occasionally covered by a French Fleet.

10fiklmnopqrs conclusion *underlined.*

11fiklnopqrs While that of the Enemy was increased in number, discipline, assisted by a French Army & covered by a French fleet.

12m While that of the Enemy was encreased in Number Discipline assisted by a French Army & covered by a French Fleet occasionally.

I confess that the campaign of 1781 terminated very differently from what I once flattered myself it would; as may appear, by the subjoined extracts of letters, written in the beginning of that year,*[1c·2c·3g·4a] and

* *Extract Clinton to Cornwallis*, 5 *March* 1781, *see Letters pp* 331 *and* 341.
Extract Phillips to Clinton, 16 *April* 1781, *see Extract p* 407.

1c to Lord Cornwallis March 5th 81

2c This letter was delivered to Col. Balfour to be forwarded to Lord Cornwallis on the 6th April, but not sent for reasons the Col must explain. had his Lordship received this and others by the same conveyance he would not have marched into Virginia

3g This is one of the letters which were delivered to Col. Balfour on the 7th April but was not sent to Lord Cornwallis then at Wilmington had his Lordship received it He Certainly would not have marched into Virginia while there was a doubt whether a British or a French Fleet was in Chesapeak Bay.

4a All were convinced there was much Blame somewhere. Ministers did not chuse to blame Lord Cornwallis publickly for forcing Operations in Virginia lest Lord C. should retort on them who had *once* approved of it, and *ordered* me to adopt it, nor would they Both blame the admirals in the West Indies who had been *ordered* & had promised to cover it if necessary with his whole Fleet, lest He should retort on the Ministers in a manner His pamphlet *now* explains. They therefore, seem all agreed to publish L Cornwallis letter of the 20th Octr Cong both insns & assertions which He acknow himself since were unfounded witht any part of our correspondence to prove it, thus throwing responsibility on the absent man, who in fact *could* be no ways concern'd respecting opns, He had always objected to, as dangerous before we had recovered N. Carolina, or were certain of a covering Fleet — in a Climate the most unhealthy, and the worst season — in which He had not the means of subsistence, from whence He could not retire by land except under most serious losses — in which he could not remain in safety unless covered by a Fleet or a Place of arms till that Fleet should arrive; Operations that S. H. C. (as He had been ordered) did all in his power to support, to secure, by a well chosen station the admirals choice not in York River where L C placed himself but in James River, and to succour when in danger by embarking himself with 6000 men on board an inferior fleet (of 25 sail) to that of the Enemy of 37 sail of the line, nor was there notg a doubt in the naval chiefs, but that S. H Clinton would have joined & succoured L. C. had his Lordship defended his post, 6 days longer or the Fleet sailed six days sooner witht insulting the leaders understanding. I cannot therefore ask him whether any possible blame *can* lay at S H Clinton's door.

which were [6] transmitted to the Minister.[1c] I was led, however, into these hopes, more by the apparent distresses of the enemy than any material successes we had met with.[2bm·3d·4k]

The plan I had formed for the campaign of 1781, (upon the expectation[5a] of a[6m] rein[7]forcement from Europe—from the West-Indies—and from the Southward (after operation should cease in that quarter)[7a·8k·9d·10l] — added to what I might be able to spare at the time from the small force under my immediate command at New-York) was calculated to make a fair and solid effort in favour of our friends[11k·12m]—in a district[13a·14c] where I had some reason to believe they were numerous and hearty; and where I judged it might be made with little

1c by intercepted *decyphered* letters proving the French would not assist america beyond that Campaign, by other intercepted letters from Washington, to Congress, &c &c and others & from every symptom.

2bm or could in our reduced state expect

3d or that I with my reduced force could expect to meet with tho Washington in his letter to Congress in May 81 speaking of their distresses says "We are suffering more from the *remnant* of an Army than We did in their" &c &c.

4k or indeed could expect

5a promise

6m promised

7a L Cornwallis had implyed it in all his letters previous to his marching into Virginia.

8k all which were positively promised.

9d if reinforced to make such Effort, if not reinforced or till I was to remain on respectable defence, as at N. York having added the Chesapeak corps to such command from various causes that Campaign without effort would be the last of French assistance now too late the Cause and consequently of American resistance!

10l if reinforced as promised I intended to carry on operations on Delaware neck, if not reinforced or till I was, assembled my whole force at N. York defensible leaving only a small corps in Chesapeak in either case tis probable the Campaign 81 would have been the last of French assistance or of American resistance.

11k from Baltimore to Delaware neck beginning our operations with Philadelphia.

12m after in the M. words I had sent such ample reinforcements to L. C.

13a perfectly healthy.

14c Delawares Peninsula safe, healthy well stocked with provisions

danger, even from a temporary naval superiority of the enemy. This plan had been suggested to the Minister in the year 1780, and more particularly explained to him in 1781;[1ac·2abd·3b·4hl·5k] notwithstanding which a preference was[6l] given to another, (Appendix, No. I.)[7abdm] which[8abm] seemed to be[9ab] [8] forced (Appendix, No. II.)[10abd] upon me by Lord Cornwallis's quitting the Carolinas,[11l·12fiklmnopqrs·13fr] where I had left him in the command, and marching into Virginia; a measure, I must say, determined upon without my approbation, and very contrary to my wishes and intentions.[14ab·15d·16c·17l·18m·] The Minister directed[19c] me to support Lord Cornwallis and solid operation in Virginia; the danger of which, without a covering fleet, I had constantly represented to him. He repeatedly and positively promised me a covering fleet;*[20ab·21d] and when the [9][22m]

**Extracts from Lord George Germain's letters to Sir Henry Clinton: see Letters* 4 *April* 1781 *p* 379: 2 *May* 1781 *p* 464: 7 *July* 1781 ii. 42: 14 *July* 1781 ii. 69: 24 *July* 1781 ii. 91: 25 *September* 1781 ii. 161. [23b·24d·25h·]

1ac and approved

2abd Page 95

3b the Cabinet in most positive terms approved of this plan, till misled by L. C. this in April and May 81 they reject mine and *order* me to adopt L C's.

4hl And approved till May 1781

5k and was repeatedly approved till May 81

6l after

7abdm Page 49 N. 104.

8abm was

9ab seemed to be *run through.*

10abd Page 51.

11l & Charlston.

12fiklmnopqrs which I had ordered him & he had promised to consider as the principal object.

13fr Carolinas *underlined.*

14ab and were contrary to my orders & his own Promises.

15d & contrary to my Order which were not to make any move that could risk C. Town.

16c And as I have heard *since* it was done at a time Charles Town was open: (many of the old works thrown down, to replace them, by others) I must add it was done contrary to my Orders "to make no move that could risk C. Town."

17l the Minister forbid my withdrawing a man from thence, how could I then send him back.

18m all this he owns in his reply.

19c A Cabinet order it was.

20ab Vide Page 99. 105 & 108. Vide also Pages 93 & 94.

21d Pages 99. 105. 93. 64.

22m S. S. Hood

23b These are all letters from

Admiral[1a] arrived with the naval reinforcement from the West-Indies, he[2fiklmnopqrs·3b+·4abd] was clearly[5a]

the Minister to S. H. Clinton promising a covering Fleet.

24d These are letters from the Minister to Sr H. Clinton promising a covering Fleet.

25h This Pampt was written in terms of great moderation, S. H. C. meant only to say enough to induce L. Cornwallis to call for an Enquiry S H well knowing that on such enquiry it would appear that L. C. had frequently *disobeyed* his orders. that C. Balfour had neglected to send S. H. C. dispatches to Lord Cornwallis before he marched into Virginia, that those dispatches all but forbid L C going into Virginia, that L. C. repeatedly disobey'd S. H. C's orders while there, that he took York river in direct disobedience of S. H. C orders. that he had declared no diversion could be of any use to him, that the only way to succour him was to join him by sea in York river by forcing a superior Fleet, that there were many assertions in his official letter of the 20th Octr absolutely false. that I did not give him assurances of the exertions of the navy to succour him before the 29th Sepr; that I did *not* tell him the fleet *would* sail about the 5th Octr & that he had more than double the intrenching tools he said he had, that S. H. C had pointed out the danger of operation in Chesapeak without a *Covering Fleet*; and the extracts in the margin will clearly prove not only that S H C was promised a fleet, but that Lord Rodney a sufficient Fleet in the West Indies, but neglected to send one, & that we either had not one in time or L. C. did not defend his works till it arrived, that S. H. C had chosen the only mode by which Lord Cornwallis could be succoured; that he not only did all that depended on him to carry it into execution, but all that depended on him to strike at the Enemy Combid action before they were put in motion against him & there we des malheurs de la Campaigne 81 il se lave les mains. Party Zealots may have said that S. H. C. ought to have marched out of N. York in search of W. & prevented his going into Virginia had he had force sufficient & known the Enemys Fleet superior it possibly would have been the best Plan but having every reason to expect a covering Fleet, & having determined in consequence if W. should go there to follow him, & in which opinion L. Cornwallis had constantly declared himself under these circumstances to have engaged another would have been such an absurdity that the basest sycophant of Lord Cornwallis dared not have defended it, tho many of these Gentry before the above circumstances were known ignorant of my Force & the local effected to censure S. H. C. for not doing so.

1a Lord Hood.

2fiklmnopqrs read his Letter page 54.

3bdfiklmnpqr he *underlined.*

4abd Vide Page 53.

5a clearly *underlined.*

of [10] opinion himself, and of course convinced me, that he had brought that covering fleet. (Appendix, No. III.)[1abd] Therefore, as Admiral Graves's squadron was acknowledged to be superior to that under Monsieur de Barras, [11] I could not but suppose that the arrival of Admiral Digby (hourly expected) would give us a most decisive naval superiority.—And here, perhaps, it may not be improper to remark, that though the Minister directs me,[2abd] by his letters of the 2d of May, and 6th of June, to adopt solid operation in Virginia,[3fiklnopqrs.4m.5f+] he signifies to me his Majesty's approbation of my own plan,[6a] in a subsequent letter of the 14th of July,[7abdk] telling me at the same time,[8d] that "he has not the least doubt "Lord Cornwallis will have fully seen the reasonable-"ness of it, and has executed it with his wonted ardor, "intrepidity, and success."[9c.10frs.11i.12knpq.13l.14m.15o.]

1abd Page 53.

2abd Pages 49 & 51.

3fiklnopqrs which had been forced upon me by Lord Cornwallis.

4m which had been forced upon me by Lord Cornwallis coming there.

5fiklmnopqrs Virginia *underlined.*

6a This approbation I received alas too late.

7abdk Vide Page 9 & Page 18

8d Page 18.

9c "that admiral Arbuthnot "had at last been sent to ano-"ther command, and that it was "hoped *I* should receive this in-"formation in time to prevent "my resigning the command of "the Army to Lord Cornwallis" tis clear from this what his Majesty and ministers thought of the good Earl, and his Plan: in the most inimical Province—the most sickly, & at the worst of seasons, no retreat from it, no subsisting in it, & requiring a Fleet to cover it.

10frs tells me His Majesty has removed Adl Arbuthnot from the Command as I had requested and hopes I shall receive this Intelligence in time to *prevent* my resigning the Command to Lord Cornwallis Read Letters from Ld G. Germain to Sr H. C. Page 18 & 36.

11i Tells me His Majesty has removed the Admiral from the Command as I had requested, & hopes I shall receive this intelligence in time to *prevent* my resigning the command to Ld Cornwallis. Read Letters from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton Pages 18 & 36.

12knpq tells me His Majesty has removed from the Command as I had requested & hopes I shall receive this intelligence in time to *prevent* my resigning the Command to Ld Cornwallis.

Under these circumstances, and with these assurances, I never could have the most distant idea that Mr. Washington had the least hopes of a superior French fleet in the Chesapeak; and I consequently never could suppose that he would venture to go there.[1h·2a·3b·4g·] But if he should,[5b] I was satisfied from the reasons already [12] stated, that I should be able to meet him there with every advantage on

Read Letters from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton pages 18 & 36.

[13l] tells me His Majesty has removed Admiral Arbuthnot from the Command as I had requested and hopes I shall receive this intelligence in time to *prevent* my resigning the Command to Lord Cornwallis Read Letters from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, pages 18 & 36. As it was the Cabinet that gave first the preference to Lord Cornwallis Plan so it was that same Cabinet that afterwards approved of mine alas too late!

[14m] tells me His Majesty has removed old Admiral Arbuthnot from the Command as I had requested and hopes I shall receive this intelligence in time to prevent my resigning the Command to Lord Cornwallis! Read Letters from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton pages 18 & 36. all were in 3d person.

[15o] tells me His Majesty has removed old Admiral Arbuthnot as I had requested and hopes I shall receive this intelligence in time to prevent my resigning the Command to Lord Cornwallis Read Letters from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton, pages 18 & 36.

1h Lord C. opinion was very different he did not adopt it altho till he had recd my permission to follow his own if he had any, he ought in strictness to have adopted it.

2a I may appeal to him whether under such circumstances he would all his intercepted letters confirm this.

3b In short as all the Admirals and *all* the Generals agreed with me that the only way to succour L. Cornwallis was to join him by sea, & L Cornwallis repeatedly calls him to York River, S H Clinton could not with propriety have engaged in operations, that might have prevented or retarded that movement, if he could have done so, but the fact is had not 4000 to move with & therefore he would not if he could; but he could not if he would.

4g S H C had been promised as is seen a covering Fleet, and thought he had till long after Washington had marched for Virginia.

5b an Event which, so far from desiring to prevent, I most ardently wished under the assurances I had received of being supported by a decided naval superiority.

my side, by having the command of the waters of that bay—without which he could not possibly feed his army.[1b] This opinion has been also since confirmed by a letter from him to Count De Grasse,[2bd·3a·4ck] dated 26th of September 1781, (No. IV. Appendix) wherein he tells him, if he quits the Chesapeak, the enemy will certainly get possession of it, and he must disband his army.[5m]

Had my correspondence been produced, it would have appeared from it, and the returns accompanying it, that instead of seventeen, twenty, nay twenty-four thousand men, which it has been reported I had at New York (after the very ample reinforcements as the Minister acknowledges (No. V. Appendix)[6bd] which I had sent to the southward) I had not 12,000 effectives, and of these not above 9,300 fit for duty, regulars and provincials.[7c·8c·9a·10k] But had I had [13] twice that number, I do not know that, after leaving sufficient garrisons in the islands and posts

1b Consequently could not engage in operations which might have prevented a timely Embarkation of the Troops the moment the Fleet was ready to receive them,

2bd Page 53.

3a his letter

4ck read his letter to De Grasse Page 55.

5m so that S. H C would not certainly have to acquiesce in operations to prevent his doing what he under the promises he had of a covering fleet wished him to do, we thought he could have delayed particularly as by engaging in such operations he might be prevented from embarking on board the fleet & meeting W. in Virg. where L. C. called him & where all was of opinion he could do it to advantage.

6bd Page 6.

7c in July 81

8c 12th augt arrived 2500 Germn recruits.

9a Be it observed that since my return from the seige of Charles Town I had detatched to the Southward, to join or Cooperate with L. C. near 9000 men.

10k Lord Cornwallis reported on the 16th Sepr that the Enemy's Fleet were 37 of the line & he knew from me that we had only 21. I did not till the 23d receive his letter of the 16th. My troops were dispersed in the 3 Islands of N. York, Staten & Long Island, occupying near 60 miles, they were employed in throwing up defensive works, & in guarding those already raised, to have assembled these at Kingsbridge wantonly would have been unpardonable.

depending[1a] (which it is admitted by all[2d] would take 6000) I could, as has been insinuated, have prevented[3c] the junction between Mons. Rochambeau and General Washington, which was made in the highlands, at least 50 miles from me; or that I could have made any direct move against their army[4c] when joined (consisting then of at least 11,000 men, exclusive of militia, assembled on either side the Hudson) with any prospect of solid advantage from it. [5b]Or if I had as many reasons to believe that Mr. Washington would move his army into Virginia[6c] without[7k] a covering French fleet,[8k] as I had to think he would not;[9b.10ab] I could[11ab] not have prevented his passing the Hudson under cover of his forts at Verplanks and Stoney Points.[12b.13g] Nor (supposing I had boats properly

1a had that been practicable it surely must have hapned during S W. Howe's Command when He had in the Field 15000, and before the French had joined.

2d the Genls in Council.

3c absur'd

4c not less so

5b nor.

6c which after what S S Hood told me I could not suspect

7k without *underlined.*

8k and to be convinced I should have one all the Genls concurred with me in opinion that the only way to assist Lord Cornwallis was to join him in York River, His Lordship repeatedly said no diversion would be of use that the only way to succour him was to join him in York River, had I therefore been in force sufficient to have engaged in any other operation it would have been wrong to have done so, as it would have arrested, nay prevented a Plan which all approved, & which we waited only for the return of the Fleet (which till the 2nd of Sepr we supposed superior) to carry into execution.

9b could I not

10ab I *run through.*

11ab not *run through.*

12b after I knew of his Army being assembled on the West of that River.

13g The short Fact is that when I found Lord C. threatned by such a superior armament I consulted all the admirals and Generals and it was their unanimous opinion confirmed repeatedly by that of Lord Cornwallis that the only way to succour him was to embark on board the Fleet and attempt to join him in York River (which He had fixed as a naval Station and fortified) in preference to Old Point Comfort in James River which he had been directed to fortify, to have engaged in any other move that might have retarded this would have been absurd. S. H C of course would not have done it if He could, but he had not the means if he would have done it.

manned) would it have been adviseable to have landed at Elizabeth town,[1a] [14] in the face of works which he might easily have occupied (as they were only seven miles from his[2b] camp at Chatham)[3b·4k] without subjecting my army to be beat, *en detail.* Nor could I, when informed of his march towards the Delaware,[5ab] have passed an army in time to have made any impression upon him before he crossed that river.[6ab·] But with my reduced force, any attempt of the sort would have been madness and folly in the extreme. 7b·8b·9d·10c·11f·12k·

1a If in force to oppose would have met me at my landing if not in force to meet me might have reached the Delaware before I could have debarked at Elizabeth Town my army &c &c &c.

2b camp *underlined.*

3b Strong Camp behind the Pisaick River.

4k within a few miles of his middlebrook Camp, which S W. H. with 15000 thought too respectable to attack in 77.

5ab have *to* to *underlined.*

6ab not having the Means to do it.

7b Even if I had not expected a Superior Fleet to cover my Operations.

8b Lord Cornwallis seems to have been so well convinced of this from his own experience of what hap'ned to him in 76 that he uniformly said no diversion will be of use the only way to succour me is to join me by sea in York River.

9d In short under the promises I had of a covering Fleet, and from S S Hood that he had brought one, I would not have engaged in operations in Jersey to prevent Washington going Southward if I had been in force sufficient but the fact is I was not in force sufficient to have done so if I wished to have done so.

10c In short the Generals agreed unanimously that the only way to succour L. Cornwallis was to join him, & L. Corns repeatedly says "no diversion will be of "use the only way to succour "me is to join me" I would not therefore have engaged in any other if I could; but the Fact is I could not if I would.

11f for if I had taken out my whole force 9300 I appeal to those who know the country what chance I had against W. with 10,000 regulars at least & the Jersey Militia in a Country where from the nature of it scarcely any victory could be compleat, and where defeat would have been too much

12k In short I would not have attacked Washington if I could have done it; as my only motive must have been to prevent what I *could* have no idea he would attempt; but I could not (tis plain) attack him if I would have done it.

With what might possibly be spared from such a force, nothing could be attempted except against detachments from Mr. Washington's army,[1m·2h·3a] or (when reinforced in a small degree) against such of it's distant magazines as might occasionally happen to be unguarded. Two of the latter offered, one against Philadelphia, which I certainly should have attempted in July, had Lord Cornwallis spared me any part of 3000 men; but as his Lordship seemed to think he [15] could not hold the[4k] stations[5k] we[6c] both thought eligible,[7a·8b·9c·10d] if he spared me any part of the force with him, I was obliged to relinquish

1m all these reasons are totally unnecessary the short is S H. C. would not have engaged in operations in Jersey to prevent W. going to Virginia if he could & the fact is he had not the means if he would.

2h by all this detail is only meant to be proved that S H C would not have adopted any other Plan than that already determined on if he had had a force sufficient, but the fact is he had not that force if he had been inclined to have Employed it in Jersey. & therefore S H had always said respecting operations in Jersey and under promise of having a Covering Fleet He would not have engaged in it if he could but he could not if he would.

3a I do these annonymous writers too much honor to answer all these absurd insinuations.

4k stations *underlined.*

5k to garrison a *respectable* post, as Place d'armes and to cover large ships & sufficient also for desultory expeditions in the bay.

6c both *to* eligible *underlined.*

7a Lord Cornwallis & I had both thought well of York River tho I had always preferred James river as a station for large ships, and a place of Arms but when He quitted it, and the Admiral was of opinion a naval Station was absolutely necessary and named James river from his own knowledge & the Commodores, I ordered his Lordship to take that of Hampton road & fortify old point Comfort in James river to secure it, my L. C. disapproving of James river took that of York for which He became therefore responsible.

8b before I by desire of the Admiral directed him to fortify old Point Comfort in James River.

9c we both agreed a healthy Station as a Place of Arms, & to cover the navy, necessary; and by the advice of the Admiral I afterwards ordered Lord Cornwallis to fortify old point Comfort in James river covering a naval station of Hampton road in that river.

10d a healthy station to cover large ships.

this design. The other much more important, was against Rhode Island. I had discovered by intercepted letters from all the French Admirals and Generals, that Count Rochambeau's army had marched from Rhode Island to join Mr. Washington at the White Plains; that their battering train and stores for siege were left at Providence[1c·2d] under little more than a militia guard; and that their fleet remained in Rhode Island harbour with orders, as soon as repaired, to retire to Boston for security.[3c·] By private information, which I had at that time, I found also that the works at Rhode Island were in a great measure dismantled,[4c] and had only a few invalids and militia to guard them, and that they were both there and at Providence under great apprehensions of a visit from us. From[5b] other motives[6b] as well as my own knowledge of these posts, I had the strongest [16] reason to expect the fullest success to an attempt against them,[7a·8b·9m]

1c Contrary to Rochambeaus opinion

2d Much against Rochambeaus consent or opinion tis needless to mention particulars. Suffice that the fullest success might probably have been the consequence of a combined attempt of navy & army; Howitzers, Red shot &c from commanding heights, and against his train for siege at Providence. The Admiral till he discovered the defects of his Fleet had consented to go. S. H. C. was embarking with 3000 Elite to attempt all that depended on him.

3c their Fleet half manned and in bad order,

4c the works of Newport in general thrown down a few militia guarding what remained.

5b other motives *underlined.*

6b private Informn

7a greatly annoying the Fleet with Howitzers & red shot from commanding Heights and the Capture of their Heavy Artillery & Stores which would have effectually defeated all their future Designs.

8b No less than at least the annoying the Fleet with Howitzers & red shot from commanding Heights, and the Capture of their Heavy artillery & Stores, which would have effectually defeated all their future Designs, instead of anoying I might say destroying their Fleet at R. Island, all was ready the troops embark'd the admiral first consented and then discover'd two of his ships hors De Combat.

9m No less than the destruction of that Fleet & Capture of their Heavy Navl stores &c in that *all* that can be done by Howitzers & red shot from Comg heighths.

and I therefore immediately proposed to Admiral Graves a joint expedition for that purpose; which he readily consented to. It was accordingly agreed between us, that it should be undertaken as soon as he could assemble his fleet, and a small reinforcement (hourly expected) should arrive from Europe.[1a·2b·] The reinforcement joined me on the 11th of August, and the Admiral (who had sailed on a cruise) having returned to the coast on the 16th, I immediately renewed my[3k] proposal,[4k·5a·6c·7h·8o] (Appendix, No.

1a While there was the least probability of the Fleet and Army being able to attempt this Service, Sr H. Clinton would not have been justifiable in engaging in any other Operation which might have delayed it.

2b While there was the least probability of the Fleet & army being able to attempt this service, Sir H. Clinton would not have been justifiable in engaging in any other Operation which might have delayed it even had he had the means.

3k proposal *underlined.*

4k I found the admiral had assembled his Fleet, I offered myself the Instant he arrived. The admiral on his arrival informed he was ready but in answer to my letter telling him I was he told me two of his ships, *Robust & Alcide* wanted repairs. I still offered to go & attempt my part, asking only of the Admiral to mark the Harbour, with his line of battle while his frigates put me ashore but I heard no more Howitzers on very commanding heighths would have obliged *their* Fleet at 4 or 500 yds distance to have retired; Ours would have Entered the harbour, & joined in operation with the army commanding heighths on banks of R. Island channel, beyond which the E. Fleet could not retire safely.

5a I offered to attend him in Person with 3000 men at a moments warning.

6c The Admiral assembled his Fleet imply'd he was ready, on seeing him arrive I began to embark the troops & told him I was ready, He then examined his Fleet, & told me he could not go as two were disabled; as I asked nothing of the Admiral but to mark the Harbour while I landed with 3000 men having Howitz. & red shot to stir the Enemys Fleet, I offered still to go or risk 24 hours notice when he should be ready:

7h the short fact is the Admiral told S. H. C. he was ready. S. H. seeing him arrive, not only called upon him to proceed but embarked the troops, but the admiral on receipt of his letter examined the state of his fleet & informed as above that two were unfit to proceed.

8o The fact stands thus, when I heard on the 16th that the Admiral was returned, I ordered the troops to embark & wrote to propose that we two should go to

VI.)[1abd.2m.] The Admiral informed me in answer, that he was under the necessity of sending the Robuste to the yard to be refitted, and that he should take the opportunity while that was doing of shifting a mast or two in the Prudente ; and when those repairs were accomplished, he would give me timely notice, (Appendix, No. VII.)[3ab.] The ships were not ready on the 28th; Sir Samuel Hood, however, arriving [17] on that day, I immediately ordered the troops to be embarked; and going to the Admirals on Long Island, I proposed to them that the expedition should instantly take place: but receiving intelligence that evening that Monsieur De Barras had sailed on the 25th, it was of course stopped.[4m.] Thus, to the Admirals great mortification and my own, was lost an opportunity of making the most important attempt that had offered the whole war.[5fiklmnopqrs.6o.7d.8d.9k.]

R Island immediately. the Admiral wrote also to inform me he was arrived and ready; but letters crossed each other, but examining his fleet after he had received my letter, he informed me as above.

1abd Page 61.

2m It was so delicate the admiral on his return told me he was ready. before I received this letter I told him I was & called upon him; our letters crost & when he recd mine he answered back that two ships were hors de combat.

3ab Pages 62 & 63

4m in short till the 28th this of course would have stopt me & after I had heard L C. opinion & taken that of a council of war 16 Sep. of going to Virginia I certainly could not concur in anything wh might prevent my going there.

5fiklmnopqrs and while I had any hopes of carrying it into execution I could not have been justified in engaging in any other which might delay or prevent it.

6o I think I am not too sanguine when I say that fleet, if not totally destroyed, would have been hors de combat.

7d with S S Hood fleet in addition there could not be the least doubt of our having the fullest success.

8d & this Lord C in answer to my first letter wh every other was of the same opn & therefore to have engaged in any other operation that might have retarded or prevented my embarking when the Fleet was ready, would have been the height of folly, absurdity & misconduct.

9k tis my clear opinion founded on a very general one that If we could have sailed in time the French fleet & battering train at

Early in September, to my great surprise, (for I still considered our fleet as[1b] superior)[2b] hearing that Mr. Washington was decidedly marching to the southward, I called a council of all the general officers, who unanimously concurred with me in opinion,[3a·4b·5c·6b] that the only way to succour Earl Cornwallis was to go to him in the Chesapeak.[7h·]

Although I had every reason to disapprove of Earl Cornwallis's march into Virginia, without consulting me,[8a·9b] (at the risk of en[18]gaging me in dangerous operations, for which I was not prepared) [10a·11d] yet, as I supposed he acted with at least the approbation of the Minister,[12c] I left him as free as air, when he arrived there, to plan and execute according to his discretion ; — only recommending to him, in case he had none of his own, the plan [13fr·14f·15fiklmnopqrs] I had offered to the Minister ;[16b·17d]

Rhode Island and Providence would have been destroyed or taken

1b superior *underlined.*

2b from the assurances of the Admiral that it was.

3a in which Opinion Lord Cornwallis *uniformly* concurr'd.

4b and they fully approved.

5c and did so with the 17 or 18

6b read L. Cornwallis letters also page 197 and 204 Lord Cornwallis's Reply.

7h where Lord Corns had repeatedly called S. H Clinton saying no diversion could be of the least use that the only way to succour him was to join him in York river, & this even after He knew what S H. C did not know till the 23rd Sepr that the Enemy had 37 sail & we only 21.

8a nay contrary to my orders.

9b and even against orders.

10a In the most inimical Province, in the most sickly Province at the worst season — where he could not supply his army for any time, from whence he had no retreat, and where he could not remain in safety, unless protected by a Fleet, or by a respectable Place of arms till that Fleet should arrive.

11d had Constantly show'd my disapprobation of, proving by the ministers letter to me that this plan had his Majesty's approbation.

12c who had *Ordered* me to support him.

13fr plan *underlined.*

14f this plan Gen Phillips to whom L Corns succeeded had been directed to carry into execution.

15fiklmnopqrs the Minister not only approved but ordered me to support it extraordinary as that may seem.

16b viz. a Move to the Head of Chesapeak. &c &c.

17d One perfectly safe perfectly econonical.

which, notwithstanding the[1c] opinion given in the letter[2d] of July 14, before quoted,* I did not, however, find his Lordship the least inclined to [19] adopt.[3i.4k.5b.] And that letter, which I did not receive till[6bd] September, found me deeply[7c] and dangerously engaged in the operation he had forced me into.

And here, perhaps, it may be proper to give the reasons which induced me to recom[20]mend to Lord Cornwallis to secure a naval station for large ships, if one could be found that was capable of being fortified and maintained against a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea, agreeable to the instructions which I had before given to General Phillips, and which were of course to be now considered as such to his Lordship, (Appendix, No. X.) [8bd.]

Although I ought not to have apprehended that the enemy could have had a superiority at sea, after the assurances I had received from[9i] the Minister, [10bm.11k.12i] I yet always wished to guard against even a

**Extract Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, 14 July 1781, see Letter* ii. 69.

1c Minister's

2d I give only that part of the Letter I thought necessary.

3i and after approves of my Plan (alas too late!) as appears by following extract.

4k and not to take a single man from thence till Virginia was conquered.

5b It may however occur, that having no Plan of his own, it became his Lordship's Duty at least to try this, for which everything was prepared on the Side of the Commander in chief and if his Lordship had done so, the French naval Superiority would not have been so fatal as it afterwards proved. His Lordship would have found plenty of Provisions on the Delaware in Philadelphia, for from there Washington subsisted in great measure; and even if the Enemys *Fleet* had been superior in both bays a thing utterly impossible, He might have lived till the Fleet should be forcd to retire or I could have joined him from N. York.

6bd September *run through and* October *substituted.*

7c deeply *underlined.*

8bd Pages 93 & 94

9i from the Minister *underlined.*

10bm the Admiral &c

11k S G Rodney and S S Hood

12i read Extracts Pages 8, 9, and 10.

possibility[1am] of it.[2d] Finding, therefore, by Lord Cornwallis's letters, that on his arrival in the Chesapeak, he had no plan of his own to propose,[3c·4g] and that he did not incline to follow the one I had offered to his consideration,[5b·6a·7g] I recommended the taking a respectable defensive station[8f·9iklmnopqrs] either at Williamsburg, or York[10b] (the latter of which his [21] Lordship had informed me in a letter, dated 26th of May, he was inclined, from the reports which had been made to him, to[11c] think well of as a naval station and place of arms)[12i] and left his Lordship at liberty to keep all the troops he had in Virginia, (amounting to about seven thousand men). But thinking that he might well spare three thousand; I desired he would keep all that were necessary for a respectable[13a] defensive, and desultory water movements, and send me[14c] of three thousand men all he could.[15bm·16b] His Lordship[17a] misconceiving[18a] my in-

1am possibility *underlined.*

2d & which was at last approved by the King, alas too late!!

3c at that season

4g at that advanced season in such a climate

5b G. Phillips had been ordered to follow it. Surely L. Cornwallis being in his place should have considered it as an order also.

6a and which the minister had at last approved, alas too late.

7g and which the Corps he joined in Chesapeak had been ordered to carry into execution.

8f When L. Cornwallis came into Virginia I left him to his own plan finding he had none to propose, I referred him to that I had ordered G. Phillips to pursue but as he did not approve of that I desired him to take a *respectable* defensive Station telling him what sort of attack he might expect in the hurricane season.

9iklmnopqrs When Lord Cornwallis came into Virginia I left him to his own Plan finding he had none to propose I referred him to that I had *ordered* Genl Phillips to pursue but as he did not approve of that I desired him to take a *respectable* defensive Station.

10b The Heights of which had been always represented as very defensible.

11c think well *underlined.*

12i which his Lordship as well as every other Person must have thought quite necessary.

13a preparing him for De Grasse's arrival with troops.

14c of three thousand *underlined.*

15bm spare

16b I positively assert, and the Correspondence proves it, that his Lordship never *received* any call of mine for 3000 men but only such part as he could spare from

tentions[1c] (as will, I trust, be manifest to whoever reads our correspondence) and considering my call for three thousand men as[2a] unconditional, tells me that he could not with the remainder keep York and Gloucester; and that he should, therefore, repass James-river and go to the station at Portsmouth. Which resolution (I confess) surprised me, [22] as he had a litle before, in the letter above quoted, represented that post as unhealthy, and requiring an army to defend it.[3a] On receipt of his Lordship's letter, I immediately consulted the Admiral, who was of of opinion, that a naval station for large ships was absolutely necessary, and recommended Hampton-road.[4acd·5bm·6d·7c] Therefore in my letter of the 11th July,[8h] I[9i] directed[10i] his Lordship to examine and fortify[11b] Old Point Comfort,[12h·13b·14d·15k] which the Admiral and I thought

the above services before he passed the James River 5th July 81.

17a misconceiving *underlined.*

18a as those who had will see.

1c my orders

2a unconditional *underlined.*

3a it seems it could not have been much more unhealthy than that he finally chose in preference, and it would have had this advantage that he might at all times have retired over the roanoke or by Albemarle sound, had he not stopt the building of boats (which I had *ordered*) owing to his mistaken oeconomy. N. B. we have suffered so much & so often from this sort of mistaken oeconomy that I dread the word in War. the best oeconomy in every war is to finish it as soon as you can.

4acd In James River

5bm Declaring that the Fleet had better winter in Europe than at Halifax.

6d declaring that the Fleet had better go to Europe than to Halifax

7c the first and *only* order I ever gave his Lordp to secure a Station for large ships.

8h The first order I gave L Cornwallis to occupy a place of arms covering a Station for line of battle ships was that of July 11th

9i directed *underlined.*

10i and as Genl Leslie had informed me ordered him to prepare privately to abandon on that very account

11b Old Point Comfort *underlined.*

12h in James River

13b which is the only Post his Lordship had positive Orders to occupy

14d Which is the only Post his Lordship had My Orders to occupy

15k the first & only *order* I ever gave him to take a Station for the purpose.

would cover that Road, and in which there had been a fort for that purpose for fifty years, though probably then in ruins. But his Lordship informing me in his letter of the 27th of July, that it was the opinion of the captains of the navy, the engineers, and himself, that any works erected on Old Point Comfort, "might be easily destroyed by a[1il] fleet, "[2h.3i.4a] and would not answer the purpose; and "that therefore, according to the[5c] spirit of my [23]

1il fleet *underlined.*

2h Ships approach End on through a narrow channel a few transports sunk leaving room to warp in would have effectually stopt the passage—it lay nearer the entrance of Chesapeak than Y. River, a retreat from thence by Portsmouth & Albemarle sound always practicable & as an Enemys Fleet could not lay in safety anywhere between it and the harbour ours could always go in and out even tho' inferior, 'tis plain the Station in York River was not safe for a fleet for the Enemy during the seige destroyed every ship above water.

3i which fleet however might easily have been prevented, by sinking in a narrow channel 3 or 4 transports within reach of our Guns leaving room for ships of our own to warp through tho' such obstructions could not be removed by an Enemy on his retreat that was soon done, but if a work on Old Point Comfort would not answer the purpose, there was reason to suppose that which Lord Cornwallis chose in preference at York and Gloucester would, or his Lordship should have said so; instead of which read his letter of the 22d August page 24 and subsequent compare it with that of the 20 october written after his Capitulation, then say whether they could have been supposed to be descriptive of the same Post.

4a had these naval officers examined the Channel leading to Hampton road from sea, they would have found it narrow, & winding. & if 3 transports had been held ready in ballast to have been Sunk on the approach of the Enemy that would most effectually have stopt an enemys Fleet tho our own might have led in ship by ship, but I believe these naval Gentlemen thought it more comfortable to lay up at York Town, than at Hampton in James river & I suppose L. Cornwallis had received such positive assurances from the Cabinet that he should have a covering Fleet that he might have attended to convenience of situation more than to its safety or utility, for certain it is that tho I put him on his guard respecting probable attempts on his post not a spade had been used to fortifye the ground He stood seige on till the French Armamt arrived, except one redoubt to cover his own quarter & another occupd by the 23d Regt.

5c spirit *underlined.*

"orders,[1b] he should seize York and Gloucester,[2acdgh] "as the only harbour in which he could hope[3h] to "be able to give effectual protection to line of battle "ships;" I supposed his Lordship had entirely approved of those posts; and that after examining them with the officers of the King's ships and his engineer, he would let me know if he should see reason to alter his opinion; and consequently I did not object to the choice he had made;[4a.5k] nor indeed had I ever cause to do so before I saw his letter of the 11th of October, which I did not receive until the 16th, the day before he offered to capitulate, when for the first time I found his Lordship thought unfavourably of them. For on the 16th of August, his Lordship told me that he should apply to the Commodore for a ship to send me a state of things at York, and bring him back my commands; by which I was of course to understand that his Lordship would send me his own and the Commodore's opi[24]nion of York and Gloucester,[6a] after his

1b objects to old point Comfort in James River, takes York & Gloucester in York River in preference.

2acdgh in York River.

3h read the above had he such hopes.

4a in preference

5k In his letter of the 22 Augst he says his Engineer had (after 18 days survey and Examination) offered his plan for fortyfying York side that to him it appear'd Judicious & he had order'd it to be carried into execution that it would be finished in 6 weeks without any great labour to the troops & he could spare 1200. In describing the grounds after he had surrendered he says it was commanded & infiladed, & his works unfinished, how am I to reconcile the two letters, but by supposing (what there is no doubt was the fact) that his Lordship quitted his Exterior works described in his first letter, and stood seige in others calculated for no other purpose but to cover batterys he had raised in a hurry after the french fleet arrived, when for the first time he seems to have recollected my letter preparing him for the arrival of de Grasse, better he had sunken his transports across the channel to stop any attempt of the fleet & defended those works he had taught me to believe he would, he said he could defend as long as his provisions lasted, and officers coming from him had declared also he could.

6a as he had done of Hampton road which He did as the reader will observe in his letter 22

engineer had made a most exact survey,[1b] which he told me he was employed in, and of which I expected a copy, as his Lordship had before sent me of the one taken of Old Point Comfort. But not receiving these from his Lordship, I naturally concluded that the post of York and Gloucester was such as his Lordship and the Commodore approved ; [2a] especially, as his Lordship, in his letter of the 22d of August, was pleased to say, "the engineer has finished his "survey and examination of this place, [3h·4i·5b] (York) "and has proposed his plan for fortifying it; which "appearing judicious, I have approved, and directed "to be[6k] executed."[7b·8k·9m·] And in the same letter

Augt & subsequent by which it would seem the ground was judiciously chosen, the Plan for fortyfying it good, would be compleat in about 6 weeks & from whose defence he could spare 1000 men.

1b as he had done that of Old Point Comfort.

2a L. Cornwallis represents the naval Station he had chosen in preference in York River, as respectable, has fortify'd by a *Judicious* Plan, after an exact survey, will probably be compleat about the 4th october & has more men than necessary from its defence.

3h after many days survey. In short that the post was well chosen to answer all purposes. that it would be soon and well fortified that he could defend it as long as his provisions lasted, and that the works would be compleated in about 6 weeks and when compleated he could spare 1000 men from.

4i York supposed to be fortyfied after a *Judicious* Plan which his Lordp approvd and ordered, compleated without great labour in six weeks or about the 2d of october many days before the Enemy broke ground and that he could spare 1000 men from the defence.

5b near 18 days making that survey a judicious Plan for fortifying it—which his Lordship approves finished in six weeks without any great labour of troops, & when finished can spare 1000 men from its defence.

6k executed *underlined.*

7b How does this correspond with his Lordships subsequent Description of the Ground & Works in his Letter of the 20th Octr ? "A successful Defence in "our situation was perhaps im-"possible, for the Place could "only be reckoned an intrenched "Camp, subject in most places to "infilade, & the Ground in "general so disadvantageous."

8k "it will be finished in six "weeks without any great labour "of the troops & I shall be able "to spare from its defence 1200 "men."

9m How does this agree with his description of the ground & works, he stood seige in as de-

it was farther implied, that through the exertion of the troops, the works would probably be tolerably complete in about six weeks from that period : [11] and from his saying also in the same letter,[2g] "I will not venture to "[25] take any step that might retard the establish- "ing this post. But I request that your Excellency will "please to decide whether it is most important for "your plans, that a detachment of a thousand or "twelve hundred men[3m] (which I think I can spare "from every other purpose but that of labour) should "be sent to you from hence, or that the whole of the "troops[4i] here should continue to be employed in "expediting the[5k] works,")[6a·7b·8k] I naturally concluded that his Lordship had not only sufficient to complete his works by the time he mentioned, but that he could spare that number from the defence of them afterwards. His Lordship's letter of the 29th of September moreover told me, "I have no doubt, if "relief arrives in any[9abcm] reasonable time,[10b·11d] that

scribed in his letter of the 20th Octr accg for the misfortune, repeat :

11 with respect to my engaging in any other operation than that of a direct move to York river on board the Fleet when it should be ready to convey me I could not do it without the greatest impropriety as all the Genls particularly Lord Cornwallis and all the Admirals declared it was the only one ; but if I had had he wished to have engaged in any other I had not the means for I could not have taken the field with above 4000 men.

2g Compare this letter with that of the 20th october.

3m and that he could when they were finished spare 1000 men from the defence.

4i the whole troops were continued with his Lordship's & he had besides a great number of negroes.

5k works *underlined.*

6a not a man was taken or called for.

7b not a man was taken from him.

8k I did not take a man from him.

9abcm reasonable time *underlined.*

10b As his Lordship had before implied that he could hold out as long as his Provisions (of which he had enough to last to the latter End of Novr) Sir H. C. might reasonably suppose that any Time in October might be considered as corresponding with his Lordships Ideas of a *reasonable Time.*

11d I had reason to think from L. Cornwallis & certain Officers of rank who I had ordered to

"both York and Gloucester will be in possession of "his Majesty's[1k] troops;"[2a·3h·4i·5k·6m] and again, that of the 3d of October, "My works are in a better state "of defence than [26] we had reason to hope." In short, I think his Lordship appears to have implied in all his letters,[7b] (except that of the 17th[8h] of September, the day he heard from Lieutenant Conway of the navy, that Mons. De Grasse, by the junction of Monsieur de Barras,[9c] had thirty-five or thirty-six sail of the line) that he could hold out as long as his provisions lasted—which was, by his Lordship's own calculation, to the end of October at least.

From all these circumstances, I had flattered

join me from his army that he should be able to hold out against 20,000 men even! & a train in proportion at least 3 weeks.

1k troops *underlined.*

2a His Lordship had been prepared by S. H. C. for a seige. He had told S. H. C. that He could hold out as long as his provisions Certain officers of Rank had said he could do so 3 weeks, but He capitulated in 7 or 8 days open trenches.

3h he had frequently imply'd that he could hold out as long as his provisions & that these would hold to the end of Octr at least. therefore judged that any time within that Period would be the reasonable time he mentions.

4i and even when he knew the force &c brought against him he told me he could defend them a reasonable time as in all his letters previous to this he had implied he could hold out as long as his provisions, & all those officers who left him declared the same or for 3 weeks, and as by his own account his provisions would last till the end of October at least, I judged that reasonable time to be any within the month of October, & I had not a doubt of being with him by the middle, but his Lordship was forced (in a Post described as above) to extremity in 7 days open trenches.

5k and in a former letter that he should be able to hold out as long as his provisions lasted, which with care would last to the end of Octr.

6m as he had before imply'd he could hold out as long as his provisions to the latter end of Octr even, I might naturally suppose that any time in Octr might be considered as reasonable.

7b & which I did not receive till the 23rd Sepr.

8h on this day he had discovered the great superiority of the French Fleet, & seemed uneasy, but in subsequent letters seems to have no doubt of holding out

9c Who was not in the action of the 5th Sepr

myself, that the works at York would have been tolerably complete by the 9th of October,[1c·2m] the day Mr. Washington opened his batteries against them : and from the opinion given me by certain officers of rank,[3a·4c·5g·6h·7i·8k] who had lately come from Lord Cornwallis at York,[9b] I was under no apprehensions for his Lordship before the latter end of that month ; as I could not conceive that the enemy could possibly bring against him [27] such a powerful battering train as would demolish his defences (such as I had reason to hope they would be) in so short a space of time as nine or[10k] ten days.[11k·12b·]

Although I never gave Lord Cornwallis assurances of the exertions of the navy before my letter of the 24th of September,[13a·14b·15c·16flmnopqrs·17g·18i·19k·20d] when I did it in consequence of a council of war, composed of flag

1c 7 weeks subsequent to his Letter 22 August.

2m 7 weeks from the 22d Augt.

3a Col Conway Major Veimar Col Bose Hessian

4c Col de Barras Col Conway Maj G. Veimar who declared an opinion "that L. Cornwallis "could hold in the exterior posi- "tion (in which they left him "26th Augt) for 3 weeks against 20,000 men and artillery in proportion."

5g Col Conway Major G. Veimar a Hessian Colonel &c informed the Council of War that in their opinion L. Cornwallis then occupying the Exterior position could hold out against 20,000 and a proble artillery &c for 3 weeks.

6h they all declared in Council "that he could hold out in the "exterior position 3 weeks against "20,000 men &c &c.

7i These all declared before a council of General and Flag officers on the 16 Sepr that they thought L. Cornwallis could hold the post 3 weeks against an army of 20,000 and a proportionable Artillery.

8k Col Conway, Major Veimar a Col of Bose Regt & other officers declared before the Council of war he could defend those works against 20,000 men 3 weeks.

9b These officers informed me in Council that his Lordship was fortifying the exterior position & that he would be able to defend himself 3 weeks against 20,000 men, & a proportionable artillery.

10k ten days *underlined*.

11k 7 days open trenches.

12b His Lordship was reduced to extremity 8 days open trenches.

13a As he asserted but has since acknowledged was without foundation.

14b as he asserts I did in his letter 20 octr but acknowledges I did in that of the 2d Decr.

and general officers; I certainly never gave his Lordship the least reason to suppose they would not be made; as I always took it for granted,[1a] before Admiral Graves's letter to me of the 9th of[2km] September,[3b·4i·5k·6m·7o] that our fleet was superior to that of the enemy. Nor, indeed, did I know before I received Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 17th, (which was not until the 23d of September) that the enemy had thirty-six sail of the line, or that Monsieur de Barras had not already joined Monsieur de Grasse before the action of the 5th of September.[8a·9i·] But even against this superiority, great as it was, the Admirals [28] were clearly[10b·11c] of opinion, that a joint attempt should be made by us to succour the fleet and army in the Chesapeak.[12a·13b·14g·15h·16i·17k·18m·] I certainly, therefore,

15c as he asserts in his of the 20th october but in that of the 2d Dec acknowledges not to be true.

16flmnopqrs as he asserts in his of the 20th October

17g as he asserts I did

18i as he *asserts* in his of the 20th October, but acknowledges in that of the 2d of Decr page 71 was not the case.

19k As He asserts in his of the 20th October and owns in that of the 2d Decr he was not justified in doing

20d and even after the 24 Sepr when I knew our Fleet was inferior - I had not the least doubt from the opinion of the Admiral that we could force the Enemys Fleet at anchor in Chesapeak & that the troops under my command might be landed in York river as L. Cornwallis had desired.

1a we should have a covering Fleet and

2km September *underlined.*

3b which I did not receive before the 23d

4i recd the 19th

5k which I received the 16.

6m which I recd the 23d

7o which I did not receive till the 19th.

8a the Admiral thought also that the two French Fleets had joined & were in the action.

9i and been in it.

10b & unanimously

11c the unanimous opinion of the Admirals in Council was that the British Fleet could pass that of France at anchor, and by bringing up near York river put the troops ashore and further of opinion that having the advantage of springs on cable which the Enemy could not avail *themselves* of in the outer position, their Fleet would not attempt ours particularly so near the mouth of York river.

12a and could be done without great risk. to force the Enemy Fleet at anchor & land me after-

never could have hinted to his Lordship that their exertions would not be made. The whole of this matter may, I think, be summed up as follows:

Lord Cornwallis's march into Virginia,[1i+] without consulting his Commander in Chief,[2inpq·3i·4k·5m·6o·7c] forced us into solid operation in that province.

wards in the York River where Lord Cornwallis repeatedly invited me to come.

13b Which might have been done without great Risk by forcing the Enemys Line at anchor in the Chesapeak as *all* agreed they could not in such a tidesway avail themselves of the spring on their cables.

14g there is no doubt if Lord Cornwallis had held out till we arrived, or we had sailed sooner but I should have joined his Lordship and the probable consequence Washington disbanding his army. read his letter, tho our Fleet was very inferior it was the opinion of the Admirals that we might have passed that of the Enemy at an anchor in the mouth of the Chesapeak, as the Enemy in such a tide's way could not avail themsvs of the springs on their Cables.

15h that the French Fleet at anchor in chesapeak could not avail themselves of the springs on their Cables & that therefore an inferior Fleet might pass them with some advantage even; & occupying a Station, near the entrance of York river where they could use their springs, & conseqtly for reasons obvious a superior Fleet would not attempt them, they could land the troops, which when landed might easily have joined Lord Cornwallis & perhaps had nothing to fear but something to hope against Mr. W. even in the field.

16i nor did these Admirals in Council seem to have the least Idea that we should meet with any difficulty in passing the Enemys Fleet anchored in a situation where they could not avail themselves of the springs on their Cables, or that our Fleet could not afterwards draw up near the entrance of York River, where it could have had that advantage nor that there would be any difficulty in putting the troops ashore or much to apprehend perhaps on the contrary something to hope even in the Field against Washn *Motley* Corps.

17k As the Admirals were of opinion that the French Fleet tho superior being at anchor in an exterior exposed Position in Chesapeak bay could not avail themselves of the springs on their Cables, so that we might pass broadside for broadside take up an interior Position near York River where we could.

18m & might be done without great risk either of or in an action, or by forcing through theirs & avoiding ours.

1iknopq without *to* Chief *underlined.*

2inpq Sir H: C: should have said contrary to his Orders.

3i It will appear that I never called for 3000 but of that number as many as L. Cornwallis

Being there, as his Lordship could not subsist his army[1d] without having a place of arms to cover his magazines, &c. &c. &c. it became absolutely necessary to fix on some healthy and respectable station,[2d] that could be made secure against a[3a] temporary superiority of the enemy at sea;[4b.5d] and York and Gloucester seem to have been originally thought of by Lord Cornwallis, and approved by me[6d] for that purpose. But by his Lordship's misconceiving my orders, he

could spare; nor was he justified in sending these but certainly not so in quitting Williamsberg neck till he had read my letters of

4k Sir H: C: should have said contrary to his orders, and contrary to his own promises read S H Clintons orders to him 1st June 80. His Lordship's letter to Leslie & Lord Rawdon's letter to Lord Cornwallis informing his Lordship of the opinion Balfour had given him & which it was his duty he no doubt had given to Lord Cornwallis that not expecting Lord Cornwallis would ever have exposed, S. Carolina or Chas Town he had thrown down the old works & till they were raised that Place was risked N.B Lord Cornwallis did or ought to have known this when he began his march into Virginia but so determined was his Lordship to go into Virginia(*Hearing I was desirous of quitting the Command & wishing to be within my reach*) that I am clear nothing could have stopt him otherwise the very reasons he gives for going operate agt it; & my dispatches which were laying at C. Town from the 6th of April to the 24th had his Lordship received them, instead of inviting him into Virginia forbid his going, but those dispatches, nor copies nor the substance of them Col Balfour did not send tho he had many & safe opportunities —

5m had the Enemy been superior in the bay for 48 hours, his Lordship was liable to be cruelly insulted unless he had a place of arms to cover frigates, transports &c at least.

6o I may say contrary to my orders and his own promises.

7c Now I must say contrary to orders.

1d Washington with all the exertions of the country for him could not subsist his army, how could L. C. risk those exertions against him read Washingtons letter 26 Sept to De Grasse

2d for if he had not we should have only held a small station.

3a temporary *underlined*.

4b Had the Enemy been superior in the Bay only 48 Hours his Lordship was liable to Insult unless he had a Place of Arms to cover at least Frigates, Transports &c.

5d Had the Enemys Fleet been superior in Chesapeak Bay only 48 hours His Lordship might have lost Frigates Depots &c &c unless he had secured a Place of Arms to cover them.

6d when he proposed it in preference.

quitted the Neck of York, and consequently [29] relinquished every idea of occupying those posts. Soon afterwards, the Admiral thinking a naval station[1a] for large ships absolutely necessary, and recommending Hampton Road,[2ac] I directed[3a] Lord Cornwallis to examine and[4g] fortify Old Point Comfort in James River;[5a·6c] but his Lordship not approving of that station, made choice of York and Gloucester.[7acdgh·8i·9b·]

I perfectly agree with Lord Cornwallis, that to abandon his posts, after he had once fixed himself, (although by doing so he might save[10i] part of his army)[11i] would have been[12bm] disgraceful, nay, perhaps fatal to our future prospects of establishment in the Chesapeak, when such a measure should be authorised by a covering fleet. But even that misfortune, great as it may be represented, would have been preferable to the one which happened; and therefore I told his Lordship, in a[13c] conversation[14c·15h·16i·17b]

1a for large ships *underlined.*
2ac in James River
3a directed *underlined.*
4g fortify *underlined.*
5a to secure Hampton Road
6c to cover H. R.
7acdgh In York River
8i in preference
9b which tho I had ever approved of them as a healthy respectable situation and place of arms I had never consider'd as a station to cover line of battle ships.
10i part *underlined.*
11i losing frigates transports, Gallies Gun Boats, heavy Cannon, Stores &c &c &c &c and leaving behind sick wounded & all his friends, all which must have been sacrificed whenever we had been found in chesapeak bay either witht a respectable place of arms to cover ships also, or on our quitting any such; I therefore never blamed his Lordship so much for not quitting that which *he* had chosen, as I did for forcing solid operation in a district where it was absolutely necessary to have a Place of arms when he knew preservation depended on a naval superiority.
12bm disgraceful *underlined.*
13c conversation *underlined.*
14c in which Conn I do aver that he tacitly or formally acknowledged that there were many insinuations and assertions in his letter of the 20th october wch could not be supported, that it was written under great agitation of mind, & might contain some mistakes. He spoke in handsomest terms of *my* exertions & those of the army, & finished by saying, "I would not have come into Virginia had I not had hopes

I had with him[1a] before I sent his letter[2d] of the 20th of October to be printed at New York, I had conceived [30] hopes, that between the time of the French fleet's arriving in the Chesapeak, and his receiving information from me that Sir Samuel Hood had joined Mr. Graves, which was not until the 13th of September,[3iknpq] or between that time and the junction of Mr. Washington with the Marquis De la Fayette, when his Lordship heard from Lieutenant Conway of the navy, that the enemy were thirty-six sail of the line, he would have tried to

of a covering Fleet, I knew the danger without it, we were promised it by the minister & admiral we had it not.

15h and in which convern His Lordship either tacitly or formally acknowledged that his letter had been written in a hurry, & that it did contain insinuations nay assertions, which he was convinced could not be supported.

16i In this conversation *I do aver* that Lord Cornwallis did acknowledge either tacitly, or directly thus that the Post of York & Gloucester was his own choice in preference — 2 that he had never given me any reason to think unfavourably of that Post till the day before his capitulation honestly owned "he had done wrong" if he had said I gave him any promises or assurances of the exertions of the navy till in my letter of the 24th which he had not recd till the 29th at night, and when he had said I had told him the fleet would sail about the 5th October he owned that my words were only that there was every reason to hope it would sail.

17b In this Conversation His Lordship then tacitly or formally acknowledged that most of the insinuations nay assertions in his letter of the 20 of october were not quite so correct as they should be, that the letter was written under a great agitation of mind, & that there might be mistakes, but neither his Lordship nor the minister took any pains to explain on his Lordships arrival in England, I had too much liberality, to press his Lordship more while at N. York, than is contained in my letter of the 2d & 10 Decr on page 71 Narrative.

1a before *underlined.*

2d at his desire

3iknpq St Simon landed from the french fleet the 13th with 3000 french Troops reported raw & sickly. La Fayette had about 1200 continental Troops. As it is an object of Consequence to beat an Army en detail coming to besiege you, 'tis to be lamented Ld Cornwallis could not attack these Corps separate or joined; if he had, no attempt could afterwards have been made by W— Lord Cornwallis had full 6000 as good Troops as any in the World, the Enemy all together exclusive Militia had not 5000.

escape with part of his army to the southward; a step which certainly would have been[1d] justifiable,[2d·3k·4b] although in the conversation alluded to, his Lordship did not seem to think it would, unless I had given him assurances that the navy could not attempt to succour him; which assurances, however, I certainly could not possibly have given him.[5a·6c·7k·8b·9c·]

If, therefore, Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th of October, giving an account of the unfortunate conclusion of the campaign, by the surrender of York Town, (Appendix, [31] No. VIII.[10bd]) could ever have been understood[11o] to imply[12o] that[13c] the posts of York and Gloucester[14bh] were not his Lordship's own choice, in preference to Old Point Comfort,[15bh] which I had[16h·17h] recommended to him;[18h·19o] or that[20o] I had ever received information from his Lordship, that the ground at either was unfavourable,[21b] till the day before he had offered to capitulate; or that I had ever given him[22o] any assurances[23o] of the exer-

1d justifiable *underlined.*

2d so says Washington to de Grasse.

3k read Washingtons letter to De Grasse Page 55.

4b read Washingtons letter 26 Sepr to Degrasse respecting the propriety & practicability of his Lordships doing so, before he had assembled his army & invested him

5a I had often represented the danger of operns in Chesapeak without a Fleet by minister and Admirals. S. S. Hood assured me he had it, how then could I give L. Cornwallis such assurances.

6c at any time.

7k How could I after the assurances I had recd of a covering Fleet.

8b after being assured we had a superior fleet or even with an inferior that we could force it at anchor, that I could be landed & could join Lord Cornwallis, how could I.

9c How.

10bd Page 64.

11o to imply *underlined.*

12o they Certainly do.

13c changing the naval Station from James River to York River or

14bh in York River

15bh in James River

16h recommended to *run through.*

17h ordered him.

18h to take

19o or that *underlined.*

20o that also

21b "the works liable to be commanded or infiladed."

22o any assurances *underlined.*

23o this he positively asserts, in his letter 20 october altho he acknowledges his mistake in that of 2d Decr.

tions of the navy,[1h] before my letter to him of the 24th of[2k] September,[3k] which he acknowledges[4bd] he did not receive till the 29th ; or that any assurances whatsoever given by me could have prevented his attacking the Marquis De la Fayette, before Mr. Washington joined that General, which was on the 27th of September ;[5c·6a] I am persuaded it will appear that those implications[7bm] are not founded on any orders[8f·9g·10i·11h·12b] I gave his Lordship,[13d] and cannot be supported by any part of our[14k] correspondence.[15k·16m·17b·18c·19a·] And as I took an opportunity of telling his Lordship the [32] same,[20a·21c] in a letter I sent him before he sailed from New-York, dated the 2d and 10th of December (which letter,[22bd]

1h or told him the Fleet would sail the 5th.

2k September *underlined.*

3k written in Council of Generals and admirals.

4bd Page 69.

5c all which he has either imply'd or asserted.

6a That he had not the least foundation for these implications or assertions.

7bm or assertions.

8f a civil way of telling his Lordship that many of his Insinuations & some of his assertions are false.

9g in other words, if such assertions or implications are made, they are made without the least foundation.

10i In short in the language of a Gentleman if his Lordship has said so and his Lordship certainly has said so or implyed it, I say in the language of a Gentleman such assertions, such implications are not true.

11h in short are not *True.*

12b In short in the language becoming my high Station at the time, and in that of a Gentleman I tell his Lordship that those insinuations, and assertions are *false* —

13d this in the language of a Gentleman and Comr in Chief. but in other words, are Contrary to *Fact* I told him so in our Conversation togetr at New York & he either tacitly or formally owned it.

14k correspondence *underlined.*

15k does not this civilly tell his Lordship that if there are such assertions in his letter, that they are not true,

16m every Officer every Gentleman nay whoever reads this must conceive my meaning tho I avoid telling his Lordship grossly that he asserted what was false, it yet must be understood that I in the civilest way possible tell him so.

17b Consequently are not true.

18c in other words are not true.

19a indeed he *now* owns it

20a in Conversation &

21c first in Conversation at N. York then.

22bd Page 71.

however, did not appear when this part of our correspondence was produced before the House of Lords) 1a.2b.3fklopqrs.4m.5n.6i.7c.8h I cannot doubt his Lordship is convinced that what I therein asserted is right.9b.

Lord Cornwallis was pleased to tell me that his letter of the 20th of October,10bd was written under great agitation of mind and in a great hurry.11d.12a.13d. No man could possibly feel for his Lordship, and his dreadful situation, more than I did. And I will venture to say, no man could be more anxious, or would have gone greater lengths to succour him. Nor will this, I trust, be doubted, when it is recollected that the proposal first came from me for embarking 14acgi.15flmnrs.16k six thousand men for that purpose on

1a tho his Lordships in answer to it was called for and read in the House of Lords.

2b tho his Lordship forced the reading of his answer to it in the House of Lords, present himself & my letter in his Pocket.

3fklopqrs tho when he called for his to be read he had mine which was an answer to it in his pocket.

4m Tho' when he called for his to be read in Parliament he had mine which was an answer to it in his pocket.

5n Tho' when he called for his to be read he had two, one mine which was an answer to it & the other was not in his pocket.

6i Tho when he called for his to be read he had mine to which it was an answer to it in his Pocket, and which was not produced in the house of Lords, nor did the minister produce either that I wrote to him on the same subject and had desired him to publish.

7c on the Contrary he desired Lord Townsend to call for the answer to it in the House of Lords the impropriety of which did not occur to their Lordships at the time.

8h Lord Townsend called by Lord Cornwallis's desire for his Lordships answer to this letter to be read in the House of Lords but did not call for S H C letter

9b His Lordship acknowledged it in the Conversation alluded to, said the conduct of the army under my command had been most honourable indeed.

10bd Page 70.

11d and he said further that if he "had in that letter" said I had "given him assurances of "the exertions of the Navy "before the 24 Sept which he "had received on the 29th only "*he had done wrong*" ! ! !

12a His Lordship may add that feeling how very reprehensable his Conduct had been throughout this whole business, He had been advised by evil councillors to write this letter.

13d He does not of course deny it. But —

14acgi in Person with

15flmnrs myself with

16k with

board an inferior fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line, including two fifties, to thirty-six; and thereby putting the fate [33] of the American war on the joint exertions of the fleet and army, to relieve that noble Lord and his gallant corps.

I have to lament that these exertions could not have been made in time. All the Admirals seemed of opinion at the council of war of the 24th September that there was every reason[1f+] to hope[2iknpq·3o·4m] that the fleet would be ready to sail on the 5th of October.[5d·] The troops intended for the expedition had been for some time in readiness to embark, and did actually do so early in October.[6h·] It seemed also to be the general opinion of the Admirals, that the enemy, although superior in number, could not obstruct[7b] the[8c] channel to York-river, so as to[9b] prevent the passage[10b] of our fleet, much less both passages of the Chesapeak.[11g·] Could the troops, which embarked under my immediate command, have been put on shore on the Gloucester side,[12a] a junction with[13b] the part of Lord Cornwallis's corps on that side [34] was easy: but if they had been put on shore, even in

1fiklmnopqrs to hope *underlined.*

2iknpq His Lordship says I had given him assurances that they would sail about the 5th.

3o his Lordship calls it assurances in his letter of the 20 octr

4m for tho it was the opinion of the admirals that there was little danger in making the junction as far as regarded the fleet, I might have contented myself with sending the reinforcement but the fact is I notg the inferiority of our fleet thought that after making a junction I should oblige W. to retire & when I had relieved L. C. I had resolved to go immediately to England, quitting a command I had been forced into, repeatedly held out the impracticability of, and as often requested to him to retire from

5d of this intended exertion & of the projected move to Rhode Island his Lordship spoke highly at our first Interview.

6h unanimous.

7b the *to* as to *run through.*

8c great.

9b or

10b of *to* passages *run through.*

11g that in such a tide's way they could not avail themselves of the springs on the Cables or prevent an inferior Fleet passing them.

12a where I was repeatedly invited by his Lordship to come.

13b the part of *run through.*

James River, although a junction with his Lordship in York would have been scarcely[1k] practicable,[2c·3a·4k] it might have been made in some other part;[5i] or at least such diversions might have been made by the troops under my command as might have saved part of his Lordship's corps, (Appendix, No. XI.)

I must, therefore, repeat that I lament, and ever shall, that those exertions could not have been made in time. Because, from the professional merit of the Admirals who were to conduct us, and from the zeal which appeared so conspicuous when I proposed the move to them; and which, from their example was[6c] communicated to all ranks in the fleet; and with which,[7c] it is to be presumed, those of the army kept fully equal pace; I have every reason to think we should have had most complete success.[8g·9d]

[35][10c+]But at the same time, that truth compels me to impute our misfortunes ultimately to the want of a[11a] covering fleet in the Chesapeak, I think it right to declare that, as a land officer, I do not feel myself a competent judge of the propriety and practicability of naval operations.[12g·13d] Nor can I, as a servant of

1k practicable *underlined.*

2c after he had given up the exterior Position

3a after he had quitted his exterior position, and given to the Enemy what commanded in a near advance all the rest of his Works Vide Washn letter.

4k after he had retired from what he calls his Exterior position & had given the Enemy the Key to that he held.

5i & had it been made it may be presumed that 13. or 14000 such troops had little to apprehend perhaps something to hope against Washs mottley army.

6c of course

7c pace

8g a very few words will point out the causes which brought forward the Catastrophe of York Town, and lost America. Lord Cornwallis for going into Virginia contrary to the orders of S H Clinton, and forcing operations there, and Lord Rodney for not going into Virginia and covering such operations according to orders.

9d wishing to keep the navy in good humour I always gave them their full share of merit on all occasions.

10cghmno But at *to* the empire (11 *lines*) *run through.*

11a promised.

12g I was promised a covering Fleet and a reinforcement. But if the Minister had told me I was neither to expect the one or the other, I should have taken a

the State, entrusted with an important, but partial command, presume to enter into the counsels of Ministers; who, from a more elevated station, survey and balance the whole system of the campaign, and the general safety and welfare of the empire.*1i·2a·3d·4c·5g·6h·7m·8h·9a·10b.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, 30 April 1781, see Letter p 446.

respectable defensive at New York, at a Period of the war when negative Victory would have ended American Independence.

13d But now that I know facts I do blame and highly blame that Cabinet who rejected the Plan of the Comr in chief which they had before approved and did again approve alas too late ! and forced him to adopt another which he represented & they knew the danger of without a covering fleet —

1i this paragraph is a cavil 1. 2. 3 introduced by a friend of the Cabinet who revised my Narve it had been better left out, it appeared unknown to me.

2a This was slipt in witht my intention I think His Majty Cabinet highly culpable for forcing the Plan of a Subaltern General made on partial Information. I say our Fleet in the West Indies *was* equal to that of the Enemy, that it had been ordered, promised, and had it acted must have saved America. All this Lord Rodney acknowledged to me.

3d this was put in by a friend of the ministers I did not object tis true.

4c nonsense

5g nonsense slipped in unawares

6h nonsense slipped in by a friend of the then Cabinet.

7m nonsense introduced by a friend to the minister.

8h I mean for Ever to declare that to the Cabinets having given a preference to the Plans of a second in Command made on partial information to that of a Comr in chief only as information till too late serve in great measure to impute the loss of that Campaign & of America. Lord North, Lord G. Germain, Thurlow Lord Chancellor. Lord Sandwich, Lord Amherst, Lord Gower the last not least — to these the thanks of the Nation are due in great part for the loss of America

9a The short Fact therefore stands Thus. Lord Cornwallis for going into Virginia, Contrary to the orders of S. H Clinton, the Comr in Chief, and forcing Operations where they could not be protected except by a Fleet, and Lord Rodney for *not* going to Virginia with his Fleet and protecting such operation as He acknowledges He had been ordered and had promised to do. I should insult the understanding of any man particularly that of a military man if I was to ask him whether S H Clinton can be responsable for operations He was ordered to support — had

[36] Upon the whole, I am persuaded, that had I been left to my own plans, and a proper confidence had been earlier reposed in me, the campaign of 1781 would not probably have ended unfortunately.[1b·2f] But though that apparent want of confidence was at last removed,* and the fullest approbation I could [37] wish given to the operations I had projected, my knowledge of the change happened too late to extricate me from the consequences of Lord Cornwallis's ill-fated march into Virginia, and the orders [3g] they had probably occasioned.[4a·5d] Foreseeing many of the evils which would result from this fatal move the instant I heard of it,[6b] I immediately at

**Extract Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, 7 July 1781,*[7b] *see Letter* ii. 45.

represented the danger of witht a Fleet & had been promised that Fleet, Operations, He did all he could, to render secure & succour when in danger.

10b by neglect of Govt I was 3 times within 3 weeks of Starving

1b Had Lord Cornwallis staid in Carolina as I had ordered him & I had even assembled my Force at N. York & remained there with my arms across without affront, negative victory would have insured American Dependence.

2f Till Lord Cornwallis Glorious and important Victory of Campden I had the most unreserved Confidence of ministers, but from the month of Octr 80 to July 81 they seemed by their conduct to transfer it to Lord Cornwallis & could I have resigned to him I certainly would have done so perhaps he thought so himself, and was his only motive for not reading my dispatches of the 20 & 21 March, and going contrary to every opinion but his own into Virginia to be near me, but L. G. G. letters 7th 14th July will show how soon the ministers repented the confidence they had placed in L. Cornwallis.

3g they had probably *run through, and* it had certainly *substituted.*

4a from his Majty Cabinet

5d I now say certainly occasioned

6b and had read Rochambeaus intercepted cypher letter to Luzerne, inclosing to him his *secret* orders from the French King, to Cajole the Americans, says no more troops *positively* are to be sent, these then probably withdrawn, & cautions Rochambeau from separating his army for reasons of distress after Arnolds detection and also on their finding New York & not Chesapeak was Washingtons & Rochs object. there is no doubt but that L. Cornws advised operations in Virginia, & gave false hopes to the Cabinet of success there and that in consequence of these hopes my

the time communicated my apprehensions to the American Minister.[1bd.2g.] And as my letter to him of the 18th of July 1781 speaks very fully on this and other matters, of which I fear the public has been hitherto equally misinformed, I shall take the liberty to conclude this Narrative with the following extract from it:[3a.4d.5i.6b]

plan was rejected till too late & I was order to support Lord Cornwallis.

7b which S. H. Clinton received in Sepr.

1bd Page 107.

2g which he sent me word by Col. Conway He had laid before the King, with this opinion that many of my Prophecies had come to pass, & he feared they all would.

3a The K. in his closet, his conversation with the Duke of Newcastle, Mr. Gerard Hamilton what passed between Lord Lothian and him & Lord G. Germain's message to me of the 4th December 81 by Col Conway with his letters of the 7th & 14th July, all convince me that the whole of Lord Cornwallis Conduct from his march into North Carolina in January 81 to the Catastrophe of York Town and his 10th article of Capitulation had met with His Majtys fullest Disapprobation as well as that of His Minister Lord G. Germain nay finally that of the whole Cabinet. The good Earls Zeal, (I shall not call it ambition) often outran his Prudence. Thus it was in August 80 He invited the Loyalists of N. Carolina rise, promised to march and protect them, not recollecting the danger of doing so at that season, lost great part of his army by sickness & Ferguson's Corps whom he had contrary to promise to me, left in an exposed situation unsustained was obliged to retire *him*self all but disgracefully sacrificed Friends in North Carolina, & Ferguson misfortune (who had commanded the Militia of S. Carolina) made, as his Lordship acknowledged to me, such an impression in that Province & threw it back in Rebellion. Thus it was again in January 81. when having ordered part of the works of C. Town to be levelled, & when that Place so very particularly recommended to his care was open and exposed, & without reporting to me. When he had lost all his light Troops at Cowpens and not withstanding he had assured me a month before that these poor people had not given sufficient evidence of their Zeal or numbers for him to risk S. Carolina had destroyed all his waggons and Consequently lost the means of making a solid move into N. Carona He proceeds loses half his army: gains a victory after which his own losses sickness and wants oblige him to fly before the beaten army nor does he fall back on South Carolina & C. Town, in its dismantled state & which He had been ordered to consider as the "Primary object" but to Wilmington, & from thence as here

[38] [1g] "I can say little more to your Lordship's sanguine hopes of the speedy reduction of the southern provinces, than to lament that the present state of the war there does not altogether promise so flattering an event. Many untoward incidents, of which your Lordship was not apprised, have thrown us too far back to be able to recover very soon, even what we have lately lost there. For if (as I have often before suggested) the good-will of the inhabitants is absolutely requisite to retain a country, after we have conquered it; I fear it will be sometime before we can recover the confidence of those in Carolina, as their past sufferings will of course make them cautious of publicly forwarding the King's interests before there is the strongest certainty of his army being in

related, marches a third time into Virginia contrary to *orders* &c. &c.

4d Page 109

5i tis presumed the Majority of that Cabinet preferred L. Cornwallis conditions to those of S. H. C. S. H. told them truths, some of them very disagreeable and did not give them hopes that with a reduced army he would *conquer* America without the assistance of friends; tis presumed L. Cornwallis did; judging of the whole continent by those Gentry he had had opposed to him in the Carolinas: his Lordship who seems to have been willing to take more of the responsibility on himself than S H C could with consistency do. S. H. C. called for reinforcements L. C. perhaps said he had enough. Lord Amherst of course tho he could not prefer L. Corns Plan preferred his Lordship for strange as it may appear tho Lord Amherst refused to take the command unless he had 20000 addition & before the French had joined, after they had & instead of 20000 added S H C had been deprived of above 10000 this noble Lord wrote to L. G G. saying that it was his opinion that if proper attention was paid to the compleating the provincials we had troops Enough; Lord Sandwich ever considered the american war as secondary after the French interfered, his Lordship liked also L C conditions best, & perhaps he was not pleased that S H C should dare to disapprove of any admiral he had judged proper to send to the american Station Lord Chancellor & Lord Gower seem to have thought of nothing but the terms L C. is supposed to have offerd, & perhaps Lord Mansfield may have joined them sometimes. but it seems all agreed alas too late, in readopting S H Clintons Plan.

6b N° 109

1g This letter was not produced in the House of Lords.

a condition to support them. I shall, therefore, most cordially join with your Lordship, in condemning the bad policy of taking possession of places at one time, and aban[39]doning them at another; and in the opinion that the war should be conducted upon a [1c] permanent and settled plan of conquest, by securing and preserving what has been[2c] recovered.[3b·4d·] But if these maxims have been, on any occasion, deviated from in the[5abc] past progress of the war; I must, in justice to myself declare, that it has never been warranted by my orders, except, only in the case of Rhode-Island.[6a·7c·8h·9iknpq·] This I doubt not will appear from the instructions I gave to General Leslie, and the other general officers, whom I sent on expeditions to the Chesapeak. For if Lord Cornwallis made a[10k] desultory[11i·12k] move into North Carolina, and, without a force sufficient to protect, or provisions to support them, invited by proclamation, the Loyalists to join him, and afterwards found it necessary to quit the

1c permanent *underlined.*

2c recovered *underlined.*

3b is not this Idea totally relinquished by the Cabinet when they approve L. Cornwallis march into Virginia at the certainty of losing every thing out of Charlestown (Lord Cornwallis own words) and at the risk I may add of that Capitol.

4d Lord Cornwallis was the first that broke through this system when he forced opens in Virginia before N. Carolina was restored

5abc Past

6a which was occupied in 76 at the desire of Lord Howe, as of the utmost importance to the Fleet, and quitted in 79 on the opinion of Adml Arbuthnot that it was of no use, and when its garrison was wanted for important service Elsewhere

7c which was occupied at the desire of one Admiral and given up with the advice of another, Lord Howe Adl Arbuthnot.

8h we took possession of R. Island because Lord Howe had at first considered it as a good harbour S H C quitted it when Admiral Arbuthnot declared it of no use, & S H C in his reduced state wanted the troops for service.

9iknpq At the request of the Navy R. Island was occupied at their request it was also Abandoned

10k desultory *underlined.*

11i instead of a solid move to give the Experiment a fair tryal which alone he was authorised by me to do.

12k instead of a solid establishment among them to give the Experiment a fair tryal.

friendly districts of that province, before he could have time to give them a[1a+] fair trial,[2b] I am persuaded your Lordship will acknowledge [40] he did not act under my instructions:—nor were his Lordship's retreat to[3k] Wilmington,[4iknpq] and subsequent move from thence to Virginia, in consequence of my orders:[5h] on the contrary, as I foresaw all the unhappy consequences of them, I should certainly have endeavoured to have stopt him, could I have known his intentions in proper time.[6a·] But though his Lordships movements, (which it must be confessed have been as rapid as your Lordship expected) have not to my sincere concern been successfully decisive; I am convinced he is, as I hope we all are, impressed with the absolute necessity of vigorous exertions in the service of his country at the present crisis. If mine, however, have not been equal to my inclinations, I have little doubt they will be found to be at least equal to my powers.[7iknpq·8d·]

"I shall now, my Lord, beg leave to conclude with

1abc fair trial *underlined.*

2b as he had promised

3k Wilmington *underlined.*

4iknpq instead of securing S: Carolina as he was ordered & had promised.

5h but contrary to them.

6a but so very determined was his Lordp upon this last move that tho he says one of his principal reasons for making it was because he does not hear from me, tells you at the inst he makes it that he expects my dispatches from C. Town every instant. He moves witht them. Nay tho he announces to the army before he had passed the roanoke that Lord Rawdon had beaten Green, & consequently another principal reason for going into Virginia no longer existed. He tells Farther He still looks Northward.

7iknpq I had full one third less army than Sir W: Howe who was protected by a fleet commanded by his Brother Whereas Washingtons army during my Command increased in Numbers & Discipline, & was reinforced by 8 or 10 000 french, & these generally covered by a french fleet.

8d I had not lay by so much as S. W. Howe had even before the French joined the Americans, the Minister speaks in flattering terms of my exertions with that inferior army till he affects to misunderstand Arnold's report to him, & Washington's intercepted letter to Congress, says, we are now suffering more from the *remnant* of an army than we did when in its fullest force.

the strongest assurances, that no man can be more fervently desirous than I [41] am to see an honourable end put to this most burthensome war. And if I remain in the command, that no endeavours of mine shall be wanting to execute, in the fullest manner, the King's pleasure and commands. Of the 10,000 men I solicited,[1i] only 4000 were even promised; and no portion of these, except a few recruits,[2d] has yet joined this part of the army. Your Lordship's last letters, however, give me hopes, that three[3d] British battalions[4b.5d] and two thousand six hundred German troops may be immediately expected. If all these arrive, I shall then be able, at a proper season to reinforce the Chesapeak corps very considerably;[6i] and if a reinforcement[7h] does not likewise come to the French armament already here, such operations may be carried on as may perhaps produce some advantages in the course of the Winter. But if our reinforcement does not arrive,[8a.9b.10c.11fiklmnopqrs] and the French should receive [42] theirs,[12d] I think we shall have every thing to apprehend.

Before I close, however, I beg leave to say a word or two in explanation of two observations, in the Commissioners of Accounts Seventh Report; in order to obviate any implied censure, they may be

1i these 10,000 were taken from me the first Campaign

2d and such Recruits!

3d British battalions *underlined.*

4b the 3 Batns went to C. Town the German recruits such as they were arrived in August immediately on their arrival I offered to embark with 3000 men for R Island & Providence.

5d the three Batts went to C. Town and arriv'd in time to save that Capitol, & Province The German Recruits such as they were joined me the 11th of August I immediately offered to proceed with 3000 men on conjunct Expn to R. Island.

6i as they had ordered me to carry on operation there.

7h not a Regt joined S. H. C.

8a our reinforcemt did *not* arrive and that of the Enemy *did.*

9b which unfortunately happened to be the Case, as I feared it would.

10c which was exactly what hap'ned

11fiklmnopqrs Which exactly happened as I feared it would.

12d alas too true.

supposed to point against me as Commander in Chief of the army in North America.

The Commissioners are pleased to say, "It appears "that the number of the forces decreased every year, "from 1778, but the issue for the extraordinary "services of that army greatly encreased, during the "same period."[1a·2b·3d·4h·5i·]

[6a] And again, "In the account of the issues to the "officers in the four departments, we find that the "warrants[7i·8b] issued to the Quarter-master's-general,

1a had these Gentlemen read the report of a Board of Investigation recommended to their President by the Secretary of Treasury they would not have been at a loss to account for this

2b Too true but fully accounted for.

3d Tis true but if the Comrs had read the report of a board of investigation, appointed by Sr H. C. a year before they made of theirs and which was offered to them by the Treasury, they would have found this Increase accounted for and every other Remark in their 7th Report expos'd as they deserved to be, perhaps this was the reason they would not receive those Papers they were in some hurry to make this Report immediately after it their Salary was established

4h True and if the Comrs had examined me as they had done S. W. Howe & L.Cornwallis they would havefound it accounted for:

5i all accounted for & reported to the Treasury long before the date of this report — offered to the board but not accepted.

6a nor this

7i There were two Reasons why final warrants could not be granted; I had differing in that respect from other Comrs in Chief directed the Comr of accounts to act, in auditing, examining, & reporting all such accounts before I gave final warrants, till he had done so it will appear obvious therefore that I could not grant final warrants, nor could I grant final warrants to any but the heads of Departments and it often hapned that these were separated for a considerable time. the Q. M. Genl was in England for one whole year on very important service; and as money therefore could only be granted on temporary warrants, had that mode not been followed the service must have suffered with respect to the ceremony of a quarterly abstract that sauve la presence de Messieurs les Commissionars *is false.*

8b a Commissary of Controul and accounts was appointed in Feby 79 at my request all these accounts were of course referred to him; He would not act or report upon them, till he did no final warrant could be granted; nor indeed if he had could any final warrant have been granted to the Dept of Q. Master General as he was in England on service; nor indeed were any final warrants of the Comrs in chief necessary, for he could not pass accts.

"since the 16th July 1780, and to the Barrack-"master's-general since the 29th June 1780, and to "the Commissaries-general, since the 25th [43] of "May 1778, have been all temporary, for sums on "account; and that no final warrant has been "granted since those several periods.[1b·2h·] So that "these sums have been issued, without even the cere-"mony of a[3b] quarterly abstract,[4a] and the con-"fidential reliance on the officer, that his vouchers "are forth coming."[5d·6l·]

I arrived in London many days before the Com-

1b this is not true & the Commissioners know it.

2h false & they would have been convinced on enquiry.

3b quarterly abstract *underlined*.

4a I had very early in my Command requested that a Commissary of accounts might be appointed, Col. Drummond was appointed in Feby 79. but tho frequently called upon would not act till July 81. expecting of course that he would, all these accounts were to be laid before him, nor could I with propriety grant final warrants except upon his report.

5d In short without taking the trouble to explain Article by Article suffice it to say that declaring as they do that they can obtain no information relative to Expenditures in America pointing out the only means by which such information can be obtained when such is offered by authority they reject it imply a censure of neglect in the Comr in Chief and give credit to a Lieut Genl serving under *his* orders at *his* expence and that of Truth. They mention a certain suppd abuse existing and say the only orders they find striking at such abuse are those of Ld Cornllis 23rd Decr 80 whereas had they read the above reports and investigations they wd have seen that there were *general* orders of Sr H. Clinton of 18 months prior date to those Reports of Ld Cornllis presenting a *possibility* of such abuse and therefore if they did exist as the Commrs declare they did when Ld Cornllis issued his orders. They must have existed by his Lordship's disobedience of Sr H. C's orders, issued part of them while his Ldship was in the same Camp with Sr H. C. and are to be found in his Ldship's orderly Book. This I told Ld Cornwallis, Mr Pitt and the Comr ofrs in form in 1785. H. Clinton

6l had all these implyed Charges of Negligence been as well founded as they are most of them ill founded it will be difficult to place blame on S H C. He informed the Treasury he had not leisure to look into expenditures they answered that they could not expt & that at his desire they had appointed a Com. of accounts to examine audit & report relative to them if that Genl would not act how is S H C to blame.

missioners of Accounts delivered in their Seventh Report to the House of Commons.[1b] Had those Gentlemen called upon me, as they did on Sir William Howe, and Lord Cornwallis; had they examined certain officers of the different departments, who arrived in England at the time I did, and who announced themselves to them; and had they read all the Reports of the different Boards of General Officers and Magistrates, that had been appointed by me at New York, to enquire into the expenditure of public money,[2fiklmnopqrs·3a·4c] (all which reports had been sent to the [44] Lords Commissioners of the Treasury many months before)[5fiklmnopqrs] I am persuaded that their Report would not have appeared on the table of the House of Commons in the shape it has done. For when they were informed (as they would have been by the means just stated) that all the rum purchased for the supply of the army during the whole period of my command, was paid for in America by my warrants, whereas before then it used to be paid for in England; that considerable sums of money were paid on my warrants for expences incurred during the command of my predecessor,[6i·7ab] which could not be brought to account sooner; that provisions to a very considerable amount

1b A short Fact I told the Board when admitted to a private audience you say you have no information, can get none, that the only means by which tis to be obtained is in america, by persons of rank & properly qualified, such information I obtained by a board of Genl officers & Magistrates a year since, their report was sent to the treasury & I am informed by the Treasury it was offered to you before you made your seventh report but you rejected it.

2fiklmnopqrs from the beginning of the war to nearly its close.

3a and were particularly recommended to the board by Mr John Robinson then the Secretary of the Treasury.

4c and recommended to them by order of the Lords of the Treasury.

5fiklmnopqrs and which were recommended to their Consideration by Mr Robinson Secretary to the Treasury.

6i I paid above 300.000 of debts contracted in S.W.H. time.

7ab 300.000

were purchased in America,[1a·2b] and paid for in America on my warrants, for the supply of the army, which might otherwise have been exposed to the greatest distress; all which together amounted to nearly 1,500,000 l. and that the increase of posts, during my command, at [45] Savannah, Charles Town, Cape Fear, Portsmouth, Penobscot, &c.[3a] requiring each their respective establishments,[4fiklmnopqrs] added of course to the extraordinaries of my army;[5a] and that, besides these, and many others which I could enumerate, the peculiar circumstances of my command exposed me to many expences unknown to my predecessor;[6iknpq] it is presumed, those Gentlemen would have admitted, that the increase of the issues for the extraordinary services of the army under my command,[7iknpq] was accounted for. This matter, however, went, by my desire, through a very full and formal investigation,[8iknpq] in August 1781, before a Board of general officers and magistrates (of which Lieutenant-general Robertson was President) under the title of a Comparative View of Expences incurred,[9a] from the 31st December 1775, to the 16th of May 1778 (the time of Sir William Howe's command) and of what was paid by me,[10i] between the 26th of [46] May 1778,

1a 120,000; 500,000; etceteras 500,000.

2b etceteras the rest, 90,000

3a & had recollected that a defensive war is more expensive than an offensive one.

4fiklmnopqrs Solid works instead of light field works.

5a as explained by the report

6iknpq my Rum paid for by me £300,000.

7iknpq Provisions £100,000.

8iknpq of Debts contracted in Sir W: Howes time which were paid by me £300,000.

9a why this Comparative view was to take in 2yrs & 5 months of S. W. Howe, and two years 7 months of my command or with what view that was done Gen. Rob. and Col. Drumd must explain. Their Report proves the impropriety of it and that the last year of S. W. Howe and the first of mine would have been the fairest Comparative view, as will appear to all who read the report.

10i Increase of Loyalist Secret service one article of which cost (Arnold) £6300 & the whole amount of secret service during my command did not exceed £18000 & not a sixpence ever passed through my hands I count I had not better opportunity of distributing on such occasions,

and the 31st of December 1780. Which produced the following report from that Board.

"The great national expence in the first period "of Sir William Howe's command, arose from the "whole navy, and a very numerous fleet of transports, "being employed in attending the movements of the "army ; no part of which appears in Sir William "Howe's warrants.

"The expence of the Quarter-master-general, "Barrack-master-general, and Engineer departments, "were necessarily small, while the troops were on "board ships, or had their supplies from transports.

"During part of the first period, the great article "of expence, *rum*, was provided for by a contract "made in England, and paid for there. Whereas, "during the second period, the rum was pur-[47] "chased by the Commissary-general, and paid for by "the Commander in Chief's warrants. A very large "quantity of provisions purchased also, during the "latter period, swells the amount of the warrants.

"But what destroys a possibility of drawing any "just conclusion from a comparison of the amount "of the warrants in these two periods, arises from "this; that a great part of the expence incurred by "Sir William Howe, was paid by warrants granted "by Sir Henry Clinton."

This report having been regularly transmitted to the Treasury, I must suppose it was laid before the Commissioners of Accounts. Had it been read by those Gentlemen, it is presumable it would have, at least, accompanied theirs.

With regard to the second observation alluded to,[1b] respecting my not granting final warrants to certain departments from certain [48] periods; if the commissioners had read all the above papers, I think it would have occurred to them;[2b·3c] that

one million properly applied early would have saved America.

1b offered to them but rejected

2b I do not scruple in the least to assert that these Commissioners reported on exparte evi-

as a Commissary of Accounts had been commissioned, 1fiklmnopqrs·2c and was actually employed in auditing the accounts of the different departments, I could not, with propriety, grant final warrants to any of the departments upon their quarterly abstracts (as had been before practised) untill their accounts had been first audited and certified by the Commissary. 3fiknopqrs·41·5a·6a·

As to the mode of supply which I found established,[7a] when I succeeded to the command of the army in North America, and which I understood had been approved by Government, I certainly could not, in prudence, have made any alterations or reduction in it, as long as I had offensive operation in view. The instant, however, that I received orders to place

dence when other might be had, & I told them so at their Board

3c These Commissioners inform the Treasury they can get no information respecting the extraordinaries of the Army in America, point out the means by wch that is to be obtained, & when they are told by the Treasury, that such means had been employed a year since by Sir H. Clinton, and the report then laying at the Treasury, they neglect availing themselves of it, censure one officer commend another without the least cause for either.

1fiklmnopqrs That Gentleman was Commissioned in Feb. 79, but I could not prevail upon him to act till July 1781.

2c by S W. Howe

3fiknopqrs That I did both the instant I obtained his certificate or was otherwise justified by another Board of Genl officers & whose proceedings were also sent to the Treasury before the Commissioners of Accounts made their 7th Report & was offered to their Inspection.

41 *Same as note* 3, *adding* together with the first.

5a the Commissary General Mr Weir objected to his accounts being audited in America & the Principal of the Q M Generals Department Col. Dalrymple, was in England from July 80 to Octr 81 so that no final warrant could be granted to that Departt in his absence.

6a the President of the board of Contract.

7a The Contracts of supply were *all* made by Sir Willm Erskine, & by order of S W. Howe, as I found them; so I left them. if contract & Controul were in the same hands S. W. E. told me it ever had been the custom in America I told him it sounded odd that I should take no notice, but that we must be *responsable.*

the army upon a strict defensive, I proposed such a reduction as could take place. And when I obtained [49] his Majesty's permission to resign the command, I recommended it to General Robertson, who was appointed to succeed me.

(Signed)

"H. CLINTON."

1g.2h.3i.

1g These Gentlemen the Commissioners of Accounts told the Secy of the Treasury that they could get no information relative to expenditures in America they recommend that proper persons may examine on the spot, they are informed their wishes had been anticipated a year before by S H Clinton, & the papers and reports recommended for their inspection and examination. but they reject them, & make their Report on exparte information censure some commend others without being founded in either.

2h The short fact is & I told these Gentlemen so at their Board, and further that the Sectry of the Treasury had informed me that He had had a meeting with their President & told him on his complaining they could get no information, & pointing out the only means by wch it could be obtained that such had been obtained by S H Clinton & the Lords of the Treasury wished them to acpt that report (of the board appointed by S H C). but tho it was offered a second time to them through their Secretary it was rejected; & that they had therefore made their report on exparte information; I said further that I would not have been guilty of such impropriety by them for all the world; & as to Lord Cornwallis he had declared upon Oath that an abuse had existed in the Com. Genl department when he issued his orders Oct 80 to remedy; I would declare either that no such abuse did exist or if it did it must have been owing to L. C disobeying my orders most of them given many months before his, & while he was under my immediate Command.

3i The President of this board of accounts waited upon Mr Robinson then Secretary of the Treasury I believe in March 82 in company with Mr Mollison the then Secretary He informed Mr Robinson that it would be impossible for his board to give any information relative to expenditures He pointed out the means by which that was to be obtained Mr Robinson informed him that S H C had long since anticipated their wishes obtained full information & reported it to the Treasury and that it was their Lordships wishes the Commissioner would examine it, but that notwithstanding they left it

out of their Precept sent to the Treasury by Mr Mollison it was however altered by Mr Martin Leak by desire Mr Robinson & with the Consent of Mr Mollison, but on his returning with it to the Commissions He Mr Mollison was sent back with a Precept still more confined than the first — this I had from Mr Robinson himself — In short the Board of Commissioners Complain they can get no information on american expenditures point out the only means by which that is to be obtained, & when such is offered by the Treasury they refuse it, imply censure of negligence on S H C and give the Credit of an ecconomical system to Lord Cornwallis (which by the bye his Lordship also seems to have assumed.) & which belongs to S. H. Clinton & which had been established by the order of S. H. C of date 12 months prior to that order which L C seems to have claimed the merit, & the Commissioners of accts have positively ascribed it to his Lordship.

APPENDIX.

Number I. [51] Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, dated May 2, 1781. *see Letter p* 464.

Number II. [53] Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, dated June 6, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 13.

Number III. [54] Copy of a Letter from Rear Admiral Sir S. Hood to Sir H. Clinton, dated off Cape Henry, August 25, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 140.

Number IV. [55] Copy of a Letter from General Washington to Count De Grasse, dated Williamsburg, September 26, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 165.

Number V. [61] Extract from Lord George Germain's Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, dated October 12, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 178.

Number VI. [63] Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letter to Rear-Admiral Graves, dated August 16, 1781. *see Extract* ii. 126. Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letter to Rear-Admiral Graves, dated August 18, 1781. *see Extract* ii. 129.

Number VII. [64] Extracts from Rear-Admiral

Graves's Letters to Sir H. Clinton, dated 18 and 21 August, 1781. *see Extracts* ii. 129.

Number VIII. [65] Extract from Lord Cornwallis's Letter to Sir H. Clinton. York Town, Virginia, 20 October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 205. Copy [68] of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated 30 November, 1781. (This letter was not produced in the House of Lords.) *see Letter* ii. 217.

Number IX. [70] Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, dated New York, 2d December, 1781. (This letter was read in the House of Lords.) *see Letter* ii. 219.

Number IX. [73] Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, 2d and 10th December, 1781. (This letter was not read in the House of Lords.) *see Letter* ii. 240.

Number IX. [82] Extract of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, to Lord George Germaine, dated December 3, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 230.

Number IX. [84] Copy of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, to Lord George Germain, dated December 6, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 233.

Number X. [95] Extract from Sir H. Clinton's Instructions to Major-General Philips, dated March 10, 1781. *see Letter p* 347. Extract [96] from the Substance of Conversations held with General Philips, sent to that General Officer for his Guidance. *see Letter p* 430.

Number XI. [97] Vide p. 7. l. 15. Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain, Oct. 30, 1780. *see Letters p* 281.—April 5, 1781 *p* 383. [103] April 30, 1781. *p* 458.—[105] Inclosed in the above letter the following extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's letters to Major General Phillips, April 26, 1781. *see Letters p* 437. [106] April 30, 1781. *p* 450.

N.B. These two letters with other dispatches fell into Lord Cornwallis's hands on General Phillips's death and were opened by his Lordship; and the expedition therein proposed recommended to his consideration.

Number XII. [109] Vide p. 37. l. 6. Extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain. May 20, 1781. *see Letters p* 474. May 22, *p* 478.

Number XIII. [111] Vide p. 37. l. 11. Extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain, July 18, 1781. *see Letters* ii. 82. [113] July 25, ii. 91. August 9, ii. 120.

[*From last leaf of Book* i *which is mutilated.*]

26 Feb. 89

After reading this narrative perhaps it will be acknowledged that the original cause of the misfortunes of the Campagn 81 was Lord Cornwallis coming there (contrary to H C orders) and his advising the Cabinet [to ad]opt *solid* operation there, the second [cause] was the Fleet under Lord Rodney [not following] the French Fleet to Chesapeak [to cover] operations as he had [been] ordered and had promised [to do] can S. H. C. be in the least [responsib]le; in L. C. reply all he includes [attempts to prove the] misfortunes of that Campaign [were] not the unavoidable consequences of his coming into Virginia or his advising the Ministers to adopt solid operation [there] he [insinuates] further that if S. H. C. had disapproved of his being there he might have disposed of his Corps as he pleased, [His] Lordship might have recollected that the Cabinet letter page 51 & others clearly put it out of [S. H. C.'s] power to draw a man from chesapeak if he had not been forbid to do so, under the [ass]urances of a covering fleet he should not [have] been anxious to have sent him back knowing [it was] the Cabinets and his wish to carry on operation [there] & having determined himself to quit the [com]mand the instt he should think himself [at] liberty—this obsn of his Lordship therefore [had] better been left out—if his Lordship

AN

ANSWER

TO THAT PART OF THE

NARRATIVE

OF

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

Which relates to the Conduct of

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

EARL CORNWALLIS,

DURING THE

CAMPAIGN IN NORTH-AMERICA,

IN THE YEAR 1781.

By EARL CORNWALLIS.

LONDON:
Printed for J. DEBRETT, (Successor to Mr. Almon,)
opposite BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
M.DCC.LXXXIII.

THE
INTRODUCTION.

THE feelings, which dictate this publication, have originated from the contents of a Narrative, signed by Sir Henry Clinton, late Commander in Chief in America. In which Narrative, events are attributed to my conduct[1b] during the campaign of 1781, which, I trust, it will appear, were by no means the unavoidable[2ac·3b] consequences of any part of it.[4a·5c·6c·7a·]

1b and Councils my good Lord.

2ac unavoidable *underlined.*

3b Had Lord Cornwallis been as explicit in his Reply as he had been in his conversation with S H Clinton at N. York, He would have said thus. I would not have come into Virginia, or advised the Cabinet to adopt solid operation there, if I had not had hopes and had expected a covering Fleet—we were promised it we had it not in time; the Fate which met me there was not therefore the unavoidable consequence of my conduct or my councils, such an explanation would have thrown great share of blame on the Cabinet & on the Navy to whom it belongs.

4a I acknowledge that If the *promised* covering Fleet had arrived, L. Cornwallis would have been safe.

5c Memm. Narrative Jany 25. my letter 5 march 81 expresses my opinion of operation in Chesapeak witht the certainty of a covering Fleet. Tarletons History proves L C disregard of my orders, first by throwing down the works of C Town & then by marching into N. Carolina leaving it exposed. How different L C. opinion is when He in a conversation we had says He did not think He could be justified in leaving York & escaping to S. Carolina unless I had assured him the Fleet would not attempt to succour him in his letter 20 octr He says if He had not had *hopes* of succour He would have tried to escape to N. York.

6c Sir Henry Clinton could not prevent Lord Cornwallis going into Virginia — he was forbid sending him back, or employing his Corps anywhere else — he did all that depended on him to

The materials, hitherto produced, cannot be deemed complete, either in form or substance. There were many deficiencies in the papers laid before the House of Lords;[1c] in particular, four

render his operations there secure — all he could to succour him: & by the best Plan, all he could to strike at the Enemy's Combinations before they were put in motion against his Lordship. Certain it is however(tho S H C. must ever disapprove of operation in Virginia beginning in June) yet if the promised Fleet had arrived in time L. Cornwallis could not have been attempted by the Enemy, tho in such a climate, at such a season he must have risked his army, as I had charg'd his Lordship with calling for letters in Parliament & publishing others witht my answers I suppose he judged it necessary to seem at least to retort.

7a once established in Virginia tis certain nothing could supply, succour or save you but a Fleet, but all must admit that if you had not (contrary to my original orders; contrary to my opinions contained in dispatches (which if you had not received, if Col Balfour had done his duty you *must* have received); contrary to the united opinion of all the officers you called into Council) marched into Virginia you could not have been taken there. I never meant to be understood to say that Catastrophe was the unavoidable consequence of your march. We were promised a Fleet by Minister and Admiral if we had it not, it was not S H Clinton's fault, this your Lordship knew, acknowledged in private, & should have done so publickly.

1c There were deficiencies tis true my good Lord and I have proved it in my narrative, and so clearly that your Lordship finds it necessary to meet it by a *retort*, but you unfortunately have pitched upon 4 letters which of all others are such as I could have wished to have published, particularly the 3 last, as they describe the Post of York which you had chosen in preference to that of Old point Comfort in the James river very differently, from what you describe it in your letter giving an account of the Capitulation. And the copies of the others in augt and Octr were sent to the Minister because the originals had been dispatched to your Lordship; but had been *taken*, a circumstance not known to me at the time, but with respect to my charge it stands shortly thus, Your Lordship's letter giving an account of the Catastrophy which lost America is read in the House of Lords, & though it contained implications nay assertions reflecting on the Comr in Chief some of which you acknowledge not founded, this letter to your Lordship in answer is not read, (altho He had particularly requested the minister to publish it,) still more strange your Lordships reply to this letter is called for and *read*, & *published*, so that, of a Correspondence of so much Consequence, your Lordships part of it only is read!!!

letters, dated July the 24th, August the 16th, 20th, and 22d, from me to Sir Henry Clinton, were wanting;[1a.2a] one of which contained my reasons at large for undertaking the [ii] march[3b.4d] into Virginia: This omission, as the Secretary of State informed the House, was owing to their not having been transmitted by the Commander in Chief. Four other letters (three of them dated the 2d, 27th, and 30th of August, and one the

1a as S H Clinton had not blamed your march to the Minister, it was not necessary for him to send your reasons for it, you had given them when you made the move, and as to your letters 16th 20th 22nd August, those of all others S H Clinton should have wished to send to the Minister, as they describe your Post of York so favorably, and so differently from your description of it in your letter 20th october after your capitulation. read pages 185. to 188 of this book.

2a Having proved that these letters were of no consequence to Lord Cornwallis tho some of them were materially so to S. H. C. He must again repeat that of 4 letters giving an account of the catastrophe of York Town & the events which produced it, those only of Lord Cornwallis are called for in the house of Lords or Published.

3b As S H Clinton had never accused Lord Cornwallis to the minister there surely was no occasion for him to Vindicate his Lordships conduct Lord Cornwallis availing himself of the power S H Clinton had given him of *reporting* to the minister, not only did that but offered his plans, and, gave his reasons for every part of his conduct it therefore was not necessary for S H Clinton to send duplicates; but Lord Cornwallis conduct was very different. He was in the House of Lords desired Lord Townsend to call for his Lordship's answer to S H Clinton page 68 of his appendix while his letter of the 30th novr page 66, to which it was an answer, was not read in the House of Lords or called for. as to the 4 others:

4d As Sr Hy Clinton had never accused Ld Cornwallis to the minister it was not necessary to vindicate his Lordship. Lord Cornwallis when he marched into Virginia and advised solid operation there gave his reasons to the Minister and explained those also which had induced him to March into N. Carolina to Wilmington &c &c.—The Letters of the 16th 20th and 22nd of August where left out by mistake of all others (*read them*) they were what I should have wished to have published as they describe the Post very different from what his Lordship described it on his surrender but his Ldship seems to think it necessary to meet my charge (of producing his Answers to my Letters without those to which they were answers) by something similar on my part.

14th, 15th, and 18th of October) from Sir Henry Clinton to me, were read to the Lords, according to the order of their dates; although they were only delivered to me, by the Secretary to the Commander in Chief, in the latter end of November, at New-York, above a month after my surrender; and consequently, their contents could not influence my conduct in any manner.[1d]

I own I am perfectly aware of the impropriety of publishing official letters for private reasons; but, since the measures with respect to America have now undergone a total change, I hope, I shall in some degree stand excused for producing the whole correspondence, in my possession, relative[2d] to the principal transactions of that campaign; as it is the most candid and complete mode, in my power, of submitting them to the public consideration.

The perusal of this Correspondence will, I think, render not only the military, but every other reader a competent judge of the proprie[iii]ty of my conduct, either when I acted under positive orders, pressing contingencies, or discretionary powers.[3a·4a·5d·]

1d These others were sent by a Man of War but she was taken, that Sr H. C. could not know till the copy's were gone to Europe.

2d even private Letters Yr Lordship published and such as only could tend to produce altercation between the good Old Admiral and me and deliver over a whole district and a Chief by Name to the resentment of Congress Vide Pages 105. 111. Yr Lordship's Reply.

3a positive *to* powers *underlined.*

4a from the opinion I had of your judgment & exertions I acquiesced in your Plan of operations in N. Carolina as long as you had the means of making a *solid* establishment there, but not after your loss at Cowpens. You had positive orders not to make any move that might endanger Charles Town, you notg. order part of the works to be levelled, & 3 times while that Capitol is in that *exposed* state, (without reporting it to the Comr in Chief) you move at the very probable risk of losing that Capitol & a province, put under your care: what the pressing contingencies were which induced you to move into Virginia in April 81 I am at a loss to guess. the exertions were as likely to have been made to the Northward, & probably to more advantage in the months of July &c & then in Virginia.

It is foreign to the present purpose, and I shall therefore not endeavour to enumerate the many difficulties, which I had to struggle with, in my command of the Southern district, previous to the march into North Carolina, in the beginning of the year 1781. This measure was thought expedient not only by me, but by the Commander in Chief :[1b] I was principally induced to decide in favour of its expediency from a clear conviction, that the men and treasures of Britain would be lavished in vain upon the American war, without the most active exertions of the troops allotted for that service ; and, that, while the enemy could draw their supplies from North Carolina and Virginia, the defence of the frontier of South Carolina, even against an inferior army, would be from its extent, the nature of the climate, and the disposition of the inhabitants, utterly impracticable. The many untoward circumstances, which occurred during the four months succeeding the complete victory of Camden, had entirely confirmed me in this opinion. Our hopes of success, in offensive operations, [iv] were not founded only upon the efforts of the corps under my immediate command, which did not much exceed three thousand men ;[2b] but principally, upon the most positive assurances, given by apparently credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the appearance of a British army in North Carolina,[3b] a great body of the inhabitants were ready to join and co-operate with it, in endeavouring to restore his Majesty's Government.[4a]

5d Under one of these My good Lord you might have saved part of your Army if you had at any time thought you could not be succoured by the Navy read Washington's Letter to de Grasse respecting the practicability of your doing so.

1b I approved a solid opn to give it a fair Tryal but not a disultory move such as he was obliged to make after Tarltons defeat and the destruction of his waggons &c.

2b he passed the Catawba 3560

3b he fought the battle of Guildford with 1306.

4a such assurances were given at that time but none after they had been abandoned in Sept 80.

The disaster of the 17th of January cannot be imputed to any defect in my conduct, as the detachment was certainly superior to the force against which it was sent, and put under the command of an officer of experience and tried abilities.[1a] This misfortune, however, did not appear irretrievable;[2a,3b,4b] and to have abandoned, without absolute necessity, the plan of the campaign, would have been ruinous and disgraceful: ruinous, by engaging us in a defensive system,[5a] the impracticability of which I have already stated; and disgraceful, because the reasons for the undertaking still existed in their full strength, the public faith was pledged to our friends in North Carolina, and I believed my remaining force to be superior to that under the command of General Greene. [v] That this opinion was well founded, the precipitate retreat of that General from North Carolina, and our victory at Guildford, after his return with Virginia reinforcements, are sufficient proofs.

The unexpected failure of our friends[6a] rendered the victory of Guildford of little value. I know that it has been asserted or insinuated that they were not sufficiently tried upon this occasion: But can any dispassionate person believe, that I did not

1a Tarlton tells us you promised to co-operate & did not.

2a have you so soon forgot Lord Rawdons letters 29 Octr 1780, written in your name. pages 37. 38 to 44 My Observations. did not these reasons operate stronger in Jany after you had lost all your light Troops at Cowpens, and destroyed your waggons & had not the means of making a solid move into North Carolina.

3b Your Lordsp offered co-operation, it was accepted and you promised it. had you co-operated: Morgan would have flown and you would have catched him probably at his passage of Catawbaw

4b after the loss of all your light troops how could you hope to succeed in an operation depending so totally on them.

5a Why was you to suppose that S H C was to be Idle or that his offensive in the proper season for him to act was not as likely to be important and successfull as your Lordship's in such a Province as Virginia and at such a season.

6a or rather of your means of protecting them.

give every encouragement to people of all descriptions to join and assist us, when my own reputation, the safety of the army, and the interests of my country, were so deeply concerned in that junction and assistance? All inducements in my power were made use of without material effect; and every man in the army must have been convinced, that the accounts of our emissaries had greatly exaggerated the number of those who professed friendship for us, as they must have observed, that a very inconsiderable part of them could be prevailed upon to remain with us, or to exert themselves in any form whatever.[1b]

This disappointment, and the wants and distresses of the army, compelled me to move to Cross-creek; but meeting there with no ma[vi]terial part of the promised assistance and supplies, I was obliged to continue my march to Wilmington,[2a·3b] where hospitals and stores were ready for us. Of this move I sent information by several expresses to Lord Rawdon, but unfortunately they all failed. My intention then was, as soon as I should have equipped my own corps, and received a part of the expected reinforcement from Ireland, to return to the upper country;[4a] in hopes of giving some protection to South Carolina, and of preserving the health of the troops, until new measures could be concerted with the Commander in Chief.[5a]

1b your Lordp ordered them to rise after Campden, they did so, you marched to suppt them. Fergusons defeat obliged you to retrograde and leave them to be massacred you afterwards made a desultory move instead of a solid one to support them and when you invited them to join you, you had not 700 men to support them; no arms to give them, not 2 days provision in your army, & actually in retreat when you called them!!!

2a why not to Campden my good Lord.

3b for these reasons Campden was much nearer, in going there you had all these, you covered S. Carolina & obey'd the orders you had received.

4a and you had promised so to do.

5a do you not my good Lord in your letter to L. G. G. dated the day before you march into Virginia say that you had heard

The march of General Greene into South Carolina, and Lord Rawdon's danger, made my situation very critical.[1a·2c] Having heard of the arrival of a pacquet from Europe, without any certain accounts of the sailing of the reinforcement, I thought it too hazardous to remain inactive;[3a·4a] and, as it was impossible to receive in time any orders[5b·6b] or opinions[7bd·8d] from Sir Henry Clinton to direct me,[9c] it became my duty to act from my own judg-

my dispatches & orders were coming to you.

1a & yet tho' you announce to your army that L. R. with a 3d of your numbers had beaten Green you still proceed.

2c why did you not return to S. Carolina my good Lord. you knew of the dismantled state of C. Town, you had aprehensions for Lord Rawdons corps & carolina by going even by sea which you might have done in 12 hours, or by Waggamaw were you were invited by Col. Balfour you saved Lord Rawdon S Carolina & Charlestown, by going to Virginia you risked not only all these but Genl. Phillips corps which you had ordered to meet you at Petersberg.

3a the good Earl seems to think that no body's activity but his own could save America was it even True that S. H C. Zeal, capacity or activity did not Equal His Lordship's; His Exertions to the Northward in the months of July &c. were more likely to benefit the cause than any his Lordship could carry on in Virginia at that season.

4a inactive *underlined.*

5b orders *underlined.*

6b those orders those opinions were lying at C. Town since the 7th. you knew it C. Balfour read this, & neglected sending them to you by the Amphitrite and Swallow, & finally sent you what was not the substance of those orders & opinions for they all tended to prevent your going into Virginia.

7bd opinions *underlined.*

8d Both were waiting at C. Town for yr Ldship from the 6th of April 81 to the 23d the day you marched for Virginia read them then ask yourself whether instead of inviting you into Virginia or inducing you to hope that solid operations might be adopted in that quarter they do not tell you the Enemys Fleet is in the Chesapeak that I had determined against solid operation there fixed on another Plan which yr Lordship by going there would counteract had you therefore read those Letters you would have saved the Provinces of South Carolina and Georgia preserved your Own Army in the back healthy parts of S. Carolina as I should the rest by taking the other part of it from that sickly Province of Virginia assembled the whole at New York and saved America.

9c don't say my good Lord it was impossible to receive S H C. orders, your letter dated the day before you move acknowledges

ment and experience; I therefore upon mature deliberation, decided to march into Virginia, as the safest[1a] and most effectual means[2a] of employing the small corps, under my command, in contributing towards the general [vii] success of the war.[3c] I came to this resolution principally for the following reasons,—I could not remain at Wilmington, lest General Greene should succeed against Lord Rawdon, and, by returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry, and every horse in the army:[4c] From the shortness of Lord Rawdon's stock of provisions, and the great distance from Wilmington to Camden, it appeared impossible, that any direct move of mine could afford him the least prospect of relief:[5a] in the attempt, in case of a misfortune to him,[6c] the safety of my own corps might have been endangered ; or if he extricated himself, the force in South Carolina, when assembled, was, in my opinion, sufficient to secure what was valuable to us, and capable of defence in that province.[7c] I was likewise influenced by having just received an account from Charles-town of the arrival of a frigate with dispatches[8d] from the Commander in Chief,[9b] the sub-

that dispatches & consequently orders have been near 3 weeks at C. Town, & that they may be expected every hour nay ought to have been (had Col. Balfour done his duty) with you long since.

1a safest *underlined.*

2a effectual means *underlined.*

3c it surely was safer to go back to S. Carolina — nor can there be the least doubt but that it was the most effectual,

4c return by Waggamaw my good Lord.

5a you know my good Lord you might have passed the Bayernin that Coll Balfour intreated you to do so, told you He had sent to occupy George Town. & gallies & boats into that River for that purpose that unless you did C. Town would be lost.

6c risk a 3d of your Force He relieved you from all apprehension & you knew it before you had marched 4 days.

7c what say Lord Rawdon & C Balfour to this.

8d if that was all that Coll Balfour sent yr Lordship he ought to have been dismissed the service. With respect to the rest I refer you to Number 5.

9b disobeys his orders which

stance of which, then transmitted to me,[1a] was, that General Phillips had[2c·3a] been detached to the Chesapeak, and put under my orders; which induced me to hope, that solid operations might be adopted [viii] in that quarter: and I was most firmly persuaded, that, until Virginia was reduced,[4d] we could not hold the more southern provinces; and that, after its reduction, they would fall without much resistance, and be retained without much difficulty.[5a·]

With these sentiments, I joined General Phillips's corps at Petersburgh on the 20th of May, a few days after his death; but from his papers, and dispatches from the Commander in Chief, directed to him, which I received at that place on the 24th of May, I found there were other projects in contemplation, which to me were entirely new.[6d·7c·8c·] The Com-

were to cover S. Carolina marches into the most sickly province at the worst of seasons & uncertain of having a covering fleet there; Complains of not having orders & opinions & tho he knows they are coming to him does not wait for them, but at the risk of all these losses, and in direct disobedience to his orders marches into Virginia as the safest and most effectual means &c. &c.

1a who ever did transmit that as the substance transmitted anything but the substance these dispatches did not inform your Lordship that Gen Phillips *had been detached,* but that he waited the Event of a Naval action to be detached, & the same dispatches informed you, I was determined to withdraw all but a Small Place of Arms in the sickly season, in short these dispatches all but forbid your going into Virginia, by telling you the French Fleet were there.

2c if Col Balfour sent your Lordship that substance He deceived you.

3a had *underlined.*

4d you was as firmly persuaded you ought not to undertake the reduction of Virginia in the month of June and that if you succeeded you could not hope to keep it or remain in safety in that Province unless we had a permanent superiority at sea which at the time you marched you had not the least reason to hope for or expect.

5a own honestly my good Lord did you Ever think operations in Virginia safe, practicable or likely to succeed, without a covering Fleet did you expect one when you forced operations there?

6d But which ought to have been considered as orders to yr Lordship (for such they had been to Genl Phillips) till you recd My Letters of the 29th of May by which your Ldship was left at Liberty to follow your own Plan if you had any.

7c how would your hopes of

mander in Chief having desired General Phillips to give his opinion concerning the scheme of operations in the Upper Chesapeak, and the design upon Philadelphia, I thought it my duty, as I was then in his place, to offer mine: which was, that I could not see sufficient grounds for approving of either of these schemes; nor indeed could I bring myself to think any other plan, but the attempt to reduce Virginia, at that time either expedient or important.[1b] But I informed Sir Henry Clinton that I should repair to Williamsburgh about the time when I should probably receive his answer,[2a] in order to be in readiness to execute his com-[ix] mands; and that I should employ the intermediate space in destroying such of the enemy's stores and magazines, as might be within my reach.

the Comr in chief having adopted solid operation in Virginia at that unhealthy season have been founded you would have seen by these dispatches & a copy of his instructions to Gen Phillips that Genl waited the event of a naval action (which equally imported you to know) before he was detatched;—and that His corps was to be withdrawn to the northward in June leaving only a weak detatchment in Chesapeak during the unhealthy season, you would have done well to have recollected also that even if you could have succeeded in taking Virginia you must have been convinced it could not be kept without a Fleet; till you were certain therefore of having that superior permanent Fleet you should not have risked it. doing it also by a move which lost you those very provinces you wish to secure is conduct which deserves a name I shall not give it. That which you would have been informed of had you received his dispatches from C. Town before you quitted Wilmington.

8c I certainly ever did declare against it till I was sure of a permanent superiority at sea.

1b I on the Contrary till then was perfectly assured we ought not to have attempted Virginia for whi of naval superiority could at the Carolinas & which you would not have been ignorant of had you read the dispatches being at C. Town.

2a my answer my good Lord was of course determined by the orders I had received to adopt your Plan of conquering Virginia, not to take a man from you, but after the Hurricane season to reinforce you to the utmost; you knew from G. Phillips papers what had been my Plan if you had not broke in upon it, finding you not inclined to pursue your own, unless I removed the whole army from N. York to that burying ground you had plac'd yours

[1a]Whoever reads the Correspondence will see, that, since Sir Henry Clinton had declared positively in his first, and in several subsequent dispatches, against the plan of reducing Virginia,[2d·3a] no explicit alternative was left to me, between complying with the requisition (contained in his letters of the 11th and 15th of June) of such troops as I could spare from a healthy defensive station, or engaging in operations in the Upper Chesapeak:[4a] The choice[5a] of an healthy situation was controlled by other material considerations;[6a] for, whilst he stated in such strong terms the imminent danger of New York, or the important effects, which he expected from the expedition against Philadelphia, I did not think myself authorized to detain any part of the troops he so earnestly required;[7d] merely upon my opinion of the difference of the quality of the air of Williamsburgh, York, or Portsmouth; from the latter of which only, as it was already fortified, I could afford an immediate detachment. And with respect to the operations in the Upper Chesa-[x] peak, it will be remarked, that, although that plan

in. I recommended my Plan, which you thought proper to disapprove; I then apprehensive of a visit of a French armament from the W. Indies, recommend a respectable Place of Arms & leaving as few troops as possible in that sickly Province.

1a from this Sir H Clinton did disapprove of the Plan for reducing Virginia and his Lordship rather adopted His own which failed; then sent a Part of the army to Sir Henry Clinton after His Lordship had established a defensive Situation in the Carolinas.

2d Sir Henry Clinton was always of opinion that until North Carolina was reduced and we were sure of a permanent superiority at sea for reasons too obvious to him to need mentioning.

3a against *to* Virginia *underlined.*

4a this blends a number of different subjects the first Requisition was not complied with; nor the second at a distant period from the first.

5a what were those considerations?

6a from the subject entirely—

7d Read it once more My good Lord You will find that till you had passed the James and gone to Portsmouth I called for none except such as you could spare from a Healthy respectable defensive &c. &c. On the Williamsburg Neck at Williamsburg or York.

had been for some time under the consideration of the Commander in Chief, he did not seem inclined to take more share in the responsibility than barely to recommend it:[1a.2b.3d] and many reasons, but particularly my recent failure in a similar attempt, deterred me from undertaking it, without an explicit instruction. Accordingly, that I might be enabled to comply with those orders of the 11th and 15th of June, I passed James-river, (my remaining force being insufficient to fortify and maintain a post on the Williamsburgh Neck) and embarked the troops required with all possible dispatch. And it will be seen by the Correspondence, that the Commander in Chief's opinion of the indispensable necessity of an harbour for line of battle ships only appears in his letter of the 11th of July,[4d.5a] after he had

1a to General Phillips I had ordered it, but to your Lordship I only recommended it in case you had no Plan of your own, or should think operation in Virginia at that season dangerous, after being ordered to adopt and support your Plan I could not with propriety direct another.

2b was not G. Phillips positively ordered to carry it into execution if L. C had not come—was it not L. C duty to obey all orders he found in Virg[a] on his arrival altho out of delicacy I did not repeat the order, but only recommended, referring him however to the orders he should find there.

3d I had ordered Gen[l] Phillips to carry it into execution. The Minister at first approved but the King afterwards disapproved and ordered me to adopt your Plan, not thinking it likely your Ld-ship s[d] have any Plan in such a climate in that advanced season I took the Liberty to recommend that which I had before ordered and which was approved by the Kings Cabinet. A second time *Alas too late.*

4d It was then for the first time that the Admiral informed me that a Place of arms to cover a station for line of battle ships which was since your Lordship had forced solid operation in Chesapeak absolutely necessary According to the spirit of My orders I am willing to acknowledge that not liking Old Point Comfort you did well in taking York and Gloucester in York River but you should have informed me of the defects if any as you had done of Old P. Comfort in Jame's River.

5a until the Admiral informed me that a Naval Station for ships of the line was absolutely necessary, tis true I never gave your Lordship positive orders to occupy one. If you mean to insinuate (by what follows) an instance of my indicision others who read our correspondence will be more

been acquainted, that the troops, intended for the expedition against Philadelphia, would be soon ready to sail.

Hampton-road[1a] was recommended by that order; but, as it was, upon examination, found totally unfit for the purpose desired, every person can judge, whether the order did not then, in its spirit, become positive[2b] to occupy York and Gloucester;[3a] the only harbour in the Che[xi]sapeak, that I knew of then, or indeed that I have heard of since, in which line of battle ships can be received, and protected against a superior naval force:[4a] and, as the harbour was the indispensable object, I thought it unnecessary[5d.6d] to enter into a description of the disadvantage of the ground, against a land attack, since there remained no other choice.[7d.]

liberal I believe recollect my good Lord that of

1a in James river.

2b certainly not. read my letter to G. Phillips dated March 10th 81 page Lord Cornwallis reply 175, does not this clearly imply that if he had forcible objects to the station required by the admiral as the above certainly was he must decline it, at least his Lordship should have waited my answer, but I am convinced of the necessity of a place of arms to cover large ships from the Admirals opinion, & convinced we should have the promised fleet to cover our operations I should have directed him still to take old P. Comfort notwithg the objections he made, for reasons obvious.

3a line of battle ships you had none with you but every ship you had with you except those you sunk were burned by the Enemys batteries, such effectual Protection you gave in York river which you had chosen in preference, when I recomd.

4a tho you might have saved part of your army any time before that of the Enemy was assembled, I never blamed you for not attempting it under such circumstances I repeat that nothing could save you but a Fleet or well chosen respectable Place of arms till that Fleet should arrive the Minister promised a covering Fleet, you *implyed* that your Post was respectable had it not been so you should have said so. had you told me at first what you did at last I should have if I had had no hopes of joining you have advised you to save what you could your moving army;

5d You cannot surely be in earnest My good Ld

6d unnecessary *underlined.*

7d My letter of the 2d August 81 explains all this. page 237 Lord Cornwallis reply.

read my letters of 19 June.

When the arrival of the French fleet, and the approach of General Washington, were known to Sir Henry Clinton, it will appear by the Correspondence, that his promises of relief in person[1a·2a] were uniform;[3b·4d] without giving me the smallest particle of discretionary power,[5d·6a] different from holding the posts that I occupied. Every reader will therefore be competent to judge, whether, under these circumstances, and as I could not but suppose that the Commander in Chief spoke from a perfect[7a] knowledge of his own resources,[8a·9b·10d] and of the force of the enemy, it would have been justifiable in me either to abandon, by the evacuation of York, a considerable quantity of artillery, the ships of war, transports, provisions, stores, and hospitals, or, by venturing an action, without the most manifest advantage, to run the risk of precipitating the loss of them.[11b·]

wherein I tell you that De Grasse will most probably come upon the Coast with a considerable armament. I rept a *respectable* Post.

1a by a direct move by sea when the Admiral would convoy or convey me.

2a Whenever the Fleet should convoy or convey me.

3b all depending on the fleet.

4d whenever the Admiral should convey him.

5d Under what power did your Lordship act, when you movd into Virginia contrary to orders—when you quitted the Williamsburg Neck 5th July—when you chose York and Gloucester in preference to old Pt Comfort wch you were ordered to take, either discretionary power of pressing contingencies, no further Comment, my good Lord is I believe necessary

6a discretionary power *underlined.*

7a perfect *underlined.*

8a My own yes, but I did not know the event of the Naval action of the 5th Sept till the 13th or the number of the Enemys Fleet till the 23d or whether the Navy would or could make an attempt to succour you till I had met the Admirals in Council on the 24th Sept.

9b I had informed L. C we had 21 sail. He knew what I did not tell R that the Enemy had 37.

10d By my letter of the 2d and 6th Septr your Lordship was made acquainted with *all* my resources those of the Enemy you reported to me in your answer of the 17th till I received that letter I knew not the great disparity of numbers in the two Fleets.

11b Can his Lordsp be serious when he calls it venturing an action against St Simons Corps, or La fayettes or both.

[xii] Although the Marquis de la Fayette advanced his light troops early in September to Williamsburgh, he did not take post there with his army till reinforced with the French troops from the West Indies, under the command of Brigadier de St. Simon. I could, at that time, after leaving some slight guards in the works, have marched out a little more than four thousand men, partly composed of troops unaccustomed to action.[1a.2d.3b.] The enemy were in a strong position, and considerably superior in number, but I should have attacked them without hesitation, if I had thought myself at liberty, after a victory,[4b] to escape into the Carolinas, with the

1a I do not know a single Regt that had not acquired credit in action, if there were any such you would probably have left them in the works. St. Simon had 3000 sickly raw troops from West Indies La Fayette 2000. you had includg sailors & negros &c near 9000. you surely had more than 4000 to move with but that was quite enough.
read Tarlton on this intended move, His Lordship had the Guards. 2. Btt Light Infy 2. Bt 17 Regt 23d 33d 43d 71. 76th 80th Ansp. 2 Battn Hess. P. Here. Bose. P. 100. Q. Ranger & this Legion besides detatchments 1000 men, from artillery cavalry, &c &c which of all these His Lordship calls Troops unacustomed to action I am at a loss to guess,

N.B. He marched out after the siege near 8000 men.

2d look at the Return of your army once again My good Lord is there a single Corps except the two Batns of Anspach
that had not repeatedly recd your lordships thanks on service. The day you took the command in Virginia you had above 7000 men in the worst of Climates at the worst of seasons. I fear your sick List was long. you had 800 man of war sailors, many transport do. Loyalists in number & I have always understood thousands of poor blacks. in justice to these corps I must say they were under most perfect Prussian discipline, they had been repeatedly in fire — & their own was such as had forced a superior Enemy to precipitate retreat in Force, in June 80.

3b look at the Corps under his Comd is there a single Regt that had not served with eclat if there had been surely he would have left them in his works.

what service had any of the French troops seen, what the general character of the Virginia Militia.

4b he who thought himself at liberty to march into Virginia contrary to the orders of the Commander in chief at the risk of the Carolinas, and all the corps which he had directed to cooperate in that fatal march, should not have hesitated proving the great superi-

troops that were able to march. No other object appeared sufficient to justify this measure; for our labour would have been materially interrupted[1a] by an action,[2a] and even a victory, unless it had extended to the annihilation of the Marquis de la Fayette's corps, without considerable loss on our side, (two events not to be expected) would not have enabled us to make a successful defence against the army then approaching, under the command of General Washington:[3d] But a defeat[4a] would probably have been followed with the immediate loss of our post, which, until the end of Septem[xiii]ber, was in a most defenceless state : and as I could never have proved,[5b] that I should not have been relieved, I should have been exposed to public execration, as a man, who, having reason to expect the early arrival of the Commander in Chief to supersede him in his command, had, in hopes of personal reputation from a victory, sacrificed the essential interest of his country.[6d] Far less could I have ventured an action without the most evident advantage, after the junction of General Washington; a decision, which nothing could have justified, but a certainty that I could not be relieved: in that case, I should have fought before I was hemmed in by the enemy's works, believing a vic-

ority of the Enemy's Fleet to have saved what he could of that army if La Fayette had been beat in such ground he was undone, if he had averted action L. C. crossed the James & retired at his leisure.

1a materially interrupted *underlined.*

2a 12 hours of those troops who went out.

3d to endeavour to beat an Army en detail which is coming to besiege you is generally thought an object if La Fayette and St Simon had retired you were but where you were 24 hours only would have been lost so very superior in Numbers and discipline to those corps you could not apprehend defeat.

4a defeat *underlined.*

5b note on this part mem book No. 2.

6d Are you quite so sure My good Lord that something too like that may not be said on your breaking into the Comr in chiefs Plan for the Campaign 81 forcing him into Operations which he cd not be prepared for and without being certain of a covering Fleet, had always declared against.

tory,[1a] over great disparity of numbers in the open field, to be possible; but a successful defence, without relief, in such a post, and against such an attack, to be impossible.[2b]

My resolution at last, of attempting to escape with part of the army, could only have been dictated by despair. The enemy's immense train of battering artillery had now nearly reduced[3a] our fresh earthen works to ruins: The attacks were conducted with so much caution,[4a] that we had no opportunity of making any material impression upon them:[5d] The batteries [xiv] of the second parallel, which I knew in a few hours would compel us to surrender at discretion, were nearly completed; and I had then lost all hopes of relief. If the sudden gale of wind had not prevented our passage of the river, Brigadier de Choisy, who lay with a small corps a few miles from Gloucester, would have been attacked at daybreak by the greatest part of our force; after which, being without baggage, I should have gained the upper country by rapid marches,[6a·7b] mounting my infantry, by collecting horses on the way, and leaving my intended route doubtful, until I was opposite to the fords of the great rivers;[8d] I then intended to have turned off to the northward,[9d] expecting

1a tho there are who say that the Enemy were so sickly &c &c that if you had attacked their whole army you must have beaten them. I am not of that number.

2b His Lordship is clearly right.

3a very true.

4a Washington knew he had to do with an army of 8000 well disciplined & commanded.

5d It has been I know insinuated that yr Lordship did not check the Enemys approaches as much as you ought and might have done but as far as I cd presume to judge ignorant of the Carte du Pays The Enemy seems to have respected you so much and to have advanced with so much circumspection that it became you to be cautious in yr sorties.

6a If any body could you could but you told me yourself Washington had scouted the Idea.

7b you told me yourself Washington laughed at the Idea of your escaping to N. York.

8d Alas I fear the Enemy was nearer those fords than yr Lordship.

9d To the Southward perhaps you mght have escaped My good Lord with your Moving Corps.

that the enemy would principally take their measures to prevent my escape to the southward. The success of this attempt would, no doubt, have been precarious; and I cannot say that it would have been practicable to have reached New York; but, in our desperate situation, I thought it well deserved a trial.

I shall make no other remark upon the enumeration that is made of the troops under my orders, than that a great part of them were dispersed in garrisons, totally out of my reach,[1a] and that some regiments had hardly any ex[xv]istence, but in name. I am not in possession of the general returns of the southern district for the year 1781, but those of the corps under my immediate command, at different periods, are annexed to the Correspondence.[2d]

During that campaign, I reckoned among the many other embarrassments which I had to encounter, that, on some important occasions, it was impossible to communicate with, or to receive instructions from the Commander in Chief, in time to enable me to act according to his wishes:[3a·4c] But, I

1a I cannot pretend to say what you had after the desertions, sickness battles &c &c &c but I know what I left with you & what I afterwards sent you.

2d I left 5000 Men with your Lordship in 80, Genl Leslie joined you with 3000 More I sent Arnold with 2000, 500 more to Chesapeak to cooperate with yr Ldship I sent Genl Phillips to take the command and with him 3000 more to these I added 1500 Anspachs you had therefore acting with you and for you near 15000 Men. while I at New York had not more than 12000 including *Provincials*

3a we had both of us but too much cause to complain, but in this instance your Lordship does it without reason; for you say yourself a frigate with my dispatches was coming to you, from Charles Town, not 12 hours sail from you.

4c This was also your Lordships Complaint When you moved from Wilmington into Virginia, those who read will judge wher such complaint was well founded, in that instance; you lament in your letter to the Minister you are about to make a desperate move, without the Com. in Chief's approbation, in the same letter you say there is a frigate coming from Charles Town, (not 12 hours sail from you) and expected every hour,

trust, it will appear from the Correspondence now laid before the public, — that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part,[1a·2c] — that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded,[3a·4c·5d] — that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent[6b] reasons,[7d] which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief,[8a·9a·10c] — that I did not

you say your army is in no state to move, & yet you march before those dispatches arrive ; & I now appeal to yourself, whether if you had received them you would have marched into Virginia.

1a reduced from 3000 to 700 by desertion, illness, and action not two days food and in actual retreat how could y L. expect them to risk.

2c how could you expect they should after you had sacrificed them 9 months before, & tho you obtained a brilliant Victory in March 81. it had all the consequences of a defeat, you had not provisions or arms to give them ; you were reduced from 3500 to 700 men, you were in actual retreat when you invited them to join you.

3a from Crosscreek you were not above 60 miles from Campden, 90 from Wilmington.

4c pardon me my good Lord for these very reasons you should have fallen back from Crosscreek to Campden, where Lord Rawdon would supply all your wants, it was the shortest & safest way, by doing so, you obey'd your Commr in Chief's Orders; you fulfilled your " own promises, to cover S. Carolina."

5d Camden was nearer.

6b urgent *underlined.*

7d every reason for going back to C. Town no good one I fear for going into Virginia— what say the Cabinet in their Letter Page 49, 51.

8a All the urgent reasons were on the Contrary against your going.

9a had you waited a few hours more the arrival of the dispatches from Charles Town, you would have found *all* the urgent reasons were against your going.

10c on the contrary my good Lord, *all* the urgent reasons were against your going into Virginia, for by that move you exposed the Carolinas & Florida, and Charles Town, which "you had been ordered to consider "as the *primary* object," you risked your own Corps, that of Gen. Phillips, you broke in upon the C. in Chief Plan, you forced operations upon him which he was not prepared for, and had *always* declared against, in the most inimical Province, in the most unhealthy

establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it,[1a·2c·3b] — that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order,[4a·5b·6d·7c] and was in-

province, at the worst season, in a province where your army could not be supply'd from the country at least in a province from whence your army could not retreat, & where it could not remain in safety unless covered by a Fleet, or a *respectable* Place of arms till that Fleet should arrive.

1a Tis true your Lordship did only reinforce it; but tis Equally so that if you had not reinforced it, it would have been (except a small post to cover Frigates) have been withdrawn in the *exposed*, & sickly seasons.

2c true my good Lord you did not Establish the station in Virginia, a small station was established at your desire to favour your operations while the season permitted your acting in the Carolinas; but meant to be withdrawn when *those* should cease; and consequently if your Lordship had not come into Virginia, forced solid operation there; recommended it to the minister, & the Comr in Chief had not in consequence been *ordered* to support it, your Lordship will acknowledge it would except a small post have been withdrawn in June.

3b S H Clinton never had an Idea of solid establishment in Virginia till the provinces to the southward were recovered. till then S H C had no other views than of a small station to cover frigates and troops for desultory expedition in the healthy season to cooperate with you, your Lordsp therefore did establish vide page 96 Observns.

4a no my Good Lord you were ordered to occupy old Point Comfort securing a naval station in James River, not in York River, you were permitted tis true to fortifye York as an addl security to O P Comfort; but I did not disapprove of the choice you had made for the reasons you gave in your letter of the 24. August, when you took it:—

5b read all my Corce with Genl Phillips. is there the least Idea of establishment in Virginia, merely a small station in Elizabeth river to cover frigates & desultory expeditions, during the season for operation in that unhealthy climate; I appeal whether I ever gave L. C. an *order* to occupy York & Gloucester: of the prospects L. C. could better judge than I. he knew the Enemy were 37 sail the 8th of Sepr and that we had only 21. I did not know the E. number till the 23d Sep:

6d I can with more propriety say contrary to My Orders but I have never yet charged you publickly with disobedience.

7c by whose order I know not but certainly contrary to S H Clinton's order: read his order of the 11th July page L. C. reply 167. it orders L. C. to examine and fortify old point Comfort which covers Hampton road in James river, it permits L. C. to fortify York also as an additional security to old P. Comfort but his Lordship moving the naval Station to York river instead of James River and fortifying York

[xvi]duced to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief [1a·2c·3d·4a], — and, that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton,[5b·6b] either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas [7a·8c·9d], — and consequently, that my

and Gloucester to secure the Naval Station in York river is so far from being by order of S H C every body will agree that it was contrary to his order, tho S H C afterwards acquiesced in it.

1a Here your Lordship alters your tone; assurances I certainly never gave you; Prospect or hope you might have, & could you have held out longer, or the Fleet sailed sooner you might have been saved, but surely S H C. cannot be in the least responsable for either your conduct or that of the Navy.

2c No my good Lord, the only *order* you had was to occupy old point Comfort covering a naval station in James River—in strictness you acted contrary to orders by removing the naval station to York River; I did not however blame it then because you told me that it was the only station in which you could hope to give *effectual protection* to line of Battle ships, tis true you had no line of Battle ships with you when you were besieged; but the reader will judge of the sort of protection you could have given had they been with you: when they are informed, that all the ships during the siege which you did not *sink* were burned by the Enemy.

3d if I gave you hopes of relief it was from the Navy I recd them and if that Navy sd have sailed sooner or Yr Ldship could have defended yr Post longer you would have been succoured.

4a could I have conceived you would so soon alter your opinion & described that ground so differently as you do in that of the 20 Octr I should have ordered you at all events to remain at Old Point Comfort.

5b Lord Corns Corps ought to have been at S H C. disposal, but it was not, the minister ordered him not to take a man from Virginia, but to go there with all He could spare from N. York.

6b His Lordship is pleased to acknowledge he and his corps was under the orders of the Comr in Chief—tis great condescension—but the publick will recollect that the Cabinet disapproving of S H C plan of a reduced defensive post in E. river during the season of operation to the northward, had *ordered* S H C *not* to take a single man from Virginia otherwise there can be no doubt but that S H C disapproving of L C march into Virginia would have sent him back, if he had not been ordered to support him there.

7a read again the Ministers

conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe,[1d] which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.

CORNWALLIS.

MANSFIELD-STREET,
Feb. 10, 1783.[2c]

letter my good Lord, Page 49 my Narrative, & the Kings orders to me not to take a man from Virginia till that Province was Conquered: you surely will not *then* say that your Lordships Corps was at my disposal any time before I received the Ministers letters of the 7th and 14th July disapproving of your Lordships Plan; approving *at last* of that of the Comr in Chief, wch however He did not receive untill He had embarked to endeavour to relieve you from a Situation in which your ill timed, injudicious, ill-fated march into Virginia had engaged us; and therefore I must beg leave to repeat; that your Conduct and Councils did, in the first instance contribute to the Catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate Campaign 81; His Majesty's Cabinet had also their share; & the admiral in the West Indies His great very great share.

S H Clinton S'en lave les mains

8c your Lordship has surely forgot the Kings order to S. H. Clinton not to take a man from Virginia till that province was conquered; & that S H C could not under *such* orders dispose of your Lordships corps, & I flatter myself you will do him the Justice to believe, *that*, if He had thought himself at liberty to do so, He would have ordered your Lordship to have followed his Plan; or joined him at N. York; or sent you back to Carolinas; in Either of which cases, the Catastrophe of York Town could not have hap'ned, nor could America have been lost. As it is S H Clinton has only to say that by Lord Cornwallis coming into Virginia contrary to S H C's orders, & forcing operation there; and Lord Rodney's not bringing, or sending a Fleet to cover such operation according to orders the Catastrophe, which terminated the unfortunate Campaign, and put an End to British Empire in America has been produced; and of all which S. H. C. S'en lave les mains.

9d I must intreat you to read the Cabinet letter Pages 49. 51. once more then tell me if you really think Yr Corps was at My disposal or whether I was at Liberty at any time till I recd the King's Approbation of My Plan to have removed a Man from Virginia till that Province was conquered.

1d Therefore your Lordship's Conduct and your Councils if not the only causes were at least the primary causes of that Catastrophe.

2c The Narrative was written, in the Hope that the charges therein contained (tho expressed in as moderate terms as possible) would have induced Lord Cornwallis to have desired a Court of Enquiry or Martial. among the

many implied charges it contained were misconception, Misrepresentation, and Disobedience of Orders, neglecting under frivolous, nay sometimes false pretences opportunities of beating an Inferior Corps, and crushing an army en detail which He knew was coming to besiege him. For not occupying the naval Station He was ordered to take under pretext that it did not answer the purpose of protecting the Men of War, & then chusing another in preference under Idea that He could give "Effectual protection," altho it appeared afterwards none such could have been given, for every ship He did not sink, was burned by the Enemy. For telling his Comr in chief that the Plan for fortifying the Post had been judiciously chosen after examination & survey; that it would be compleated in 7 weeks and that He could then spare from its defence 1000 men, & when attacked in it 8 weeks after to quit it without a shot, give to the Enemy "Ground which commanded in a near advance all the rest of His works," (Washingtons words) and which had been constructed in haste, were unfinished, Commanded, and infiladed, and in which He is reduced to extremity in 7 days open trenches, for saying He had only 400 intrenching tools when He began His works at York Town, altho He had by formal return of his Engineer 992, & had on his first arrival in Virginia sent quantities away,— His asserting in his official letter that I had promised him the exertions of the *Navy* as well as army in all my letters, & that those assurances had prevented his attacking La Fayette before his junction with Washington, or His Escaping immediately upon that junction altho He acknowledges afterwards, I had not given him any such assurances till 3 days after the Junction of the Combined Armies had taken place—the mutulating my letter of the 24 Sepr & asserting I had told him in it the Fleet would positively sail about the 3d of october, & acknowledging afterwards I had only said I had every reason to hope it would sail about that time, telling me his Engineer had made a regular survey of the ground wch He denied

Correspondence between Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Commander in Chief, and Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis.

PART I.

RELATIVE TO THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA.

Number I. [1] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Camp on Turkey-Creek, Broad River, Jan. 18, 1781. *see Letter p* 318.

Number II. [5] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, March 5th, 1781. (Received June, 1781.) *see Letter p* 331.

Number III. [9] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Camp near Wilmington, April 10, 1781. *see Letter p* 395.

Number IV. [13] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, April 30, 1781. (Received, June, 1781.) *see Letter p* 441. Duplicate. [18] Inclosed in Number IV. Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, April 13, 1781. *see Letter p* 405.

Number V. [20] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington, April 23, 1781. *see Letter p* 424. Inclosed [22] in Number V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 6, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781. *see Letter p* 353. Inclosed [23] in Number V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 7, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781. *see Letter p* 354. Inclosed [34] in No. V. By the Right Honourable Charles Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-general of his Majesty's Forces, &c. &c. &c. A proclamation. *see proclamation p* 327. Inclosed [35] in Number V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 8, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, 17th March, 1781. *see Letter p* 363. Inclosed [44] in No. V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 9, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18, 1781. *see Letter p* 414. Inclosed [47] in No. V. North Carolina. By Charles Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General of his Majesty's Forces, &c. &c. &c. A Proclamation. *see proclamation p* 371. Inclosed [48] in No. V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 10, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18th, 1781. *see Letter p* 416. Inclosed [50] in No. V. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 11, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 23d, 1781. *see Letter p* 420.

Number VI. [53] State of the Troops that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis. *see p* 376.

CORRESPONDENCE between
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief, and Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

PART II.

RELATIVE TO EARL CORNWALLIS'S MARCH INTO VIRGINIA.

Number I. [55] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 426. (Inclosed [56] in Number I.) Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to Major-general Phillips, dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 427.

Number II. [58] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, March 2d, 1781. Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia. *see Letter p* 341.

Number III. [61] Copy of Sir Henry Clinton's Instructions to Major-general Phillips, dated Head Quarters, New York, March 10th, 1781. Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia. *see p* 347.

Number IV. [64] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Petersburgh, in Virginia, 20th May, 1781. *see Letter p* 476.

Number V. [67] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, May 29th, 1781. (Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. Macpherson.) *see Letter p* 493.

Number VI. [74] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, Virginia, July 24, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 88.

Number VII. [77] State of the Troops that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis. *see p* 457.

CORRESPONDENCE between
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief, and Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

PART III.

RELATIVE TO THE OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.

Number I. [79] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry

Clinton, dated Byrd's Plantation, James River, May 26, 1781. *see Letter p* 487.

Number II. [80] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Byrd's Plantation, North of James River, 26th of May, 1781. *see Letter p* 487.

Number III. [85] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated March 14, 1781, half past Two. (Received at Petersburgh by Earl Cornwallis, May 20.) *see Letter p* 352.

Number IV. [87] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 24, 1781. (Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 20.) *see Letter p* 373.

Number V. [90] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-General Phillips, dated New-York, April 11, 1781. (Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.) *see Letter p* 401.

Number VI. [95] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-General Phillips, dated New-York, April 26th, 1781. (Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.) *see Letter p* 437. Inclosed [100] in No VI. Substance of several Conversations had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither. (Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.) *see p* 430.

Number VII. [105] [Secret, and most private.] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, 30th April, 1781. (Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg.) *see Letter p* 450.

Number VIII. [111] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated May 11. (Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.) *see Letter p* 474.

Number IX. [112] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 15, 1781. (Received June 26, 1781, from Ensign Amiel.) *see Letter* ii. 24.

Duplicate [113] inclosed in Number IX. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 11, 1781. (Received the 26th of June from Ensign Amiel.) *see Letter* ii. 18.

Number X. [118] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Williamsburgh, June 30, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 31.

Number XI. [126] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 28, 1781. (In Cypher.) (Received July 8, 1781.) *see Letter* ii. 29.

Inclosed [128] in No XI. List of Cannon, Stores, &c. to be sent from Virginia. *see* ii. 30.

Number XII. [129] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Cobham, July 8, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 56.

Number XIII. [132] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Suffolk, July 12, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 66.

Number XIV. [133] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 8th, 1781. (Received July 12th, 1781, from Lieut. Col. M'Pherson.) *see Letter* ii. 14.

Number XV. [137] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated at New York, 19th of June, 1781. (Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. M'Pherson.) *see Letter* ii. 26.

Number XVI. [141] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, July 1st, 1781. (Received July 12, 1781, by the Orpheus.) *see Letter* ii. 41.

Number XVII. [142] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Suffolk, 17th July, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 79.

Number XVIII. [145] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, July 11th, 1781. (In Cypher.) Received from Brig. Maj. Bowes, July 20th, at 1 A.M.) *see Letter* ii. 61.

Number XIX. [146] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, July 15, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 73.

Number XX. [152] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, July 26, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 98.

Number XXI. [153] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-Town, Virginia, 20th August, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 130.

CORRESPONDENCE between
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief,
and Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

PART. IV.

RELATIVE TO OCCUPYING AN HARBOUR FOR LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS.[1c.2e.]

Number I. [161] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, July 8th, 1781. (Received July 21st, 1781, from Captain Stapleton.) *see Letter* ii. 49.

Number II. [167] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl

1c As Lord Cornwallis and his Friends assert that His Lordship occupied York river as a Harbour for Ships of the line by the order of S H C. & his Lordship brings forward the following correspondence to prove it the reader must judge whether such assertion is founded.

2e Altho' as a Naval Station I always preferred Hampton Road, yet, from all the information I had received prior to Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th October, I had been induced to think well of York and Gloucester as a place of arms, securing a Harbour for Line of Battle ships. And the following Extract from his Lordship's letter of the 26th May shews that he himself had the same opinion of it. "I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my Light Troops to destroy any Magazines or Stores in the Neighbourhood, which may have been collected either for his use or for General Green's Army. From thence I purpose to move to the Neck of Williamsburg, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured, and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interfere with your Plan for the Campaign until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure relative to a proper harbour and place of Arms. At present I am inclined to think well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong without an Army to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy & can give no protection to a Ship of the Line." For, with respect to his Lordship's Letter of the 30th June, wherein he says "Upon viewing York I was clearly of opinion, that it far exceeds our power consistent with your Plans to make safe Defensive Posts there and at Gloucester both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping" it does not give an opinion that the Post was unfit for the purposes proposed, but that he should not have Troops enough to occupy it, if he sent me the 3000 men, which he understood my letter of the 11th June positively called for.

Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, July 11, 1781. (Received July 21st, 1781, from Captain Stapleton.) *see Letter* ii. 62.

Number III. [170] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, Virginia, July 26, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 104. Inclosed [175] in No. III. Extract of the Instructions of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 10, 1781. *see p* 347. Extract [175] of the Substance of several Conversations that his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither, dated April 26, 1781. *see p* 430. Inclosed [177] in No. III. Copy of the Report of Lieutenant Sutherland, Engineer, dated Billy Ordnance Transport, Hampton Road, July 25, 1781. *see* ii. 95. Inclosed [179] in No. III. Copy of the Opinions of the Commanders of his Majesty's Ships in Chesapeak, relative to Old Point Comfort, dated Richmond, Hampton Road, July 26, 1781. *see* ii. 101.

Number IV. [180] Admiral Graves to Earl Cornwallis, dated London, off Sandy Hook, 12th July, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 67.

Number V. [181] Earl Cornwallis to Admiral Graves, dated Portsmouth, July 26, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 100.

Number VI. [182] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York, in Virginia, August 12, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 124.

Number VII. [183] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, New-York, August 11, 1781. (In Cypher.) (Received August 16, 1781.) *see Letter* ii. 123.

Number VIII. [185] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-town, 16th August, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 126.

Number IX. [186] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York town, Virginia, 22d August, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 137.

CORRESPONDENCE between
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief,
and Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.[1c]

PART V.

RELATIVE TO THE DEFENCE OF YORK, IN VIRGINIA.

Number I. [189] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-town, in Virginia, 31st August, 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 146.

Number II. [190] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York, 1st September, 1781. (Written in Cypher on a Congress Note.) *see Letter* ii. 147.

Number III. [190] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York, in Virginia, 2d September, 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 148.

Number IV. [191] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-town, Virginia, 4th September, 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 151.

Number V. [191] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-town, in Virginia, 8th Sept. 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 154.

Number VI. [193] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, Sept. 2, 1781.—(In Cypher.) (Triplicate,—Received 15th September.) *see Letter* ii. 149.

Number VII. [195] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, New-York, Sept. 6, at Noon, 1781.—(In Cypher.) (Received 16th September.) *see Letter* ii. 152.

1c [*On a separate sheet, sealed to page* 189]

read this correspondence who pleases they will observe that if S H Clinton should admit for argument sake that Lord Cornwallis was justified in removing the naval station from James river to York river, without receiving fresh instructions from the Commander in Chief, He certainly could not be justified on any other principle than that station which he had chosen in preference would answer every purpose required by the Admiral & Comr in Chief & for which he becomes responsable but S H Clinton now asserts L. C. disobeyed his orders in not fortifying old point Comfort in James river, that he acted without his orders in removing the naval station to York river, & if S H C admits that the occupying a station was by his order L C. must admit that of York river, tho it did not meet his disapprobation had never received his fiat. Sir H. Clinton.

Number VIII. [196] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York Town, in Virginia, 16th Sept. 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 156.

Number IX. [197] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, New York, Sept. 24, 1781.—(In Cypher.) (Received September 29, 1781.) *see Letter* ii. 159.

Number X. [199] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York-Town in Virginia, Sept. 29, 1781. 10 P.M. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 169.

Number XI. [200] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, New-York, September 25, 1781. (Duplicate, —in Cypher.—Received October 2.) *see Letter* ii. 163.

Number XII. [201] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York-Town, Virginia, October 3, 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 174.

Number XIII. [202] Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, September 30, 1781. (Duplicate,—In Cypher.) (Received October 10, from Major Cockran.) *see Letter* ii. 172.

Number XIV. [204] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-Town, Virginia, October 11, 1781.—12 M. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 176.

Number XV. [205] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-Town, October 15, 1781. (In Cypher.) *see Letter* ii. 188.

Number XVI. [206] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated York-Town, Virginia, October 20, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 205.

Inclosed [214] in Number XVI. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington, dated York, in Virginia, October 17th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 189.

Inclosed [215] in Number XVI. Copy of General Washington's Letter to Earl Cornwallis, dated Camp before York, 17th October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 190.

Inclosed [215] in Number XVI. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington, dated York, in Virginia, 17th Oct. 1781. Half past Four, P.M. *see Letter* ii. 191.

Inclosed [217] in Number XVI. Copy of General

Washington's Letter to Earl Cornwallis, dated, Camp before York, 18th October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 193.

Inclosed [218] in Number XVI. Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington, dated York in Virginia, 18th October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 195.

Inclosed [220] in Number XVI. Copy of the Articles of Capitulation, *see* ii. 199.

Number XVII. [227] Sir Henry Clinton, to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, November 30th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 217.

Number XVIII [228] Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated New-York, 2d December, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 219.

Number XIX [230] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, December 2d, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 240.

Number XX. (To face p. 236) State of the Troops in Virginia, Under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis. *see* ii. 197.

Number XXI. (To face p. 237) State of the Army in Virginia, Under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis. October the 18th, 1781. *see* ii. 198.

CORRESPONDENCE between
Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K.B. Commander in Chief, and Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

PART VI.

LETTERS FROM SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B., TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

DELIVERED AT NEW-YORK A MONTH AFTER EARL CORNWALLIS'S SURRENDER.

Number I. [237] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, August 2d, 1781. (Received from the Secretary at New York, Nov. 19, 1781.) *see Letter* ii. 109.

Number II. [251] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, August 27th, 1781. (Received from the Secretary at New-York, November 19th, 1781.) *see Letter* ii. 141.

Number III. [253] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis dated New-York, August 30th, 1781. [Received from the Secretary at New-York, November 19th, 1781.] *see Letter* ii. 143.

Number IV. [257] Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, October 14, 1781. [Received from the Secretary at New-York, Nov. 29, 1781.] *see Letter* ii. 184.

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S

OBSERVATIONS

ON

EARL CORNWALLIS'S

ANSWER.

PRICE TWO SHILLINGS AND SIX-PENCE.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

SOME PARTS

OF THE

ANSWER

OF

EARL CORNWALLIS

TO

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S

NARRATIVE.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

AN APPENDIX;

CONTAINING

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS AND OTHER PAPERS,

TO WHICH REFERENCE IS NECESSARY.

LONDON:
Printed for J. DEBRETT, (Successor to Mr. ALMON,)
opposite BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
M.DCC.LXXXIII.

13

1e Notes marked thus are proved by our Correspondence.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

SOME PARTS OF EARL CORNWALLIS'S ANSWER

TO

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S NARRATIVE.

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

WHEN I published a Narrative of my conduct during the period of my command in North America, which comprehends the campaign of 1781, I was in hopes I had said every thing that was requisite to explain the motives of my own actions, and to convince [2] every unprejudiced person, that certain positions respecting them, advanced in Lord Cornwallis's letter to me of the 20th of October, had no foundation. But it gives me extreme concern to observe, that his Lordship's seeming to avow nearly the same sentiments in his Introduction to a late publication, styled, an Answer to that Narrative, lays

me under the necessity of troubling the public again upon a subject, which they are probably tired of; and I sincerely wished to have done with. I hope, therefore, it may not be judged improper to request their attention to the following Observations on some of the opinions and assertions therein stated. Which (to be as concise as possible) I shall take according to the order in which they occur; — adding only, in an Appendix, the copies of such extracts from my correspondence, and other papers, as appear necessary.

I find upon enquiry that the four letters were omitted to be sent to the Secretary of State, which Lord Cornwallis mentions to have been wanting when the papers relating to this business were laid before the House of Lords. But the reasons for his Lordship's [3] march from Cross-creek to Wilmington, and from thence into Virginia (stated in the first of them) had been before given in his letters of the 23d and 24th of April, to the Secretary of State, General Phillips, and myself; and these stand the first of those letters from his Lordship's correspondence, read before the House of Lords; the other three letters had been inserted in a pamphlet containing extracts from our correspondence, handed about at the time of the enquiry; and one of those pamphlets had been presented, by my order, to Lord Townshend, as a man of honour, and a friend to both parties, previous (I believe) to his[1a] noticing[2a.3a] this omission to the House; and all the four missing letters were soon after published in the Parliamentary Register, along with those which had been read to the Lords. So that Lord Cornwallis could not well have sustained any injury by that omission. This, however, cannot be said to have been the case with

1a his *underlined.*

2a by L. Cornwallis desire.

3a Indeed those of the 16th & 22. August 1781. were of all others those I should wish most to have published as they describe his Post of York as most respectable very different from what he describes it in his letter of the 20th Octr 81

mine of the 30th of November, and 2d of December to his Lordship, and of the 6th of December to the American Minister; which were with-held, whilst Lord Cornwallis's letters of the 20th of October, and 2d [4] of December (to which they were answers) were suffered to operate, for a long time, upon the minds of the public, to my prejudice.[1a]

My letters of the 30th of November and 2d of December, were in Lord Cornwallis's possession, when his friend, Lord Townshend, moved for those of his Lordship, which he judged necessary to explain his conduct. The public will judge, whether mine were not, at least, equally so, to explain mine; and whether, on finding that the Secretary of State had omitted to produce them to the Lords, Lord Cornwallis ought not to have desired Lord Townshend to have moved for them. I declare, I would have done so, had I been in his Lordship's place.

The four other letters, taken notice of by Lord Cornwallis, were certainly not delivered to him before November; because the three first, having been committed to the charge of General Leslie, (who was in a manner embarked for the Chesapeak, from the beginning of August to the arrival of the French fleet) could not have been transmitted to his Lordship sooner; and the last (the substance of which, however, had been previously communicated [5] in the presence of a council of war, for his Lordship's information to Major Cockran, who joined him on the 9th of October) being sent by an advice boat, did not reach the Chesapeak before his surrender. But whoever will take the trouble of

1a tis time to speak out these letters of mine were intentionally witheld from the Public. They throw blame on Lord Corns on the Cabinet & on the Fleet. Lord Cornwallis for coming into Virginia contrary to orders and forcing Operan there.

Lord Rodney for not covering such Operation according to order. & His Majtys Cabinet for adopting & forcing the Plan of a subaltern General, which Plan they afterwards condemned approving of that of the Comr in Chief alas too late.

perusing those letters, will perceive that his Lordship's conduct (in the then state of matters) could not have been influenced by an earlier receipt of them.

Every man of sensibility must lament that Lord Cornwallis has so indiscreetly availed himself of the liberty, he supposed was given him, by the late change in American measures. For as *my secret and most private letter* to General Phillips, dated April 30, contained nothing necessary for his Lordship's justification; the publishing it was highly impolitic at least, not to say more—for reasons too obvious to need explanation.[1a]

No person can be more ready than I am to admit the difficulties Lord Cornwallis had to struggle with; and I shall always acknowledge that I expected success (notwithstanding) from his Lordship's abilities. I left his Lordship in the Carolinas,[2f] with every power, civil and military, which I could give him, to carry on [6] such operations as he should judge most likely to complete their reduction.[3f] Where I had hopes of success, I studiously sought to approve without reserve. And, as long as I imagined his Lordship to be in sufficient force, and in other respects prepared and competent to give the experiment of supporting our friends in North Carolina, *a fair and solid trial*,[4e.5e] I certainly approved. But after the unfortunate day of *Cowpens*, which diminished his Lordship's acting army nearly one fourth;[6a.7b] and after he thought proper to destroy

1a there were many more letters of His not published, for what purpose the reader may Judge.

2f & gave him all he wished all he wanted of every sort.

3f with positive orders however to consider Charles Town as the principal object and to take no step wch could put it in danger.

4e his own words.

5e a *to* trial *underlined.*

6a and those of his light troops which could least be spared in the move he was about to make besides I find by Col. Tarlton's History a Circumstance which realy astonishes me His Lordship it seems had ordered part of the old works of Charles Town to be thrown down, & that place was consequently open & exposed &

great part of his waggons, proviant train, &c.[1e] (whereby he was reduced, I fear, to something too like a Tartar move); had it then been possible for him to have consulted me, he would have found that, could I have even *consented* to his persisting in his march into that province, that consent must have totally rested upon the high opinion I entertained of his Lordship's exertions, and not on any other flattering prospect I had of success.

Major Ferguson's misfortune was one of those untoward circumstances, which Lord Cornwallis says, occured during the four months succeeding the battle of Camden. His [7] Lordship, immediately after the complete victory he there obtained, ordered our friends in North Carolina, to arm and intercept the beaten army of General Gates; promising them at the same time, that he would march directly to the borders of that province in their support. About this time Major Ferguson was detached to a distance from his Lordship, with a body of militia (without being supported by regular troops) under an idea that he could make them fight; notwithstanding his Lordship had informed me, some little time before, that it was contrary to the experience of the army, as well as of Major Ferguson himself.[2b·] The consequence was, that the Major and his whole corps were unfortunately massacred. Lord Cornwallis was, immediately upon hearing of this event, obliged to quit the borders of North Carolina, and leave our friends

in fact remained so from Janry to May. this circumstance alone should have prevented his Lordships march, had I known it I should have forbid it as it was contrary to my orders.

I should have referred him also to Lord Rawdons letters to me written by his order, and before alluded to pages.

7b and he lost all his light troops.

1e to enable none to move rapidly & to do after what he ought to have done before catch Morgan at his passage of Catawba.

2b read L. Cornwallis's letter to S H C page 22 how could S H suppose L.C. would after that risk Ferguson unsupported the loss of Ferguson was the Bennington of Burgoyne French Town of S. W. Howe

there at the mercy of an inveterate enemy, whose power became irresistible by this necessary retreat.[1e] This fatal catastrophe, moreover, lost his Lordship the whole militia of Ninety-six,[2b] amounting to four thousand men, and even threw South Carolina into a state of confusion and rebellion.[3a]

[8] How nearly the force I left with Lord Cornwallis in the Southern district, and what I afterwards sent to him, might have been adequate or not to the success expected from it, I shall not now examine.[4e] It was all I could possibly spare. But for the satisfaction of the public, I shall give at the end of the Appendix, a view of the force first left with his Lordship,[5b] of what was sent to him afterwards, and of what was finally under his Lordship's orders throughout the whole extent of his command ;— to contrast with which, I shall add also another view of the force left under my own immediate orders at New York, at different periods; giving at the same time as near a calculation as I can make from the intelligence received, of the number of regular troops which the enemy had opposed to each of us. I beg leave likewise to mention, that before I sailed from Charles-

1e His Lordships own report as to the Consequences.

2b so he says himself.

3a one positive order I left with Lord Cornwallis not to make any offensive move that might endanger Charles Town which was always to be considered as a primary object. there is therefore no doubt but circumstanced as Charles Town then was and continued months after His march into N. Carolina and afterwards into Virg[a] was contrary to my orders. as his risking Fergusons with the Militia unsupported was contrary to every opinion he had given me.

4e I gave him all he wished all he wanted at first, on the arrival of Leslie he told me I had sent more than he expected & full as much as I could spare.

5b I left near 6000 with his Lordship he thought he should be able to send me 3000 of them instead of which I sent him as follows.

3200	Leslie
3500	Arnold
3000	Phillips
1500	Anspachs
11200	

besides 3 Reg[ts] from Ireland and recruits, in consequence the minister says my reinforcements were ample, that he had often

town, I offered to Lord Cornwallis all he wished, all he wanted, of every sort; and that his Lordship expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with the troops he had, and wished for no more, as will appear from the letters annexed. What the exact strength of the corps under his Lordship's immediate command may have been at any given [9] period, I cannot ascertain, as I had not regular returns of them; but his Lordship did not make any complaint to me of the smallness of his force when he commenced his move into North Carolina; and I always thought it to be full as large as I had rated it at.[1e]

I cannot judge of the assurances of co-operation which Lord Cornwallis may have received from our friends in North Carolina, but from his Lordship's report; and his Lordship best knows, whether *he received any after the effects of Major Ferguson's misfortune were known.*[2b] But his Lordship cannot forget that our friends, who had risen by his order, were left exposed to ruin by his retreat, and numbers of them actually massacred. I am therefore at a loss to guess what may have been his Lordship's reasons for being surprized that they failed to join him after the victory at Guildford; as such[3b] effort of loyalty could scarcely be expected from them after their past sufferings, when they saw his Lordship's army so greatly reduced after the action, and so scantily supplied with provisions; which, without doubt was very far short of that solid support which they had been encouraged to expect from his [10] Lordship's promises. And indeed his Lordship might have supposed that these were

spoke of it much to my honour, & that with what remained under my command at N. York he hoped I should be able to defend it.

1e it appears by Tarltons letters &c that before the misforn of Cowpens His Lordp had full enough.

2b I fear not after Campden L. Cornwallis had invited them to arms, promised to support them did so till called back by Fergusons misfortunes, & these poor people were left a sacrifice.

3b an.

their sentiments from what followed, as described by himself. "Many of the inhabitants rode into "camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad "to see us, and to hear we had beat Greene, and "then rode home again;"—no doubt with aching hearts, from the melancholy secene his Lordship's camp "*encumbered with a long train of sick and* "*wounded*," exhibited to their view.

But as this attempt[1b] (such as it was) had failed, surely Lord Cornwallis's next object should have been, *to secure South Carolina*:[2f] and this appears to 'have been his Lordship's own opinion when he wrote his letter to General Leslie of the 12th of December,* 1780:[3e] — "We will then give our "friends in North-Carolina *a fair trial.* If they "behave like men, it may be of the greatest ad- "vantage to the affairs of Britain, If they are "as - - - -[4abf] as our friends to the southward, we "must leave them to their fate, and *secure what* "*we have got.*" Had I not consequently every reason to expect his Lordship would have done so? To what purpose then did his Lordship [11] march to Wilmington from Cross-creek,[5e] as he was so much nearer Camden and South Carolina? Or, even when at Wilmington, (as he could not but be apprehensive for the safety of South Carolina, from General Greene's march into that province; — and even for Charlestown,†[6e] "*whose old works were in* "*part levelled, to make way for new ones, which were* "*not yet constructed; and whose garrison was inade-*

* *For* December *read November.*

† Vide Lord Rawdon's Letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated May 24, 1781. *p* 480.

1b L. C had my positive orders, not to risk Charles Town

2f as I had ordered and his Lordship had promised.

3e I left positive orders with L. Cornwallis never to risk Cs Town but always to consider S. Car. & it the primary object

4abf dastardly

5e through a friends Country

6e this is an extract of Col. Balfours letter to L. Rawdon & the same information Col. B of course gave L. Cornwallis

"*quate to oppose any force of consequence;*"[1a] which material information it is presumed Colonel Balfour could not have failed communicating to his Lordship as well as to Lord Rawdon,[2f]) why did not his Lordship retire to Charlestown by the route of Lockwood's folly and the Waggamaw? Which, it is the opinion of many others as well as mine, was practicable.[3e] For gallies might have secured him the passage of that river, and we then held the post of George-town upon its banks: it was, moreover, early in the month of April, long before the droughts set in, and it may therefore be presumed there was not much danger of the mills wanting water, as his Lordship seems to [12] have apprehended. Had his Lordship fortunately done so, South Carolina would have been saved, and the fatal catastrophe which afterwards happened to his army in the Chesapeak avoided. Lord Cornwallis in answer to this says, "that he "decided to march into Virginia, *as the safest and* "*most effectual means of employing the small corps* "*under his command.*[4e·5a]. For the force in South

1a such had been the state of Charles Town from Jany to May 81

The fact is Thus, Major Barras told me he had been sent from Charles Town on the 6th April, to endeavour to get to Lord Corns and inform his Lordship of this circumstance & that if he did not return to S. Carolina immediately that province & Charles Town would be lost that in the hope he would he had occupied George Town & sent Gallies into the Waggamaw. *All* this convinces me that Col. Balfour did not only send him this information by the many safe opportunities he had but my dispatches to his Lordship which absolutely all but forbid his going into Virginia, but so determined was he to go there, that he does not own the receipt of them, engages Balfour to be silent also and marches into Virginia against the *unanimous* opinion of *all* the officers he had assembled to consult, at the risk of losing Carolinas intrusted to his care.

2f Lord Rawdons was not only an action most ably determined on but most spiritedly conducted, but a victory one of the most important of the War, had he not attacked Greene but stood longer in Campden he must have fell & for the reasons Balfour gives the Carolinas Georgia & their with him.

3e I never heard a man but L C say it was not

4e when he reported to me 16 Sepr that the Enemy had 37

"Carolina was in his opinion sufficient, when collected, "to secure what was valuable to us in that province." But his Lordship's letter to General Phillips, of the 24th of April, (written a day or two before he moved) so far from representing this march *as a safe one*, describes it as most perilous. And if there was a possibility that his Lordship's return to South Carolina (even by sea) might prevent any material part of that province or Georgia from falling into the enemy's hands, (as many of the posts there did, notwithstanding his Lordship's opinion of the *sufficiency of the force to secure them*,) it may be presumed, that his Lordship's *march into Virginia was not the most effectual means of employing the corps under his command*, as the event has but too well proved to our cost. Lord Corn[13]wallis gives likewise another reason for this move. He says, "he was "influenced by having just received an account from "Charlestown of the arrival of a frigate with dis-"patches from me. The substance of which then "transmitted to him was, that General Phillips had "been detached[1a·2a] to the Chesapeak, and put "under his orders. Which induced him *to hope* "*that solid operations might be adopted in that* "*quarter*." I shall therefore take the liberty of saying a few words on this passage, which appears to me very necessary to be explained.

The dispatches his Lordship alludes to, were my letters to his Lordship of the 2d, 5th, and 8th, of March, with a copy of my instructions to General

sail of the line & had mov'd he knew from me we had only 21 he perhaps according to this rule should have done as here mentioned, march'd back into N. or S. Carolina & saved all he could.

5a His own Corps Lord Rawdons Gen Phillips &c &c &c &c as the safest and most effectual means of employing the Troops under his command!

1a If that was the substance sent him those who sent it as the substance of S H Clinton's dispatch to his Lordp sent anything but the substance of S H C informd L. Cornwallis that Genl Phillips waited the Event of a naval action to be despatched.

2a had been detached *underlined*.

Phillips. Captain Amherst, of the Sixtieth regiment, having charged himself with those of[1b.2b] Lord Cornwallis, and other dispatches for Colonel Balfour, sailed from New-York on the 20th of March, in a merchant ship, called the Jupiter.[3e] And as Colonel Balfour acknowledged the receipt of them all, in his letter to me of the 7th of April, it is presumable they were delivered to him on or before that day. This letter was brought to [14] me by his Majesty's ship Amphitrite; which, having in her way called at Cape Fear, brought me a letter likewise from Lord Cornwallis, at Wilmington, dated the 10th of April.[4e] It is therefore to be lamented, that neither the dispatches themselves, nor the substance of them, had been transmitted to his Lordship by that ship.[5f] The Speedy packet too, which was sent from Charlestown[6e] soon after the Amphitrite, with letters to me of the 20th of April, called likewise in her way at Cape Fear, and brought me letters from his Lordship of the 22d, 23d, and 24th of April; but I am concerned to observe, that safe opportunity of conveying my dispatches to his Lordship was also missed. Although Lord Cornwallis, in his letter to the American minister of the 23d April, and in his introduction, intimates that the substance of those dispatches was sent to him on the 22d April; I should, notwithstanding, suppose, that what was sent

1b for

2b of *run through*.

3e for I could never get a frigate to carry dispatches whatever the consequence of them.

4e proof that oppty was missed—

5f why neither the dispatches nor the real substance of them were sent to E. Corns by Col. Balfour, His Lordship & Col. B must settle between them, I sometimes suspect that E. Cornwallis was determined to put himself within my reach, under the Idea that I was in temper to resign the command to him & that he was blind to every other consideration, But Balfour knew this & that the dispatches contained almost a *forbidanse* & therefore he was too good a courtier to let them go to him, I do realy believe there were certain men in that Army that had rather an —— should be lost than that I should save or recover it.

6e by Col Balfour first to C. Town

to his Lordship as such must have been improperly stated. For by having recourse to the dispatches at large, it will be seen, that so far from *inducing his Lordship to hope that solid operation might be adopted in Virginia*, [15] (as he intimates the substance of them did) it is presumed, they would on the contrary have convinced him, that I had not even an idea of the sort (which, indeed, his Lordship might have already judged from my letter of 6th November)[1e] and therefore, instead of influencing his Lordship's move into that province, they might have most probably prevented it. But when the Public have read my letters to Lord Cornwallis of the 2d, 5th, and 8th of March, and my instructions to General Phillips, they will be competent to judge in what manner they were most likely to influence his Lordship, had he received them, or even the substance of them, before he commenced his march into Virginia, as I think his Lordship might have perceived by the *instructions* that Generals Phillips and Arnold, with part of the Chesapeak corps, were to be drawn back to New-York for a particular service, after a certain time; — and *by the letters*, that a considerable French armament was sailed from Rhode-island to the Chesapeak.[2e·] It is consequently presumable, that in the *first instance* his Lordship would not have marched into Virginia, *lest he should in*[16]*terfere with my plans*; and that *in the other* he would have been equally cautious of doing so, *lest he should hazard the destruction of his own corps*, should the troops in Chesapeak happen at the time to be invested at Portsmouth, which from those letters would appear very probable to be the case.[3a·4b·]

1e which he had received long before,

2e was at that inst in possession of it

3a As I said before I never had a doubt but Lord Cornwallis received these dispatches by the Amphitrite but it did not suit his purpose to obey them or own the receipt. He resolved on a march into Virginia because He judged in the humour I was at their not changing the Admiral that I should if he came within my Reach re-

I will frankly own that I ever disapproved of an attempt to conquer Virginia before the Carolinas were absolutely restored.[1e] However, when I saw that Lord Cornwallis had forced himself upon me in that province, I left him at liberty to act there as he judged best, as may appear by my letter to his Lordship of the 29th of May,[2e·3f] which was the first I had an opportunity of writing to him after my knowledge of his arrival at Petersburg, or of his intentions of coming there.[4b]

Although Lord Cornwallis thought proper to decline engaging in the plan of operations which I had proposed to him in case he had none of his own; I am at a loss to guess what may be his motives for saying, "*I did not seem inclined to take more share in the "responsibility than barely to recommend it;*" [5a] and indeed I cannot think his Lordship was really serious [17] in suggesting an insinuation so apparently groundless. For it is manifest that my letter to General Phillips of the 30th of April (published by Lord Cornwallis) conveys to him and General Arnold the *most explicit instructions* for carrying those operations into execution;[6e] and it can scarcely be doubted, that those instructions were equally *explicit to his Lordship*, the moment the com-

sign to him & which if he remd at Charles Town or in Carolina I could not do.

4b the Fact is these letters so far from inviting Lord Cornwallis into Virginia all but forbid his coming there, and informs him that at that very instant tis probable the Enemys Fleet are in possession of Chesapeak, with this infornn his Lordship would not of course have judged it proper to have engaged in operations which totally depended on a superior Fleet ! ! !

1e the reasons to me are so obvious I need not innumerate them.

2e page 99.

3f page 99, & 102. & indeed throughout.

4b by this letter I leave him totally at liberty to follow any plan he might have of his own.

5a I had ordered Genl Phillips to follow this Plan, but under the positive orders I was to follow that of Lord Cornwallis.

6e his Lordshp should have published that as well as that which he did

mand of that army devolved upon him.[1b·2f] Besides, though it may be admitted that I only *barely recommended* the move, in my letters on the subject to his Lordship (because it had been hitherto usual for me to leave him to his own discretion) yet I am persuaded a reference to my correspondence (as published by Lord Cornwallis and myself) will shew that those recommendations were sufficiently explicit to fix responsibility upon me, had his Lordship adopted my plan, and afterwards failed.[3e·4a]

Lord Cornwallis is pleased to say, "that he "informed me he should repair to Williamsburg, "about the time when he should receive my answer, "in order to be in readiness to execute my commands; "and that he should *employ the intermediate space* in "de[18]stroying such of the enemy's stores and "magazines as might be within his reach."— The letter which is thus explained was dated the 26th of May, at Byrd's, a little more than twenty miles from Richmond, which is fifty from Williamsburg, and is expressed in the following words: "I shall *now* pro- "ceed to dislodge La Fayette *from Richmond*, and "with my light troops to destroy any magazines or "stores in the *neighbourhood*, which may have been "collected either for his use or for General Greene's "army. *From thence* I purpose to move to the *Neck* "*at Williamsburg*, which is represented as healthy, "and keep myself unengaged from operations which "might interfere with your plan for the campaign, "until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. "I hope I *shall then have an opportunity to receive*

1b the fact is that standing in the Place of G. Phillips they ought to have been obeyed by his Lordship

2f in short Phillips had been ordered & L C did and of course should have considered himself as bound to the orders he found in Virginia when he came there

3e by permitting it I became as Com in chief responsible.

4a I could do no more than recommend it, as to responsibility there is no doubt but I was responsible for a Plan I had ordered G. P. to execute, & had recommended also to L. Cornwallis.

"*better information* than has hitherto been in my "power to procure relative to *a proper harbour and* "*place of arms.*[1e·2f] At present I am inclined to "think well of York. *The objections to Portsmouth* "are, *that it cannot be made strong without an army* "*to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy, and* "*can give no protection to a ship of the line.*" From [19] the foregoing letter I naturally concluded, that, as soon as his Lordship had finished the service he was gone on, (which I did not imagine would have taken up above six or seven days at most) he would endeavour to *obtain information respecting a proper harbour and place of arms*; and having found it, that he was actually employed in establishing a post there. For, not having received any letter from his Lordship between the 26th of May and 30th of June, I was totally ignorant of his having changed his design, (as described in his letter of the first date) and *gone across the country towards Fredericksburg, by Hanover Court-house* ; an operation which took his Lordship a complete month before he reached Williamsburg. But had his Lordship fortunately explained to me his instructions[3b·4b] in that letter in the same manner he has now explained his letter, I should have seen that his Lordship had no idea of establishing a post on the Williamsburg Neck: and, when I found he had no plan of his own, would of course have sent early and explicit orders for that purpose, either to his Lordship, or in his absence to General Leslie, whereby much time might have been saved, [20] and the fatal catastrophe that followed —at least retarded, by his Lordship being in a better

1e we all agreed in this Necessity of a place of arms, tis plain by this his Lordp did.

2f In his first letter after his arrival he seems to have had an Idea of a harbour & place of arms & thinks well of York & Gloucester this also implies that York & Gloucester had not these deficiencies, and the Idea of a harbour for ships of the line if it did not originate with L Cornwallis at least met his approbation

3b Intentions

4b instructions *run through.*

state of defence than that in which the enemy found him.[1f] For, though from his Lordship's letter to me of the 22d of August,* I had every reason to suppose that a proper survey of the ground had been taken, and a judicious plan fixed on for fortifying it; I very much fear that nothing material was done until after the arrival of the French fleet on the 29th of August, as the engineer has since given me to understand (when I asked him for his survey) that he did not take one.[2d] There appears, therefore,[3f] to have been a misapprehension somewhere respecting this matter, as well as the number of intrenching tools; which, though computed by his Lordship† to [21] be only about four hundred when he began to work on the York side, I find by his engineer's reports, in my possession, to have been 992‡ on the 23d of August, the day on which (it is presumed from the letter before quoted) he began to break ground.[4a]

* *Extract.—Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, dated York-Town, August* 22, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 137.

"The engineer has *finished his survey* and examination of *this* "*place*, and has proposed his plan for fortifying it; which, appearing "judicious, I have approved of, and directed to be executed."

† *Extract.—Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton dated York-Town, October* 20, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 205.

"And our stock of intrenching tools, which *did not much exceed* "*four hundred when we began to work* in the latter end of August, "was now much diminished."

‡ Vide the return in the Appendix. ii. 250.

1f If the fact is that L. C. did not defend the ground he described in his letter of the 20th Octr but stood siege in ground which that commanded in a near advance (Washingtons words that it infiladed) & which works were not thought of till the french arrived, chose in a hurry without a plan & his Lordship was reduced to Extremty in there in 7 days open trenches

2d The Engineer informed me he had never examined the ground

3f What I can spare 1000 or 1200 men from everything but labour

4a Lord Cornwallis asserts in an official letter that his Engineer had made an actual survey of ground He has chosen in preference to cover a naval Station for large ships in the York River, that he has offered his Plan &c &c &c page 20. when I call on His Engineer for this Plan he tells me he never surveyed it & when called upon

Lord Cornwallis is also pleased to say, "Whoever "reads the correspondence will see, that since Sir H. "Clinton had declared positively in his first,[1f] and "in several subsequent dispatches against the plan "for reducing Virginia, no *explicit alternative* was "left to me, between complying with the requisi- "tion (contained in his letters of the 11th[2f] and "15th of June) of such troops as I could spare from a "healthy defensive station, or engaging in operations "in the Upper Chesapeak."[3f]. But this conclusion does not, I presume necessarily follow; for though it is admitted that the whole of my correspondence with the American Minister and Lord Cornwallis uniformly declare my sentiments, of the impracticability of reducing Virginia by an operation solely there, without the good-will and aid of the inhabitants,—and of the bad policy [22] of the measure from the unhealthiness of the climate; and I was equally uniform in expressing to his Lordship my wishes, that he would adopt my ideas of the move to the Delaware Neck, &c. against which there were none of those objections. Yet, when I found that his Lordship was averse to engage in the operations concerted with

suddenly to fortify it on the arrival of the French Fleet He knew nothing of it, what does Lord Cornwallis say to this— again when his Lordship says he has not above 400 intrenching tools on the 22d of August this same Engineer makes a formal return of 992. at that very period what says Lord Cornwallis to this also—

1f the first letter his Lordship recd was that of the 29- may page 99.

2f which the Minister had however not only approved of himself but had said he was convinced L Cornwallis would also.

3f Lord Cornwallis asserts here what is not true. read my letter of the 29th may page 99. & there I appeal whether I do not leave his lordship at full liberty to carry on such operations in Virga as he shall judge proper & again p. 102 I had always declared & I still think without a covering fleet it was not only impracticable but must be fatal, and I appeal to his lordship what would have been his fate if he had ever reduced Virginia and the Enemy had afterwards arrived in the force & with the intentions they did. that his whole covering fleet &c would have been swallow up in a few hours had it not been secured by a place of arms

General Phillips, and that he concurred with that officer respecting the propriety of changing the post of Portsmouth for one more healthy and defensible, I gave my consent to the change proposed, and referred his Lordship to my correspondence with General Phillips for my opinions thereon. His Lordship might have therefore judged that I expected he would immediately carry into execution this part of my plan, especially as his Lordship might have recollected that he told me in the letter before quoted, "That he hoped, when he got to the "Williamsburg Neck, he should have an opportu- "nity to receive better information than had hitherto "been in his power to procure, relative to a *proper* "*harbour and place of arms.*"[1b] Wherefore, as his Lordship was left at liberty by my letters of the 11th and [23] 15th of June, to detain all the troops, if he had not finished the operations he was engaged in : and as his Lordship had *not completed his measures relative to a proper harbour and place of arms*, which appears from his letter to have been one of the operations he proposed engaging in ; it may be fairly concluded that an *explicit alternative* was left him. For the letter of the 11th of June explicitly recommends to his Lordship *the taking a healthy defensive station* wherever he chose on the Williamsburg Neck ; and only calls for what troops he could spare from its ample defence and other purposes mentioned, *after it was taken.* And as his Lordship *had not yet taken that station*, the troops were without doubt to be detained ;—because *in that case only* my letter requested them to be sent ; but though his Lordship might possibly have understood the letter differently at the time, we may at least suppose that, as it referred him to other letters of the 29th of May and 8th of June, for a further explanation of my wishes, and these letters had not then been received

1b and from its being the most inimical Province and the danger of operation there witht a fleet to cover it

by his Lordship, he had very sufficient reason *to suspend at least* his intention of crossing James River, until [24] he either received them or heard again from New-York. Lord Cornwallis endeavours to invalidate this reasoning by saying, "that the choice "of a healthy station was controlled by other material "considerations, particularly the *imminent danger of* "*New-York*, and the *important effects expected from* "*the expedition against Philadelphia.*" His Lordship will, however, forgive me if I cannot discover from whence those considerations arose; as my letters of the 11th and 15th of June (which were the only letters *he had* then* received) do not describe New-York to *be in any sort of danger*, and his Lordship by his answer to those letters seemed of opinion, *that the project against Philadelphia was then become inexpedient.* I am therefore sorry to be under the necessity of repeating, that it is my opinion, his Lordship totally misconceived all my orders and intentions respecting this business, when he judged they warranted his *passing James River* and retiring to *Portsmouth;—which* I could not possibly suspect his Lordship would make choice of as a *healthy defensible station*, [25] after he had just told me in his letter of the 26th of May, "that it was *remarkably unhealthy, and (though* "*fortified) required an army to defend it.*" But our correspondence is now before the public, and they will judge whether my orders authorized his Lordship to do so, and whether consequently six weeks at least were not lost *in securing a place of arms*, which we both seemed to concur in opinion was necessary.[1a] With respect to his Lordship's saying, "It will be seen "by the correspondence that the Commander-in-chief's "opinion of the indispensible necessity of a harbour "for line of battle ships only appears in his letter of "the 11th of July, after he had been acquainted that

* Vide his Lordship's letter of the 30th of June. ii. 31.

1a without a covering Fleet, or place of arms till that Fleet should arrive all agreed operation in Chesapeak was dangerous.

"the troops intended for the expedition against "Philadelphia would be soon ready to sail," (thereby intimating that it was a new idea just then started) I presume it may be easily made appear from the same correspondence, that so far from being a new idea, *the taking a station for large ships* was one of the earliest and principal objects recommended to General Phillips's consideration and enquiry.* And I think it may be inferred, [26] from his Lordship's objecting to Portsmouth, in the letter of the 26th of May, "*because it could not give protection to a ship of the* "*line*," that he regarded it as such, and consequently went in search of a naval station *as standing in that general officer's place*, it being apparently from that letter one of the principal reasons which induced his Lordship to go to the Williamsburg Neck.

Lord Cornwallis says, "Hampton-road was recom- "mended by that order; but as it was upon "examination found totally unfit for the purpose "desired, every person can judge *whether the order* "*did not then in its spirit become positive to occupy* "*York and Gloucester.*" To enable every person therefore to judge whether it did or not, I shall beg leave to transcribe the words of the order. "I "request that your Lordship will without loss of "time *examine Old Point Comfort, and fortify it.* "But if it should be your Lordship's opinion that "Old Point Comfort *cannot be held without having* "*possession of York*, for *in this case* Gloucester may "perhaps be not so material) *and that the whole* "cannot be done with less than seven thousand "men, you are at full liberty to detain all the "[27] troops now in Chesapeak, which I believe "amount to somewhat more than that number. "Which very liberal concession will, I am per- "suaded, convince your Lordship of the high "estimation in which I hold a naval station in "Chesapeak." If nothing else had been said to

* Vide instructions of the 10th of March. *p* 347.

Lord Cornwallis or General Phillips, upon the subject of a naval station, but what this order contains; there could not in my humble opinion be a doubt, that his Lordship was not at liberty to take any other than Old Point Comfort, — except he should be of opinion that *York was necessary to cover it, in which case he might take York also*;[1a] and as the *two posts* might probably require more troops than were intended to be left in Chesapeak, his Lordship was at liberty to detain the whole *for fortifying and garrisoning* them. I dare say Lord Cornwallis saw the order in this point of view; -- but judging that Old Point Comfort was totally unfit for the purpose desired, he had recourse to the instructions and letters to General Phillips in his possession, to see whether they would authorise him to reject it, and look out for another.[2a] And discovering that my instructions to that General officer gave him leave, "in [28] case the Admiral disapproving Portsmouth "should require a fortified station for large ships "in Chesapeak, and *should propose York town or* "*Old Point Comfort*, to take possession thereof, if "possession of either could be *acquired and main-*"*tained without great risk or loss*;" his Lordship conceived he should act according to the spirit of my orders, by taking York and Gloucester. I am however humbly of opinion, that admitting the propriety of his Lordship's consulting other papers besides the order immediately before him, the order (even as explained by the instructions) did not *become positive to occupy York and Gloucester.* For it does not appear that the instructions authorised either

1a York being above old P. Comfort & on the same neck.

2a If Lord Cornwallis considers the orders to Genl Phillips as affecting him in one instance they do so equally in all, tho' in strictness I think his Lordship disapproving of James River should not have removed the station to York river without first receiving the Admirals & my approbation. I never blamed him for doing so judging he was convinced He could there give effectual Protection to ships of the line the Responsibility remaining however in him.

General Phillips or his Lordship to occupy York or Old Point Comfort, *unless they should have been proposed by the Admiral*[1a] *for a naval station.* But the post of York and Gloucester never having been proposed by the Admiral either to his Lordship or me for a naval station, as Old Point Comfort was, but only barely mentioned to his Lordship by the Admiral, as likely to command one of the principal rivers *if it could be secured*; and it at last appearing by the letter of 20th October, to have been his [29] Lordship's opinion that it was *incapable of being so*; it may be presumed that his Lordship did not act conformable to either the spirit or letter of the order in taking it, — and consequently that his *doing so was entirely of his own motion and choice.* But, being probably aware of this conclusion, his Lordship says, "as the harbour was the "indispensible object, he took York, being the only "one in Chesapeak that he knew of." In which (no doubt) his Lordship would have been perfectly justifiable *if the objections to it were not such as he thought forcible.*" [2b] But it appears from his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October, *that the objections to that post were such as he thought forcible.* It may therefore be a matter of some surprise, that, as his Lordship thought proper to avail himself of the *latitude of choice* he supposed given him by the instructions to General Phillips,[3b] it did not occur to him that the same instructions directed him to "*decline* "*taking either York or Old Point Comfort, if his* "*objections were such as he thought forcible.*" And as Lord Cornwallis *never stated his objections to the post of York* either to the Admiral or me, as those

1a Admiral *underlined.*

2b so very difft from that of the 22. Augt

3b at least till he had repetd them to me & had recd my orders but I confess if he had spoke as unfavorably of York and Gloucester as he did favorably I should under the assurances I had received of a covering fleet, convinced of the necessity of a place of arms to cover large ships have ordered him to take the best he could find.—

instructions directed him to do, if he had any; it may be [30] asserted that his Lordship alone is answerable for whatever impropriety there may have been in *taking the post of York and Gloucester*; as it is I presume, clear from the foregoing reasoning, that, having under the sanction of the instructions to General Phillips, declined taking possession of *Old Point Comfort* (which his Lordship was positively directed to occupy by the order of the 11th of July,)[1b] his Lordship had *the same authority for declining to take York or any other naval station*, "could they not be *acquired and maintained without* "*great risk or loss, and so well and so soon fortified* "*as to be rendered hors d' insulte before the enemy* "*could move a force, &c. against them*;"* which his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October intimates to be his opinion the post of York could not be *from the disadvantageous nature of the ground.*[2a]

Having represented to the Minister for the American department the danger of operations in Chesapeak[3f] without a covering fleet; and having been in consequence promised that I should have it; and being told by Admi[31]ral Hood upon his arrival that he had brought me a sufficient one;[4b] I gave Lord Cornwallis of course all the hopes I could, and "*certainly promised to succour* "*him in person, by moving into Chesapeak with four* "*thousand troops*," the instant the Admiral should inform me the passage to him was open, or would undertake to convoy me. But as his Lordship did not receive these hopes (such as they are) before the

* Vide the instructions *p* 347 and substance of conversations with General Phillips *p* 430; as quoted by Lord Cornwallis in his letter dated July 26, 1781. ii. 104.

1b the only *order* I ever gave to take a naval station to cover large ships.

2a very different from the discription he gives of this ground in his letter 22d Augt.

3f which I had been ordered to engage in in support of L. Cornwallis.

4b & S G. Rodney having promised to follow de Grasse & cover our operations.

16th of September; (for I must still persist in declaring that I never gave his Lordship *assurances of the exertions of the navy* before my letter to him of the 24th of September, which he received on the 29th — as asserted in his Lordship's letter of the 20th of October)[1a·2b·] Surely his Lordship's hopes of succour must have been but small between the 29th of August and that period, *when he knew there was an enemy's fleet of thirty-six sail of the line blocking him up, and a formidable army collecting to invest him*, "in an "intrenched camp, subject in most places to enfilade, "and the ground in general disadvantageous;"[3f]— without *knowing of more than seven sail of the line on our side*, and consequently having in the intermediate space no very great prospect of relief.

[32] His Lordship says, "that, as I did not give "him the smallest particle of discretionary power "different from holding the posts he occupied; it "would not have been justifiable in him, either to "abandon by the evacuation of York a considerably "quantity of artillery, the ships of war, transports, "provisions, stores, and hospitals;[4b] or, by venturing "an action without the most manifest advantage, to "run the risk of precipitating the loss of them." To this, I shall only observe, that it will appear from the correspondence, that his Lordship's discretionary powers were unlimited from the first moment of his taking charge of a separate command[5a·6b·7f]; and it will I believe be admitted, that his Lordship acted in most cases as if he considered them as such. And though I may not condemn[8a·9b·10f] his Lordship for

1a but has since acknowledged was not the case.

2b but since acknowledged to be otherwise

3f how differently do his Lordships letters of the 22d August, and 20th of Octr describe the ground of York.

4b &c &c &c.

5a except with respect to his making any move that might endanger Charles Town.

6b except as to the risking C. Town.

7f except with respect to exposing S. Carolina.

8a whether I condemn him or no He no doubt *now* condemns himself.

9b S H Clinton saw the ne-

not attacking the Marquis de la Fayette, before his junction with Monsieur St. Simon (when he had, as I understand, only two thousand regular continental troops) ; or for not attempting to prevent that junction ; or for not attacking them when joined ; and endeavouring to escape with part of his army to the southward, between the 29th of August and the [33] 16th of September ; — as such measures must have altogether depended on his Lordship's own feelings, of which no man can speak but himself. Yet it was natural to suppose, that the General officer, who had but a few months before (at the risk of engaging his Commander in Chief in operations, for which he could not be prepared[1a]; and perhaps at the risk of losing a valuable province under his immediate protection)[2a] decided upon a move with part of his army into Virginia, "*for urgent reasons*," "*being influenced thereto* (he says) *by the substance of a dispatch*,[3a.4b] (he heard was coming to him,) with-

cessity of a Place of arms ; had every reason till the 16th octr to judge favorably of that L. Cornwallis had taken in preference to the one S H C had *ordered* ; S H had every reason to expect a covering fleet how then could he with propriety direct L. Corns to quit that place of arms particularly under the circumstances he must have done so as described above ; but tho L C had not positive orders, under "pressing contingences, or discretionary powers he might have retired. It will be judged he ran risks from the great superiority of the Enemy's Fleet.

10f In the first place I defy his Lordship to produce a single prooff that I ever ordered him to take York and Gloucester much less to hold them, but when I ordered him to fortify old point Comfort in James river & he not approving that took Y. & Gloucester in preference I did not disapprove but uniformly said I hoped he had chose a healthy & respectable post & explained my meaning of a respectable post such a one as could resist a serious attack of fleet and Army read my Insns June page 8 when I left L Cornwallis in Carolina I in a standing order forbid all offensive operations except what might be undertaken without risk to C. Town

1a and had always disapproved.

2a and its Capitol committed to his care

3a from the Comr in chief.

4b C. Balfour received it the 7th of april neglected many safe opportunities of sending it to L. Cornwallis & tho he had read it did not send the substance of it to L C. because perhaps he knew L. C. was bent on going to Vir-

out waiting to receive it, though it might have been expected in a few hours: — I say, it was natural to suppose, that the General officer who had done this, might have judged it equally expedient to decide upon retiring back again without waiting to receive *special discretionary* powers from his Commander in Chief, if he judged there was a great probability of his losing every thing should he remain. Which, if it was so, I am bold to say, was a reason far more urgent for his endeavouring to save part of his army by any means in his power, than any his Lordship [34] could suppose he had for quitting the Carolinas at the time he marched into Virginia.

There remains little more necessary in reply to Lord Cornwallis's introduction, but to observe, that the army and its followers in Virginia had been so increased in consequence of his Lordship's move into that province; that it would have been impracticable to withdraw them by water (as his Lordship is pleased to suggest) for want of transports, even if the American minister had not directed[1ab] me[2b] to support his Lordship there, and a pressing contingency had required it. And I must take the liberty to say, that the sending his Lordship's corps back to South Carolina by land, would have been a most absurd idea for me to adopt after the opinions I had given of the risks it run in its former march by that route.[3a]

ginia, & that those dispatches must prevent him; L C. knew S H C was resolved to quit the command if Arbuthnot was not removed—his Lordship knew from L. Sandwich by post that Arbuthnot would not be removed immly & perhaps his Lordship had hopes S. H. C. would resign to him on his arrival in Virginia, who witht leave which S H C could not so well do if his Lordship remained as S H C had directed him in S. Carolina—now the secret is out ! ! ! Ross wanted to be Secretary more than his Lordship to be C. in Chief

1ab directed *underlined.*

2b and forbid my drawing a man from thence.

3a but had I been at liberty I should have ordered his Lordship hither to New York leaving only a small Station to cover Frigates in Chesapeak or if it should have been expedient directed him to have proceeded in the execution of my Plan.

I shall now beg leave to conclude with an opinion, which I presume is deducible from the foregoing (I trust candid) review of circumstances. Which is, that Lord Cornwallis's conduct and opinions, if they were not the immediate causes, may be adjudged to have at least contributed[1a] to bring on the fatal catas[35]trophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.[2a]

H. CLINTON.

HARLEY-STREET,
April 3, 1783.[3a.4b]

1a principally

2a and lost that Continent.

3a I should realy think I insulted the understanding of any Man (particularly that of a Military Man) if I should ask him whether He thinks S H Clinton can be Responsable for operations forced upon him by a subordinate General which he does his utmost to render the secure, and when in danger to succour by every means in *his* Power

4b pages 8 & 9. & 7 Lord Cornwallis for coming into Virginia *contrary* to the orders of his Comr in Chief, the Cabinet for rejecting the Plan of the Comr in Chief (which they had approved till May & did again approve in July too late !) and ordering him to adopt that of a Sr Genl serving under his orders. S G. Rodney for promising to obey the orders he had received to follow De Grasse & cover our absurd operations in Chesk & for not doing it. & S S H for so positively asserting he had brought a covering fleet. Blame who they will S H Clinton S'en lave les mains.
S H C thought his Narrative would have induced L. Cornwallis to have demanded an Enquiry— he could have had no doubt but that his observations would at least, he was mistaken.—does not S H in the language of a Gentleman accuse L C of having repeatedly disobeyed his orders, misrepresented and of asserting in an official letter what was not true !

APPENDIX.

PART I.

CONTAINING extracts from the Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis,[1a] respecting the Force left with his Lordship, and the Instructions given him upon his taking the Command of the Southern District.

1a To prove that S H C left with L. Cornwallis all he wished all he wanted

Extract [1]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Charles Town, May 17, 1780. *see Extract p* 209.

Copy [2]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Manigolds, May 18, 1780. *see Letter p* 210.

Extract [4]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Manigolds, May 19, 1780. *see Extract p* 211.

Extract [5]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Charles-town, May 20, 1780. *see Extract p* 211.

Extract [5]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Charles-town, May 20, 1780. *see Extract p* 212.

Extract [6]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Lenews, East Side of Santêe, May 21, 1780. *see Extract p* 212.

Extract [6]—Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Charles-Town, June 1, 1780. *see Extract p* 213.

Extract [8]—From Instructions to Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, Charles-town, June 1, 1780. *see Letter p* 215.

Extract [9]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Romulus, June 8, 1780. *see Extract p* 220.

PART II.

CONTAINING Copies and Extracts from Letters, relative to the entire Submission of South Carolina, and the progressive Operations proposed in Consequence, for the Reduction of North Carolina.

Extract [11]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Charles-town, June 30, 1780. *see Letter p* 221.

From the same. [12] *see Letter p* 221.

Extract [13]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Charles-town, July, 14, 1780. *see Letter p* 231.

Extract [14]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Charles-town, Aug. 6, 1780. *see Letter p* 235.

PART III.

CONTAINING Extracts from the Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis, respecting the Events which

occurred between the Battle of Camden and Major Ferguson's Defeat.

Extract [19]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Camden, August 23, 1780. *see Letter p* 257.

Extract [20]—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, August 20, 1780. *see Letter p* 241.

Extract [21]—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, August 21, 1780. *see Letter p* 249.

Extract [21]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Camden, August 29, 1780. *see Letter p* 261.

Extract [22]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, September 20, 1780. *see Extract p* 269.

Inclosures. [23] Copy.—Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, dated Charles-Town, June 3, 1780. *see Letter p* 218.

Extract [24]—From Lord G. Germain to Sir H. Clinton, Whitehall, July 5, 1780. *see Letter p* 229.

Instructions [25] to the Hon. Major-general Leslie, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, October 10, 1780. *see Extract p* 270.

Extract [26]—Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, New-York, November 6, 1780. *see Extract p* 287.

Second Instructions [27] to the Hon. Major-general Leslie, dated New-York, November 2, 1780. *see Letter p* 285.

Extract [29]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Waxhaw, September 22, 1780. *see Extract p* 269.

Extract [30]—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camp at Waxhaw, September 19, 1780. *see Letter p* 264.

PART IV.

CONTAINING Extracts from the Correspondence with Earl Cornwallis, &c. from Major Ferguson's Misfortune to his Lordship's second Move into North Carolina.

Extract [31]—From Major-general Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, Nov. 7, 1780, eight at Night. *see Extract p* 289.

Copy [32]—From Lord Rawdon to Major-general Leslie, dated Camp, near the Indian Lands, West of Cattawba river, South Carolina, Oct. 24, 1780. *see Letter p* 271.

Copy [38]—From Sir Henry Clinton, to Major-general Leslie, dated New York, November 12, 1780. *see Letter p* 294.

Extract [38]—From Major-general Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, on board the Romulus, dated Hampton Road, November 19, 1780. *see Letter p* 297.

Copy [39]—From Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, camp between Broad River and the Catawba, October 29, 1780. *see Letter p* 277.

Extract [43]—From Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp between Broad River, and the Catawba, South Carolina, October 31, 1780. *see Letter p* 284.

Extract [45]—From Earl Cornwallis to Major-general Leslie, dated Camp at Winnesborough, between Broad River and Wateree, November 12, 1780. *see Letter p* 295.

Extract [45]—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, without date, to Major-general Leslie. *see Letter p* 301.

Copy [46]—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, December 13, 1780. *see Letter p* 310.

Copy [49]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Wynnesborough, December 3, 1780. *see Letter p* 302.

Extract [52]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Wynnesborough, Dec. 22, 1780. *see Letter p* 312.

PART V.

CONTAINING Extracts from the Correspondence; between his Lordship's second Move into North Carolina, and his Arrival at Wilmington.

Extract [54]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Wynnesborough, Jan. 6, 1781. *see Letter p* 315.

Extract [56]—From Major-general Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, Camden, Jan. 8, 1781. *see Letter p* 317.

Copy [56]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, March 2, 5, and 8, 1781. (Sent by Captain Amherst, in the Jupiter Merchant Ship.) *see Letter p* 341.

Extract [61]—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, January 23, 1781. *see Extract p* 322.

Extract [63]—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to General Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, February 5, 1781. *see Extract p* 324.

Extract [64]—From Sir H. Clinton, K.B. to Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, sent by Captain Amherst, in the Jupiter merchant ship, dated New York, March 9, 1781. *see Letter p* 346.

Extract [64]—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 13, 1781. *see Extract p* 324.

Extract [65]—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 25, 1781. *see Extract p* 328.

Extract [67]—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Brigadier-general Arnold, dated New York, February 18, 1781. *see Extract p* 326.

Extract [67]—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 27, 1781. *see Extract p* 329.

Copy [68]—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Brigadier-general Arnold, dated New York, March 1, 1781. *see Letter p* 330.

Extract [69]—From instructions to Major-general Phillips, New York, March 10, 1781. *see Letter p* 347.

Extract [71]—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, March 8, 1781. *see Extract p* 339.

Extract [72]—From Admiral Arbuthnot to General Arnold, Chesapeak, March 19, 1781. *see Extract p* 372.

Extract [73]—From Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Chesapeak, on board the Royal Oak, in Lynhaven Bay, March 26, 1781. *see Extract p* 375.

Extract [73]—From Sir Henry Clinton to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, March 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 373.

Extract [75]—Major general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, April 3, 1781. *see Extract p* 377.

Copy [79]—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 5, 1781. *see Letter p* 392.

Extract [80]—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 13, 1781. *see Extract p* 405.

Extract [81]—Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, in Virginia, April 15, 1781. *see Extract p* 407.

Extract [81]—Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Hampton Road, on board the Maria, April 19, 1781. *see Extract p* 412.

Extract [82]—Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, received by the Amphitrite man of war, Charles-Town, April 7, 1781. *see Letter p* 392.

PART VI.

Containing Extracts from the Correspondence; between Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington, and his entering Virginia.

Extract [84]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, received by his Majesty's ship Amphitrite, Camp, near Wilmington, April 10, 1781. *see Letter p* 395.

Copy [85]—Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, April 30, 1781. *see Letter p* 441.

Copy [90]—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, received by the Speedy packet, which called at Cape Fear, dated Charles-Town, April 20, 1781. *see Letter p* 418.

Extract [91] of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, May 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 480.

Copy [92]—Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, Wilmington, April 23, 1781. *see Letter p* 420.

Copy [94]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Wilmington, April 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 426.

Copy [95]—From Earl Cornwallis to Major-general Phillips, dated April 24, 1781. *see Letter p* 427.

Copy [97]—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Charles-town, May 6, 1781. *see Letter p* 471.

PART VII.

CONTAINING Extracts from the Correspondence from his Lordship's entering Virginia, &c.

Extract [99]—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Lord Cornwallis, dated New York, May 29, 1781. *see Letter p* 493.

Extract [105]—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Bird's Plantation, North of James-river, May 26, 1781. *see Letter p* 487.

Extract [108]—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Lord Cornwallis, New-York, June 11, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 18.

Copy [111]—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Lord Cornwallis, New-York, June 15, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 24.

Extract [112]—Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Williamsburg, June 30, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 31.

Return [114] of intrenching Tools in the possession of the Engineers at York Town, in Virginia, on the 23d of August, 1781. *see* ii. 250.

[At End] Table of British and American Armies opposed to each other at different periods in 1780 & 1781. *see* ii. 226.

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

EARL CORNWALLIS.

1b No. 29 2b Colonel Mordaunt

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL

SIR HENRY CLINTON, K.B.

AND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Clinton [3] to Cornwallis] Head-Quarters, New York, July 8, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 49.

[Clinton [6] to Cornwallis] Head-Quarters, New York, July 10, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 62.

Extract [9] of a Letter from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. dated Cobham, July 8th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 56.

[Clinton [10] to Cornwallis] Head-Quarters, New York, July 15, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 73.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis [15] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. Portsmouth, Virginia, July 27th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 104.

Extract [19] of the Instructions of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, to Major General Phillips, dated at Head-Quarters, New York, March 10, 1781. *see p* 347.

Extract [19] of several Conversations that His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton had with Major General Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither. *see p* 430.

Copy [20] of a Letter from Lieutenant Sutherland,

of the Engineers, to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. Billy, Ordnance Transport, Hampton Road, July 25th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 95.

Copy [22] of a Letter from the Captains of his Majesty's Ships, to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, Richmond, Hampton Road, 26th July 1781. *see Letter* ii. 101.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [23] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York, Virginia, August 12th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 124.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [24] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, in Virginia, August 16, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 126.

[Clinton [25] to Cornwallis] New-York, August 2, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 109.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [37] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, August 20, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 130.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [42] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, August 22, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 137.

[Clinton [44] to Cornwallis] New-York, August 30th, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 143.

[Clinton [46] to Cornwallis] New-York, September 2, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 149.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [48] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York, in Virginia, August 31, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 146.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [49] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, 2d September, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 148.

[Clinton [49] to Cornwallis] New-York, September 6th, at Noon, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 152.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [50] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, September 8, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 154.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [52] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, September 16, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 156.

[Clinton [53] to Cornwallis] New-York, 24th September, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 159.

[Clinton [54] to Cornwallis] New-York, September 25, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 163.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [55] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, in Virginia, 29th Sept. 1781. 10 p.m. *see Letter* ii. 169.

[Clinton [Facing 55] to Cornwallis] New York, 30th Sept. 1781. *see Letter* ii. 172.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis [56] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, 3d October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 174.

[Clinton [57] to Cornwallis] New-York, 14th October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 184.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [59] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, 12 M. October 11. 1781. *see Letter* ii. 176.

Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, [60] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, 15th October, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 188.

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, [61] to his Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c. &c. &c. York-Town, Virginia, October 20, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 205.

[Clinton [67] to Cornwallis] New-York, 30th November, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 217.

[Cornwallis [68] to Clinton] New-York, December 2d, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 219.

[Clinton [71] to Cornwallis] New York, December 2d, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 240.

A

REPLY

TO

SIR HENRY CLINTON's NARRATIVE.

WHEREIN

HIS NUMEROUS ERRORS ARE POINTED OUT,

AND THE CONDUCT OF

LORD CORNWALLIS

FULLY VINDICATED

FROM

ALL ASPERSION:

INCLUDING THE WHOLE OF THE

PUBLIC AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE,

BETWEEN

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN,

SIR HENRY CLINTON,

AND

HIS LORDSHIP;

AS ALSO

INTERCEPTED LETTERS FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON.

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM----
NON FUMUM VENDO, NEC FUCUM FACIO.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR R. FAULDER, NEW BOND STREET,
AND J. DEBRETT, PICCADILLY.
MDCCLXXXIII.

REPLY

TO

SIR HENRY CLINTON's

NARRATIVE.

SIR,

YOU have roused the public attention to an affair, that your bitterest enemy would not have been so impolitically cruel as to handle. The unfortunate issue of the campaign in 1781, was sinking into oblivion. The wound it gave your Sovereign, and your Country, was almost closed by the lenient hand of Time. With rash hand you have torn it asunder. Your Narrative challenges OPINION—and you cannot count it obtrusion that you meet it.

[4] Your tale, though by no means clear, possesses at least one of the characteristics of truth. It is simplicity itself. I cannot, therefore, suspect deceit in your obscurity, nor think, that when you are confused, you intend to be unintelligible, and thus practise on paper, a piece of generalship, sometimes successful in the field, where green and rotten materials are heaped together, and set on fire, that their smoke may favour an escape, when battle would be imprudent.

Having paid this tribute to your candour, Sir Henry, you will be the less pained at the liberty I shall take, of arranging the matter of your Narra-

tive in such distinct order that the dullest capacity shall be able to comprehend it; especially, as my motive for this arrangement is, to save you from the anxiety of misrepresentation, which you have already, it seems, so grievously experienced, through the want of that necessary precaution in the communication of your thoughts.

Upon a patient and accurate perusal of your pamphlet, I find, that although you confess "truth compels you to impute our [5] misfortunes, *ultimately*, to the want of a covering fleet," yet, still you would give the world to understand, that the measure, which led to those misfortunes, was taken by Lord Cornwallis, "*not only without your approbation, but even contrary to your wishes and intentions**." And this heavy charge you allow yourself to make, without, at the same time, submitting to the public consideration letters written by his Lordship, accounting for his conduct on the occasion you allude to. But, suspicious as this omission is, it does not induce me to retract my opinion of your candour. The man who complains of the publication of Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 2nd of December, 1781, *unaccompanied by its answer* †,[1,2] cannot, surely, through design, adopt the very same mode, he is himself so earnest in reprobating. In opposition, however, to this imputation on his Lordship, impartiality obliges me to produce extracts of the letters of that nobleman, whom thus (*doubtless* through inadvertence) you would [6] have wronged, by neglecting to couple his justification with your charge. In one of them, written to yourself, on the 10th, and received on the 22d, of April, 1781, it appears that you had, so late as that period, *left his*

* p. [8] 11 of the Narrative.

† Ibid. p. [5] 8.

1 These Letters having been read in the House of Lords & already published there was no necessity to swell the Narrative by a Repetition—nor do they refute the above Charge.

2 they were read in the house of Lords.

*Lordship in the dark, as to your intended operations of the summer.** In this state of uncertainty he remained at Wilmington, till the 24th of the same month,[1] when, receiving intelligence of General Greene's march into South Carolina, and apprehensive, on [7] that event, of fatality to Lord Rawdon, which he shews very circumstantially in his letter of this date to General Philips †, as also in one to Lord George Germain the day before‡, the utter improbability of averting, otherwise than by quitting his post at Wilmington, and pointing his route towards Hillsborough, *in hopes to withdraw Greene*, he determines on that measure, which, he informs you, in his letter of the same day, he is under the necessity of adopting,[2] "as he finds there is no prospect of a speedy reinforcement from Europe, and that the return of Greene to North Carolina, would put a junction with Philips out of his power §." But, in taking this step, we see his Lordship, in another letter to you of the same date, securing the conveyance of his Majesty's troops to South Carolina, by every means, that the wisest precaution could, in his critical situation, suggest, in case his junction with Ge[8]neral Philips, should be found inexpedient or impracticable ‖.

* *Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp before Wilmington, 10th April*, 1781. see Letter p 395.

† See the letter in the Appendix, No I. *p* 427.

‡ Appendix, No. II. *p* 420.

§ See his Lordship's letter in the Appendix, No. III. *p* 424.

‖ See Appendix, No. IV. *p* 426.

1 no Communication could be had with Lord Cornwallis from his Passage of the Catawba until his arrival at Wilmington had his Lordsp received my letter of the 14th March he would have seen my opinion on that subject.

2 Sir Henry Clinton does not doubt that Lord Cornwallis had his Reason for marching into Virginia but none he has yet seen have been sufficiently satisfactory to convince him that the measure was not in the high degree impolitic, & fatal to our Southward Possessions, and has always given that opinion to his Lordship

Such, Sir, is the history of "Lord Cornwallis's march into Virginia, *without consulting* his commander in chief." From your manner of narrating the circumstances, one would be apt to conclude,[1] he *might* have consulted you, if he *would*; but he must be blinded by prejudice indeed, who, after reading his Lordship's account of this business, does not perceive,[2] that the necessity of his affairs, alone, prevented him from seeking your advice, in an undertaking "that sat heavy on his mind."—"It is very disagreeable to me," says he,in one of his letters already quoted,[3] "to decide upon measures so very important, and of such consequence to the general conduct of the war, without any opportunity of procuring your Excellency's directions or approbation; *but the delay and difficulty of conveying letters, and* THE[4] IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAITING *for answers*, render it *indispensibly necessary*.

[9] Beside, *solid* operation (as you term it Sir Henry) in Virginia met the warmest approbation of the Ministry. The reduction of that province was a favourite contemplation of your Sovereign, long* previous to the letters you refer to in your Appendix. It was a step deemed absolutely necessary, to secure the subjection of the Carolinas.[5] This was the opinion of Lord Cornwallis also. And the numerous proofs, that illustrious General had given of his gallantry, his skill, and his judgment, had obtained reverence to his sentiments. The glorious battle of Camden,[6] and the wise and salutary measures he took in consequence,

* See letters from Lord George Germain, in Appendix, No. V. *pp* 334 *and* 337.

1 certainly—Had he remained only a few days longer at Wilmington

2 The necessity nowhere appears—but the contrary

3 read in the house of lords

4 Rather the impossibility of resisting any measure his Lordship once determines on.

5 The Narrative says nothing to the contrary.

6 Sir H. Clinton ever spoke of the Battle of Camden in Terms of the Highest Praise.

had crowned his reputation.* [10] He possessed the entire confidence of Government, at a season, when you, Sir Henry, confess you murmured at the indignity of [11] wanting it. It is not then matter of surprise, that a commander in chief, brooking continuance in office under so mortifying a [12] circumstance, should scowl on measures, whose success must have added to his chagrin.†[2].

[13] It is to this temper we ought, in candour, to ascribe the many inconsistencies, Sir Henry, which are apparent in the course of your nar[14]ration. "‡ The plan I had formed," say you, "for the campaign of 1781, (upon the expectation of a reinforcement from Europe—from the West Indies, and from the *southward*, (after operation should cease in *that* quarter) added to what I might be able to spare at the time, from the small force under my immediate command at New York) was calculated to make a fair and *solid* effort, in favour of our friends, in a district where, I had some reason to believe, they [15] were numerous and hearty, and where I judged it might be made with little danger, even from a temporary naval superiority of the enemy.[4].

* To give our Readers some idea of the high estimation in which Lord Cornwallis was held by his Majesty, at this time, the following extract of a letter from Lord George Germain,[1] dated 9th November, 1780, is inserted. *see p* 290.

† Nor was Lord Cornwallis insensible of this disposition of the Commander in Chief, as appears from the following extract from a letter of his Lordship to Sir Henry Clinton, dated at Bird's Plantation, north of James River, 26th May, 1781.3 *see p* 487.

‡ Narrative, p. [6 and 7] 10 *and* 11.

1 This letter was read in the House of Lords.

2 It is impossible to prove that Sir Henry ever scowled at Lord Cornwallis measures previous to his detaching Major Ferguson to whose Defeat we owe the Defection of South Carolina, a measure taken as Lord Cornwallis himself confesses contrary to the Opinion of the whole army.

3 read in H of Lords.

4 Sir H. Clinton never did suspect Lord Cornwallis's Intentions of marching into Virga until he recd his Letter of 24th of April (which was about 20t of May) and even then he flatter'd himself that his Lordship would drop his Design in preference to

This plan had been suggested to the Minister, IN THE YEAR 1780, and more particularly explained to him, in 1781; *notwithstanding which*, a preference was given to another," namely, to Lord Cornwallis's *plan** of reducing Virginia,[1] to *which* you refer in your Appendix, No. I. Good God, Sir! how can you reconcile this passage of your Narrative, with another a little afterwards, where you say, that his Lordship marched into Virginia "at the risk of engaging you in *dangerous* operations, *for which you were* UNPREPARED †?" What! Is it possible [16] you

* The fact is, that Lord Cornwallis, being second in command, had never arrogated to himself any privilege beyond his line of duty; he had never offered a plan to Ministry; tho' he had often indeed hinted, with great deference, to them, and to Sir Henry, the expediency of carrying his Majesty's arms from South to North—an idea that Ministry had long conceived, and were pleased with his Lordship's *coinciding* with them in. See Appendix to Sir Henry's own Narrative, No. II. ii. 13.

† Narrative, p. [18] 22.

a Measure so obviously his Duty —namely the Defence of South Carolina from Greenes army then likely to overrun it.

1 As to the Predilection in favor of reducing Virginia, Sir Henry certainly complains of it. But it does not appear that he ever in Consequence adopted the Idea of solid operation in that Province, as the preliminary measure of the Campaign in the Chesapeak. On the contrary he had given his orders to General Philips, & had made his arrangements for carrying into Execution his own Plan, when he was prevented by Lord Cornwallis's taking the Command of the Army there, and declining to concur with him in any one of the Measures proposed. Therefore the next measure Sir H. intended taking was to secure a healthy Station as a place of arms, & protection for a Naval Force which might be defended by 2000 men, & to withdraw the Remainder of the Troops in Chesapeak for operations to the Northward during the hot Months. This station Sir H. imagined Lord C — would have chosen and fortified after his March to Richmond — But instead of doing so his Lordship unknown to Sir H. employed himself a whole month in unprofitably rambling thro Virga His Lordships neglect therefore protracted the Securing this Place of Arms so long, that the Enemy caught us unprepared. For by endeavouring to attain this desirable End—the whole Force was left in the Chesapeak contrary to the original Design & taken by the Enemy which certainly wd not have been the case if Lord C had not come into Virga.

could be *unprepared* for a measure, that, you confess, had been preferred to your own—your own, which had been suggested to the Minister, *so far back as the year* 1780? It is not in credulity to believe it. Indeed, your subsequent words enervate the assertion. "Yet, *as I supposed*, he acted with at least the approbation of the Minister, I left him free as air, to plan and execute according to his discretion*." And why, Sir, should you *suppose* he acted with this sanction? Was there any other reason, beside the neglect shewn your plan, and the long-known† predilection of Government in favour of operations in Virginia? There was none.—You, of course, *foresaw* the probability of Lord Cornwallis's march into that province. The conclusion is inevitable.—Your being *unprepared* for the event, is imputable only to yourself‡.

[17] Having, I trust, fully vindicated his Lordship from the aspersion of *wilfulness and precipitation*, of which, (through mere miscon[18]ception of the matter, without doubt) you, Sir Henry, would insinuate him guilty, I shall proceed to the examination of your next [19] charge, and flatter myself, I shall find as little difficulty in rectifying that error, as I have found in rectifying this.

* Narrative, p. [18] 22.

† See Lord George Germain's letters to Lord Cornwallis, before referred to, Appendix, No. V. *pp* 334 *and* 337.

‡ In addition to the very honourable testimonies already produced by us, as well as by Sir Henry himself, in his Appendix, No. I. *p* 464 and II. ii. 13 in favour of the movement in question. Our *ingenuous* readers will probably be gratified by the perusal of the following extracts of letters[1] from Lord George Germain to Lord Cornwallis and Sir Henry Clinton.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain, to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Whitehall, the 4th of June, 1781.[2] See Letter ii. 7.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain, to Earl Cornwallis, dated Whitehall, 4th June, 1781.[3] See Letter ii. 10.

1 all these were read in H of Lords

2 read in the House of Lords

3 read in House of Lords

And here, sir, permit me, once for all, to confess, that the chief obstacle, indeed, the only one, I meet in the task I have undertaken, of setting your conceptions right on the present subject, is the *loose* texture of your Narrative, on which I am often puzzled to hang a meaning, that will bear the weight of any *solid* operation. For instance, in summing up your charges against Lord Cornwallis; after reprobating his march into *Virginia*, (which by the way, it will not only [20] be in favour of your honour, but your judgment, to distinguish far differently in future your roll of accusation proceeds thus: "Being *there*, as his Lordship could not subsist his army, without having a place of arms to cover his magazines, &c., &c. it became absolutely necessary to fix on some healthy and respectable station, that could be made secure against a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea; and York and Gloucester seem to have been originally thought of by Lord Cornwallis, and approved by me for that purpose.[1] But by his Lordship's misconceiving my orders, he quitted the neck of York, and consequently, relinquished every idea of occupying those posts." Now, would not any man of ordinary understanding, who had read nothing more than your Narrative, Sir Henry, suppose from this passage, that a fixed and *solid* plan

1 Lord C. on his first coming into Virg[a] told Sir H. Clinton that he had read his Instructions & Letters to Gen[l] Philips—looked upon himself as bound by them, & should follow the Ideas then suggested. The Securing a Naval Station different from Portsm[h] (which had been condemned by that General Officer) being therefore one of the Measures thought on, & York judged proper for the purpose—and Lord C. having said in his Letter of 26[t]. May—that from Report he thought well of it—It was natural for Sir H. to suppose that the Idea of possessing it had also originally struck his Lordship—especially as his Lordship expressed in very strong Terms his Disapprobation of Portsm[h]—— But this is really trifling—the Insinuation is totally unworthy of Repetition Besides it may be also worthy of Remark that the Idea of taking a Place of Arms was certainly originally his Lordships—as he had not received the Thought from Sir H. before his Lordship mentioned it to him in his Letter of 26[h] May.

had been concerted between you and his Lordship, for occupying the posts in question, previous to his quitting the neck of York ?—He would certainly suppose so. But [21] were he to advert to the letters about that period, he would quickly perceive, that light and darkness are not more opposite, than such a supposition, and the reality of fact. Out of this chaos, let us try to draw some order.

Immediately on Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Petersburgh, in Virginia, on the 20th of May, 1781, he found General Phillips dead, and, of course, added the command of that officer to his own. But on account of the information conveyed by you, Sir Henry, to General Arnold, relative to the probable movements of the French army, his Lordship, in his letter of the above date tells you, he was restrained at that time, from any material offensive operations ; but as soon as he could hear any satisfactory accounts of the two fleets, he would endeavour to make the best use in his power of the troops under his command. On the 26th of the same month, he writes to you thus*: I shall now proceed [22] to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and, with my light troops, to destroy any magazine or stores in the neighbourhood, which may have been collected, either for his use, or General Greene's army ; from thence I purpose to move to the neck at Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured ;—and keep myself unengaged from operations, which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, UNTIL I have the satisfaction of hearing from you ; I hope I shall *then* have an opportunity to receive *better* information, than has *hitherto* been in my power to procure, *relative to a proper harbour, and place of arms* ; at present I am inclined to think well of York." Here, then, Sir Henry, we develope, what you style, " Lord Cornwallis's *original thought* of York and

* See extract of this letter, Appendix, No. VI. *p* 487.

Gloucester." Let us now look, for what you style, your *approbation.* It is very probable we will find it built on materials as little *solid,** as the *thought* you so gravely [23] tell us, it was given as a sanction to. In your letter of the 11th of June, 1781, (before quoted) we read the following advice to his Lordship: "I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to take a *defensive* station in any healthy situation you choose, (*be it at Williamsburgh or York Town*)." —Why *this*, Sir Henry, is *recommendation*, not *approbation!*[1] And there is no small distinction between the terms. The former *precedes* measures, the latter *follows* them. But the strife of words is as foreign from your honourable profession, as it is from my honest inclination. In compliment, therefore, to your careless way, I will, for a moment, suppose (*contrary to fact*) that you did *approve* of his Lordship's *original thought*, in favour of York and Gloucester. On what was that *approbation* (as you are pleased to term it) founded? Had you [24] yourself any idea of the situation, but from *hear-say*, and consequent *conjecture*?[2] Not an atom. You were every whit as much in the dark respecting it as his Lordship—And a passage in your letter, of the 6th December, 1781, to Lord George Germain, clearly evinces this to be the case. Speaking of the post of York Town, you there say, "And indeed, if his Lordship had not now informed me, that it was

* In truth, Lord Cornwallis shews, by the preceding words of his letter, that he had not sufficient information of the situation of the place, to speak *decidedly* in its favour, *as a good post*, though Sir Henry would insinuate, he did give an opinion of that nature.

1 Does not his Lordship say that he is going to the Neck of Williamsburg to look out for a proper Harbour & place of arms—& that he is inclined to think well of York? And does not Sir Hs Letter approve of his Intention, and concurring with his Lordships Idea about York, recommend that or Williamsburg-whichever he may find the best defensive Station—?

2 Granted

a bad one, *the eagerness with which I understand the French have since seized, and are fortifying it, would incline me to think well of it.*" So that the *first* part of this grave charge of yours, Sir Henry,[1] "that York and Gloucester seem to have been originally thought of by Lord Cornwallis, and approved by you for that purpose," turns out, after all, to be nothing more or less, than a mere creature of the imagination—there was neither *solid* thought* [25] of the matter, nor *solid* (or indeed *any*) approbation.

But the conclusion, and more weighty part of this second charge, Sir Henry, is still to be examined. After asserting, "that York and Gloucester seem to have been originally thought of, by Lord Cornwallis, and approved by you for that purpose," you continue, "*But, by his Lordship's* MISCONCEIVING *my orders, he quitted the neck of York, and consequently relinquished every idea of occupying those posts.*"[2] Here are two things, Sir, which, in your usual loose manner, you very *roundly* assert, without one tittle of proof for their foundation. The *first* point is his Lordship's *misconception* of your orders, and [26]

* So far was Lord Cornwallis from thinking of these posts in a favourable light, that although (*as* has been before set forth) *previous* to his *viewing* them, he was inclined to think favourably of them, on mere hearsay, yet, when he had examined them himself a few days afterwards, he speaks of them in this manner: "Upon *viewing* York, I was clearly of opinion, that it far exceeded our power, consistent with *your* plans, to make safe *defensive* posts there, and at Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping."—Extract of a letter, dated at Williamsburgh, 13th of June, 1781. ii. 31.

1 If it is a charge it was certainly not intended as a criminal one. It was only to show that the thought struck Lord C— as well as Sir H. Clinton.

2 Lord C—certainly misconceived the orders—relative to sending Troops.—Because the implied Conditions under which they were to be sent are incontestably the following—His Lordship not inclining to adopt the two Plans proposed to Genl Phillips—his being engaged in none of his own or having any in contemplation and his having secured a healthy defensive Station for the purpose of possessing a Harbour in the Chesapeak—the latter therefore not having been accomplished—his Lordship was warranted in not complying with the Requisition & ought not to have quitted the neck until further Orders

the next is, his relinquishment of those posts *in consequence* of the misconception. To get at the fact, we will inspect *the orders* themselves, and we will then take a view of the *construction* of his Lordship. But, as a preliminary step to the perusal of the *orders*, let us cast an eye over some passages of your letters, which preceded them. On the 29th of May, 1781, we find you talking thus, in one of them, addressed to Lord Cornwallis :—"It is possible, that the additional corps your Lordship has brought with you, may enable you to return something to me for this post : But I beg your Lordship will, by no means, consider this as *a call* ; for I would rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive, UNTIL *there was an appearance of serious operation against me*, than cramp your's in the least." Here, Sir Henry, you cannot help remarking, that although you forbear to *call* for the present, yet, there is the fullest implication, which words can convey, of your intention to demand the succours from his Lordship, which you afterwards did, *when* you [27] fancied "*the appearance of a serious operation against you.*" And on the 8th of June following, are these words in another letter. "Your Lordship will see, by Fayette's letter, that you have little more opposed to you than his corps, and an unarmed militia; for we are told here, that the Pensilvania line has revolted a second time at York Town, *your Lordship can, therefore,* CERTAINLY *spare* 2000 *men, and the sooner they come the better,* without it should be your intention to adopt my idea of a move, and put yourself in nearer co-operation with us. But even in that case, you can spare us something, I suppose:" and a little lower you say, "should your Lordship be engaged in a *move* of such importance, as to require the employment of your *whole* force, I would by no means wish to starve or obstruct it; but *in that case* would rather *endeavour* to wait A LITTLE LONGER *until* my occasions grow *more urgent*, or your situation can

admit of your detaching, of which, however, I request to be informed, with all possible dis[28]patch." Your affairs, it seems, growing more urgent, on the 11th of June, you write thus to Lord Cornwallis:— "By the intercepted letter, inclosed to your Lordship in my last dispatch, you will observe that I am threatened with a siege in this post; my present effective force IS ONLY 10,931, with respect to what the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to AT LEAST 20,000, *besides* reinforcements to the French, (which, from pretty good authority, I have reason to expect,) and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces.—*Thus circumstanced*, I am persuaded, your Lordship will be of opinion, that the *sooner* I can *concentrate* my force the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letters of the 29th of May, and 8th instant,[1] should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore or the Delaware Hook, &c.*) I [29] beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations, you may be now engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you choose, (be it at Williamsburgh, or at York-Town) and I would wish, in that case,[2] that after reserving to yourself such troops, as you may judge necessary for an ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communications, destroying magazines, &c. the following corps may be sent to me in succession

* How poor an opinion his Lordship had of that expedition, may be seen in the extract of his letter of the 26th of May, already quoted. *see Letter p* 487.

1 These three Letters are to be considered as one—because the last refers to the other two—and this writer ought to have given the whole three, that we might be able to judge of the Propriety of his reasoning —but indeed the Extract he has given from the last fully proves what I said in the last note.

2 I *to* case *underlined.*

as you can spare them. *Two battalions of light infantry — forty-third regiment — seventy-sixth or eightieth—two battalions of Anspach—Queen's rangers —cavalry and infantry. Remains of detachment of 17th light dragoons, and such a proportion of artillery as can be spared, particularly men.*" And the urgency of this requisition, you will observe, Sir Henry, is increased in your letter of the 15th of June. In this you say.—"And as I am led to suppose, from your Lordship's letter of the [30] 26th ultimo,* that you may not think it expedient, to adopt the operations, I had recommended, in the Upper Chesapeak—and will, by this time, probably, have finished [1] those[2] you were engaged in; *I request you will* IMMEDIATELY embark a part of the troops, stated in the letter enclosed,† beginning with the light infantry, and send them to me with all possible dispatch; *for which purpose*, Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the King's ships, will, I presume, upon your Lordship's application, appoint a proper convoy. I shall likewise, in proper time, solicit the Admiral to send *some more* transports to the Chesapeak, in which your Lordship will please to send hither the *remaining troops*, you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy, as I do not think it adviseable to leave more troops in that unhealthy climate, at this season of the year, [31] then what are *absolutely* wanted for defensive and desultory water expeditions." The requisition is repeated in still stronger terms, in your letter, to his Lordship, of the 19th of June, 1781: Then you tell him, "that you are *persuaded* the enemy will attempt the investiture of New York, and, therefore, *heartily wish*, that you were *more* in force, that you might be

* This letter has been before quoted. *see p* 487.

† Meaning a duplicate of the above recited letter of the 11th. *see* ii. 18.

1 which certainly implies *a deefnsive Station* Vide Sir H. Clintons letter of 2d August in Debrets Parliamentary Register No 41.—

2 those *underlined.*

able to take advantage of any false movements they might make in forming it.[1]

You again repeat the old assurance, "that if his Lordship had any *solid* operation in the Chesapeak, &c. you should not, as you already told him, press him for the corps you wished to have sent you, at least for the present."—And you add, "*in the hope* your Lordship will be able to spare me 3000 men. *I have sent* 2000 *tons of transports from hence.* The corps I named in my letter of the 11th instant, will, I imagine, amount to nearly that number. But should your Lordship not be able to spare the whole, it is necessary to mention, *I expect* the de[32]tachment of the 17th dragoons, as they happen to be placed last in the list."[2]

Such were *the orders*, Sir Henry, which you have insinuated, in the latter part of your second charge against Lord Cornwallis, that his Lordship had *misconceived*, and *in consequence*, made a false movement. And your reason for saying, he had misconceived them, is, I find, that you suppose his Lordship had deemed your requisitions *absolute*, whereas they were worded *conditionally*. Now, both these terms, though apparently so inconsistent, are yet very reconcileable, as the late worthy premier, with no less truth than humour, illustrated not many weeks ago in the House of Commons. Now, by way of enlivening this *sombre* business, we are investigating, I fancy the introduction of that circumstance here, will not be deemed exceedingly mal-a-propos. The House was in high debate, upon precisely the very topic, that you and I are now discussing. The reconciliation of those two seeming opposite terms, "conditional and absolute." They

1 All this under the Idea that his Lordship was all this Time employed in fortifying the healthy defensive Station before mentioned—But unknown to Sir Henry his Lordship was at this Time chasing La Fayette & did not come to the Neck of Williamsburg before the 25 June

2 This Detachmt was only 40 men—of course proves that his Lordship might have kept all the rest if he chose it.

[33] were twisted and turned into five hundred different lights and forms; they were pounded, ground, sifted, and beat up together; no mode of mixture, rough or smooth, was left untried with them, during the course of a long winter evening. But in vain! And the *wise* men of the land, were about to break up in dudgeon, at their mis-spending so much of the precious time of the nation (contrary to their usual custom) in attempting to blend incongruities, and make absurdity and sense meet. When, behold, the arch wag in the *blue ribbon* rose, and, to the admiration of all present, did the feat in a moment, by calling to the minds of his auditors, the far-famed oath at Highgate, where you swear, never to kiss the maid, when you can get the mistress, IF you do not like the maid better; nor to eat brown bread, when you can get white, IF the brown should not be more pleasing to your palate; nor to drink small beer, when you may have strong, IF the small should not be more agreeable to you.—Now, here, remarked his facetious Lordship, are *conditional* expressions, [34] yet, in many cases, they act as strictly, as if they were *absolute*. For instance, if I CANNOT like the maid, or the brown bread, or the small beer—why, in all these cases, the oath I have taken, acts upon me *absolutely*. There is *no condition*, where, *in fact*, there is *no choice*. This exactly was the case of Lord Cornwallis. His situation (for neither he nor you expected he would shortly be so formidably surrounded,) did not allow him to make any of those elections, you pointed out to him, or suggested. And your calls were pressing—indeed, most pressing, as the foregoing extracts plainly shew—he was therefore obliged to consider your requisition, not as conditional, but *absolute*, and to conduct himself accordingly. But, that the matter may appear in the fullest, clearest, and most candid manner, we will refer the public to *his letter* on the occasion, and yours in answer, (*in answer*, Sir Henry

—for so candour requires,[1]) No. 8. of the Appendix. But, in fairness to Lord Cornwallis, I am obliged here to mention, in addition to your former reiterated calls, Sir Henry, one (still more urgent [35] than the others) dated the *26th of June, 1781.[2] "My Lord, having, for very essential reasons, come to a resolution of endeavouring to bring the troops employed on that service, to reinforce this post, (*New York*)[3] I am to request, that, if your Lordship has not already embarked the reinforcement I called for in my letters of the 8th, 11th, 15th, and 19th instant, and should not be engaged in any important move, either of your own, or in consequence of my ideas respecting operation in the Upper Chesapeak, you will be pleased, as soon as possible, to order an embarkation of the troops specified in the margin†, and of the ordnance and stores, &c. &c. stated in the inclosed paper, *or*, in *as full* a manner, as your Lordship can, with propriety, comply—*recollecting, that whatever may have been taken too great a pro*[36]*portion of, will be immediately returned to you, the moment the expedition is over.*"

The amount of all these extracts may be thus concisely stated. Sir Henry Clinton acquaints Lord Cornwallis with the probability of his wanting two or three thousand of the troops, under his Lordship's command, to reinforce the garrison of New York; and this reinforcement, he tells him, (*he is informed*) he can well spare; but he will not call for it, *till* a

* [*For* 26th *read* 28th.]

† Two battalions of light infantry, 43d regiment, 76th, or 80th.—Two battalions of Anspach—Two of rangers, cavalry and infantry.—Detachment of the 17th dragoons, and such a portion of artillery as can be spared, particularly men.

1 Sir Henry wishes nothing fairer & begs the reader will refer to them.

2 This was an Expedition against Philadelphia—But still Sir H—was ignorant of Lord C—Dance after La Fayette

3 expressed so, for fear the Letter shd fall into the Enemys Hands and discover the Design of bringing away those Troops—

serious attack is menaced against him. That serious attack is menaced, and the call is accordingly made. And to convince his Lordship of the necessity for the reinforcement, the force of the enemy is displayed before him in the *utmost extent*, and the diminutive force of the garrison contrasted to it. [1] All the hurry of apprehension appears in Sir Henry's requisition. That no possible excuse should be made—two thousand tons of shipping are sent off to his Lordship, for the transportation of the troops, and he is told, more are soon to follow. An empty parade, indeed, is made of leaving his Lordship to the exercise of his discretion: [37] But what discretion could he exercise, under the alarming circumstances, in which Sir Henry described himself to be situate ? Let his Lordship's own words answer*. "*My own* operations *finished*, and being of opinion, that, with *the force under my command*, and *circumstanced as I was*, in a variety of respects, it would have been highly inconsiderate *in me*, and *dangerous* for the King's service, *to engage in operations in the upper Chesapeak*[2] [which you will remember, Sir Henry, were the operations suggested by you to him], I thought it incumbent on me, to take effectual measures, to enable me to obey *so explicit* an order, without loss of time. To this end, as I could not discover in your instructions to General Phillips, or in your paper, containing the substance of private conversations with him†, or in your dispatches to me, any earnestness for *immediately* securing an harbour for line of battle ships,[3] I

* See the letter in the Appendix, No. VIII. ii. 130.

† Appendix, No. VII. *see pp* 347 *and* 430.

1 Sir Henry was under no such Apprehension—but meditating a most serious Blow against Philadelphia and Rhode Island—which would have effectually defeated the Enemys Designs against New York or the Chesapeak.

2 However had his Lordship fortunately engaged in those operations, his Army would not have been lost & America might have still been ours—

3 Reperuse these again, and You will find great Earnestness

thought myself UNDER THE NECESSITY of being *content* with the post at Portsmouth, (*such as it was*) [38] for I did not imagine myself at liberty to exercise any *discretionary* power, by changing that post FOR ANOTHER, *which* I knew would have required, so *great a part of* the troops under my command, for many weeks, for the purposes of covering, subsisting, and fortifying it, *that* any offensive, or defensive plan of yours, which depended upon *material* reinforcement from hence, might thereby have *been totally frustrated*."

In these few lines, his Lordship has set the business of the *requisition*, and his *compliance*, in so clear a light, that volumes on the subject could not do more; but we cannot close the article, without adding a few words of his Lordship's in the same letter: "My resolution to pass James River was just executed, when I received your dispatch, of the 28th of June, ordering the expedition for the attempt upon————. That order being likewise positive, *unless I* was engaged in any important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeak, I felt a particular satisfaction, that my decision on [39] your first order, had enabled me to comply so expeditiously with this.—I was clearly convinced, when I received these orders, and I cannot yet see any cause to alter my opinion, that, having a sufficient force[1] remaining for a defensive, in the post that I had resolved to occupy, and for desultory water expeditions, if I had detained the reinforcement required, and specified in your first dispatch, for *any* other reason than *that* of being engaged *in an important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeak*; and if, in the mean time, a misfortune had happened at New York, or you had

to possess a healthy Naval Station which Portsmh was allowed by all not to be & by his Lordship particularly had represented this Post in a former Letter as unhealthy & requiring an army to defend it—

How then could it be defended with 2500?

1 His Lordship forgets that he

been disappointed of any material object at ——— my conduct would have been highly and deservedly censured."

It would be an insult[1] on the meanest understanding, to suppose these passages needed any comment. I shall therefore proceed, Sir, to investigate your next insinuation against Lord Cornwallis, with respect to his occupying York and Gloucester, in preference to Old-Point-Comfort, which you recommended. Your own account of this business, from page 19 to 25 of your pamphlet, may [40] be summed up in a few words. That you had directed Lord Cornwallis to secure "a naval station for large ships, if one could be found, that was capable of being fortified and maintained, against a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea, AGREEABLE *to the instructions* which you had before given to General Phillips*, and which were of course to be considered as such to his Lordship. That his Lordship was inclined to think well of York, *from report* on the 26th of May.—That he afterwards relinquished the idea.—That you thereupon "consulted the Admiral, who was of opinion, a naval station for large ships was ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, and recommended Hampton Road." That you, thereupon, directed Old-Point-Comfort to be examined by his Lordship, and fortified; but that this was disapproved of, "as any works (his Lordship writes to you) erected there, might be easily destroyed by a fleet, and [41] would not answer the purpose; and that, therefore, according to the spirit of your orders, he should sieze York and Gloucester, as the only harbour in which he could hope to give effectual protection to line of battle ships." And from this circumstance you conclude your detail, by supposing, "that his Lordship had entirely approved of these posts."

* These instructions are in No. IX. of *your* Appendix, and No. VII. of *mine. see p* 347.

1 It certainly would—

Audi alteram partem. Now let us see Lord Cornwallis's account of the business. In his letter to you of the 4th December, 1781, we find this passage, "I do not recollect that any conversation passed between us the other day, before the publication of my letter, relative to my reasons for taking possession of the posts of York and Gloucester. But in answer to your dispatches dated the *8th and 11th of July*, directing me so POSITIVELY to possess an harbour in the Chesapeak for line of battle ships, your Excellency will see, that after finding *that works on Point-Comfort could not protect a naval force in Hampton Road*, I thought that [42] I acted *in strict obedience* to your orders, by taking possession of *those posts.* I thought it unnecessary to enter into a minute detail of the disadvantages of the ground, either *on my first examination of it in the month of June*, or in my *return to it in August*; because, on the *first* occasion, as I have already had the honour of explaining to your Excellency, I did not, after seeing it, entertain for a moment, an idea of occupying it.—Not thinking myself at liberty, *by the instructions** under which I *then* acted, to detain the greatest part of the force in Virginia, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING A HARBOUR FOR SHIPS OF THE LINE: and, on my return to it in August, I thought it *then* became my duty†, *to make* [43] *the best of it I could*, having no other harbour to propose in its place."[1]

* The instructions his Lordship here alludes to, are those given to General Phillips, which may be seen in the Appendix, No. VII. *see p* 347, and in no part of those do we find anything to contradict; on the contrary, we see every thing that can strengthen this opinion of his Lordship—In them there is no *positive*, no *absolutely indispensible* direction, to sieze and occupy a covering for large shipping.

† At this time his Lordship was left no alternative. A post for covering large shipping was *then* (and not *before*) ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, and there was no other place for that pur-

1 It does not appear from hence that Sir Henry had any Cause at the Time to suppose Lord C— thought ill of the Post—but on the Contrary that he thought well of it—But if he judged that he

Here then is the *choice* that regulated his Lordship's conduct, on this occasion—not such a choice, as you, Sir Henry, would in[44]sinuate his Lordship had it in his power to make, namely, that in which *an alternative* presented itself. The fact is, he had no more power than old *Hobson* used to give at Oxford, when any of the scholars applied to him to hire a horse: "Aye, aye, come to the stable, my lad, and thou shalt have *thy choice*, cried Square-toes." The younker hereupon hastened to the spot with much glee, thinking to suit his mind among a number, —but he was suffered to go no farther than the door, and whichever of the nags happened to be next, was pointed out to him—What! (remonstrated he) did you not say I should have *a choice*. "And so thou shalt, young man, quoth Hobson—THAT OR NOTHING."

I have, by this time, Sir Henry, I trust, shewn you how very erroneous your conceptions have been of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, in respect to his *move from Wilmington*, which is the *first* measure you have taken upon you to censure. Nor have I (I flatter myself) being less successful in putting you right, in regard to your false notions of his [45] conduct, in quitting his position at Williamsburgh, and (on his return) in occupying York Town, &c. which, it seems, is your *second charge* against him. It therefore now only remains, that I should turn my thoughts to the rectifying your ideas, concerning his Lordship's continuing in that post, till his *unmerited* and

pose, but York Town, as Point Comfort would not answer, as may be seen by the following official report:

Copy of a Letter, from the Captains of his Majesty's Ships to Earl Cornwallis, relative to the state of Point Comfort, dated Richmond, Hampton-Road, July 1781. see ii. 101.

was to be governed by the orders and Instructions to General Phillips It will be found that his Lordship notwithstanding this seeming positive order had still the Power of rejecting the Post if he found it untenable and abiding by a small Post, such as Mill Point, in Elizabeth River. Therefore Sir Henry had certainly reason to judge that York was a Post of his Lordship's Choice from his staying in it.

much-lamented capture (which appears to be your third and last charge). And in doing this, I shall not only shew that your *constant* promises of relief would have rendered any attempt of his to escape, not only disgraceful, and highly criminal, but that you yourself, to this very hour, are *inwardly* of the same opinion, notwithstanding you have been prevailed upon, *by vile sycophants**, to insinuate, "that you were in [46] hopes he would have tried to escape, with part of his army, to the southward, between the time of the French fleet's arriving in the Chesapeak, and his receiving information from you, that Sir Samuel Hood had joined Mr. Graves, which was not until the 13th of September, OR between that time and the junction of Mr. Washington with the Marquis de la Fayette, when his Lordship heard from [47] Lieutenant Conway of the navy, that the enemy were thirty-six sail of the line†."

* I have such respect for the exalted rank, the honour and integrity of Sir Henry Clinton, that I gladly embrace this opportunity of convincing the world, that no part of the unfounded charges, puny insinuations, and ridiculous absurdities, with which the NARRATIVE abounds, could have originated from him; but were the base offerings of sycophants, which his facile temper accepted, when his better judgment would have rejected them with indignation, had he examined them as scrupulously as I have done. Miscreants of this sort buz about the ear of every great man. And Sir Henry himself, in the following extract of one of his letters, confesses such to be his lamentable situation. This confession, added to his general good character, has induced me, contrary to all appearances, to give Sir Henry Clinton *credit* for *candour*, though I am under the necessity of *debiting* his *discernment* for the allowance.

"*Extract of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Cornwallis, dated New York, 30th November*, 1781. see Letter ii. 217.

MY LORD,

"After the conversation I had with your Lordship, (before I sent your letter to be published) in which we seemed so perfectly to agree, &c.

"But being *informed* (perhaps OFFICIOUSLY) &c.

Poor Sir Henry!—Yet your fate is not singular. *Informers* and other *officious* gentry, have brought many a great man into disgrace, besides yourself.

† See pages [29 and 30] 36 of the Narrative.

Before I enter upon this part of the task I have set myself, you will permit me, Sir, to shew, that York Town was by no means a favourite post of Lord Cornwallis's, or such a place as he would have staid to *defend*, if he could, with honour, have *relinquished*. —Read his Lordship's opinion of that situation,[1] so far back as July the 8th, 1781, in a letter to yourself. "I must AGAIN, (said he) [*for this was not the first time he had given you his thoughts on the subject,*] take the liberty of calling your Excellency's *serious* attention to the question of the *utility* of a DEFENSIVE post in *this* country, which *cannot have the smallest influence on the war in Carolina*, and which *can only* give us *some acres of an unhealthy swamp*,[2] and is *for ever liable to become a prey to a foreign enemy*, with a *temporary superiority at sea. Desultory* expeditions in the Chesapeak, may be undertaken from New York, with as much ease, and *more safety*, whenever there is rea[48]son to suppose that our naval force is likely to be superior for two or three months."—Here, Sir, you had *sufficient warning* given you of his Lordship's situation—a situation "*for ever liable to become a prey to a foreign enemy, with a temporary superiority at sea**." And yet, notwithstanding this *early* admonition, (through an infirmity of your memory, I make no doubt) you venture to aver, "that you *never* heard from his Lordship, that *this* ground was unfavourable, *till the day before he had offered to capitulate*†.[3] To the same unfortunate laxity of brain, Sir Henry, we must impute your assertion, "that you had never given him any ASSURANCES of the exertions of the navy, *before your letter of the 24th of September*," *or* "that *any*

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, No. XLI. p. 180.

† See *Narrative*, p. [31] 37.

1 This writer is desired to read the Letter he quotes once more & he will find that his Lordship speaks of Portsmouth not of York.

2 His Lordp alluded to Portsmth

3 This proves the writer to be a fool, & the former Part shows him to be some low lived scoundrel.

assurances *whatsoever*, given by you, could have prevented his attacking the Marquis de la Fayette, before Mr. Washington joined that General, *which was on the 27th of September**." [49] Will you credit your own letters, Sir Henry? Here is one of the 2d of September, 1781, addressed to Lord Cornwallis, in which you tell him, "that Washington is moving his army with an appearance of haste, and gives out, that he expects the co-operation of a considerable French armament; but "that his Lordship, however, may be assured, that if this should be the case, you shall either endeavour *to reinforce* the *army* under his command, by all the means within the compass of your power, OR to make *every possible diversion in his Lordship's favour*." You further tell him, that forty sail of French ships were counted at about sixty leagues distance from the coast, "*However*, as Rear Admiral Graves, after being joined by Sir Samuel Hood, with fourteen coppered ships of the line, sailed from New York on the 31st ult. with a fleet of nineteen sail, besides some fifty-gun ships, you flattered yourself, *his Lordship would have little to apprehend from that of the French*." Now, pray, Sir Henry, after [50] deliberately reviewing this letter of yours, can you, with any composure of muscles, affect to think you did not give Lord Cornwallis, *all the encouragement you could*, to remain in the post of York at that period?[1] As to the *pitiful quirk* meant to be practised under the firm *assurances* of naval exertion, before mentioned, it might do honour to a *knight of the post*; but whether it would shine with equal lustre among the *memorabilia* of a *knight of the bath*, is to me somewhat problematical.

But this is not the only encouragement his Lordship received from you, before the 24th. *On the 6th of September*, 1781, We find you chearing him in this manner: "My Lord, as I find, by your Lordship's

* See *Narrative*, p. [31] 37 *and* 38.

1 I cannot conceive who this Black guard can be.

letters, that De Grasse has got into the Chesapeak, and I can have *no doubt*, but Washington is moving, with at least 6000 French and Rebel troops against you, I think the best way to relieve you, is to join you as soon as possible, with all the force that can be spared from hence, which is about 4000 men; they [51] *are already embarked*, and will proceed the instant I receive information from the Admiral that we may venture, or that from other intelligence, the Commodore and I shall judge sufficient to move upon."

"By accounts from Europe, we have *every* reason to expect Admiral Digby *hourly* on the coast.[1]

"I beg your Lordship will let me know, as soon as possible, your ideas, how the troops embarked for the Chesapeak may be best employed for your relief, according to the state of circumstances, when you receive this letter. *I shall not, however, wait to receive your letter*, should I hear in the mean time, that the passage to you is open."

Permit me to ask you, Sir Henry, to what purpose are all these circumstances of relief described?—— "4000 *men embarked*,"—ready for the word of starting.—"*Admiral Digby hourly expected on the coast*," —to give *nerve* to naval action——"yourself determined *not to wait even the return of a letter*," but *risk* a landing *without information*, so cer[52]tain were you of support, and so eager to relieve his Lordship.—Believe me, Sir, they were not your true friends, who advised you to say, "that you had *hopes*, between the time of the French fleet's arriving in the Chesapeak, and his [Lordship's] receiving information from you, that Sir Samuel Hood had joined Mr. Graves, (which was not till the 13th of September)—*that he would have tried to escape with part of his army to the southward*.—I maintain, *that no man, possessed of* TRUTH *or* HONOUR, could have *suggested such an idea to you*.—This *after-thought*

1 Does not this prove that I did not promise the Exertions of the Fleet as I tell him that I am waiting to hear from the admiral.

could never be your own.—The heart of Sir Henry Clinton could not harbour so *assassin-like* a mischief. Were it possible that his Lordship should have been forsaken by his wonted magnanimity—were it possible, that pannic-struck, on the first appearance of the French fleet, he should have fled precipitately from his post, without first acquainting his Commander in Chief with his situation, or consulting him upon measures for his conduct. I say, were these things possible—had his [53] Lordship so disgraced himself—what HOPES, *but the hopes of blackest malignity*, could have been gratified on so melancholy an occasion? THEN, indeed, would all his goodly crop of laurels have been blasted—THEN, indeed, would he have feasted the envious, and the base.—With what face, THEN, could he have met his dishonoured Sovereign, and his injured Country, while, with *honest* hand, some good IAGO held out to the world, *these damning proofs* of your gallant *encouragement* and *enterprize*, and his mean *despondency* and *retreat!*—a brave man has no poor suspicions —no dishonourable *hopes*—His confidence in himself, makes him slow to distrust others.

His Lordship acted more in character. He sent you word, Sir Henry, of the appearance of the enemy, and waited your direction and advice, as you *happened* to be *superior* IN COMMAND. You lost no time (notwithstanding your, I trust, *careless* and *lately* adopted HOPES) of giving him the *most* CIRCUMSTANTIAL reasons to suppose he should be relieved. On this occasion, you lost [54] your usual fondness for *conditional* direction and advice. You spoke *absolutely* of relief. If he retreated—that retreat would have been at his Lordship's *utmost* peril.—You gave him *no direction* for his shield against future animadversion.

On this article, believe me, Sir Henry, my humanity has been pained to dwell so long, and I shall, therefore, with the greater eagerness, shorten

my observations on the rest of the Narrative ; as what is to come, appears to take its hue from what is past.—"There were not *any* ASSURANCES [you'll pardon me, Sir Henry, for remarking this pettyfogging appropriation of language] (you say) *whatsoever*, given by you, that could have *prevented* his attacking the Marquis de la Fayette, before he joined General Washington, which was on the 27th of September."—Not one ?—Pray, Sir Henry, what were the intimations already mentioned ?—If they did not authorize him to *retreat*, they, of course, did not anthorize him to cease from *labouring* to put his post in the best state [55] of defence, it could possibly admit.—And, if so—you must see, that so far from being in a capacity to attack the Marquis de la Fayette, before the 27th of September, (the day he joined General Washington) he was *then* hard at work with his *whole* force, endeavouring to fortify himself, so as to be able to keep out intruders, and to receive your good company, and that of your 4000 attendants, promised him by your polite card of the 6th of the same month. But, that I may not be suspected of a weak memory, (like my neighbours) take the worthy nobleman's own words for my assertion. In his letter to you of the 22d of August, 1781, dated from York Town, his Lordship tells you, "That his experience of the fatigue and difficulty of constructing works in that warm season, convinced him, that ALL the labour, *that the troops there* would be capable of, without ruining their health, would be required *for at least* SIX WEEKS, to put the intended, works at this place in a *tolerable* state of defence." Now, Sir, if we add six weeks, [56] that is to say, forty-two days, to the date of this letter, which is the 22d of August, we will find, that instead of thinking of *scampering* parties, his Lordship had as much work *at home*, as must have employed *all* his hands, till at least the *first* of October ; so that it was utterly impossible for him, consistent with *military etiquette*,

to have given the *Marquis* a meeting before the 27th of September, as you (probably owing to your knowledge of his Lordship being no way tardy on such occasions) would appear to suppose he might.

Having given you *my* thoughts of your *encouragement* to Lord Cornwallis, to *keep* his post, I fancy the world would think hardly of me (when the matter is in my power), if I withheld *his Lordship's own* sentiments on the business. You yourself, Sir Henry, say, in the fourth page of your *Narrative*, "that letters, written to the moment, as events happened, are certainly the most faithful records of actions, and intentions.—I liked the principle, and have hitherto conducted my review of your Narrative upon it; and for the [57] same reason now, that I am gotten almost to my journey's end, I shall not deviate from it. His Lordship writes thus to you, from *York Town on the 16th and 17th of Sept.* 1781, Sir, I have received your letter of the *2d* and *6th*.

"*IF I had no hopes of relief, I would rather risk an action than defend* MY HALF FINISHED *works*. But as *you say* Admiral Digby is *hourly* expected, and *have promised* every exertion *to assist* me.—*I do not think myself justifiable in putting the fate of the war upon so desperate an attempt*."* To this there is added a line or two, written on the 17th,—"Lieutenant Conway of the Cormorant is just arrived. He assures me, that since the Rhode Island squadron have joined, they have thirty-six sail of the line.

"This place is in no state of defence, if you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst."

On the last passage, Sir Henry, you eagerly lay hold (a *rush* in the hands of one drown[58]ing has the salvation of an *oak*,) and you tell us, "that until Lieutenant Conway, had given his Lordship this information, he appears to have implied, in all

* The whole of this important letter may be seen in the Appendix, No. IX. *see* ii. 156.

his letters, that he could hold out as long as all his provisions lasted."—True.—It is granted. But he did not, *when he so writ*, know that the French had a superior fleet to our's, and, consequently, he could not apprehend (encouraged as he was by your letters of the 2d and 6th) that he should be left in the lurch, as he was at last. Notwithstanding your boasted promise of the 24th—on the receipt of which, indeed, namely, on the 29th of September, giving it more credit than it appeared afterwards to merit—his Lordship's hopes revived, and in the warmth of his heart, on the occasion, he writes as you mention, in page 25 of your *Narrative*: "I have no doubt, if relief arrives in any reasonable time, that both York and Gloucester will be in possession of his Majesty's troops."—And again, in the same temper, and to animate [59] you to the performance of your last promise of relief, made on the 24th ult. he tells you, on the 3d of October, 1781, "his works were in a better state of defence, than he had reason to hope."—In vain was his confidence—in vain was his preserverance—in vain was his animation.

The King of France and forty thousand men
Went *up* the hill, and so—*came down again!*

Sir Henry Clinton embarked his 4000 troops—made mighty bustle—held many councils and——What?—saved York Town?—Psha! what an oaf art thou, *Mr. Reader*, to be so inattentive to the burden of the ballad![1] He saved no York Towns—he *debarked* his men, blockhead! and so *saved* THEM AND HIMSELF, and left York *to meet its fate*.

To be serious, Sir Henry, I have now dissected your Narrative, and so rotten a subject, permit me to assure you, never in the course of all my practice, (of the extent of which you may form some opinion, from my dexterity on this occasion.) have I handled. [60] It will smell vilely in the nostrils of the people. It was a thing long defunct, and it were, therefore,

1 Low very low indeed!

better that it had remained for ever buried in the grave of oblivion. It was unwise to think diffidently of the smiles of Royalty, and the *merits* of a long —long seven years SERVICE in America, and turn with reliance upon a *thing like this!*

What will the world now say ?—It will doubtless pronounce, "that, as not only *the minister*, but even *the enemy**, thought the *whole* British force should be employed in the reduction of Virginia, previous to northerly operations, you acted wrong in not employing that force *accordingly*, before Lord Cornwallis was *necessitated* to quit Wilmington *as he did*.—They will say, that instead of harrassing his Lordship's brave troops, by *to* and *fro* capricious orders, when he sat himself down at Williamsburgh, you ought either to have *joined* his Lordship in Virginia with all *your* force, or to have *withdrawn his*.—[61] They will further say, that this latter measure of withdrawing *his* troops, was doubly incumbent on you, *when* you ought to have seen the *imminent* danger they ran of being captured, on the appearance of so formidable a fleet, as that of France was, on the coast of America. Nay, they will say something still more grating than all this—they will revive an old prophecy, broached a long time before *the unfortunate issue of the campaign in* 1781, "that the *triumph* of Charles Town, portended *the disaster at York*; and that, from the LAWRELS of *Camden*, would be *extracted* the BANE of the *British Empire* on the *Continent*.

THEMISTOCLES.

P. S. Having, in the correction of your charges against Lord Cornwallis, necessarily rendered your Narrative, Sir Henry, almost one entire blot, I would consider it an unmanly triumph, to proceed immediately to another score. For this reason, I leave

* See extracts of General Washington's letters, in Appendix, No. X. *pp* 500, 502, 503, *and* 505.

you and *the Commissioners of Accounts*, to settle the [62] matters mentioned in the conclusion of your pamphlet, in the best mode you may. And, for the same reason, I shall not enter upon the examination of those charges, which you have conjured up *against yourself*, in pages 13 and 14; but sincerely hope, in that business, you have regarded the rule of (I think it is) Quintilian. "Never to raise objections, which it is not in your power to suppress." I cannot, however, take my final leave of you, without giving you one humane piece of counsel: Henceforward, discard *sycophancy*—and take *honour* and *common sense* as your secretaries. This done, your friends will never blush for the productions of your *bureau*.

APPENDIX.

Number I. [63] Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis to Major-General Phillips, Wilmington, 24th April, 1781. *see Letter p* 427.

Number II. [66] Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, Wilmington, North Carolina, 23d April, 1781. *see Letter p* 420.

Number III. [69] Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington, 24th April, 1781. *see Letter p* 424.

Number IV. [71] Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington, 24th April, 1781. *see Letter p* 426.

Number V. [72] Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Earl Cornwallis, dated Whitehall, March 7th, 1781. *see Letter p* 337. Extract [74] of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, Whitehall, 7th March, 1781. *see Letter p* 334.

Number VI. [76] Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated at Bird's Plantation, North of James River, 26th May, 1781. *see Letter p* 487.

Number VII. [77] Extract from Sir H. Clinton's

Instructions to Major-General Phillips, dated March 10, 1781. *see Instructions p* 347. Extract [78] from the Substance of Conversations held with General Phillips, sent to that General Officer for his Guidance. *see p* 430. Inclosed [79] in the above letter the following extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's letters to Major General Phillips, April 26, 1781. *see Letter p* 437. [80] April 30, 1781. *p* 450.

Number VIII. [82] Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Williamsburgh, 30th June, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 31. Extract [88] of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated Head Quarters, New York, 8th July, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 49. Extract [95] of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York-town, Virginia, 20th August, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 130.

Number IX. [103] Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York Town, Virginia, 16th and 17th of September, 1781. *see Letter* ii. 156.

Number X. [105] Extract of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to General Sullivan, dated New Windsor, 29th May, 1781. *see Letter p* 500. From General Washington [106] to Mr. Lund Washington, 31st May, 1781. *see Letter p* 502. Copy [107] of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to the Marquis De la Fayette, dated Head Quarters, New Windsor, 31st May, 1781. *see Letters pp* 503 *and* 505.

A PARTING WORD;

OR, A

SUMMARY REVIEW

OF THE

CONTROVERSY

BETWEEN

SIR HENRY CLINTON

AND

EARL CORNWALLIS.

OCCASIONED BY THE OBSERVATIONS LATELY PUBLISHED BY THAT GENTLEMAN ON HIS LORDSHIP'S ANSWER.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR R. FAULDER, NEW BOND-STREET;
AND J. BEW, PATER-NOSTER-ROW.
MDCCLXXXIII.

A PARTING WORD.

As there cannot be a more unequivocal proof of magnanimity, than a generous confession of error, when it has been evidently disclosed, so on the other hand, there is no circumstance in life which more clearly exposes the narrowness of the human mind, than an obstinate maintenance of wrong, when a choice of right is placed within one's grasp. Those who have read the controversy between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis can be at no loss for the application of these remarks.

To a narrative published by Sir Henry Clinton, late Commander in Chief in America, arraigning the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, as accessary to, if not the immediate cause of "the fatal catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781," His Lordship replied with the intent of shewing, that the events attributed to his conduct during that campaign *were by no means the consequences of any part of it.* And in order to do this with all the perspicuity and candour that integrity and common sense could suggest, the whole* of the correspondence relative to the principal actions of the campaign were submitted to public consideration, that from so impartial a view, as impartial a judgment might be formed of the propriety of his Lordship's proceedings, "either when he acted under *positive* orders, *pressing* contingencies, or *discretionary* powers."

If Lord Cornwallis's success on this occasion wanted any aid to render it more conspicuous than a bare perusal of his answer makes it, Sir Henry's observa-

* In Sir Henry's Narrative, *extracts* only were given: Which was the more candid mode of publication, every one will readily decide, who knows in what a different light the context oftentimes throws a *partial* quotation.

tions have furnished that aid.—The strength of truth stands never so confessed as when rage and imbecility assail it.

The sole question of the controversy is very clearly nothing more than this—Did or did not the conduct and opinions of Lord Cornwallis bring on, or contribute to bring on the fatal catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781? The consideration of any transaction subsequent to that period, is consequently totally foreign from the subject. Of course, whether certain letters of Lord Cornwallis, or certain letters of Sir Henry Clinton were or were not produced at the time of the parliamentary enquiry, is matter of as little relation to the business in discussion, as an investigation of the merits of Katterfelto and his cat would be.

This being premised, the next point to be settled is the *time* at which the review of Lord Cornwallis's conduct should commence. His Lordship assigns his march into North-Carolina in the beginning of the year 1781 for that purpose, and in so doing Sir Henry appears to join issue with him. "As long (says he) as I imagined his Lordship to be in sufficient force, and in other respects prepared, and competent to give the experiment of supporting our friends in North Carolina, a fair and solid trial I certainly approved. But, AFTER the unfortunate day of *Cowpens*, &c."*—Now, it is evident from this passage, that UNTIL the unfortunate day of Cowpens, which was it seems the 17th of January, 1781, Sir Henry certainly approved of Lord Cornwallis's design to march into North Carolina, and of course our examination of the conduct of his Lordship, with regard to the campaign of 1781, must begin from that period.

But before we enter upon this task we will clear away all extraneous matter, and with this view take into consideration an observation which Sir Henry

* P.[6] 102 of Sir Henry's OBSERVATIONS *on Lord Cornwallis's Answer.*

has made on his Lordship's publication, of what he is pleased to style *his* (Sir Henry's) *secret and most private letter to* General Phillips, dated April the 30th, of which act he thus speaks:* "Every man of sensibility must lament that Lord Cornwallis has so indiscretely availed himself of the liberty he supposed was given him, by the late change in American measures. For, as my secret and most private letter to Gen. Phillips, dated April 30th, contained nothing for his Lordship's justification, the publishing of it was highly impolitic at least, not to say more—for reasons too obvious to need explanation." This is a curious sort of argument truly!—If the impolicy of publishing the letter arose merely from *its containing nothing for his Lordship's defence*, by a parity of reasoning, there could be no *impolicy* in doing so, if its contents could have done that service. Now, if we take the word *impolicy* in its most extensive sense, as an act of imprudence, hurtful to the *community*, certainly in that case the letter ought not to be published *on any* account whatever—and it is, therefore, puerile in the last degree to make any distinctions with respect either to its hurt or benefit to an individual. On the other hand, if the word *impolicy* be taken in its contracted sense, as meaning an act of imprudence, detrimental to the interests of the particular person who commits it, it appears (with great deference to *refined* conceptions) downright nonsense to apply it here, where there is no other reason given for the application, than solely, "that the letter contained nothing for his Lordship's justification. Oh! but then we are told by Sir Henry, that it was *his secret and most private letter*. Pray how does this appear?—The wording of this remark conveys an imputation of so *ungentlemanly* a nature, that a man of honour ought to have well considered his ground before he had dared

* P. [5] 102 of the OBSERVATIONS.

to hazard it. It was a rash assertion to advance, "that the letter in question, merely on account of the indorsement, was a *secret and most private one*. Can Sir Henry say that there was essentially any distinction by which this letter could be discriminated from others, which he had written officially to General Phillips? No such thing is pretended—On the contrary, Lord Cornwallis gives us to understand in his letter to Sir Henry of the 26th of May, 1781, that he took the only guide which the strictest delicacy could suggest to him, in getting at the contents of such part of the correspondence with General Phillips, as it was absolutely necessary he should see, upon his standing in the place of that officer. "I opened all your dispatches to poor Phillips, says his Lordship, marked *on his Majesty's service*."* Lord Cornwallis therefore justly considered the letter in question, bearing as it did this character of publicity, a subject no way improper for public inspection, and especially as "the measures respecting America, have now undergone a total change;"† and he was the more confirmed in this opinion, on observing, that Sir Henry himself had quoted a part of it in his narrative, with the intent of throwing his Lordship into a culpable point of view.

From this candid review of facts, the idleness, rashness, and indelicacy of the insinuation conveyed in Sir Henry's Observation on the publishing of this letter, appears beyond all controversy. Whether his Lordship was so weak (as is farther insinuated) to publish it, though a matter that "contained nothing necessary for his Lordship's justification," will be seen presently, when we come to enquire into the nature of those instructions, which the Commander in Chief in *this secret and most private letter* gave General Phillips for his future *public* conduct.—But before

* See P. [80] 487 of his Lordship's Answer.

† See Lord Cornwallis's Answer, p. [2] 64.

we dismiss this subject, we cannot forbear remarking from what we have as yet observed of this *private* mode of giving *public* orders; that it appears to us exceedingly curious, indeed, and we were just on the point of giving the originality of so eccentric a thought to the Commander in Chief, when we recollected the famous pantomime scene of politics in the *Rehearsal*, when King *Phyz.* and King *Ush.* are introduced by the ingenious Mr. Bayes, as holding a sort of *dumb* conversation on state affairs, and this the Poet did, for the purpose of shewing his excellence at "penning a whisper." Now it is very possible that Sir Henry might have taken the hint from this wonderful contrivance, and by admiring the poet's happy knack of rendering *mysteries* as notorious as *manifestoes*, conceived the amazing thought of communicating *public orders* in the manner of *impenetrable secrets.* But whether our conjectures in this respect be right or wrong, we cannot, in justice to the genius of Sir Henry, refrain observing, that his idea of *whispering public* instructions, is not a whit less new and surprizing than the art of Mr. Bayes in *publishing* a whisper.

Having cleared away every thing that appears foreign to the subject, we will now commence our examination of the matter really in question.

Lord Cornwallis, from as plain and candid a state of facts* as was, perhaps, ever submitted to the judgment of the public, thinks himself warranted in drawing the following inferences: (we will take them in his Lordship's own words:)—"That our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends; but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part; - - - that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded; - - - that the march into Virginia was

* See his Lordship's Answer. *pp* 59—94.

undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief; - - - that I did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforced it; - - - that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order, and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief held out to me by the Commander in Chief - - - and that during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas.—And from these premisses his Lordship concludes, in opposition to the assertion of Sir Henry, that his conduct and opinions *were not* the causes of the catastrophe, which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.

Now the truth of these deductions must be considered as established, should the observations which Sir Henry has ventured to make for the purpose of invalidating them, prove inadequate to that end. We will examine them separately, The first in order, is, "*That our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity and unwillingness to take an active and useful part.*" Now, let us see what *observations* Sir Henry has made any way relative to this position.

It cannot be forgotten that Sir Henry acknowledged he "*certainly approved*" * of Lord Cornwallis's march into North Carolina, and yet so wayward and confused is he in all his motions and opinions, that he immediately retreats several months back to haul in "the misfortune of poor Major Ferguson by the head and shoulders,"—a misfortune which he was well acquainted with long† antecedently to the move he so approved of. That disaster had therefore

* Observations, p [6] 102.

† See Sir Henry's Observations, p. [34] 294 and [42] 310.

just as much relation to the present business, as the affair of Bunker's Hill, which happened at the beginning of the troubles in America. However, as it affords a very remarkable specimen of the CANDOUR of Sir Henry, as well as his pertinence, we conceive it would be deemed a piece of injustice to him to suffer it to pass without some comment. We will first give the passage in Sir Henry's own words—

* "Major Ferguson's misfortune was one of those untoward circumstances, which, Lord Cornwallis says, occurred during the four months succeeding the Battle of Camden.—His Lordship after the complete victory he there obtained, *ordered* our friends in North Carolina to arm and intercept the beaten army of General Gates, promising them, at the same time, that he would march to the borders of that province in their support. *About this time* Major Ferguson was detached to a distance from his Lordship with a body of militia, (without being supported by regular troops) *under an idea that he could make them fight*; notwithstanding his Lordship had informed me, some little time before, that it was contrary to the experience of the army, as well as of Major Ferguson himself. The consequence was, that the Major and his corps was unfortunately massacred. Lord Cornwallis was, immediately upon hearing of this event, obliged to quit the borders of North Carolina, and leave our friends there at the mercy of an inveterate enemy, whose power became irresistible by this NECESSARY retreat. This fatal catastrophe, moreover, lost his Lordship the whole militia of Ninety-Six, amounting to some thousand men, and even threw South Carolina into a state of confusion and rebellion.

Here is candour with a witness!—as an indignant public will judge from the following *real* state of the business, supported by *facts*:—

Lord Cornwallis, after the complete victory at Camden, very justly conceived, that if we had any *well*

* OBSERVATIONS, p. [6] 103.

wishers in North Carolina, as had been reported, the manifest superiority of our arms in their neighbourhood would have inspired them with sufficient firmness to avow themselves open and active friends to the cause of loyalty. In consequence of this opinion, he sent persons well instructed in his Lordship's expectations and intentions among the inhabitants of that province, whom he had been persuaded by friendly emissaries to rely on, in order to incite them to take a decisive part at this favourable crisis. And the more to stimulate them, his Lordship promised to march [not (as Sir Henry has so very candidly stated) *directly*,[1·2] —but without "*loss* of time,"] * to their support. Lord Cornwallis was at this time weakened and incumbered by his sick and convalescents, whom yet he hoped soon to behold in so recovered a state as to enable him to support the friends he expected to find in North Carolina. But the restoration of his people's health keeping no pace with his Lordship's zeal for the public service—and the dread of disheartening such as should have been, in consequence of the foregoing encouragement, inclined to act in concert with his Majesty's forces, determined him, in order to support whatever loyalty there might be in North Carolina, to yield to the solicitations of Major Ferguson for permission to enter that province with a *chosen* party of militia [The FLOWER of *the militia of Ninety-six*—the very militia which Sir Henry

* The discerning reader will, at a glance, perceive how wide the distinction is between these two phrases. If one says, he will go *directly* to a place, he implies that there is *no obstacle* to prevent the immediate execution of his promise—But if one says, he will go *without* LOSS *of* TIME, he certainly means it should be understood, that he is not so disengaged as *directly* to set out—however, the party he promised might be assured he would not delay more than was necessary—that is to say—he would go without *loss* of time: and this was the exact situation of Lord Cornwallis, encumbered with sick, whom yet he hoped soon to have so recovered as to enable him to support his friends.

1 I shall take the liberty to mark such parts as I think require it *thus*,

2 directly *underlined*.

affects now to consider as so very heavy a loss] *and the remains of his own corps.* [Sir Henry, in his usual strain of candour, says he had *no regulars* — were not the major's own corps *regulars?*] And his Lordship took this measure—not (as Sir Henry, so artlessly and so fairly states it)," under the idea that he (Major Ferguson) could make them fight; notwithstanding his Lordship had informed him (Sir Henry) some little time before that it was contrary to the experience of the army, as well as of Major Ferguson himself"—No—but under the ideas before mentioned, and under the positive injunction that the Major should retire before the face of a *superior* foe; and also under the previous *assurance* which the Major himself had given his Lordship of his dependance upon this chosen party *for doing their duty and fighting well.** An assurance sanctioned by the antecedent superintendance and favourable report of a brave and judicious officer†— an assurance—by no means destroyed by *past experience*, however repugnant that experience might be to it:—for, the "great attention and diligence" of a man high in rank, and military fame, as Colonel Balfour was, supported by the "active assistance" of a veteran, so skilful and so indefatigable as Major Ferguson,‡ may well be *supposed*, to have given any men under such care and such instruction, a degree of adroitness in the use of their arms, and of course a confidence in their own strength, which, without similar cultivation, it would have been almost a miracle that they should have in times past the possession of. These were the ideas of Lord Cornwallis, when he permitted Major Ferguson to move into Tryon County.—But at the same time, lest Sir Henry should have imagined, from this permission, that the party of *militia* were

* See his Lordship's letter, p. [22] 263 of Sir Henry's OBSERVATIONS.

† See OBSERVATIONS p. [17—22] 239, 263. ibid. p. [20] 241.

‡ ibid.

(*however improved*) adequate to the service of *regulars*, he tells him that former experience is against such a supposition, and therefore he thus in his letter to him, of 29th August, 1780, expresses his hopes, "that nothing can happen to prevent your Excellency's intended diversion in the Chesapeak," and if unfortunately any unforeseen cause should make it impossible, he then hopes "*that you will see* the absolute necessity of adding *some* force to the Carolinas."*—Thus we behold, upon a fair state of facts, this seemingly wonderful contradiction, of sending men to fight contrary to former experience, nothing more or less than the child of fancy and misrepresentation.

Well, but then Sir Henry tells us, that *the consequence* of detaching Major Ferguson and the militia, was, "that the Major and his whole corps was unfortunately massacred."—And, from this way of telling the story, he would have the public to suppose that the *permission to detach* was the *cause* of the Major's fatality.—Sir Henry is indeed a genius.—

This is something like the reasoning of a remarkable flighty fellow, who kept a button-maker's shop in St. Martin's-lane, and could never be prevailed to go beyond St. Paul's, otherwise than by water, because a neighbour of his had a son killed on Ludgate-hill by a mad ox from Smithfield, IN CONSEQUENCE (he used to say) of his being sent that way into the city.—But the fact is, that the misfortune of the Major was no more the *consequence* of his being detached, than the boy's death was the consequence of his being sent into the city. It was an *accident* and not an *effect*, as the word *consequence* properly imports. But that the matter may appear in the clearest light, the following extract of a letter, dated Dec. 3d, 1780, from Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry, is recommended to the attentive perusal of the public.†—

* OBSERVATIONS, p. [22] 263.

† See OBSERVATIONS, p. [49] 302.

"Lord Rawdon during my illness, informed your Excellency, in his letters of the 28th* and 31st of October, of the various causes which prevented my penetrating into North Carolina. I shall not trouble you with a recapitulation, except a few words about poor Major Ferguson. - - - I had the honour to inform your Excellency, that Major Ferguson *had taken infinite pains with some of the militia of Ninety-six.* He obtained my permission to make an incursion into Tryon County, *while the sickness of my army prevented my moving.* As he had only militia, and the small remains of his own corps, without baggage or artillery, *and as he promised to come back if he heard of any superior force,* I thought he could do no harm, and might help *to keep alive the spirit of our friends in North Carolina, which might be damped by the slowness of our motions.* The event proved unfortunate, *without any fault of Major Ferguson's.* A numerous and *unexpected* enemy came from the mountains. As they had good horses, their movements were rapid. Major Ferguson was tempted to stay near the mountains longer than he intended, in hopes of cutting off Colonel Clarke on his return from Georgia. He was not aware that the enemy was so near him; and, in endeavouring to execute my orders of passing the Catauba, and joining me at Charlotte-Town, he was attacked *by a very superior force,* and defeated on King's Mountain."—It would be an affront to an intelligent honest-hearted Reader to add a single word of comment on this passage.

Still this *massacre* Sir Henry talks of, is not the whole of the CONSEQUENCE of the unfortunate Major's move. "His Lordship was immediately, it seems, according to Sir Harry's account, upon hearing of this event, obliged to quit the borders of North Carolina, and leave our *friends* there at the mercy of an inveterate enemy, whose power became *irresistible*

* [*For* 28th *read* 29th.]

by this necessary retreat.——Moreover this fatal catastrophe lost his Lordship *the whole militia of Ninety-six*, amounting to four thousand men, and even threw *South Carolina* into a state of *confusion and rebellion*." After what we have already remarked, with respect to the pitiful sophistry of calling that a *consequence*, which was in fact nothing more than mere *accident*, men of sense will doubtless think it a work of supererogation, to comment upon any thing stated to be a consequence of any thing so *unconsequential* . . But since, besides false reasoning, Sir Henry has here committed gross misrepresentation, no man of feeling, surely, would wish any part of such a statement to pass undetected. The truth is, that not one of these assertions of Sir Henry are founded *in fact*. —— We left our friends (if they can be called friends, whose contemptible pusillanimity was continually betraying a brave and compassionate army, into difficulties and disasters) exactly in the same state we found them. *Before* we moved into their province, we had no more than their *wishes*. —Neither was our condition an atom meliorated *after*. If they had risen as they promised to do, they never could have had a more favourable opportunity, than after the complete victory at Camden, when all the force of the enemy in that quarter of the continent was broken to pieces, and in a manner annihilated. But their miserable fears would not suffer them to rise. If they had risen, poor Ferguson's little handful would not have been *massacred*. But Lord Cornwallis's letter, dated 19th September, 1780, to Lord George Germain, on this very subject, will render it unnecessary to observe more. "I had the honour to inform your Lordship, in my letter of the 21st of August, that I had dispatched proper people into North Carolina, to *exhort* our friends in that province to take arms, to seize the military stores and magazines of the enemy, and to intercept all stragglers of the routed army.

Some parties of our friends, who had embodied themselves near the Pedee, *disarmed* several of the stragglers. *But the* LEADING *persons of the Loyalists, were so undecided in their councils*, that they lost the critical time of availing themselves of our success, *and even suffered General Gates to pass to Hillsborough with a guard of six men only.* They continue, however, to give me the strongest assurances of support, when his Majesty's troops shall have penetrated into the interior parts of the province."*

So much for the declaration of our *friends.* Now for the *loss* of Ninety-six.—This assertion is amazingly venturous, indeed - - - especially as Sir Henry has been so careless as to give, in the Appendix to his Observations,† a letter of Lord Rawdon's to him,‡ dated 24th Oct. 1780, in which are words as contradictory to it as light is opposite to darkness. In this letter, after mentioning the circumstances of Major Ferguson's defeat, his Lordship proceeds thus: "By the enemies having secured all the passes on the Cattawba, Lord Cornwallis (who was waiting at Charlotteburgh for a convoy of stores) received but confused accounts of the affair for some time: but at length the truth reached him; and the delay, equally with the precautions the enemy had taken to keep their victory from his knowledge, gave Lord Cornwallis great reason to fear for the safety of Ninety-Six. *To secure that district was indispensible for the security of the rest of the province*; and Lord Cornwallis saw no means of effecting it, but by passing the Cattawba river with his army, for it was so weakened by sickness, *that it could not bear detachment.*

After much fatigue on the march, occasioned by violent rains, we passed the river three days ago.

* OBSERVATIONS, p. [30] 264. See also Lord Rawdon's account, ibid. p. [37] 277.

† P. [34] 271.

‡ [*see letter to Leslie of this date.*]

We then received the first intelligence, respecting the different posts in this province, which had reached us for near three weeks; every express from Camden having been way-laid, and some of them murdered by the inhabitants. - - - NINETY-SIX IS SAFE the corps which defeated Ferguson, having, in *consequence of our movements* crossed the Cattawba, and joined Smallwood on the Yadkin."*

With respect to the enemies force being *irresistible*, and South Carolina's being thrown into a state of rebellion—these assertions are just as weakly and unfairly grounded as the rest. *In fact*, the disturbance in South Carolina had no manner of relation to the disaster of Ferguson. They arose a considerable time before on account of a rumour, "industriously propagated in the province of a large army coming from the northward,"† and were continued by means of the outrages and violences of a rebel Colonel, one Marion, who, as Lord Cornwallis describes it,‡ "had so wrought on the minds of the people, partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments, and partly by the promise of his plunder; that there was scarcely an inhabitant between the Santee and Pedee that was not in arms against us. Some parties had even crossed the Santee, and carried terror to the gates of Charles-Town."—Such was the real cause of the confusion in South Carolina,—and as to the *irresistibility* of the force of the enemy, the honest foundation of that part of Sir Henry's story, appears equally plain with the fairness of the rest of his observations, from the few subsequent lines, which are a continuation of the same letter. "My first object was to reinstate matters in that quarter, without which Camden could receive no supplies. I therefore sent Tarleton, who

* This account is confirmed by Lord Cornwallis in p. [46] 302 of the OBSERVATIONS.

† See OBSERVATIONS, p. [15] 236.

‡ Ibid, p. [47] 304.

pursued Marion for several days, obliged his corps to take to the Swamps, and by convincing the inhabitants, that there was a power *superior* to Marion's, who could likewise reward and punish, so far checked the insurrection, that the greatest part of them have not dared to appear in arms against us since his expedition."

As the insidious misrepresentation of Major Ferguson's defeat, has not in reality any sort of connection with the question respecting that part of Lord Cornwallis's conduct, which has been arraigned by Sir Henry as the cause of the catastrophe of the campaign of 1781—Sir Henry himself having owned, that he did *approve* of the march into North Carolina, which was the beginning of that campaign,* "*until* the unfortunate day of Cowpen's," which was the 17th of January in that year. It may very naturally be asked, how a matter so extraneous has been so minutely refuted? But is not the answer obvious?—By fully exposing the arts and fallacies of a sophister in the *beginning* of his discourse, you render the remainder of your task the lighter, since by putting the byestanders on their guard, future impostures are in a great measure anticipated and detected.

But to return to the subject now properly before us, Lord Cornwallis's first inference from facts, is, as we have already mentioned—"that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity and unwillingness to take an active and useful part." Here is a candid acknowledgement that his Lordship was supplied by the Commander in Chief with sufficient force for his expedition into North Carolina, had the promises of *rising*, so frequently made by our friends in that province, been in a sort fulfilled. But what a miserable contrast do the *Observations* on this head form, thrown to-

* Observations, p. [42] 310.—Sir Henry speaks thus in a letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated Dec. 13th, 1780—It remains to be proved.

gether, as they are in that *chaotic* fashion, which the Commander in Chief peculiarly delights in.*—The evident purpose of his first attack—the express design of his Narrative, was to place the conduct of Lord Cornwallis is a censureable light; and in this attempt, from the rank and profession of the assailant, instead of inuendo or pitiful insinuation, the least we could have expected, was—open—manly—and soldierly charge. But much as expectation was disappointed in his Narrative, it is in his Observations infinitely more. If Lord Cornwallis had not made a proper use of that force, which his Lordship candidly acknowledges to have been entrusted to him, what hinders Sir Henry from standing forward, and honestly accusing him for the mis-use of it?—Why does he not speak out? - - - Is it owing to a tenderness for the reputation of his Lordship? - - - Let the complexion of his Narrative and his Observations answer. Why does Sir Henry declare, "How nearly the force I left with Lord Cornwallis in the Southern district, and which I afterwards sent to him, might have been adequate or not to the success expected from *it*, *I shall not now examine?*"† - - - And why? - - - Oh! perhaps a fit of compassion had seized his gentle nature - - - he had been too severe on the character of the *inexperienced*, the *inactive*, *unenterprising*, and *inglorious* Cornwallis; and he, therefore, by a sort of pious fraud, would snatch him from absolute perdition, by handing him over, in this respect, to the judgment of the public, who being less conversant than himself in the military operations in America, in point of skill as well as fact, would, of course, seeing the lenity and modesty with which the Commander in Chief declined the examination, conduct themselves with similar benignity, and conscious of their in ability to judge, refrain from the pleasure of passing sentence. What a despicable farce! Every man of

* *Observations*, p. [7—8] 103—104.

† Observations, p. [8] 104.

spirit burns with indignation at the view of it. This is to *pilfer* away that good name, of which *direct* and *undisguised* attack has been found unequal to despoil his Lordship. But a candid and discerning public will see through the wretched artifice. And when a man, who has shewn so sincere a will to depreciate the claims Lord Cornwallis has on the applause of his country, declines to examine a part of his Lordship's conduct, which yet he darkly hints to be culpable—they will spurn with due contempt so pitiful an insinuation, and justly conclude, that if *examination* would have answered the purpose of his wishes, examination would have not been declined.

To what purpose does Sir Henry make such a pompous parade of all the vast force which from time to time he sent to Lord Cornwallis "throughout the whole extent of his command"*—Does he imagine that the public will be deceived by the formidable appearance of this *paper* army, and lose sight of the *actual* force which his Lordship had at different periods under his command—a force which, all the world knows, was continually diminished by death in every shape in which it could have assailed a brave and enterprising soldiery. This puerile parade seems not unlike a piece of puppet shew humour we have remembered to have laughed at in our juvenile days—when madam Joan, in her usual strain, is represented scolding her husband Mr. Punch for his debaucheries, and neglect of his poor little ones who, she tells him, are absolutely starving—"Starving, woman, replies the wag—what the devil is become of the quartern loaf I bought for them a month ago!" In the same facetious manner does Sir Henry boast of the force he sent Lord Cornwallis, affecting to forget that sickness and repeated actions as necessarily consumed that, as the appetites of his family did the loaf of Mr. Punch. But instead of his drollery, it would be more consistent with the grave character of

* Observations p. [8] 104.

the Commander in Chief to have shewn either that the force which Lord Cornwallis states to have been (not on *paper* but) *actually* in the field with him, was more than what his Lordship states—or (if the statement be right)—that such *actual* force ought to have performed more than it did :—for every other *observation* is either trifling or foreign from the question. Lord Cornwallis tells us that his force "*present and fit for duty*" on his move into Carolina on the 15th of January in the beginning of the campaign of 1781, was no more than 3224 troops—a force that mouldered away so rapidly that in the April following it was reduced to a mere handful—only 1723 men. And, by the way, from this rapid diminution, no very inaccurate conjecture may be formed of the reduction of his Lordship's force in past times. Be that however as it may, the only points of enquiry here are what we have above laid down.

Now as Lord Cornwallis candidly declares that he had sufficient force to give the experiment of supporting our friends in North Carolina a fair and solid trial, and as Sir Henry has not shewn that his Lordship did not make the best use he could of that force which he owns to have had under him—of course his Lordship's position must be taken for granted, " that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, *but to their timidity and unwillingness to take an active and useful part.*"

Indeed Sir Henry endeavours to excuse this timidity and unwillingness of our friends, but it is only to make bad worse, like the drunken tinker who, for every hole he *mended*, *made* ten. He tells us that* " he cannot judge of the assurances of co-operation which Lord Cornwallis may have received from our friends in North Carolina, but from his Lordship's report, and his Lordship best knows, whether *he received any after the effects of*

* Observations, p. [9] 105.

Major Ferguson's misfortunes were known."—How weak and how insidious is this insinuation!—Sir Henry here would have the world to suppose, that Lord Cornwallis had misinformed him respecting the disposition of our friends in North Carolina. *Cui bono*?—For what purpose should his Lordship have misinformed him ? Could a false report have bettered Lord Cornwallis's condition in any one respect under heaven ? On the contrary, would it not have been in every point of view injurious and destructive to him ? If his Lordship had not received the strongest * assurances of support from the Loyalists to reduce him to a second attempt to favour their rising, by penetrating into the province, would it not have been the height of madness to have made it ? Can any unprejudiced *cool-headed* man imagine his Lordship would in such a circumstance have acted so diametrically opposite, not only to all his great military knowledge, but even to common sense ?—"But, says Sir Henry, his Lordship cannot forget, that our friends who had risen by his order, were left to ruin by his retreat, and numbers of them actually massacred." This dismal picture has been already shewn to be nothing more than the offspring of an Hypochondriac fancy; and, indeed, it is for the honour of Sir Henry that it should be so deemed, since, if he *really* viewed the defeat of Major Ferguson and its consequences in the same gloomy colours *then*, that he appears to do *now*, he would have been in the highest degree culpable in giving his assent, (as he owns he did) to the second move into North Carolina. "I am therefore at a loss, continued Sir Henry, to guess what may have been his Lordship's reasons for being surprised, that

* OBSERVATIONS. p. 30—Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germaine, dated Sept. 19th, 1780. "They continue, however, to give me the *strongest* assurances of support, when his Majesty's troops shall have penetrated into the interior parts of the province. *see Letter p.* 264.

they failed to join him, *after the victory at Guildford.*"—Poor Sir Henry has, through the whole of this controversy, evinced such a fondness for conjecture, that it would be cruelty to see him so *lost*, for a *guess*, as he seems to be, and not afford him some relief. Though in truth, his *loss* on the present occasion deserves rather our laugh than our compassion. The shatter-brained fellow, who for a whole winter's day, amidst frost and snow, sought the very horse he was riding on, sustained just as ludicrous a loss of his beast as Sir Henry does of his conjecture.—To guess at the reasons of Lord Cornwallis's *surprise*, what has he more to do, than merely to recollect the reasons which induced him to *approve* of his Lordship's march to give our good *friends* in North Carolina, a *fair trial*?—And then let him ask himself, whether the gaining a *complete victory* over their enemies, was not such a trial, as might well warrant a surprise at their dastardly conduct on that event, after all their former mighty promises of support in case his Lordship came among them?

However, Sir Henry, with his usual good sense, apologizes for this backwardness of our *worthy friends*, by ascribing it "to the melancholy scene of his Lordship's camp, *incumbered* (as it was after the battle) *with a long train of sick and wounded*"—a scene, which so shocked their tender nerves, that they rode away from it, "no doubt (as their kind apologist gravely tells us) with aching hearts," communing with themselves, like Falstaff on the sight of the field of battle after Prince Henry had defeated Hotspur. It was a sad spectacle for men, more remarkable for their wishes than their spirit. Facetious Jack liked not "grinning honour;" neither, it seems, did our *promising* friends of Carolina. But is not this way of excusing the conduct of the *Seceders*, something like the funny mode of helping the lame dog over a stile, by giving the poor brute a kick on the posteriors, or a lugging of the

ears, which, though meant possibly to quicken his exertions, only exposes his infirmity?

To dwell longer on this topic, would be the idle task of holding a taper to the sun. Lord Cornwallis's declaration, "that the timidity and unwillingness of the North Carolinas in fulfilling their promises, *was the sole cause* of the failure of his Majesty's arms in that province," far from being weakened by Sir Henry Clinton's *observations*, will doubtless be considered by the intelligent reader, as confirmed irrefutably;—we shall therefore proceed to the review of the next article.

"But as this attempt (*such* as it was*) had failed, continues Sir Henry, surely Lord Cornwallis's next object should have been to secure South Carolina." What! whether he could or *not!* Must not every man of common sense see, that when his Lordship told General Leslie, (according to the words quoted by Sir Henry) "that if our friends in North Carolina were as——as our friends to the southward, we must leave them to their fate, and *secure what we have got*," his Lordship could only mean to speak *conditionally*; that is to say, as futurity should unfold itself? It is thus he explains himself, in his letter to the Commander in Chief, dated 3d December, 1780. "Whenever our operations commence, your Excellency may depend on hearing from me as frequently as possible—*and it is from events alone that any future plan can be proposed.*" But "Why did his Lordship march to Wilmington from Cross-Creek, says Sir Henry, "as he was so much nearer to Camden and South Carolina?"† His Lordship has shewn, that absolute *necessity* caused this move; and has detailed the matter in so clear and satisfactory a manner, in pages 6 and 7 of his ANSWER, that one

* It would have been candid in Sir Henry if he had here opened his *vast* stores of military lore, and for the good of posterity, told us the faults of the attempt, and how it might have been made better.

† Observations, p. [11] 106.

would imagine the querist had never read it. But there are many people who talk, solely for talk sake. And this seems the foible of Sir Henry on more occasions than the present. In the instance now before us, he resembles strongly the Irishman, who, when he lost a race, by the slipping of his horse's shoulder, used as often as he dressed the diseased part, to put a number of judicious interrogatories to the poor beast, and among the rest this pointed one. "Arrah, *Coppul cree*, when you finded that your collar-bone vas breaked, phy vasn't you after jumping over Paddy Mooney's Pallysaids, and galloping through dhe mill-race viddhout boddering yourself about dhe big mastiff on todher side - - - you knows grah! *dhat vas dhe short cut to dhe vinning posht* ?

Well, but, continues Sir Henry, "even when at Wilmington, why did not his Lordship retire to Charles Town, by the route to Lockwood's Folly, and the Waggamaws ? which, it is the opinion of many others, as well as mine, was practicable ?" A hungry quere betrays an empty skull. It is a great pity that Sir Henry has not drawn up his argumentative forces with greater skill. One fact has more force than a dozen questions, or a score presumptions, The Commander in Chief has forgotten, that he has over and over again told the public, and told Lord Cornwallis, that as he was *at so great a distance from the scene* of action, he left his Lordship "as free as air, both to plan and to do according to his best discretion. And now all on a sudden he loses all idea of his distance - - - calls his Lordship's discretion in question - - - and affects to put his own opinion in competition with that of a General on the spot. But the public will find but little difficulty in perceiving, that this same favourite route of Sir Henry's, by Lockwood's Folly, would have been a foolish route indeed; - - - for if it had been otherwise - - if it had been at all practicable - - - if it had not presented insurmountable obstacles to his Lordship,

it is not in candour to suppose that, with all the circumstances of choice placed in a manner under his eye, by means of his situation, he did not make the wisest one possible. Nor is this all the mischief Sir Henry has done himself by hazarding this observation - - he has at the same time unwittingly gotten himself into a very awkward dilemma - - - either of being *ignorant* of the nature of the route he speaks, and consequently of being deemed the invidious retailer *of old gossiping intelligence*, or, on the other hand, of being *well acquainted* with the route, and of course *a bad Commander in Chief*, inasmuch as he continued Lord Cornwallis in power, notwithstanding his culpable neglect of that route, by which (Sir Henry now insinuates*) a whole province and an army were lost.

But there is a story of old Partridge the astrologer, which hints at a way by which Sir Henry may be extricated out of his present misfortune. The poor almanack-maker was one night gazing at the stars, and his legs having thus lost their guide, brought him headlong into a ditch. The fall stunned him, but recovering himself, "It is happy for me," quoth he, as he scrambled out again, "that all the falsehoods with which I have aspersed their highnesses, has had no effect upon their splendour, else for want of light, I might now perish in a disaster, which I cannot say but I have merited." Sir Henry too has had his fall: let us see whether Lord Cornwallis will not afford him such relief, as the stars afforded Partridge. His Lordship tells us, that "The disappointment he met with in his second move into North Carolina, and the wants and distresses of the army, compelled him to move to Cross-Creek; but meeting there with no material part of the promised assistance and supplies, he was *obliged* to continue his march to Wilmington, *where hospitals and horses were ready for him.* His Lordship then goes on to describe his other views

* Observations, p. [12] 107.

and intentions in going to Wilmington; and proceeds to state his reasons for quitting that place. "I could not remain at Wilmington, lest General Greene should succeed against Lord Rawdon, and by returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry and every horse in the army. From the *shortness* of Lord Rawdon's stock of provisions, and the *great distance* from Wilmington to Camden, it appeared *impossible* that any *direct* move of mine could afford him the least prospect of relief. *In the attempt, in case of a misfortune to him, the safety of my own corps might have been endangered*, or, IF HE EXTRICATED HIMSELF, *the force of South Carolina, when assembled, was, in my opinion, sufficient to secure what was valuable to us, and capable of defence in that province.* I was likewise influenced by having just received an account from Charles Town, of the arrival of a frigate with dispatches from the Commander in Chief, the substance of which then transmitted to me, was that General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeak, and put under my orders, which induced me to hope, that solid operations might be adopted in that quarter; and I was most firmly persuaded, that, *until* Virginia was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces, and that after its reduction, they would fall without much resistance, and be retained without much difficulty."*

Such were the motives which caused Lord Cornwallis to reject, not only Lockwood's Folly, but all other routes into South Carolina. And his Lordship's statement, supported as it is, by "letters†

* ANSWER, p. [6, 7, 8] 69–70.

† See Letter, p. 92, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, subjoined to the *Observations*; and p. [50 1, 2. 5, 6, 7] 420, 426, 427, Appendix to the ANSWER, and particularly a letter written by Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry, July 24th, 1781, wherein the madness and folly of a move from Wilmington into South Carolina, as stated by Sir Henry, is exposed in the plainest and strongest manner. This Letter occupies pages [74, 5, 6,] ii. 88 of the Appendix to his Lordship's Answer.

written at the moment as events happened, which, as Sir Henry says in his Narrative, are certainly the most faithful records of actions and intentions," throw so clear a light upon the subject, that Sir Henry, unless he wishes to remain in the error he has fallen into, will earnestly make use of it.—A handsome Palinode may retrieve his credit. At present every one must imagine that he has committed one of those blunders called *bulls*, for which a neighbouring country is so famous. Nothing else can now be supposed, but that he *first* writ his observations, and *then* (if at all) perused the Answer, on which they were meant to operate as a criticism!

After the failure of two attempts in favour of the Loyalists in North Carolina, which on the one hand disclosed such a fund of disaffection, not only in that province, but in South Carolina, and on the other hand evinced too clearly for even credulity any longer to doubt it, that the timidity of our friends was unconquerable, is it not astonishing beyond measure to find Sir Henry declaring, "I will frankly own, that I ever disapproved of an attempt to conquer Virginia, before the Carolinas were absolutely restored?" And this he says, though he well knew that every means which could be supposed equal to the quashing of rebellion, and inspiring loyalty with courage, had been tried by Lord Cornwallis. At the battle of Camden, his Lordship's complete victory had humbled all the hopes of the disaffected to the dust, and presented a golden opportunity to the Loyalists; yet, our trembling *friends*, like the wretched people to whom the Romans proclaimed *liberty*, had not the spirit to seize the offered blessing. Still however, they besought another effort in their favour—another effort was made, and at Guildford, Victory once more unbarred the gates to Freedom; yet again our miserable friends, with more than female fears, declined to enter, and fled—not from an enemy, for their enemies were trodden under foot—No, but from

their victorious champions. Their pusillanimous natures stood aghast at the streaming wounds of their benefactors. And what ought to have inflamed their just resentment against their oppressors, and drawn forth their spirit to glorious enterprise, served but to damp every generous ardour of the soul.—They shrunk into their lurking holes, and thus infamously proclaimed to all the world, that they dared not to be free.

After such trials had been made of the stamina of the Loyalists, does not the obstinate adherence of Sir Henry to his former opinions, respecting the plan of restoring the Carolinas, savour exceedingly of that blind enthusiasm, which caused one of the primitive fathers, instead of combating the errors of infidelity with the weapons of good sense, to vindicate his faith in terms of the greatest absurdity. —"Credo, said the holy zealot, quia *incredible* est."

Seeing then that Sir Henry has thought fit to oppose the well-founded experience and solid reasoning of Lord Cornwallis, on the article now under examination, with nothing more than speculation, assertion, hypothesis, conjecture, insinuation; in short, with nothing more than mere chimera, there are few, (if any) of our readers, we may rationally presume, who are not impressed with a conviction of the truth of his Lordship's well-supported assertion, "*that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of his waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief.*" If, however, it is possible that a doubt can rest on the mind of any one, we refer him for perfect satisfaction to his Lordship's answer.

His Lordship's next position is also fully proved from the correspondence annexed both to his and Sir Henry's observations.—* The impossibility of doing any thing serviceable in the Carolinas, after the *fair trial* which had been made by Lord Cornwallis, of the

* See his Lordship's Answer—Appendix. p. [12] 395.

spirit and friendship of the Loyalists on his complete victory at Guildford, induced him to take the only step that common sense would have dictated on the occasion.—General Greene had left the back part of Virginia open; his Lordship therefore seized the opportunity of attempting to form a junction with General Phillips, in order the more powerfully to effect the purposes for which Sir Henry had directed General Phillips, to *establish* posts in Virginia* And here let it be remembered that his Lordship was totally in the dark as to Sir Henry's plan of operations for the summer. This uncertainty Lord Cornwallis speaks of in his letter to Sir Henry of the 10th of April, 1781, who, instead of removing it in his answer on the 30th of the same month,† leaves his Lordship exactly in the same state; and of course under the guidance of his own discretion. That discretion urged him to move into Virginia, as his Lordship very truly states, not to *establish* but only to *reinforce* the station in that province.

We are now come to what appears, from the whole complexion of the controversy, to be the point most contended, namely,—whether his Lordship occupied the posts of York and Gloucester, and was induced to remain in them, by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to him by the Commander in Chief. And here we cannot forbear observing, that if the open generous nature of Sir Henry was not well known, one of the greatest distresses Lord Cornwallis had to endure, through the whole course of his secondary command, arose from that artful, *Jesuitical* garb, worn by most of his directions to his Lordship. Conditional measures for his Lordships conduct were constantly pointed out—If they were adopted with success, of course the merit fell to the lot of the

* See his Lordship's Answer—Appendix, p. [62] 347.

† Ibid. p. [16, 17] 441. His Lordship must have otherwise remained till he should have heard from Sir Henry, either shamefully inactive, or absurdly and ruinously employed.

director—But at the same time to guard against the plan of a miscarriage, his Lordship was generally left to his own discretion, for this and similar plausible reasons, "as they will have the advantage of being formed on the spot, and upon circumstances which at this distance I cannot of course judge of."* Now, though no one, at all acquainted with the disposition of the Commander in Chief, can suspect artifice at the bottom of all this, yet every one must perceive that Lord Cornwallis, acting under directions of this nature, must have experienced sensations far—very far, from pleasing. The correspondence before the public is full of these *Janus* looking directions. However, sometimes Sir Henry (perhaps through that caprice, and inconsistency that forms a part of the character of eccentric genius,) dealt less in the *equivoque*, as may be seen in that part of the correspondence respecting the taking post at York and Gloucester. --- In his letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated July 11th, 1781, are these words: --- "My Lord, I am just returned from a conference with Rear Admiral Graves, in consequence of your Lordship's letter of the 30th ultimo,† [in which letter his Lordship in this very strong language objects to the posts of York and Gloucester. "Upon viewing York, I was clearly of opinion that it far exceeds our power, consistent with your plans, to make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester, *both of which* would be necessary for the protection of shipping"—and a little lower his Lordship says, "But as magazines, &c. may be destroyed by occasional expeditions from New-York, and there is little chance of being able to establish a port capable of giving protection to ships of war, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it is worth while to hold a sickly defensive post in this bay, which will

* Answer—Appendix, p. [70] 493.

† See the Letter, p. [123] ii. 31 of the Appendix to his Lordship's *Answer*.

always be exposed to a sudden French attack, and which experience has now shewn, makes no diversion in favour of the southern army."]—"And we are *both* clearly of opinion, (continued Sir Henry, notwithstanding this remonstrance) it is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY we should hold a station in Chesapeak for ships of the line as well as frigates."*—Now as his Lordship's objections, as above fairly stated, were positively over ruled, and as Hampton-Road was, upon a survey of the engineers, found unfit for the desired purpose—does it require any argument to prove, that the spirit of this order from Sir Henry did not *compel* Lord Cornwallis to seize on York and Gloucester, since, according to his letter, both he and the Admiral "were *clearly* of opinion, that it was *absolutely necessary* to hold a station in the Chesapeak for ships of the line, &c. and these places only could have answered that indispensible requisition?

To recur to any anterior documents to explain so *express* an order as this, is a work as supererogatory, as if a man were to beat his brains for arguments to prove that two and two make four.—Lord Cornwallis communicated his thoughts on the impropriety of taking these posts to the Commander in Chief. His Lordship's ideas, it seems, had no weight either with that officer, or the superior of the naval department, and language cannot be more strong and plain than the directions given in consequence of those ideas being rejected. It may not be improper in this place to observe, that although in most of Sir Henry's correspondence, and particularly in his so much talked of letter of the 30th of April to General Phillips, any way relating to the Admiral, he either directly or indirectly speaks of him, as one by no means of a disposition to co-operate with him; yet here, contrary to the opinion of an officer of experience on the spot, and of course best qualified to form

* See this Letter, p. [167] ii. 62 of the Appendix to his Lordship's *Answer*.

a judgment on the matter in question, he cordially embraces the sentiments of the man whose unaccommodating temper he was for ever inveighing against. Is this caprice—or is it consistency? Let the reader peruse the letter, compare it with this conduct, and then candidly decide.

"That his Lordship remained in the posts of York and Gloucester, by the prospect of relief uniformly held out to him," is a position that Sir Henry has endeavoured in his observations to controvert, by an argument, the fallacy of which is so very evident, that it is astonishing, how careless soever that gentleman has uniformly shewn himself to be in the choice of his reasons, he should have adopted it—It is substantially this—If Lord Cornwallis used his own discretion in moving into Virginia, it is fair to say that he might have used a like discretion in quitting these posts. On the contrary, it is fair to say, that as he was perfectly in the dark as to[1] Sir Henry's plans, and neither time or circumstance suffered him to delay till he could have consulted with the Commander in Chief, previous to his march into Virginia, he was under the necessity of taking that step with only the guidance of his own judgement.—But in regard to his remaining in the posts of York and Gloucester, he was not thus circumscribed—and ought not therefore to have exercised his own discretion, but to have waited as he did for his superior's orders?—And so it is very evident Sir Henry himself thought - - - else why would he have undertaken the task of writing to his Lordship, and giving him assurances of succour.—But to argue on a point so clear, must be an insult to the meanest intellects. And as his Lordship very properly evinced no disposition to use his own discretion on this occasion, it is fair to infer, that "during the considerable interval between his arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the appearance of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, his corps

1 perfectly *to* as to *underlined.*

was completely at the disposal[1] of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn[2], or employed[3] in the Upper Chesapeak,[4] or sent back[5] to the Carolinas." And the conclusion his Lordship draws from all these premises, stands of course unshaken as a rock—namely—"that his conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781."

It was not in contemplation by this review to notice every occurrence in Sir Henry's *observations*, or in general to pay *serious* regard to any part of them. Serious regard would have been thrown away upon them. *Duplices sunt opiniones quædam habient aliquid stabilitatis, nec sunt examinandæ; quædam adeo sunt absurdæ et ridiculæ, ut sua sponte evanescant; tales itaque, non opus habient refutatione, sed potius castigatione et reprehensione.* High in the estimation of the military world, and, indeed, of all descriptions of men, as Lord Cornwallis stands, and tenacious as his Lordship is well known to be of that honour, the truth of one of these two suppositions must strike every man of sense with regard to the silence of that nobleman, on the publication of the Observations on his Lordship's *Answer*—either that they are unworthy his attention, or that they are incontrovertible. Now, *every one who has read his Lordship's Answer*, must be perfectly satisfied, that he could have been actuated on this occasion only by the former of these causes. And such as read this Review, and have not read the Answer, may, on seeing how easily overturned the very *strongest* of Sir Henry's remarks are, be induced to advert to his Lordship's own account of his conduct, for entire conviction of its rectitude, and of course of the idleness (to say no worse) of any attempt to injure it. In truth, his Lordship's Answer to Sir Henry's Narrative, would have for ever closed

1 disposal *underlined.*
2 withdrawn *underlined.*
3 employed *underlined.*
4 Upper Chesapeak *underlined.*
5 sent back *underlined.*

the lips of any man, in whom the itch of scolding was not as rooted as it was in the taylor's vixen wife, that *even in death* would have the *last word*; and when her husband was drowning her, and she could no longer make use of her tongue, continued to pour out the bitterness of her soul, by making signs with her fingers. Sir Henry would have done his reputation more service, if, instead of endeavouring to question the established merits of a brother officer, he had stated to the public the nature of his own yet to be revealed *seven year's services* he mentions in the beginning of his Narrative. He should have spurned the miserable craft of little minds, who, conscious of their inability to soar to eminence, strive to pull down to their own level, that character, which they have not the capacity or the hardihood to emulate. The conduct of Sir Henry on this occasion is the more astonishing, as from the classic elegance of his style, we must consider him possessed of all those just and noble sentiments, which the antients have handed down to us. He has evinced such a turn for *observation*, we are filled with wonder, that the cautionary doctrine of his old friend Demosthenes should have escaped his notice, as it certainly has, else he would never have fished in troubled waters in the manner he has done. To prevent a similar misfortune to him in future, we shall remind him of the passage - - - and thus bid him heartily farewel.

Οὐκ ἐστι πικρῶς ἐξετάσαι τὶ πέπρακται τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἂν μὴ παρ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ὑπάρξη τὰ δέοντα.

CHRONOLOGICAL CORRESPONDENCE

COMPRISING

1, ALL THE LETTERS IN THE

CONTROVERSIAL PAMPHLETS:

2, The OMITTED and hitherto

UNPUBLISHED portions of those Letters gathered from

ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS:

3, SIR HENRY CLINTON'S

innumerable, important, inedited,

UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT NOTES

in the Controversial Pamphlets.

CHRONOLOGICAL CORRESPONDENCE

COMPRISING:—1, ALL THE LETTERS IN THE CONTROVERSIAL PAMPHLETS:

2, The OMITTED and hitherto UNPUBLISHED portions of those Letters gathered from ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS:

3, SIR HENRY CLINTON'S innumerable, important, inedited, UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT NOTES in the Controversial Pamphlets.

1 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [1 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles-town, May 17, 1780.

Your Lordship has already with you, ([a]*in the field*) two thousand five hundred and forty two rank and file; but, if you have the least reason to suppose the enemy likely to be in great number, you shall be reinforced with the forty-second, the light infantry, and any other corps you choose. As your move is important, it must not be stinted. I will give you all you wish of every sort. Let me [b]but know what it is as soon as possible. In the mean time, I shall order the light infantry and forty-second regiment to prepare; depending upon it, that as soon as you can spare them, you will return them to me; for all operations to the Northward must be cramped without them. If you choose to keep the seventeenth[1] dragoons,[2] you are heartily welcome to them during this move.

a B *not italics*

b B *omits* but

1c seventeenth *underlined.*

2c he had only one troop.

1B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 17 May 1780, TARLETON *p* 76.

Extract of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles-town, May 17, 1780.

Same as No. 1 *with variations shown in margin p* 209.

2 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [2 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copy.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Manigolds, May 18, 1780.

Sir, Lieutenant Colonel Webster arrived this morning, and informed me of the message which you sent by him, relative to reinforcing the corps under my command. The service on which I am going, is undoubtedly of the most important nature, and in my opinion, without some success in the back country, our success at Charles-town would but little promote the real interests of Great-Britain. But at the same time it is as necessary that your situation to the Northward should be respectable. It would be with great regret[1] that I should see you leave behind any part of that corps destined for your first embarkation. The garrison, then, of Charles-town and Sullivan's-island, will consist of three British regiments,—two of them very weak,—and two Hessian, and one weak Provincial, the latter of which, perhaps, will be sent to Fort Moultrie. This garrison will have the charge of two thousand five hundred prisoners. The corps at present under my command is, in my opinion, fully equal to the purpose intended by it, unless some considerable reinforcement of Continentals should come from the Northward. I have not yet heard that fact ascertained, by any intelligence which has come to my knowledge. If troops are on their march, and not very near, your embarkation given out publicly for the Chesapeak will probably stop them. I think, therefore, Sir, if you please, with proper deference and submission to your opinion, that the business may be settled in the following manner: If no certain intelligence arrives before you are ready to sail, of a considerable corps of the Continental troops being far advanced, that the disposition should then remain the same which you mentioned when I

1c great regret *underlined.*

had the honour of seeing you. If such intelligence should arrive before that time, I should then wish to be joined by five or six hundred men, either British or Hessian, and submit it to your judgment on the spot, from whence they could be best supplied. I think, at all events, Lieutenant-colonel Balfour's expedition should go on immediately, as the season of the year makes it necessary that he should lose no time. The more pains that can be taken to establish the belief of your going to Virginia, the greater will be the probability of stopping their reinforcement.

I am, &c. (Signed) CORNWALLIS.

3 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [4 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Manigolds, May 19, 1780.

Sir, I received, very early this morning, the favour of your letter by Lieutenant-colonel Innes, to which the letter I had the honour of sending to you yesterday, by Major Dansey, will serve as an answer. I can only add, that I have received no intelligence whatever of reinforcements coming to the enemy from the Northward, or of their being in force in this province.

4 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [5 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles-town, May 20, 1780.

The light infantry and forty-second regiment[1] march this evening to Goose-creek, and thence to Monk's-corner, where they will remain at your Lordship's call, in readiness either to join you, or to return and embark, as shall have become expedient.

[1] 7,000 men in arms.

5 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [5 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles-town, May 20, 1780.

Every jealousy has been and will be given on my[1] part, as a blind to our real intentions.

And now, my Lord, having entered into everything that occurs to me as necessary to be thought on at present, I heartily wish success to your important move. I cannot doubt your having it, for as much as I agree with you, that success at Charles-town, unless followed in the back country, will be of little avail; so much, I am persuaded, that the taking that place in the advantageous[2] manner we have done it, insures the reduction of this and the next province, if the temper of our friends in those districts is such as it has always been represented to us.

1c my *underlined.* 2c advantageous *underlined.*

6 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [6 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Lenews, East Side of Santêe, May 21, 1780.

a B *begins* [a]The march of the light infantry and forty-second to Monk's-corner will be of use to those corps, and will help to spread alarm through the country; but from what I hear, I do not believe that there can be any necessity for detaining any part of the first embarkation a moment after the ships are ready b B *ends* for them.[b]

6B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 21 May 1780, TARLETON *p* 77.

Extract of a letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Lenew's, east side of Santee, May 21, 1780.

The same extract as No. 6.

7 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [6 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Charles-Town, June 1, 1780.

We shall probably leave this in a day or two. I dare not be so sanguine as to suppose that your business will be compleated in time for us to meet before I sail; and as our communication will become precarious, I think it necessary to give your Lordship outlines of my intentions, where your Lordship is likely to bear a part. Your Lordship knows it was part of my plan to have gone into Chesapeak-bay; but I am apprehensive the information which the Admiral and I received, may make it necessary for him to assemble his fleet at New-York, in which case I shall go there likewise. When your Lordship has finished your campaign, you will be better able to judge what is necessary to be done to secure South and recover North Carolina. Perhaps it may be necessary to send the gallies and some troops into Cape Fear, to awe the lower counties, by far the most hostile of that province, and to prevent the conveyance of succours by inland navigation, the only communication that will probably remain with the northern parts of North Carolina and Virginia.[1] Should your Lordship so far succeed in both provinces, as to be satisfied they are safe from any attack during the approaching season, after leaving a sufficient force in garrison, and such other posts as you think necessary, and such troops by way of moving corps as you shall think sufficient, added to such provincial and militia corps as you shall judge proper to raise; I should wish you to assist in operations which will certainly be carried on in the Chesapeak, as soon as we are relieved from our apprehension of a superior fleet, and the

1c tis to be lamented his Lordp did not do so in 80 as he did in 81.

season will admit of it in that climate.[2] This may happen, perhaps, about September, or, if not, early in October. I am clear this should not be attempted without a great[3] naval force[4]; I am not so clear there should be a great land force. I therefore propose that your Lordship, with what you can spare at the time from your important post, (*which is always to be considered as the principal object*)[5.6.7] may meet the Admiral, who will bring with him such additional force as I can spare into the Chesapeak. I should recommend in the first place, that one or two armed ships, vigilants, should be prepared, and that as many gallies as can go to sea may likewise accompany you from hence. Our first object will probably be the taking post at Norfolk or Suffolk, *or near the Hampton Road*,[8] and then proceeding up the Chesapeak to *Baltimore*.[9] I shall not presume to say any thing by way[10] of instruction[11] to your Lordship,[12] except in articles where you wish it; and if you will do me the honour to inform me of your wishes by the first safe opportunity, I shall pay every attention to them upon that subject, or any other. The Admiral assures me that there will be ships enough left for convoy, ready by the 24th of June. Your Lordship will be the best judge what use can be made of them. Correspondence may, and

2a there is a clear implication at least of the Danger I think operation is subject to in Chesapeak during the unhealthy season or without a certainty of a covering Fleet.

3c great *underlined*.

4a here again whereas when Lord Cornwallis forced it He might have known there was a doubt whether the Enemy's Fleet was not superior.

5a how could he in the face of this order expose Charles Town.

6c clearly express'g a wish that he should not come to Chek till he had recovered North Carolina and we were sure of a Fleet but never to risk C. Town, "that being the Principal object."

7bc which *to* object *underlined*.

8c my first object there Hampn Road in James river.

9a it may be observed this had ever been my Plan.

10c way *underlined*.

11c instruction *underlined*.

12c L. C. had sent a list on which he wished instruction and I gave it.

I hope will, be kept up by the cruizers, which the Admiral and officer stationed here will have, but if you find it necessary, you will be so good to press or hire armed vessels.

8 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, 1 June 1780, Copy RI 19/21.
OBSERVATIONS [8 *Ap'x*] *p* 126, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed N° 56. Copy of Instructions to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, dated Head Quarters, Charles Town, 1st June 1780. 56.

Instructions to Lieut. General Earl Cornwallis.

Head Quarters Charles Town 1st June 1780.

My Lord, [a]Upon my departure from hence you will be pleased to take [b]the Command of the Troops mentioned in the inclosed Return, and of all other Troops now here, or that may arrive in my absence. Your Lordship will make such change in the Position of them, as you may judge most conducive to His Majesty's Service for the defence of this important Post, and its dependencies. At the same time it is by no means my Intention to prevent your acting offensively, in case an opportunity should offer consistent with the [c]Security of this place,[1] which is always[2] to be regarded as [d]a primary object.[3·4]

All Provision and Military Stores of [e]every Denomination now here, or which may hereafter arrive, are submitted to your Lordship's orders, together with every Power you may find necessary to enforce in my absence, for the promotion of the King's Service.[f] To this end the Principals in Departments, and the Inspector-General of the Provincial Forces who

a B *begins*
b B *omits* the
c B *italics to* place
d B *italics to* object
e B *reads* any
f B *ends*

1bd security *to* place *underlined.*
2f always *underlined.*
3bd as *to* object *underlined.*
4a on his Lordship's disobedience of this order I ground my charge. after losing his light troops, distroying his waggons &c &c throwing down part of the works of this primary object He marched into N. Carolina & afterwards into Virginia at the Evident risk of this Capital as well as of all the Corps concerned in that move.

has the charge of the Stores designed for their use, are directed to give in returns to you of the States of their several Departments, so far as respects their Stores in possession, and of every other particular relative to their Trusts, which can tend to your fullest Information; Communicating to you at the same time their general Instructions from me. I am persuaded I need not recommend the utmost Œconomy in the Issue of Ordnance and other Stores, and particularly of the Arms, of which there are two thousand Stored in Boxes, and about Eight Hundred Serviceable, and as many more repairable which were saved out of the Magazine that was blown up.

Your Situation in respect to the two Floridas and Georgia will naturally engage you in a correspondence with the Officers Commanding His Majesty's Troops in each of those Ports. Wherefore it is my desire that all Letters directed for me from thence should be opened by your Lordship; and that you may give such orders thereupon as the Exigencies of the Service may require, forwarding to me the Letters so received, and a report of your orders in consequence, to which those Officers will of course pay due obedience.

Mr. Newton, Assistant Deputy Paymaster General, has orders to receive your Lordship's Warrant for Pay or Subsistence in all cases as final; and to furnish Money upon your Warrants on the requisition of the Publick Departments, or on account of Contingencies. The Vouchers for the Disbursements of the first of which, after being submitted to your Lordship's Inspection, will of course remain with the Principals, as they are amenable to Government. And your Lordship will be pleased to transmit to me at the close of every Quarter a list of the Warrants you have issued for Extraordinaries within that Period.

A number of Blank Warrants for Presidents, and Deputations for Judge Advocates, will be delivered to you for holding General Courts Martial. And I do hereby authorise and appoint you to approve of

the Sentences of such Courts in all Cases not Capital, if in your Judgement the necessity of the case should require it; excepting only the reduction of Commissioned Officers, unless under very singular Circumstances.

Major Moncrief of the Corps of Engineers will communicate to you the Orders he has received for the Services required for that Department, which are however Submitted to your Lordship's future Instructions.

It is my Intention that the Troopers belonging to the Detachment of the 17th Light Dragoons now here, shall follow me as soon as the Service will admit of it, and proper vessels under a Convoy provided for Transporting them. I am therefore to desire that they may be held in readiness to Embark accordingly.

Having Judged it to be for the good of His Majesty's Service that some fit and qualified persons should be appointed to superintend the Militia in the Southern Provinces, I have made choice of Major Ferguson of the 71st Regiment and Captain Hanger of the Corps of Jagers, for that Service. And I have accordingly given them Commissions appointing Major Ferguson Inspector of Militia and Major Commandant of the First Battalion of Militia to be raised, and Captain Hanger Deputy Inspector with the Brevet Rank of Major of Militia—with Orders to Major Ferguson to lay his Instructions before your Lordship, and pay all due obedience to such Regulations and Commands in everything respecting his Department, as you may think proper to give him.

Whenever any Packet or advice Boat may arrive here from Europe, your Lordship will be pleased to order them to proceed to the Army; having first taken from the Mails all Letters for the Troops under your Command. These Packets will return with my Dispatches without touching at any Port after the receipt of them. But care will always be taken to give your Lordship the earliest account of the Time intended for their Sailing, that your Dis-

patches and all Letters from hence may arrive in time to go by them.

In order that I may be furnished with every Information necessary to be Communicated to the Secretary of State for His Majesty's Information, or to the other Departments of office, I am to request you will from Time to Time communicate to me such Intelligence as you may think Interesting to His Majesty's Service; that you will report the arrival of all Troops and Stores from Europe; and more particularly I beg to be informed of every thing relative to your own immediate Situation with a full assurance of a like Communication on my part.

I understand that Captn. Henry is to remain here in the Command of the Naval Force. His zeal for the Service will of course lead him to Co-operate with your Lordship in every measure that can promote it. Your applications to him for the Conveyance of your Dispatches at any time will I am persuaded be readily Complied with. I have the honor to be &c. (Signed) H. CLINTON.
Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis.

8B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [8 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Instructions to Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, dated Head-Quarters, Charles-town, June 1, 1780.

This extract from No. 8 *is shown in margin p* 215.

9 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 3 June 1780, LS PA 137/575.
OBSERVATIONS [23 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

Endorsed Charles Town S° Carolina 3d June 1780. Sir Henry Clinton (N° 92) R/ 5th July. Entd

Head Quarters Charles Town
[a]N° 92 S° Carolina 3d June 1780.
[b]My Lord, Lord Rawdon, in Consequence of His Majesty's Order signified to me by your Lordship has

a F *inserts* Duplicate
S *inserts* Triplicate
b BV *begin*

resigned his Commission of Lieut[t] Colonel in the Army and made choice of that of Colonel of Provincials.

In Justice to his Lordship as well as to the King's Service I must observe that the Expences Lord Rawdon has been at, and the distinguished Zeal he has shewn in forming the Corps under his Command render him worthy [a]much Commendation, and make the Alternative put to him a very mortifying One. Whilst on the other Hand the Volunteers of Ireland, bereft of a chief of his Lordships Rank in Life, and Attention to the Service, would probably have lost much in their Strength and Discipline.

a BFSV *insert* of

Perhaps His Majesty may be graciously pleased to consider his Lordship in the Light of an Officer, who for the Good of his Service and the Preservation of a [b]very serviceable Corps, to which he felt a kind of parental Attachment, has offered to relinquish Rank essential to his future Hopes as a Soldier; and may in Consequence restore to him his Brevet of Lieutenant Colonel in the Army.

b BFSV *omit* very

I have the Honor[c] to be[d] with the greatest Respect Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant, Right Hon[ble] Lord George Germain. H. Clinton.

c B *ends &c.* H. Clinton
d FSV *end* H. Clinton

9B: Clinton to Germain, 3 June 1780, observations [23 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
Copy.—Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, dated Charles-Town, June 3, 1780.
Same as No. 9 *with variations shown in margins pp* 218-219.

9F: Clinton to Germain, 3 June 1780, Duplicate ls pa 631/135.
Endorsed Sir Henry Clinton 3 June N 92.
Same as No. 9 *with variations shown in margins pp* 218-219.

9S: Clinton to Germain, 3 June 1780, Triplicate ls pa 631/134.
Endorsed Sir Henry Clinton 3 June N 92.
Same as No. 9 *with variations shown in margins pp* 218-219.

9V: Clinton to Germain, 3 June 1780, Copy pa 308/13.
In margin Charlestown 3[rd] June 1780 Sir Henry Clinton (N° 92) R/ 5[th] July.
Same as No. 9 *with variations shown in margins pp* 218-219.

10 CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [9 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis,
[a] B *begins* Copy dated [a]Romulus, June 8, 1780.

My Lord, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the names of several inhabitants of the town, who signed an address, the copy of which Brigadier-general Paterson will send you. Inclosed is a copy of the answer the Admiral proposed sending until I represented to him that the subscribers were unknown to us as to their several characters; that the [b]superintendant was not with us to be consulted; that the permitting exportation amounted to opening the port, which we were not empowered to do; and that I [c]would, reluctantly, at the hour of my departure, change, within your Lordship's command, the [d]conditions of so many persons, without knowing their merits. I also considered that property, in the late troubles, might have been very unwarrantably acquired, and that exportation realized it to the present possessors.

[b] B *reads* Intendant (Mr. Simpson)
[c] B *reads* reluctantly would
[d] B *reads* condition

In consequence, the inclosed answer was substituted, bettering their present condition, and opening the prospect of trade, and [e]the restoration of civil government.

[e] B *inserts* of

To this, my Lord, I have to add, in the Admiral's and my own name, that you are empowered still farther to indulge men who exhibit proofs of a sincere return to their duty, by admitting them to any greater degree of liberty, to the fullest enjoyment of their property, and to the [f]permission, in particular cases, of shipping it[g], when the [h]officer commanding the King's ships shall furnish convoy; all which advantages I will ratify [i]either as Commissioner or Commander-in-chief.[k1]

[f] B *reads* permissions
[g] B *inserts* for England
[h] B *reads* officers
[i] B *omits* either
[k] B *ends* With respect to the province of North Carolina &c &c I have &c. Sd. H. Clinton.

[1a] besides these Powers I in stronger Terms recommended it to the minister to join Lord Cornwallis in the Commission with joint & separate powers, but the Minister told me the King did not approve of it.

10B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 8 June 1780, Copy ECA. *see* ii. 336.

11 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 30 June 1780, ALS RI 54/29.
OBSERVATIONS [11 *Ap'x*] *p* 126, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Duplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated June 30th 1780. received by Lieut. Gordon, of the 16th Foot, Aug. 1st No. 66.

Duplicate Charlestown, June 30th 1780.

Sir, [a]In my letter from Camden of the 2d instant, a SVE *begin*
I had the honour to inform you that I was employ'd in regulating the Militia & establishing some kind of government in this Province; and I likewise mentioned the state, & the steps that I had taken relative to our friends in North Carolina. I will first proceed with the affairs of S. Carolina—As the different Districts submitted, I, with all the dispatch in my power, formed them into Militia & appointed Field Officers according to the old divisions of the Province; I invested these Field Officers with civil as well as Military power, as the most effectual means of preserving order & re-establishing the King's authority in this Country, I divided the Militia into two classes, the first to consist of men above 40, & of certain property, family or service, this Class to be depended upon for the preservation of order in their respective districts & to do the Patrole Duty, but never to be call'd out except in case of an insurrection or an actual invasion of the Province; The second Class composed of the younger men not only to assist in the home duties, but liable to be call'd out for six of each twelve months to serve in either of the Carolina's or Georgia; Promising however to call upon this Class in such proportions as to occasion the least distress possible to the Country. This Militia, both Officers & Soldiers, is composed of Men either of undoubted attachment to the cause of Great Britain; or whose behaviour has always been moderate; And the Field Officers of the Rebel Militia, Members of their Council, Assembly Men, & acting Magistrates were ordered to go on their Paroles to the Islands on

the Coast between Charlestown & Beaufort, to remain there untill their Conduct & Character could be inquired into, & that their Presence in the Country might not awe those that were inclined to return to their duty, & our friends from assuming the Authority necessary to give Vigour to our Government. The rest of those that were notoriously disaffected, I ordered to be disarmed & to remain at Home on their parole, but subject in lieu of personal services to furnish moderate contributions of provisions, waggons, horses &c, towards carrying on the War. About this time [a]I readily agreed to a proposal made by [b]a Mr. Harrison to raise a Provincial Corps of 500 Men with the Rank of Major, to be composed of the Natives of the Country between the Pedee & Wateree, and in which it is at present extremely probable that He will succeed.[c]

a F *continues from p* 223 *l* 14 I have agreed
S I have readily agreed *underlined*
b F *omits* a
c FSVE *stop*

I had advanced thus far when I was met on the 11th of this month by two Gentlemen, one of whom had been in an high station & both principally concerned in the Rebellion, who said they were come to surrender upon the Proclamation of the Commissioners of the 1st of June. However extraordinary it might appear to them, I was forced to acknowledge that no Proclamation of that date had been communicated to me, & that consequently I could not acquiesce in the terms of their proffer'd submission: and indeed when I saw that Proclamation as well as your Excellency's of the third of June, which was soon after transmitted to me, I found that those Gentlemen had overstrained the meaning of the first, For upon considering both I thought myself at liberty to persevere in sending on Parole to the Islands the Field Officers of Militia, the members of Council, Assembly Men, Acting Magistrates &c, the first as falling under the exception of the Military line in your Excellency's Proclamation, & the remainder as under the description of those polluted with the blood of their fellow subjects, excepted by the Proclamation of the

Commissioners. [a]This measure appeared absolutely necessary for the security of the Province, especially as our hold is much loosen'd of a considerable number of People, who being notoriously disaffected, cannot with prudence be trusted with arms, & admitted into the Militia,[b] but are disengaged from their Paroles by the Proclamation of the third instant. [c]The submission of Gen[l] Williamson at Ninety-Six, whose Capitulation I inclose with Cap[t] Paris's Letter, & the dispersion of a Party of Rebels, who had assembled at an Iron work on the North West border of the Province, by a detachment of Dragoons & Militia from L[t] Col. Turnbull, put an end to all resistance in South Carolina.[d1] After having made the following disposition of the troops, I arrived in Town on the 25[th]. Major M[c]Arthur with the 71[st] Reg[t] a Troop of Dragoons & a six pounder on the Cheraw [e]Hill, with orders to cover the raising of Maj[r] Harrison's Corps, & to establish the Militia in the districts [f]on the Pedee; The remainder of L[t] Col. Webster's Brigade, & the Provincials that march'd with me & Brown's Corps remain at Camden, and L[t] Col. Turnbull's with some Cavalry at Rocky Mount; The whole under the command of Lord Rawdon. L[t] Col. Balfour's detachment is dispersed from the forks of Santee, by the Congarees to Ninety-Six; whilst He, & L[t] Col. Innes, & Maj[r] Graham are giving orders for the Militia of those districts. I have ordered, Major Ferguson to visit every district in the Province, as fast as they get the Militia establish'd, to procure lists of each, & to see that my orders are carried into execution.[g] I apprehend that his Commission of Major Commandant of a Regiment of Militia can only take place in case a part of the 2[d] Class should be call'd out for service, the home duty being more that of a Justice of Peace than of a Soldier. [h]I have given to the Militia Reg[ts] temporary Commissions, which perhaps your Excellency will find more convenient to

[a] SVE *continue as new* ¶

[b] SVE *stop*

[c] BF *begin* SVE *continue*

[d] BF *stop* SVE *new* ¶

[e] V *reads* Hills

[f] SVE *read* of

[g] SVE *stop*

[h] SVE *continue*

[1a] a Prooff that the whole Province had submitted.

confirm by a line in your next dispatch, than to take the trouble of signing, as the number for the whole Province will amount to some hundreds. I have had some conversations with B. Gen[l] Paterson & Mr. Simpson, & have made a little Progress in the arrangement of this Place.

a F *continues from p* 222 *l* 17 *as new* ¶

In regard to North Carolina—[a]I have establish'd the most satisfactory correspondence, & have seen several people of credit & undoubted fidelity from [b]that Province; They all agree in [c]assurances of the good disposition of a considerable Body of the inhabitants, & of the impossibility of subsisting a Body of Troops in that Country till the Harvest is over. This reason, the Heat of the Summer, & the unsettled state of South Carolina, all concurr'd to convince me of the necessity of Postponing offensive operations on that side untill the latter end of August or beginning of September, and in consequence I sent Emissaries to the leading Persons amongst our friends, recommending in the strongest terms that they should attend to their harvest, prepare provisions, & remain quiet untill the King's Troops were ready to enter the Province; Notwithstanding these precautions I am sorry to say that a considerable number of loyal Inhabitants of Tryon County, encouraged & headed by a Col. Moore,[d] whom I know nothing of, & excited by the sanguine emissaries of the very sanguine and imprudent L[t] Col. Hamilton, [e]rose on the 18[th] Instant without order or caution, & were in a few days defeated by Gen[l] Rutherford with some loss.[f] I still hope this unlucky business will not materially affect the general Plan, or occasion any commotions on the frontiers of this Province. [g]The force of the Enemy in North Carolina consists of about [h]1000 Militia[i] at Cross-Creek under Gen[l] Caswall; 4 or 500 Militia, [k]under General Rutherford, at or near Salisbury,[l] and 300 Virginians in that neighbourhood under [m]Col. Porterfield. [n]Mons[r] Treville returned with information that He saw 2000 Maryland and

b F *reads* North Carolina
c F *inserts* the
d F *stops*
e F *continues*
f F *ends*
g B *continues*
h B *reads* one hundred
i SVE *stop*
k B *omits to comma*
SVE *continue*
l B *inserts* under General Rutherford
m B *reads* one
n BP *omits* Monsr. Treville

Delaware troops at Hilsborough under Maj[r] Gen[l] de Kalbe, other accounts [a]have corresponded with his, but I have since heard that the greatest part of the last have returned to Virginia.

a BE *omit* have

After having thus fully stated the present situation of the two Carolinas, I shall now take the liberty of giving my opinion with respect to the Practicability and the probable effect of further operations in this quarter, and my own intentions, if not otherways directed by your Excellency. [b]I think, that with the force at present under my command (except there should be a considerable [c]Foreign[2] interference) I can leave South Carolina in security, & march about the beginning of September with a body of Troops into the back part of North Carolina, with the greatest probability of reducing that Province to its duty; And if this be accomplished, I am of opinion, that (besides the advantage of possessing so valuable a Province) it would prove an effectual Barrier for S. Carolina & Georgia, and could be kept, with the assistance of our friends there, by as few Troops as would be wanted on the Borders of this Province, if N. Carolina should remain in the hands of our Enemies: Consequently if your Excellency should continue to think it expedient to employ part of the Troops at present in this Province, in operations in the Chesapeak, there will be as many to spare, as if we did not possess N. Carolina. If I am not honour'd with different directions from your Excellency before that time, I shall take my measures for beginning the execution of the above Plan about the latter end of August or beginning of September, & shall apply to the Officer Commanding His Majesty's Ships for some Co-operation, by Cape Fear, which at present would be burdensome to the Navy, & not of much importance to the service.[d3]

b VE *new* ¶

c BE *italics* Foreign

d BSVE *end*

I have seen a letter from S[t] Augustine which men-

2a foreign *underlined.*

3a there we differ. at that season I should have preferred operation on the Sea Coast.

tions that two Officers had arrived there from Pensacola, who reported that Don Galvez was at Mobile when they came away, & short of Provisions, & that the Mentor had taken three Spanish Victuallers on their passage from the Havannah to Mobile, & brought them into Pensacola.

I shall immediately, in compliance with the directions contained in your letter of the 8th of June, order proper people to examine the receipts granted for Cattle previous to the taking of Charlestown, & to certify such as they think ought to be paid; a great number of Claims are likewise made for provisions deliver'd to the troops through the Commissary of Captures, and for which no receipts were given; These Claims shall undergo the same examination as the receipts, & shall depend upon similar certificates; you will be pleased to direct from what fund the whole sum when ascertained is to be paid.

I opened the inclosed letter from Governor Tonyn, but as the point appears to me to be out of the common line of Indian business, and the service suffers no inconvenience from a little delay, I herewith send Mr. Moore's letter to Genl. Paterson on the subject, and have likewise directed Mr. Moore to transmit his other papers to N. York for your Excellency's determination. Mr. Graham Lt Governor of Georgia has presented an account of money advanced to Refugees, to which is added a charge of twenty shillings per diem to the 24th of June as Inspector of Refugees in Georgia, But as He informs me that his Commission for that office is not sign'd, I beg to know your pleasure whether this account is to be allow'd. I must likewise beg to know whether the Pay is to be continued to the Commissary's of Captures, & if it is to what fund it is to be charged; or if your intention is that it should cease whilst the Troops are inactive, whether you wish that when the Troops take the Field, the office should be revived in the Persons of the present Commissaries.

Judge Pendleton who, in his Judicial character, committed a number of barbarous Murders on the Persons of His Majesty's loyal subjects, has escaped from his Parole, and I find by Returns which I call'd for, that not less than 500 Continental Prisoners have made their escape since the Town was taken. I have now taken measures which I hope will enable us to keep those that remain untill an exchange can take Place.

B. Gen[l] Paterson shewed me a letter which He received from Maj[r] André relative to the Gen[l] Court Martial left with him, in which He expressed your desire that I should give my opinion of the proper objects of mercy or severity, I must lament the fate of those unhappy people who have been, & must remain so long confined, but as all those under sentence of death are convicted of desertion & carrying arms against their country, I cannot bring myself to say that they are proper objects of mercy.

The Morning that I left Camden I had the honour to receive your Excellency's Dispatches & Instructions that had been left in charge of B. Gen[l] Paterson, your Excellency may depend on my utmost attention to them, and on my zeal in fulfilling your wishes in every respect. The Detachment of the 17[th] Dragoons will sail for New York with the first Convoy, which Cap[t] Henry informs me will be in a week or ten days, and now I think having compleatly tired both your Excellency & myself I shall only add that I have the honour to be, Your most obed[t] & most Humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

P.S. The letters & papers said to be inclosed, were sent with the 1[st] copy, & unluckily it was omitted to take copies of them.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, K[t] B. &c &c &c.

11B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [11 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles-town, June 30, 1780.

This is two parts of No. 11 *as shown in margins pp* 223-225.

11F: Cornwallis to Clinton, 30 June 1780, Tarleton *p* 117.
Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles town, South Carolina, June 30, 1780.
This is four parts of No. 11 *as shown in margins pp* 222-224.

11S: Cornwallis to Clinton, 30 June 1780, Extract PA 138/213.
Endorsed South Carolina 30th June 1780 Lieut. Genl Earl Cornwallis to Sir Hy Clinton. R/ Sepr 25, 1780. By Brigr Genl Dalrymple. this Letter, together with 3 others, annexed, 2 of which are copies, & one an Extract, arrived at New York by Express, after Sir Henry Clinton's Dispatches were closed ;—*also endorsed* Extracts of a letter from Lt Genl Earl Cornwallis to General Sir Henry Clinton dated Charles Town 30th June 1780 (19).
Begins Extracts of a Letter from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis dated Charles Town So Carolina 30th June 1780.
This is five parts of No. 11 *as shown in margins pp* 221-225.

11V: Cornwallis to Clinton, 30 June 1780, Extract Sackville 6/31.
Endorsed Extracts of a Letter from Lieut General Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated Charles Town South Carolina, 30th June 1780.
Begins Copy. Extracts of a Letter from Lieut. General Earl Cornwallis dated Charles Town South Carolina 30th June 1780.
This is five parts of No. 11 *as shown in margins pp* 221-225.

11E: Cornwallis to Clinton, 30 June 1780, Extract HL No 19.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extracts of Letters from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Hy Clinton, dated Charles Town 30th June 1780. R/ By B Genl Dalrymple from Sir Hy Clinton 25th Septr 1780. No 19.
Begins Extracts of a Letter from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis dated Charles Town South Carolina 30th June 1780.
This is five parts of No. 11 *as shown in margins pp* 221-225.

12 GERMAIN TO CLINTON, 5 July 1780, LS RI 20/81.
OBSERVATIONS [24 *Ap'x*] *p* 127, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Duplicate. N° 64. Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. 5th July 1780 rec^d^ the 12th Octo^r^ 1780 ℔ the Swift Packet. 122.

Duplicate [a](N°. 64.) [b]Whitehall 5th July 1780. [a] F *begins* [b] SV *begin*

Sir, [c]After I had closed my Letters to You of Yesterday's date I received Your Dispatches numbered 92, 93, 94 and 95, and One marked Separate of the 1st [d]June, by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce, and immediately laid them before The King. [c] E *begins* [d] F3V *insert* of

The Accounts they contain of the happy Consequences of Your Success, though not unexpected, gave His Majesty great Satisfaction, and the very judicious and well timed Publications You issued after the Surrender of Charles Town, were so well calculated to excite the Zeal, and give Confidence to His Majesty's faithful Subjects, and at the same time hold out the Terrors of due Chastisement to all such as should persist in their Revolt, that they could not fail of producing the Effects You expected from them, and of being approved by The King.

It is a great Pleasure to me to have another Occasion of obeying The King's Commands by desiring You to convey to Major Tarleton His Majesty's Approbation of His Conduct, and of the behaviour of the Corps he commanded in the Affair [e]at Wacsaw. The Celerity of the March, and the Vigor of the Attack, do them equal Honor, and merited the complete Victory with which they were crowned.[f] [e] SV *read* of [f] E *ends*

[g]You will find by my Separate Letter of Yesterday, that it is not His Majesty's Intention to confine You to so strict an observance of the general Rule of no Officers being permitted to hold Commissions in a Regular and Provincial Corps at the same time, as to prevent You from deviating from it in extraordinary Cases, and that Your having done so in favor of Majors Simcoe and Tarleton was approved by His Majesty. I also[1] informed You[2·3] that the general Rule was [g] B *begins*

1c also *underlined.* 2c possitively no. 3c you *underlined.*

not meant to affect the Brevet Rank of Officers; it is therefore, a great Concern to me to find Lord Rawdon had resigned his Rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, when he made his Option of Colonel of the
a V *new* ¶ Provincials. [a]The King is fully sensible of His Lordship's Merit, and of the great advantage which the Corps under his Command has derived from His Lordship's Attention to it, and is well pleased His Lordship has chosen to continue at the head of it; but His Majesty commands me to signify to You His Royal Pleasure that You do immediately acquaint His Lordship that he still retains his Rank of Lieutenant
b B *ends* Colonel in the Army.[b] I am,[c] Sir,[d]Your most obedient
c SV *end* &c. Geo. Germain. humble Servant, GEO: GERMAIN.
d F *ends* Geo. Germain. Sir Henry Clinton, K.B.

12B: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 5 July 1780, OBSERVATIONS [24 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Lord G. Germain to Sir H. Clinton, dated Whitehall, July 5, 1780.

This extract from No. 12 *is shown in margins pp* 229-230.

12F: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 5 July 1780, Draft PA 137/567.
Endorsed Draft to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. 5th July 1780. (N° 64) (15).

Same as No. 12 *with variations shown in margins pp* 229-230.

12S: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 5 July 1780, Copy PA 432/136.
In margin Sir Henry Clinton K.B. (N° 64.)

Same as No. 12 *with variations shown in margins pp* 229-230.

12V: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 5 July 1780, Copy SACKVILLE 9/154.
In margin Sir Henry Clinton K.B (N° 64)

Same as No. 12 *with variations shown in margins pp* 229-230.

12E: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 5 July 1780, Extract HL N° 15.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Hy Clinton, dated 5th July, 1780. N° 15.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton KB dated Whitehall 5th July 1780.

This extract from No. 12 *is shown in margin p* 229.

13 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 14 July 1780, LS RI 19/6.
OBSERVATIONS [13 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

Endorsed N° 71 Duplicate. Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton K.B. 14th July 1780/71.

[a]Duplicate Charlestown 14 July 1780.

a S *reads* Copy

Sir, [b]About the time that the Beaumont sailed with my last letters, Lieut Gordon of the 16th Regt arrived with Dispatches from General Campbell at Pensacola, which he will have the honour of delivering to Your Excellency. I was extremely sorry to learn, that the State of the Place, & that of their Enemies in the Neighbourhood of it, [c]were very different from what I had heard a few days before, through the Channel of a private Letter from St Augustine: And I am the more concerned, as the relative Situation of this Place, the State of [d]the Naval Affairs here, & the present condition of the province, render it utterly impossible for me to give Assistance. For to attempt it with any degree of prudence, and to do it effectually, a Convoy would be wanted, of more considerable Force than could be given from hence, and a greater detachment of Troops than could be spared, consistent with the Security of this important Province, and indeed I think it right to take this opportunity of remarking to Your Excellency, that [e]if even Pensacola should escape the present danger, the Navigation of a Fleet of Transports from North America, must always be tedious and difficult, and much exposed to the Cruisers from St Domingo, I should therefore be of opinion, that it would be fortunate, if His Majesty's Ministers would think proper, to annex it to the Jamaica Command, to which it is contiguous, & from which it might be speedily supported.[f]

b V *begins*

c S *reads* was

d V *omits* the

e S *reads* even if

f V *stops*

In case of a Misfortune at Pensacola, St Augustine becomes a Frontier in this Quarter, & I think I shall direct Lieut Colonel Clarke to take the Command there, with the Regiment of Wissenbach, and some Provincials, & remove the detachments of the 60th (Upon which, from their composition there can be no

great dependence) to Savannah, to assist in the interior business of the province, For with East Florida in our possession, on one Side, & South Carolina on the other, it is not probable that Georgia can be an object to [a]a foreign Enemy.

[a] S *reads* any

[b] F *begins* V *continues*

[b]Since my Arrival at this place, I have been employed in the internal Regulations of the Province, & settling the Militia of the lower districts, both of which are in [c]forwardness, & I have kept up a [d]constant correspondence with the Frontiers, & the [e]interior Parts of North Carolina, where the Aspect of Affairs is not so peaceable as when I wrote last. Majr General de Kalbe is certainly at Hilsborough with 2000 continental Troops, including some Cavalry, & said to be preparing to advance to Salisbury, Porterfield is in the Neighbourhood of Salisbury with 300 Virginians, & Rutherford with some Militia with him; Caswall with 1500 Militia is march'd from Cross Creek to [f]the Deep River, between Hilsborough & Salisbury, and Sumpter with about the same Number of Militia, is advanced as far as the Catawba Settlement. Lord Rawdon reports to me that many of the disaffected South Carolinians from the Waxhaw, and [g]the other Settlements on the Frontier, whom he [h]had put on parole, have availed themselves of the general Release of the 20th of June, & have joined General Sumpter.

[c] F *inserts* great

[d] F *reads* continual

[e] F *reads* internal

[f] F *omits* the

[g] FSV *omit* the

[h] F *reads* has

Accounts from Virginia, thro' different Channels, say, that two Thousand five hundred of their Militia had followed de Kalbe, that the Assembly had voted five thousand men, to be immediately drafted, to serve as a Corps of Observation, & had vested their Governor with absolute power during their Recess. The Government of North Carolina is likewise making great exertions to raise Troops, & persecuting our Friends in the most cruel manner, in consequence of which, Colonel Bryan, altho' he had promised to wait for my orders, lost all patience, & rose with about 800 men on the Yadkin, and by a difficult & dan-

gerous March joined Major M^c^Arthur on the Borders of Anson County, about two thirds only of his People were armed, & those I believe but indifferently.

The Effects of the exertions, which the Enemy are making in those two Provinces, will I make no doubt be exagerated to us:[a] But upon the whole there is every reason to believe, that their Plan is not only to defend North Carolina, but to commence offensive Operations immediately; which reduces me to the Necessity, if I wanted the inclination, of following the Plan which I had the Honour of transmitting to Your Excellency in my Letter of the 30^th^ [b]June, as the most effectual means of keeping up the Spirits of our Friends & securing this Province. [c]To enable me to begin,[d] I am first using every possible dispatch in transporting to Camden, Rum, Salt, Regimental Stores, Arms & Ammunition, which on Account of the distance, & excessive heat of the Season, is a work of infinite Labour, & requires [e]a considerable time. In the mean while, the measures [f]that I have directed Lord Rawdon to take, will I trust put it out of the power of the Enemy to strike a blow at any of our Detachments, or to make any considerable Inroads into this Province. [g]I have the Satisfaction to assure Your Excellency, that the Numbers & [h]Disposition of our Militia equal my most sanguine expectations.[i] But still I must confess, that their want of Subordination & Confidence in themselves, will make a considerable regular Force always necessary for the defence of the province, untill North Carolina is perfectly reduced. It will be needless to attempt to take any considerable Number of the South Carolina Militia with us, when we advance, they can only be looked upon as light Troops, & we shall find Friends enough in the next Province of the same Quality & we must not undertake to supply too many useless Mouths.[k]

When the Troops march into North Carolina, it will be absolutely necessary to get supplies up some of the principal Rivers of that Province. I there-

a F *stops*

b V *inserts* of

c F *continues*
d FSV *read* first, I am

e F *omits* a

f F *omits* that

g B *begins*

h BF *read* dispositions
i F *stops*
S *reads* expectation

k B *ends*

fore thought it proper to apply to Captain Henry to detain the Sandwich, which will be more usefull to us than any Frigate in the Service, & could not, in my opinion, be much wanted at New York, where the Admiral will have it in his power to fit up so many Vessels of the same kind; Captain Henry has consented, & I hope,[a] with her Assistance and the Galleys, [b]to procure a tolerable water communication pretty high up the Country: The bringing the troops down towards the Coast, before the Month of November, would be leading them to certain destruction.

a 8V *insert* to procure
b 8V *omit* to procure

[c]I have agreed to the proposal of M[r] Cunningham in [d]the Ninety Six District, to raise a Corps on the footing of Major Harrison's,[e] which I believe will be the last Provincial Corps that I shall attempt. I have rejected all Plans for raising Cavalry, except the Augmentation of the Legion to seventy men a troop.[f]

c F *continues*
d F *omits* the
e F *ends*
f 8 *stops* V *ends*

I inclose a Duplicate of a Letter from Governor Tonyn, with some Accounts, the former ones were I believe forwarded to You by Brig[r] General Paterson.

It gave me great pleasure to hear last night by a Vessel from New York of Your Excellency's safe Arrival.

I have the honour to be[g] Your most Obedient & most humble Servant

g 8 *ends* &c (Signed) Cornwallis

His Excellency CORNWALLIS

Sir Henry Clinton K.B. &c &c &c

13B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 14 July, OBSERVATIONS [13 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles-town, July, 14, 1780.

This extract from No. 13 *is shown in margin p* 233.

13F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 14 July 1780, TARLETON *p* 118.

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles town, July 14, 1780.

This is three parts of No. 13 *as shown in margins pp* 232-234.

13S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 14 July 1780, Copy PA 138/221.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir H: Clinton K B. dated Charlestown July 14th 1780. received the 1st August. R/ from Sir H. Clinton Sepr 25 1780 By Brigr Genl Dalrymple 2. 20.
Same as No. 13 *with variations shown in margins pp* 231-234.

13V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 14 July 1780, Copy HL No 20.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Hy Clinton dated Charles Town 14th July 1780. R/ By Genl Dalrymple from Sir Hy Clinton 25 Septr 1780 No 20.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Hy Clinton KB. dated Charlestown 14th July 1780.
This is two parts of No. 13 *as shown in margins pp* 231-234.

14 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 6 August 1780, LS RI 19/29.
OBSERVATIONS [14 *Ap'x*] *p* 126, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Endorsed Duplicate (76) E. Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton K.B August 6th 1780.
Duplicate Charles town Augst 6th 1780

[a]Sir. [b]I received by Major England your letters of the 14th & 15th of July, and am very glad to find by the latter that you do not place much dependance on receiving Troops from hence. [c]My letter of the 14th, by the Halifax, will have convinced you of the impossibility of weakening the force in this Province; and every thing which has happened, since that time, tends more strongly to confirm it. [d]The general State of things in the two Provinces of No & So Carolina is not very materially altered, since my Letters of the 14th & 15th of last Month were written: Frequent skirmishes, with various Success have happened in the Country between the Catawba River & Broad River, The Militia[e] about Tiger & Ennoree rivers was formed by us under [f]a Colonel Floyd, Col. Neale the Rebel Colonel, had Fled, but Lt Col. Lisle who had been Paroled to the Islands, exchanged on his

a B *begins*
b SV *begin*
c B *new* ¶
d F *begins*
e BFSV *insert* of the District
f F *omits* a

arrival in Charlestown his Parole for a Certificate of his being a good Subject,[1] returned to the Country and carried off the whole Battalion to join General Sumpter at Catawba. We have not however on the whole lost ground in that part of the Country, Turnbull was Attacked at Rocky Mount by Sumpter with about 1200 men, Militia & Refugees from this Province, whom he repulsed with great loss, we had on our part an Officer killed & one wounded [a]& about ten or twelve men killed & wounded, Col. Turnbull's conduct was very meritorious. The affair of Capt Huck turned out of less consequence than it appeared at first, the Captain and three men of the Legion were killed, and Seven men of the New York Volunteers taken.[b]

a FSV *omit to* wounded (1 *line*)

b FS *run on*

On the Eastern part of the Province,[c] we have been more unfortunate ;[d] Major McArthur seeing the great importance of the Post at [e]Cheraw Hill, and finding himself perfectly secure from any Attack of the Enemy desired to continue there longer than it was intended he should, when I had the honour of writing to you on the 15th, at last however the 71st Regiment grew so exceedingly Sickly that He found it absolutely necessary to move and Marched on the 24th, to the East Branch of [f]Linches Creek ; Gates, who [g]has taken the command of de Kalb's Corps, was still on Deep River, and Rutherford no farther advanced than Rocky River, Pedee ; Knowing of no Enemy within many Miles he ventured to send about one hundred Sick in Boats down the Pedee to George town.[h] By this time the reports industriously propagated in this Province of a large Army coming from the Northward had very much intimidated our friends, encouraged our enemies, and determined the wavering against us, to which our not advancing and acting offensively likewise contributed ;[i] Col. Mills who commanded the Militia of the Cheraw District, tho' a very good Man, had not complied with my instruc-

c F *omits to* unfortunate

d B *stops*

e F *reads* ChirawHills

f F *reads* Lincoln's

g F *reads* had

h F *stops* B *continues*

i B *stops* F *continues*

1c subject *underlined.*

tions in forming his Corps; but had placed more faith in Oaths and professions, and attended less to the former conduct of those [a]whom he admitted. The instant [b]that this Militia found that McArthur had left his Post, & were assured that Gates would come there the next day, they seized their own Officers, and [c]a hundred Sick, & carried them all prisoners into North Carolina; Col. Mills with difficulty made his escape to George town,[d] where I was much alarmed for Wemys whose party was much weakened by sickness; [e]The whole Country between Pedee & Santee has ever since been in an absolute State of Rebellion;[2] every friend of Government has been carried off, and his Plantation destroyed; & detachments of the enemy have appeared on the Santee, and threatened our Stores, & Convoys on that river. I have not heard, that they have as yet made any attempt on them, & I hope by this time [f]that the steps I have taken will secure them. This unfortunate business if it should have no worse consequences, will shake the confidence of our friends in this Province, & make our situation very uneasy until we can advance.[g]

[h]The Wheat harvest in North Carolina is now over: but the weather is still excessively hot, and notwithstanding our utmost exertions, a great part of the Rum, Salt, Clothing and necessaries for the Soldiers; and the Arms for the Provincials, & Amunition for the Troops, are not [i]very far advanced on their way to Camden; However if no material interruption happens this business will be nearly accomplished in a fortnight or three Weeks.[k] It may be doubted by some whether the Invasion of North Carolina may be a prudent measure,[3] but I am convinced it is a neces-

a FSV *omit* whom
b F *reads* the Militia
SV *omit* that
c FSV *read* the
d F *stops*
e B *continues as now* ¶
f B *omits* that
g BSV *run on*
h F *continues*
i B *omits* very
k FV *stop*

2a They knew what L. Cornwallis was at that time ignorant of. They knew Gates was moving into the Carolinas & that a French armament had arrived at R. Island.

3a at that time certainly not, at least till a diversion should be made in the Chesapeak which tho it had been my intention I could not attempt till the Admiral would afford naval assistance.

sary one; and that if we do not Attack that Province, we must give up both South Carolina, and Georgia, & retire within the Walls of Charles town. [a]Our assurances of Attachment from our [b]poor distressed Friends in North Carolina, are as strong as ever, and the patience & fortitude with which those unhappy People bear the most oppressive and cruel Tyranny that ever was exercised over any Country, [c]deserves our greatest admiration:[d] The Highlanders have offered to form a Regiment as soon as we enter the Country, and have desired that Governor Martin may be their Chief; I have consented, with the rank of Lieu[t] Colonel Commandant, the Men, they assure us, are already engaged.[e]

[f]An early diversion in my favour in Chesapeak Bay, will be of the greatest, and most important advantage to my operations, I most earnestly hope that the Admiral will be able to spare a Convoy for that purpose.[g]

As Major Graham's Corps grew very weak, & was very unequally composed, some of the Men of the 16[th], being totally unfit for Light Infantry; and as the Major himself is not in a good state of Health, I thought it best to break up that Corps; The 71[st] I shall send to their Regiment, except as many as will compleat those already with Tarleton to a Troop of 70; The Provincials will likewise join their respective Corps, & the detachment of the 16[th], consisting of about 60 men will be attached to the Field Artillery, except 17, or 18, who are represented to me to be active young men, and whom I intend at present to lend to Tarleton.

[h]I propose taking the following Corps with me into North Carolina, 23[d], 33[d], 63[d], 71[st], Volunteers of Ireland, Hamiltons, Harrison's new raised, Legion Cavalry & Infantry, [i]& North Carolina Refugees: I intend to leave on the Frontiers from Pedee to Waxhaw, to awe the disaffected, who I am sorry to say are still very numerous in that Country, & to prevent any [k]Insurrections in our rear, The N York

a F *continues*
b F *omits* poor
c BFS *read* deserve
d F *ends*
e S *runs on*
f V *continues*
g B *stops* ᴅV *end*
h B *continues*
i B *omits* &
k B *reads* insurrection

Volunteers & Brown's Corps, & some of the Militia of the Camden district who are commanded by Col. Rugeley, a very active & spirited man: I shall place Ferguson's Corps & some Militia of the Ninety six district, which Col. Balfour assures me, are got into very tolerable order, owing to the great assiduity of Ferguson, on the borders of Tryon County, with directions for him to advance with a part of them, into the Mountains and secure the left of our March: Lieu[t] Colonel Cruger who Commands at Ninety six will have his own Corps, Innes's, & the remainder of the Militia of that district, to preserve that Frontier, which requires great attention, & where there are many disaffected, & many constantly in Arms; Allen's Corps, and for a time, the Florida Rangers, are stationed at Augusta, under the Command of Lieu[t] Colonel Allen,[a] He being by all Accounts a much properer Man than Col. Brown to trust with Command; besides the latter will have sufficient business in the Indian department.

[a] B *stops*

Poor Hanger is always willing to do his best; but he did not think that he should be very useful, in collecting the lists, fixing the Officers, & establishing the Militia in the different districts; and as He found that the Attempt would take him up many Months, & would be entirely a Civil employment He beg'd that he might act as a Volunteer Major of Tarleton's Cavalry, as Tarleton seemed to wish it very much, I have given my consent until your pleasure shall be known.

Major Stuart is rather inconveniently placed with the 63[d] Regiment, and as He and Major Wemys are not on very good terms, & the Regiment being joined with other Troops, would occasion a constant change of command from one to the other, which would be prejudicial to the Regiment and the Service, I have given him leave to go to New York, where he tells me he was appointed to remain as Major of Brigade before the sailing of the Expedition. Major Graham has no farther duty to detain him here, his Corps

being dissolved; I beg leave to assure Your Excellency, that He has served with Zeal and Attention. I forgot apologize You for letting Lieu[t] Colonel McDonald go to New York to Solicit leave to go home, his business in Europe seemed pressing and I did not see any inconvenience in the Command's devolving upon Major McArthur who is an excellent Officer.

Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour is arrived, and I have great reason to think that He will render very essential Services at this place: It will be a great convenience to us, if Your Excellency will please to Authorize the Paymaster General to grant Money from the Warrant of the Commandant at Charles town for the Subsistance of the Garrison &c, as I may probably be at a very considerable distance; a Deputy Paymaster will for the same reason be much wanted for the Troops in the Field.

As I have the strongest assurances that Your Excellency intended that Lieu[t] Colonels Webster & Clarke should receive Pay & forage Money as Brigadier Generals, I shall take it upon me to give it to them; It is absolutely necessary that Balfour should have it, or he would be ruined by being Commandant of Charlestown; I likewise think it highly proper, that, as Lord Rawdon is acting with & Commanding all these Officers, He should be offered the same allowance. I have appointed Lieu[t] Colonel Clarke to Command in East Florida as well as Georgia, & He is gone with Moncrief to inspect the condition of S[t] Augustine.

a B *continues* [a]I have already explained the measures I had taken for establishing a Government and securing this Country by means of a Militia; I have likewise paid as much attention as possible to the Civil and Commercial matters; The principal objects of my attention will appear in the five Proclamations which I have issued, and which I have the honour of inclosing to Your Excellency.

b B *ends* &c (Signed) Cornwallis I have the honour[b] to be Sir, Your most obedient

& most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.
His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K B. &c &c &c.

14B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [14 *Ap'x*] *p* 126.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charles-town, Aug. 6, 1780.
This is five parts of No. 14 *as shown in margins pp* 235-240.

14F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 August 1780, TARLETON *p* 126.
Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Charlestown, August 6th, 1780.
This is four parts of No. 14 *as shown in margins pp* 235-238.

14S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 August 1780, Extract PA 138/233.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t]. General Earl Cornwallis to His Excell[y] Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Charles Town 6[th] August 1780. Received 24[th] August. R/ from Sir Henry Clinton Sep[r] 25. 1780. By Brig[r] Gen[l] Dalrymple. 4. 22.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis dated Charles Town 6[th] Aug[t] 1780.
This extract from No. 14 *is shown in margins pp* 235-238.

14V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 August 1780, Extract HL No 22.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir H[y] Clinton, dated Charles Town 6[th] Aug[st] 1780. R/ By Gen[l] Dalrymple 25 Sept[r] from Sir Henry Clinton. N[o] 22.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis dated Charles Town 6 Aug[st] 1780.
This is two parts of No. 14 *as shown in margins pp* 235-238.

15 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 20 August 1780, ALS PA 156/113.
OBSERVATIONS [20 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
Endorsed Camden S[o] Carolina 20[th] Aug[t] 1780 Earl Cornwallis (N[o] 1) Rec[d] 9[th] October 2 Inclosures.[a]
[b]N[o] 1 Camden Aug[st] 20[th] 1780
[c]My Lord, Your Lordship will have been informed by Sir Henry Clinton of every thing that passed in the Province of South Carolina from the

a *see* ii. 340
b F *inserts* Duplicate SV *insert* Triplicate E *inserts* Quadruplicate R *inserts* Copy
c M *begins*

reduction of Charlestown, to the Defeat of the Corps under Colonel Buford, by the great exertion & valour of Lieut: Col: Tarleton.

Sir Henry soon afterwards embarked for New York and appointed me to the command of His Majesty's Forces in the Southern Provinces. I was then at Camden, but the Corps with me being totally destitute of Military Stores, Clothing, Rum, Salt, & other articles necessary for Troops in the [a]operations of the Field, and Provisions of all kinds being deficient, almost approaching to a Famine in North Carolina, it was impossible for me to penetrate into that Province before the Harvest: I therefore employed myself in fixing [b]posts of Troops from [c]the Pedee to the Savannah rivers, to awe the disaffected and encourage the loyal Inhabitants, And I took every measure in my Power to raise some Provincial Corps, & to establish a Militia as well for the Defence as for the internal Government of South Carolina. One Provincial Corps to consist of five hundred men was put in Commission to be raised between the Pedee and Wateree to be commanded by Mr. Harrison with the rank of Major, And another of the same number was ordered to be raised in the district of Ninety Six to be commanded by Mr. Cunningham, to whom on account of his active Loyalty for [d]several years past, I gave the rank of Lieu[t] Colonel; And there appeared [e]to be great reason to expect that both these Corps would be soon compleated, as well as the first South Carolina Reg[t], which was composed of Refugees, who had now returned to their native Country.

[f]In the district of Ninety-six, by far the most populous and powerfull of the Province, L[t] Col. Balfour by his great attention & diligence, and by the active assistance of Maj[r] Ferguson, who was appointed Inspector-General of [g]the Militia of this Province by Sir Henry Clinton, had formed seven Battalions of Militia consisting of above four

a R *reads* operation
b M *reads* post
c R *omits* the
d E *reads* many
e R *omits* to be
f B *begins*
g B *omits* the

thousand Men, and entirely composed of persons well affected to the British Government; which were so regulated that they could with ease Furnish fifteen hundred Men at a short notice for the defence of the Frontier, or any other home Service. But I must take this opportunity of observing that this Militia can be of little use for distant [a]Military operations, as they will not stir without an Horse, & on that account Your Lordship will easily [b]conceive the impossibility of keeping a number of them together without destroying the Country.[c] Many Battalions were likewise formed by myself & other Officers on the very extensive line from Broad River to Cheraws, but they were in general either weak, or not much to be relied on for their fidelity. [d]In order to protect the raising of Harrison's Corps & to awe a large tract of disaffected Country between [e]the Pedee & Black River, I posted Major McArthur with the 71st Regt & a troop of Dragoons at Cheraw Hill on the Pedee, where his detachment was plentifully supplied by the Country with Provisions of all kinds. Other small Posts were likewise established in the front & on the left of Camden,[f] where the people were known to be ill disposed, And the Main body of the Corps was posted at Camden, [g]which, for this country, is reckoned a tolerably healthy place, and where the Troops could most conveniently subsist, & receive the necessary supplies of various kinds from Charlestown. [h]I likewise had settled good channels of Correspondence with our friends in North Carolina, and had given them positive directions to attend to their [i]harvests, & to remain quiet untill I could march to their relief. In this business I was greatly assisted by Governor Martin, from whose abilities & zeal for the service I have on many occasions derived great advantages, and which I must beg that your Lordship will please to represent in the strongest terms to his Majesty.[k]

a B *omits* Military

b M *reads* perceive

c B *ends* FSE *stop*

d FSE *continue* V *new* ¶

e R *omits* the

f R *stops*

g R *continues*

h O *begins*

i O *reads* harvest

k O *ends*

Having made the above arrangements, & every thing wearing the face of tranquillity and submission, I set out [a]on the 21st of June for Charlestown, leaving the command of the Troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, who was, after Brigr Genl Paterson the Commandant of Charlestown, the next Officer in rank to me in the Province.

[a] FSEM *read* the2lstJune

About this time I heard that two thousand of the Maryland & Delaware Continental Troops were entering North Carolina under Majr Genl Baron de Kalb, & that He meant to take his quarters at Hilsborough. There was then in that Country a Corps of three hundred Virginia Lt Infantry under Col Porterfield, some Militia at Salisbury & Charlottetown under Genls Rutherford & Sumpter, & a large body of Militia at Cross Creek under Genl Caswall. As all these Corps were at a great distance from us, and as I knew it to be impossible to march any considerable body of Men across the Province of North Carolina before the Harvest, I did not expect that our posts on the frontier would be much disturbed for two months, And by that time I hoped to be able to undertake offensive operations.

I had much business to do at Charlestown, in regulating the Civil & Commercial Affairs of the Town & Country, in endeavouring to form a Militia in the lower [b]districts, and in forwarding the preparations for taking the Field at the time intended. The business of the Country was particularly difficult, for many parts of the [c]lower districts are extremely rebellious, and this Climate (except in Charlestown) is so bad within an hundred miles of the Coast from the end of June untill the middle of October, that Troops could not be stationed among them during that period without a certainty of their being rendered useless for some time for Military service, if not entirely lost: And our principal Friends for the same reasons were extremely Unwilling to remain in the Country during that period, to assist in

[b] R *reads* district

[c] FSE *read* town

forming the Militia and establishing some kind of Government. [a]However under all these difficulties the business was going on, when our tranquillity was first disturbed by the accounts of a premature rising of our Friends in Tryon County N Carolina, [b]in the latter end of June, who having assembled without concert, plan, or proper leaders, were two days [c]after surprised & totally routed by the Son of Gen[l] Rutherford. Many of them fled into this Province, where their reports tended much to terrify our friends & encourage our enemies: And about the same time, notwithstanding my injunctions to the contrary, another body of Loyalists rose at the forks of the Yadkin under Col: Bryan (driven to it as they said by the most barbarous persecution) and after a long & difficult march joined Maj[r] McArthur at the Cheraws to the amount of upwards of 700 Men.[d]

Hostilities now commenced in different parts of the frontier: Gen[l] Sumpter an active & daring man assembled at Catawba about a thousand Men, chiefly Refugees from South Carolina & Georgia, and was constantly Menacing our small posts & putting us under the necessity of calling out the Militia of Ninety Six. He was joined by many disaffected persons who had been enrolled in our Militia, but as there was no serious alarm, I was very unwilling to put the Troops in Motion before our preparations were [e]compleat, & during the intense heat of the summer.

[f]Baron de Kalb moved early in July to Deep River where He was joined first by Gen[l] Caswall from Cross Creek, & about the 25[th] by General Gates who took the command of the Army: But as He was still above an hundred miles from Maj[r] McArthur, which was the nearest post to him, Lord Rawdon did not think it necessary to make any material alteration in the disposition of the Troops. [g]From this time untill the 20[th] of July, many skirmishes happened on the frontiers of Ninety Six, & towards Waxhaw, [h]but none of any material [i]consequence: The Enemy had how-

a FSEM *new* ¶
b M *omits* in
c R *reads* afterwards
d E *stops*
e R *reads* complet-d
f E *continues*
g M *new* ¶
h R *omits to* consequence
i V *reads* consequences

ever in the mean time filled this Province with their emissaries, and in all the Eastern part of it were planning a general revolt, which our lenity had left but too much in their power. The Cheraw Hill was a post of great consequence, & had the Appearance of being healthy, but it proved so much the Contrary, & sickness came on so rapidly that in nine days at least two thirds of the 71st Regt were taken ill of Fevers & Agues, & rendered unfit for service. [a]About this time the enemy were known to be in Motion, but the rigour of their Government (Many of our principal friends in N Carolina being confined in Dungeons loaded with Irons & several having been put to death) had so intimidated those, on whose good will & ability to give the most accurate intelligence, we had the greatest reason to depend, that Lord Rawdon could obtain no certain accounts of them.

a M *new* ¶

The Salvation of the 71st Regt as well as every other consideration determined his Lordship to withdraw the [b]post at Cheraw Hill, this the active incendiaries of the enemy represented as an act of fear, & so encouraged the disaffected, & terrified the wavering that the whole country between Pedee & Black River openly avowed the Principles of rebellion, and collecting in Parties commenced acts of [c]Hostility.

b R *reads* Troops

c M *reads* Hostilities

Our Cheraw Militia having seized & bound their field officers, attack'd & took some boats on the Pedee, in which Majr McArthur was sending near one hundred of his sick to Georgetown; I was greatly alarmed for a small detachment which I had sent under Majr Wemys to reduce the people of Georgetown to some order, & for my water communication on the Santee, on which at that time a large quantity of Rum, Salt, Arms & Military Stores were moving in boats up to Camden.

At this time Genl Sumpter, whose numbers were much augmented by the present prospect of affairs attack'd our Post at Rocky Mount, but was repulsed

by the steady & gallant defence of L^{t} Col. Turnbull, & the small corps under his command: It now appeared that [a]General Gates was advancing with his whole force from N Carolina, and Lord Rawdon (whose Capacity & zeal for the service I cannot too much commend) saw the necessity of contracting his Posts, & securing Camden, where we had all our Stores & above 700 sick, but He could not immediately withdraw his whole force to that place, without a certainty of losing his communication with Charlestown, & exposing the Posts dependant on the ninety six command To be surrounded & cut off: He therefore continued L^{t}. Co^{l} Turnbull at Rocky Mount, Reinforced his post at Hanging Rock, & placed himself with the principal force at Robertson's on the west branch of Linches Creek. The Post at Hanging Rock was attack'd by Gen^{l} Sumpter, a few days after his repulse [b]from Rocky Mount, & very nearly carried; The bravery of Capt McCullough, since dead of his wounds, & of the Infantry of the Legion [c]preserved it. Lord Rawdon waited for [d]Gen^{l} Gates at Robertson's with the 23^{d}, 33^{d}, 71st & volunteers of Ireland, who came up but did not think proper to attack him; in the mean time His Lordship performed the arduous task of removing the sick of the 71st reg^{t} to Camden. Gen^{l} Gates shewing no disposition to attack the Corps at Robertson's, Lord Rawdon wisely apprehending that his intention might be either to reinforce Sumpter & make a more vigorous attack on the posts at Rocky Mount or Hanging Rock, or by getting round his right destroy his stores & take his sick at Camden, retired from Robertson's to that place, where He was joined by the Corps which had been before moved from Hanging Rock to Rugeley's Mill, & directed L^{t} Col Turnbull to quit Rocky Mount, and either come down the west side of the Wateree to Camden, or fall back [e]on the Militia Posts commanded by Maj^{r} Ferguson on Broad River.

All these incidents & movements on both sides

[a] R *omits* General

[b] FSE *read* at

[c] R *reads* prevented

[d] FSVER *omit* Genl

[e] R *reads* to

were regularly reported to me, while at Charlestown, by Lord Rawdon, And I shall have the honor of informing Your Lordship of the consequences in my next Dispatch, which will be written tomorrow. I have the honor to be, [a]with great respect,

Your Lordships Most Obedient & Most Humble Servant [b]CORNWALLIS.[c]

Rht Hon[ble] Lord George Germain &c &c &c[d]

a M *ends* Cornwallis

b R *inserts* Signed

c SR *end*

d FVR *end*

15B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, OBSERVATIONS [20 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, August 20, 1780.
This extract from No. 15 *is shown in margins pp* 242-243.

15F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 20 Aug 1780, Duplicate LS RI 19/34.
Endorsed Duplicate. N° 1. Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo: Germain, 20th Aug. 1780.
Same as No. 15 *with variations shown in margins pp* 241-248.

15S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 20 August 1780, Triplicate LS RI 19/36.
Endorsed Triplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, Camden 20 August 1780.
Same as No. 15 *with variations shown in margins pp* 241-248.

15V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, Triplicate LS SACKVILLE 6/47.
Endorsed. Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden 21st August 1780. R/ 9th Oct[r].
Same as No. 15 *with variations shown in margins pp* 241-248.

15E: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, Quadruplicate LS RI 19/35.
Endorsed Copy, Quadruplicate. N° 1 Earl Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain Camden August 20th 1780.
This is two parts of No. 15 *as shown in margins pp* 241-248.

15R: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 20 August 1780, Copy PA 631/182.
Endorsed Copy N° 1 Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain 20th August 1780.
Same as No. 15 *with variations shown in margins pp* 241-248.

15M: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 20 August 1780, Copy PA 308/99.
In margin Camden S° Carolina. 20th Aug[t] 1780. Earl Cornwallis. (N° 1.) R/ 9th October.

Mem. at end Inclosures N° 1 Return of Killed & Wounded at Rocky Mount 2 D° at Hanging Rock.
Same as No. 15 *with variations shown in margins pp* 241-248.

150: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 20 August Extract SACKVILLE 6/46.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain 20th August 1780 R/ 9th Oct^r.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord Geo: Germain dated Camden S° Carolina 20th August 1780.
This extract from No. 15 *is shown in margin p* 243.

16 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 21 Aug. 1780, ALS PA 156/133.
OBSERVATIONS [21 *Ap'x*] *p* 127. *With Clinton's MS. Note from* TARLETON.

Endorsed Camden. S° Carolina 21st Aug^t 1780 Earl Cornwallis (N° 2) Rec^d 9th October 4 Inclosures.[a] Ent^d

[b]N° 2. [c]Camden Aug^st 21st 1780

[d]My Lord It is with great pleasure [e]that I communicate to Your Lordship an Account of a Compleat Victory obtained on the 16th Ins^t by His Majesty's [f]Troops under my command, over the Rebel Southern Army, Commanded by General Gates.

In my Dispatch N°. 1 I had the honour to inform Your Lordship that while at Charlestown I was regularly acquainted by Lord Rawdon with every Material incident or Movement made by the Enemy or by the Troops under His Lordships command. [g]On the 9th [h]ins^t two Expresses arrived with an account that Gen^l Gates was advancing towards Lynches Creek, with his whole Army supposed to amount to 6000 men, exclusive of a Detachment of 1000 Men under Gen^l Sumpter, who [i]after having in vain attempted to force the Posts at Rocky Mount & Hanging Rock, was believed to be at that time trying to get round the left of our position to cut off our communication with the Congarees & Charlestown, That [k]the disaffected Country between[l] Pedee & Black River had

a *see* ii. 340
b V *inserts* Duplicate ER *insert* Triplicate M *inserts* Quadruplicate N *inserts* Copy
c F *begins*
d O *begins*
e O *omits* that
f O *reads* Forces
g F *new* ¶
h RN *omit* inst
i R *omits* after
k R *reads* this
l F *inserts* the

actually revolted ;* [and that Lord Rawdon was] contracting his Posts, [and preparing to assemble] his force at Camden.

In consequence of this information, after finishing some important points of business at Charlestown, I set out on the evening of the 10th and arrived at Camden on the night between the 13th & 14th, and there found Lord Rawdon with [a]our whole force, except Lt Col. Turnbull's small detachment which fell back from Rocky mount, to Major Ferguson's posts of the Militia of Ninety Six on Little River.

a F *reads* all our force

I had now my option to make, either to retire or [b]attack the Enemy, for the position at Camden was a bad one to be attack'd in, and by Genl Sumpters advancing down the Wateree, my supplies must have failed [c]me in a few days.

b F *reads* attempt

c O *omits* me

I saw no difficulty in making good my retreat to Charlestown with the Troops that were able to march, but in taking that resolution, I must have not only left near 800 sick and a great quantity of Stores at this place, but I clearly saw the loss of the whole Province except Charlestown, and [d]of all Georgia, except Savannah, as immediate consequences ; besides forfeiting all pretensions to future confidence from our Friends in this part of America.[1]

d F *reads* all of

* [*In* ALS *these words were destroyed, and are here copied from* PA 308/108.]

1T If such was your apprehension My good Lord at a time when the province had submitted and you had numerous friends and Militia and the works of Charles Town were in good repair, what must your apprehension have been of the consequences of your retreat after Guilford to Wilmington instead of Campden and afterwards into Virginia, had you not the same losses to dread. you own you had, Lord Rawdon and Col. Balfour told you you had. all those you conversed with did the same. & with reason. for all knew that S. Carolina had been thrown back into Rebelion, by Ferguson's misfortune, & by some other subsequent losses particularly by that at Cowpens and added to all this you had imprudently suffered great part of the works of C. Town to be levelled and it was actually in that exposed state when you moved into N. Carolina in Janry 81 when you retired from it in april. 81 when you

On the other hand there was no doubt of the Rebel Army being well appointed, & of its number being upwards of Five thousand Men exclusive of Gen[l] Sumpter's detachment, and [a]of a Corps of Virginia Militia of 12 or 1500 men, either actually joined, or expected to join the main body every hour; And my own Corps, which never was numerous, was now reduced by sickness & other casualties to about 1400 fighting men of Regulars & Provincials with 4 or 500 Militia & N. Carolina Refugees.[b]

[a] F *omits* of

[b] RN *run on*

However the greatest part of the troops that I had being perfectly good, and having left Charlestown sufficiently garrisoned & provided for a siege, and seeing little to lose by a defeat, & much to gain by a Victory, I resolved to take the first good opportunity to Attack the Rebel Army.

Accordingly I took great pains to procure good information of their movements & position, and I learned that they had encamped, after marching from [c]hanging Rock, at Col. Rugeleys about 12 miles from hence, on the afternoon of the 14[th].[d]

[c] N *inserts* the

[d] RON *run on*

After consulting some intelligent people well acquainted with the ground, I determined to march at ten o'clock on the night of the 15[th], & to Attack at day break, pointing my principal force against their Continentals, who from good Intelligence I knew to be badly posted close to Col. Rugeley's House. [e]Late in the evening I received information that the Virginians had joined that day, however that having been expected, I did not alter my Plan, but marched at the hour appointed, leaving the defence of Camden

[e] O *new* ¶

quitted Croscreek and instead of going to Campden which would have covered it you went to Wilmington by which march you acknowledge you uncovered it. and finally when in defiance of of all orders of the Com[r] in Chief who had possitively "forbid your making any move that could expose C Town" contrary to every military principle at every risk of all the provinces L. Rawdon's with your own Corps & that of Phillips you moved into Virginia. Still looking northward. as you tell Tarlton page. this leads to a short note in Alpha[l] book.

to some Provincials, Militia, & Convalescents and a
a O *reads* 68h detachment of the [a]63[d] reg[t], which by being mounted on horses which they had pressed on the road, it was hoped would arrive in the course of the night.

I had proceeded nine miles, when about half an hour past two in the Morning, my advanced guard fell in with the enemy; By the weight of the fire I was convinced they were in considerable force, & was
b O *omits* that soon assured by some deserters and prisoners [b]that it was the whole Rebel Army on its march to attack us at Camden: I immediately halted & formed, & the
c O *new* ¶ enemy doing the same the firing soon ceased. [c]Confiding in the disciplined Courage of His Majesty's Troops, and well apprized by several intelligent inhabitants that the ground on which both Armies stood, being narrowed by swamps on the right & left, was extremely favourable for my numbers; I did not chuse to hazard the great stake for which I was going to fight, to the uncertainty & confusion to which an action in the dark is so particularly liable, But having taken measures that the Enemy should
d F *omits* it not have [d]it In their Power to avoid an engagement on that ground, I resolved to defer the attack 'till day.
e O *new* ¶ [e]At the Dawn I made my last disposition, and formed
f N *reads* my [f]the Troops in the following order, The division
g F *reads* on [g]of the right consisting of a small Corps of L[t] Infantry, the 23[d] & 33[d] Reg[ts] under the command of L[t] Col. Webster, The division of the left consisting of the Volunteers of Ireland, Infantry of the Legion, & part of L[t] Col. Hamiltons North Carolina Reg[t] under the command of Lord Rawdon, with two six & two three pounders, which were commanded by Lieut M[c]Leod. The 71[st] Reg[t] with two six pounders was formed as a reserve, one Battalion in the rear of the division of the right, the other of that of the left, And the Cavalry of the Legion in the rear, & (the country being woody) close to the 71[st] reg[t], with orders to seize any opportunity that might offer to break the Enemy's line, & to be ready to pro-

tect our own in case any Corps should meet with a Check.[a]

a N *runs on*

This disposition was just made when I perceived that the Enemy having [b]likewise persisted in their resolution to fight, were formed in two lines opposite & near to us, and observing a movement [c]on their left, which I supposed to be with an intention to make some alteration in their order, I directed L[t] Col. Webster to begin the attack, which was done with great vigour, and in a few Minutes the action was general along the whole front; [d]It was at this time a dead calm with a little haziness in the Air, which preventing the smoke from rising occasioned so thick a darkness, that it was difficult to see the effect of a very heavy & well supported fire on both sides: Our line continued to advance in good order, and with the cool intrepidity of experienced British Soldiers, keeping up a constant fire or making use of Bayonets as opportunities offered, and after an obstinate resistance [e]during three quarters of an hour threw the enemy into total Confusion, & forced them to give way in all quarters. At this instant I ordered the Cavalry to compleat the Route, which was performed with their usual promptitude & gallantry and after doing great execution on the Field of Battle, they continued the pursuit to hanging Rock, 22 miles, from the place where the action happened, During which many of the enemy were slain, [f]a number of prisoners, near 150 waggons, (in one of which was a brass Canon the carriage of which had been damaged in the skirmish of the night) a considerable quantity of military Stores, and all the baggage & Camp Equipage of the Rebel Army fell into our hands.

b VERMN *omit* likewise

c F *reads* in

d O *new* ¶

e VERMN *read* for

f F *inserts* and

The loss of the Enemy was very considerable, A number of Colours and Seven pieces of brass Canon (being all their artillery that were in the Action) with all their Amunition waggons were taken: Between eight & nine hundred were killed, among that number Brig[r] Gen[l] Gregory, and about one thousand

[a] VERMN *read* them Prisoners, many of [a]whom wounded, of which number were Maj[r] Gen[l] Baron de Kalb, since dead, and Brig[r] Gen[l] Rutherford.

[b] F *inserts* the I have the honour to inclose a Return of[b] Killed & wounded on our side; the loss of so many brave men is much to be lamented, but the number is Moderate in proportion to so great an advantage.

The behaviour of His Majesty's troops in general was beyond all praise; It did honour to themselves & to their Country. I was particularly indebted to Col. Lord Rawdon and to L[t] Col. Webster for the distinguished courage and ability with which they conducted their respective divisions; and the Capacity and Vigour of L[t] Col. Tarleton at the head of the Cavalry deserve my highest commendations, Lieut. M[c]Leod exerted himself greatly in the conduct of [c]our Artillery. My Aid de Camp Cap[t] Ross & Lieut. Haldane of the Engineers, who acted in that Capacity, rendered me most essential Service, and the public Officers Major of Brigade England who acted as Deputy Adjutant General, & the Majors of Brigade Manley & Doyle shewed the most active and zealous attention to their duty; Governour Martin became again a Military Man, & behaved with the spirit of a young Volunteer.

[c] N *reads* the

The fatigue of the Troops rendered them incapable of further [d]exertion on the Day of [e]the Action; But as I saw the importance of Destroying or Dispersing, if possible, the Corps under General Sumpter, as it might prove a foundation for assembling the [f]routed Army; On the Morning of the 17[th] I detached L[t] Col. Tarleton with the Legion Cavalry & Infantry & the Corps of Light Infantry, making in all about 350 men, with orders to attack him wherever He could find him, And at the same time I sent orders to L[t] Col. Turnbull & Major Ferguson, at that time on little river, to put their Corps in motion immediately, and on their side [g]to pursue & endeavour to attack Gen[l] Sumpter. L[t] Col. Tarleton executed this service

[d] R *reads* exertions
[e] F *omits* the
[f] M *reads* Rebel
[g] F *omits* to

with his usual activity & military address, He procured good information of Sumpters movements, and by forced and concealed marches came up with & surprized him in the middle of the day [a]on the 18th near the Catawba Fords; He totally destroyed or dispersed his detachment, consisting then of 700 men, killing 150 On the Spot & taking two pieces of Brass Canon & 300 Prisoners, & 44 waggons: He likewise retook 100 of our men, who had fallen into their hands partly at the action at Hanging Rock, & partly in escorting some waggons from Congarees to Camden, & He released 150 of our Militia Men or friendly Country people who had been seized by the Rebels. Capt Campbell who commanded the light Infantry, a very promising Officer, was unfortunately killed in [b]this affair, our loss [c]otherways was trifling. [d]This action [e]is too brilliant to need any comment of mine, & will, I have no doubt, highly recommend Lt Col. Tarleton to his Majesty's Favour. [f]The Rebel Forces being at present dispersed, the internal commotions & insurrections in the Province will now subside. But I shall give directions to inflict exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, in hopes to deter others in future from sporting with allegiance,[g] with Oaths, & with the lenity & generosity of the British Government.

[h]On the morning of the 17th I dispatched proper people into North Carolina with directions to our friends there to take arms & assemble immediately, & to seize the most Violent People and all military Stores & magazines belonging to the Rebels, & to intercept all stragglers from the routed Army; And I have promised to march without loss of time to their support. Some necessary supplies for the Army are now on their way from Charlestown, and I hope that their arrival will enable me to Move in a few days.[i]

My Aid de Camp Capt Ross will have the honour of delivering this Dispatch to Your Lordship, & will

a N *reads* of

b F *reads* the
c FR *read* otherwise
d O *new* ¶
e F *reads* was
f RN *new* ¶

g F *reads* and

h BST *begin*

i BST *end*

be able to give You the fullest account of the State of the Army & [a]the country. [b]He is a very deserving Officer, and I take the liberty of recommending him to your Lordship's favour and patronage. I have the honour to be,[c] with great respect, Your Lordships Most Obedient & Most Humble Servant

CORNWALLIS.[d]

R^ht Hon^ble
Lord George Germain &c &c &c[e]

a RN *omit* the
b N *new* ¶
c FO *ent* &c Cornwallis N *ends* &c (signed) Cornwallis
d VEM *end*
e R *ends*

16B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, OBSERVATIONS [21 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, August 21, 1780.

This extract from No. 16 *is shown in margin p* 255.

16F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, TARLETON *p* 128.

With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Begins The London Gazette Extraordinary. Whitehall, Oct. 9, 1780. This morning Captain Ross, aid-de-camp to Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, arrived in town from South Carolina, with a letter from his lordship to Lord George Germain, one of His Majesty's principal secretaries of state, of which the following is a copy.

Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, TARLETON *p* 185.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, August 21, 1780.

This extract from No. 16 *is shown in margin p* 255.

16V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, Duplicate LS RI 19/37.

Endorsed Duplicate, N° 2. Earl Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain August 21^st^ 1780.

Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16E: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, Triplicate LS RI 19/40.

Endorsed Triplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain. August 21^st^ 1780.

Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16R: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, Triplicate LS SACKVILLE 6/48.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden 21st August 1780. R/ 9th October.
Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16M: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, Quadruplicate LS RI 19/39.
Endorsed Copy. Quadruplicate. N° 2. Earl Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain. Camden Augt 21st 1780.
Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16O: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, Copy PA 308/108.
In margin Camden South Carolina 21st August 1780 Earl Cornwallis. (N° 2.) R/ 9th Octr.
Mem. at end Inclosures. N° 1. Field Return of Lord Cornwallis's Army previous to the Battle. 2. Return of killed & Wounded after the Battle. 3. Return of Ordnance & Military Stores taken from the Enemy. 4. Return of the killed & Wounded in the Action under Col: Tarleton.
Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16N: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, Copy PA 631/183.
Endorsed Copy N° 2. Lieut Genl Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain 21st August 1780.
Same as No. 16 *with variations shown in margins pp* 249-256.

16T: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 21 August 1780, SACKVILLE 6/49.
Endorsed D. Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camden, South Carolina 21st August 1780. R/ 9th Octr.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain dated Camden, So Carolina 21st August 1780.
This extract from No. 16 *is shown in margin p* 255.

17 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 23 August 1780, LS RI 19/41.
OBSERVATIONS [19 *Ap'x*] *p* 127, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Endorsed Duplicate 79. Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton 23d August 1780.
Duplicate Camden August 23d 1780.
Sir, Your Excellency will have in all probability

received my letters of the 6th & 10th by Captain Lutwidge. The opportunity was so safe, & I am at present so hurried with business, with everybody belonging to me Sick, that I shall omit sending the Duplicates, until another opportunity.

I left Charlestown on the Evening of the 10th & arrived here in the night of the 13th having suffered the most anxious suspense on the road, where I met frequently the most alarming reports, & had the greatest reason to apprehend, that if our Affairs did not speedily take a more favourable turn, the greatest part of the inhabitants between Camden, & Charles Town, would appear in Arms against us.

As I thought it of the greatest consequence to His Majesty's Service that the account of the important event of the 16th, should be communicated with all possible expedition to the Secretary of State; and as your Excellency told me in a conversation at Williams's House, that if I fought a Battle and took Cannon, I should write directly to England, I have on this occasion dispatched my Aid de Camp Captain Ross with the letters to Lord George Germain, of which I have the honor to enclose to you the Copies.

I must beg leave to recommend in the strongest manner to you the brave Troops who fought with me on that day. Their behaviour was indeed above all praise, & deserves every encouragement. Poor Major Mecan died a few days before the Action; & as I cannot possibly dispense with Lieut Col. Balfour's remaining at Charlestown, where he is of infinite use, I must particularly request, that you will please to appoint some active good Officer to the Majority of the 23d Regiment.

a B *begins* [a]I have not yet heard any accounts from N° Carolina; but I hope that our friends will immediately take Arms as I have directed them to do. The diversion in the Chesapeak, will be of the utmost importance. The troops here, have gained reputation, but they have lost numbers, and there can be

no doubt, [a]that the enemy will use every effort to repel an attack; which, if successfull, must end in their losing all the Southern Colonies

I have likewise to observe, that if a general Exchange should take place, the Enemy's prisoners should, in my opinion, be delivered at the same place, as ours are sent [b]in.[c] The Rebels now confined at Charlestown, are almost all Continentals, and of the old Country; and would, if released from hence, soon form a Corps on the frontiers of Virginia, far superior in number to the troops under my Command; & I do not think, if the Prisoners were all removed; that I could draw any considerable reinforcement from the Garrison of Charlestown, considering the great distance we shall be removed from thence.

[d]It is difficult to form a plan of operations, which must depend, so much, on circumstances but it at present appears to me, that I should endeavor to get, as soon as possible, to Hillsborough[1]; & there assemble, and try to arrange the friends who are inclined to arm in our favour; and endeavor to form a very large Magazine for the Winter, of Flour, & Meal from the Country, and of Rum, Salt &c from Cross Creek; which I understand to be about eighty miles carriage. But all this, will depend on the operations which your Excellency may think proper to pursue in the Chesapeak, which appears to me, next[2] to the Security of New York, to be one of the most important objects of the War. I can only repeat what I have often had the honour of saying to you; that wherever you may think my presence, can be most conducive to [e]His Majesty's Service, thither, I am at all times ready, and willing to go.[f3]

a B *reads* but

b B *reads* to
c B *stops*

d B *continues*

e B *inserts* the good of
f B *ends*

1a Hillsborough *underlined.*

2a next *underlined.*

3a and yet when I recommend your going to the healthy parts of the Carolinas after Guilford you force yourself upon me to the Northward & operation in a most sickly district at the worst of seasons.

When I found that Gen[l] Gates was advancing towards Camden, I sent orders, to The Commanding Officer at Ninety Six, to push parties of Militia, supported by Provincials, in the rear of his right; and endeavor to harrass his convoys, and be ready to take advantage of any success that we might have against him. I have since, a report that Lieu[t] Col. Innes, in attempting this Service, fell in, on the 19[th], with a party of Rebels; when he was deserted by the Militia, & himself wounded in the neck; and about Fifty Officers & men of his Provincials Killed, Wounded, or taken. the rebels, who were pursuing him, heard of our Successes against Gates, & Sumpter, and went off with great precipitation. Major Wemys, performed his March from George Town without loss, or difficulty, and is now in the neighbourhood of this place.

I am sorry to say, that I fear Major Harrison will totally fail, in his attempt to raise a Corps.

Our sickness is great, and truly alarming. the Officers are particularly affected; Doctor Hayes, and almost all the Hospital Surgeons are laid up. Every person of my family, and every Public Officer of the Army, is now incapable of doing his duty. I have the honour to be Sir Your most Obedient & most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

His Excellency
Sir Henry Clinton &c &c &c.

17B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [19 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camden, August 23, 1780.

This is two parts of No. 17 *as shown in margins pp* 258-259.

18 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 29 Aug. 1780, Copy PA 138/515. OBSERVATIONS [21 *Ap'x*] *p* 127, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed. Copy Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis to His Excell[y] Sir H. Clinton Camden 29[th] Aug[st] 1780 Received Sept[r] 23[d]. N° 3. In Sir Henry Clintons N° 107.[a]

[a] No. 25 *p* 281

Copy Camden 29[th] August 1780

Sir, I send Duplicates of my Letters of the 23[d] and of those of the 6[th] & 10[th] of this Month. Nothing very material has occurred since the 23[d]. We receive the strongest Professions of Friendship from North Carolina. Our Friends however do not seem inclined to rise untill they see our Army in Motion. The Severity of the Rebel Government has so terrified & totally subdued the Minds of the People, that it is very difficult to rouze them to any Exertions. The taking that violent and cruel Incendiary Gen[l] Rutherford has been a lucky Circumstance; but the indefatigable Sumpter is again in the Field, & is beating up for Recruits with the greatest Assiduity.

Major Wemyss is going with a Detachment of the 63[d] Regiment mounted, some Refugees, Provincials & Militia to disarm in the most rigid Manner the Country between Santee & Pedee, and to punish severely all those who submitted or pretended to live peaceably under His Majesty's Government since the Reduction of Charlestown, and have joined in this second Revolt. And I ordered him to hang up all those Militia Men who were concerned in seizing their Officers and capturing the Sick of the 71[st] Regiment. I have myself ordered several Militia Men to be executed, who had voluntarily enrolled themselves and borne Arms with us, and afterwards revolted to the Enemy.

The Number of Prisoners was a great Inconvenience to us here, in a small Village so crowded and so sickly. I was afraid that the close place in which we were obliged to confine them might produce some pestilential Fever during the excessive hot

Weather. I therefore sent them off as early as possible, by Divisions of 150 each, under the Escort of 38 Men, about two thirds of which were composed of the 63^{d} & Prince of Wales's Regiments, the rest Militia. In order to cover their March, altho' I did not apprehend much danger, I posted Major Wemys with a Part of the 63^{d} at the high Hills of Santee, and I sent Lieu^{t} Colonel Tarleton with a Detachment of the Legion, & Lieut^{t} Colonel Hamilton's Corps & some Militia to Ratcliffes Bridge on Linches Creek, which I thought would effectually awe the lower Country. The Disaffection however of the Country East of Santee is so great, that the Account of our Victory could not penetrate into it—any person daring to speak of it being threatened with instant Death. And so great was the Ignorance in which these People were kept, that on the Night of the 23^{d} a Party of about 200 mounted Militia under Colonel Marion went to Murrays Ferry, where they passed some Men in Canoes, drove away our Militia Guard, and destroyed the Ferry Boats to prevent our making our Escape from General Gates over the Santee. On the 24th they were proceeding to do the Same at Nelsons Ferry, when they heard of the March of the first Division of Prisoners, and that they were to halt that Night at Sumpters House (which halting place was not very well chosen by the Q^{r} M^{r} General). The Ensign of the Militia of the Escort contrived to get over to the Enemy, and conducted them to the Attack. The Consequence of which was that our Escort was taken and the Prisoners released. By this Time some Patroles of Lieu^{t} Colonel Tarleton's to Kingstree Bridge on Black River had spread the Alarm in their Rear, and being perfectly convinced by the Prisoners of General Gates's total Defeat; they retired with great Precipitation to George Town. The greatest Part of the Escort escaped from them, and above eighty of the Prisoners, all Continentals either English or Irish, declared their Determination

to proceed to Charlestown. I am assured that not more than twelve of the Escort, and forty of the Prisoners were carried off by the Enemy. I believe that Cap[t] Roberts of the 63[d] who commanded the Escort, did his Duty perfectly well, & was not to blame in any Respect.

[a]I hope to be able to move my first Division in eight or nine days into North Carolina by Charlotte-Town & Salisbury; the Second will follow in about ten days after, with convalescents & Stores. I shall leave the New York Volunteers and Innes's Corps to take Care of this Place untill the Sick & Stores can be removed. Our Sickness at present is rather at a Stand, the Recovery's nearly keeping Pace with the falling down. I dread the Convalescents not being able to march; but it is very tempting to try it, as a Move of forty or fifty Miles would put us into a much better Climate.

a B *begins*

Ferguson is to move into Tryon County with some Militia, whom he says He is sure [b]he can depend upon for doing their Duty and fighting well; but I am sorry to say that his own Experience as well as that of every other Officer is [c]totally against him.[d1·2·3]

b B *italics to end of* ¶

c B *omits* totally

I am very anxious to hear again from the North-ward, as our Accounts of the French Fleet were very imperfect.

d B *stops*

[e]I most sincerely hope that Nothing can happen to prevent your Excellency's intended Diversion in the Chesapeak. If unfortunately any unforeseen Cause should make it impossible, I should hope that you

e B *continues*

1a could I have believed after this opinion that he would have sent Ferguson so far from him (& put the Catawbaw River between them) unsupported. the Conseque was, Ferguson's Corps is murdered, His Lordship obliged to precipitate Retreat leaving friends of N. Carolina to the mercy of the Foe. and in conseqce of all these misfortunes South Carolina militia is nearly anihilated & that province thrown back in Rebellion.

2a notwithstanding which He lets him go

3b after this could S H. C. suppose L. C. would risk Ferguson without support he did however & F. was massacred.

will see the absolute Necessity of adding some Force
a B *ends* to the Carolinas.[a] I have the Honor to be Your most obedient & Most humble Servant (Signed)

CORNWALLIS.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B.

18B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [21 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camden, August 29, 1780.

This is two parts of No. 18 *as shown in margins pp* 263-264.

---

19 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 19 Sept. 1780, LS PA 156/369.
OBSERVATIONS [30 *Ap'x*] *p* 127, PARTING WORD [26] *p* 193.

Endorsed Camp at Waxhaw 19th Sept[r] 1780. Earl
a *see* ii. 344 Cornwallis N° 3 R/ 11th December (1 Inclosure[a]) Ent[d]. N° 3. Camp at Waxhaw Sept[r] 19th 1780.

b BS *begin* [b]My Lord I had the honor to inform Your Lordship, in my letter of the 21st of August, that I had dispatched proper people into North Carolina, to exhort our friends in that province to take Arms, to seize Military Stores, and Magazines of the Enemy, and to intercept all straglers of the routed Army.

c V *begins* [c]Some parties of our friends, who had embodied themselves near the Pedee, disarmed several of the Enemy's Stragglers; but the leading persons of the Loyalists, were so undecided in their Councils, that they lost the critical time of availing themselves of our Success, and even suffered General Gates to pass to Hillsborough, with a Guard of six Men only.

d F *begins* [d]They continue however, to give me the
e F *italics* [e]strongest assurances of support, when His Majesty's Troops shall have penetrated into the interior parts of the
f F *ends* Province.[f] the patience and fortitude with which they endure the most cruel torments, and suffer the most violent oppressions that a Country ever laboured under, convince me that they are sincere, at least as
g BV *end* far as their affection to the Cause of Great Britain.[g]

The number of prisoners taken in the Actions of the 16th & 18th of last Month, occasioned great inconvenience to us in the small Village of Camden, which was so crowded, and so sickly, I was afraid that the close place, in which we was obliged to confine them, might produce some pestilential fever during the excessive hot weather. I therefore sent them off to Charletown as early as possible, by divisions of One hundred & fifty each, under the escort of thirty eight men; about two thirds of which were composed of the 63d, and Prince of Wales's Regiments, and the rest Militia, in order to cover their March, although I did not apprehend much danger, I posted Major Wemyss with about One hundred men of the 63d Regiment on the high hills of Santee, and I sent Lt Col. Tarleton with a detachment of the Legion; and Lt Col. Hamilton's Corps, and some Militia to Ratcliffes bridge, on Linches Creek, which I thought would effectually awe all the lower Country. The disaffection however [a]in the Country East of Santee, is so great, that the Account of our Victory could not penetrate into it; any person daring to speak of it, being threatened with instant death: And so great was the ignorance in which these people were kept, that on the night of the 23d of August, a party of about Two hundred of the Inhabitants, in the neighbourhood of Black River, under the command of Col. Marion went to Murrays ferry, where they passed some Men in Canoes, drove away our Militia guard, who fled at the first shot, and destroyed the ferry boats, to prevent our making our escape from General Gates over the Santee. On the 24th, they were proceeding to do the same at Nelsons ferry, when they heard of the march of the first division of Prisoners, and that they were to halt that night, at Sumpters house, about six miles East of the ferry. The Ensign of the Militia of the escort, contrived to get over to the enemy, and conducted them to the attack of Sumpters house; the conse-

[a] S *reads* of

quence of which was, that our Escort was taken, and the Prisoners released. By this time, some Patroles of L^t^ Col. Tarleton's to Kingstree bridge, on Black River, had spread the alarm in that Country; and the Enemy, being perfectly convinced by the Prisoners, of General Gates's total defeat, retired with great precipitation to Georgetown. Great part of the Escort escaped from them, and above eighty of the Prisoners; all Continentals, either English, or Irish, declared their determination to proceed to Charles-town.

I am sorry to inform Your Lordship, that the Troops under my Command, as well Officers as Men, have continued very sickly ever since the Action. in hopes that the change of Air might be useful, I moved from Camden on the 7^th^ of this Month, with the 23^d^, 33^d^ & Volunteers of Ireland, and encamped on Waxhaw Creek. Lieu^t^ Col. Tarleton marched the next day, with the Light Troops, up the West side of the Catawba River. The 71^st^ Regiment, who are beginning a little to recover, are to join me in a few days. Major Wemys is gone with part of the 63^d^ Regiment, and of L^t^ Col. Hamilton's Corps, to endeavour to form a Militia in the district of Cheraws, on whose fidelity we may place some dependance; and to punish those Traitors who after voluntarily engaging in our Militia, deserted to the enemy. Detachments are likewise gone, for the same purpose, to Georgetown.

I must assure Your Lordship, that His Majesty's Service has derived the greatest advantages, from the ability, and great exertion of L^t^ Col. Balfour in the very important post of Commandant of Charles-town, where he has put every thing into such perfect Order, and has formed so respectable a Militia, that with the concurrance of Maj^r^ Moncrief the Chief Engineer, he is enabled to spare another Battalion for the field, notwithstanding the increase of Prisoners; in consequence of which the 7th Regiment is now on its March to join me.

By the Capitulation of Charlestown, the Town Militia were allowed to remain on parole, and their property in Town was to be secured to them. About twenty or thirty of them who had been the Ringleaders of Rebellion in this Province, held constant meetings, from which they carried on a correspondence with the enemy, and with all the disaffected parts of the Province; and received, in order to propagate it throughout the Town, and Country adjacent, General Gates's Proclamation. they advanced, in the most publick, and insolent manner, the grossest falshoods; tending to encourage the disaffected, and to terrify the well disposed Inhabitants; and seemed to imagine, that their Parole was intended only to protect them, without laying them under any restraint whatever. it was impossible, with safety to the Town, full of Rebel Prisoners, to suffer them to persevere in these dangerous practices; I therefore ordered them to be seized, and transported, with their Baggage, to S^{t} Augustine; where they will remain, on parole, without a possibility of hurting the Interests of Great Britain. I am aware, that this proceeding, may raise a clamour amongst the enemies of my Country; but I am fully convinced that it was as Just, as it was absolutely necessary.

I transmit to Your Lordship a Copy of a Proclamation which I thought myself under the necessity of issuing relative to the Sequestration of Rebel Property. the severe mortification [a]which it must occasion to His Majesty's Loyal Subjects on this Continent to see their Estates Confiscated, and themselves and their families reduced to beggary whilst their inhuman persecutors, who have brought ruin and destruction on them, are suffered to persist openly in the avowal of Rebellion and to continue to enjoy by permission of the British Government the full possession of their property, renders this measure in my opinion absolutely indispensable, and as it can affect no future plan, and only appro-

[a] S *reads* that

priates those funds, to the present use of Government, which would otherwise be employed against it, I flatter myself, that it will meet with His Majesty's approbation.

The great sickness of the Army, the intense heat, and the necessity of totally subduing the Rebel Country between the Santee, and Pedee, have detained me longer than I could have wished, on the frontiers of this Province. I am likewise anxious to hear from New York, from whence I have no Accounts since the 15th [a]of July; I hope however, that nothing can prevent my entering North Carolina before the end of this Month.[b] I have the honour to be Your Lordship's most Obedient, & most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

Right Honorable Lord George Germain &c[a]. &c[a]. &c[a].

[a] S *omits* of

[b] S *ends* I am &c Cornwallis

19B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, OBSERVATIONS [30 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camp at Waxhaw, September 19, 1780.

This extract from No. 19 *is shown in margin p* 264.

19F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, PARTING WORD [26] *p* 193.

Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germaine, dated Sept. 19th, 1780.

This extract from No. 19 *is shown in margin p* 264.

19S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 19 September 1780, Copy PA 308/207.

In margin Camp at Waxhaw 19 Septr 1780. Lord Cornwallis (No 3.) R/ 11th Decr.

Mem. at end Inclosure, Proclamation.

Same as No. 19 *with variations shown in margins pp* 264-268.

19V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 19 September 1780, SACKVILLE 6/61.

Endorsed (E) Extract of a Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camp at Waxhaw 19th Sepr 1780. R/ 11th Decr.

Begins Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Camp at Waxhaw 19th September 1780.

This extract from No. 19 *is shown in margin p* 264.

20 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [22 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, September 20, 1780.

I have always thought operation in the Chesapeak of the greatest importance, and have often mentioned to Admiral Arbuthnot the necessity of making a diversion in your Lordship's favour in that quarter; but have not been able till now to obtain a convoy for this purpose.

Your Lordship will receive inclosed a sketch of the instructions I intend to give to Major-general Leslie, who will command the expedition; which will give a general idea of the design of the move. But if your Lordship should wish any particular co-operation from that armament, General Leslie will of course consider himself under your Lordship's orders, and pay every obedience thereto.

I have the honour to inclose the copy of a letter I wrote to Lord George Germain, and of his Lordship's answer, respecting the option Lord Rawdon had made in favour of his provincial rank. And I am happy in having it in my power to communicate to his Lordship the King's pleasure that he should still retain his rank of Lieutenant-colonel in the line, which I beg leave to take this opportunity of doing through your Lordship.

21 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [29 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Waxhaw, September 22, 1780.

[a]If nothing material happens to obstruct my plan of operations, I mean, as soon as Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton can be removed, to proceed with the twenty-third, thirty-third,volunteers of Ireland, and Legion, to Charlotte-town, and leave the seventy-first here until the sick can be brought on to us. I then mean to make some redoubts and establish a

[a] B *begins*

fixed post at that place, and give the command of it to Major [a]Wimys, whose regiment is so totally demolished by sickness, that it will not be fit for actual service for some months.[b] To that place I shall bring up all the sick from Camden, who have any chance of being serviceable before Christmas, and trust to opportunities for their joining the army.

a B *reads* Wemyss

b B *ends*

The post at Charlotte-town will be a great security to all this frontier of South-Carolina, which, even if we were possessed of the greatest part of North-Carolina, would be liable to be infested by parties, who have retired with their effects over the mountains,[1] and mean to take every opportunity of carrying on a predatory war, and it will, I hope, prevent insurrections in this country, which is very disaffected. I then think of moving on my principal force to Salisbury, which will open this country sufficiently for us to see what assistance we may really expect from our friends in North-Carolina ; and will give us a free communication with the Highlanders, on whom my greatest dependance is placed.

1c mountains *underlined.*

21B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 22 September 1780, TARLETON *p* 191.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated camp at Wacsaw, Sept. 22, 1780.

This extract from No. 21 *is shown in margins pp* 269-270.

22 CLINTON TO LESLIE, 10 Oct., OBSERVATIONS [25 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.

With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Instructions to the Hon. Major-general Leslie, dated Head-Quarters, New-York, October 10, 1780.

a B *begins*

[a]Sir, You will be pleased to proceed with the troops embarked under your command to Chesapeak Bay; and upon your arrival at that place, you will pursue such measures as you shall judge most likely to answer the purpose of this expedition; the principal object of which is to make a diversion in favour of

Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, who by the time you arrive there will probably be acting in the back parts of North Carolina. The information you shall procure on the spot after your arrival at your destined [a]port, will point out to you the properest method of accomplishing this. But from [b]that which I have received here, I should judge it best to proceed up James River as high as possible, in order to seize or destroy any magazines the enemy may have at Petersburg, Richmond, or any of the places adjacent; and finally, to establish a post on Elizabeth River.[1] But this, as well as the direction of every other operation, is submitted to Earl Cornwallis, with whom you are as soon as possible to communicate, and afterwards to follow all such orders and directions [c]you shall from time to time receive from his Lordship.[d]

H. CLINTON.

a B *reads* post
b B *reads* what
c B *inserts* as
d B *ends*

1a This Plan Lord Cornwallis speaks highly of, but laments that Fergns misfortune had prevented his availing himself of it.

22B: CLINTON to LESLIE, 10 October 1780, TARLETON *p* 199.

Instructions to the Hon. Major-general Leslie, dated head quarters, New York, Oct. 10, 1780.

Same as No. 22 with variations shown in margins pp 270-271.

---

23 RAWDON TO LESLIE, 24 Oct., OBSERVATIONS [32 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Lord Rawdon to Major-general Leslie, dated [a]Camp, near the Indian Lands, West of [b]Cattawba river, South Carolina, Oct. 24, 1780.

[c]Sir, [d]Lord Cornwallis not being sufficiently recovered from a severe fever which lately attacked him to be able to write to you, his Lordship has desired that I should have the honour of communicating with you upon the subject of the present service. [e]The Commander in Chief has transmitted to Lord Corn-

a F *begins* BS *begin* Copy
b BFS *insert* the
c S *begins*
d V *begins*
e FSV *new* ¶

wallis a copy of the instructions under which you are to act. At the time when Petersburgh was suggested as an adviseable point for a diversion, which might co-operate with our intended efforts for the reduction of North Carolina, it was imagined that the tranquillity of South Carolina was assured; [a]and the repeated [b]assurances which were sent to us by the Loyalists in North Carolina, gave us reason to hope, that their number and their zeal would not only facilitate the restoration of his Majesty's government in that province, but might also supply a force for more extensive operations. Events unfortunately have not answered to [c]these flattering promises. [d]The [e]appearance of General Gates's army unveiled to us a fund of disaffection in this province, of which we could have formed no idea; and even the dispersion of that force did not extinguish the ferment which the hope of its support had raised. [f]This hour the majority of the inhabitants of that tract between the Pedee and the Santée are in arms against us; and when we last heard from Charles-town, they were in possession of George-town, from which they had dislodged our militia.[g]

a FS *read* that
b FSV *read* assertions
c BFSV *read* those
d FSV *new* ¶
e FV *read* approach
f BFSV *insert* To
g FSV *run on*

It was hoped that the rising which was expected of our friends in North Carolina might awe that district into quiet; therefore, after giving them a little chastisement, by making the seventh regiment take that route [h]in its way to the army, Lord Cornwallis advanced to Charlotteburg.[i]

h FV *read* on
i BFSV *run on*

Major Ferguson, with about eight hundred militia collected from the neighbourhood of Ninety-six, had previously marched into Tryon county to protect our friends, who were supposed to be numerous there; and it was intended, that he should cross the Cattawba river,[1] and endeavour to preserve tranquillity in the rear of the army.[k] A numerous [l]army now appeared on the frontiers, drawn from Nolachucki, and

k V *stops*
l FS *read* enemy now appears

1a of this I complain to place Ferguson & his Corps in such Risk, after what he had said.

other settlements beyond the mountains, whose very names had been unknown to us.[2] A body of these, joined by the inhabitants of the ceded lands in Georgia, made a sudden and violent attack upon Augusta. The post was gallantly defended by Lieutenant-colonel Brown, till he was relieved by the activity of Lieutenant-colonel Cruger: but Major Ferguson, by endeavouring to intercept the enemy in their retreat, unfortunately gave time for fresh [a]bodies of men to pass the mountains, and to unite into a corps far superior to that which he commanded. They came up with him, and after a sharp action [b]entirely defeated him. Ferguson was killed, and all his party either slain or taken.[c]

a FS *read* Body's of them

b FS *omit* entirely

c FS *run on*

By the enemy's having secured all the passes on the Cattawba,[3] Lord Cornwallis (who was waiting at Charlotteburg for a convoy of stores) received but confused accounts of the affair for some time: [d]but at length the truth reached him; and the delay, equally with the precautions[e] the enemy had taken to keep their victory from his knowledge, gave [f]Lord Cornwallis great reason to fear for the safety of Ninety-six. To [g]secure that district was indispensible for the security of the rest of the province; and Lord Cornwallis saw no means of effecting it, but by passing the Cattawba river with his army; for it was so weakened by sickness, that it would not bear detachment.[h]

d FS *omit* but

e FS *insert* which

f FS *read* his Lordship

g S *reads* save

h BF *run on*

After much fatigue on the march, occasioned by violent rains, we passed the river three days ago. We then received the first intelligence, respecting [i]the different posts in this province, which had reached us for near three weeks; every express from Camden having been waylaid, and some of them murdered by the inhabitants.[4]—Ninety-six is safe: the corps

i BFS *read* our

2a that of the Indians their neighbours was not unknown to them. these Indians should have been permitted to menace.at least it would have kept them at home.

3a This proves the impropriety of thus placing Ferguson.

4a bad bad all bad! !

which defeated Ferguson having, in consequence of our movement, crossed the Cattawba, and joined Smallwood on the Yadkin.[a]

a B *runs on*

In our present position we have received the first intimation of the expedition under your command. [b]From the circumstances which I have detailed, we fear that we are too far asunder to render your co-operation very effectual. No force has presented itself to us, whose [c]operation could have been thought serious against this army: but then we have little hopes of [d]bringing the affair to the issue of an action. The enemy are mostly mounted militia, not to be overtaken by our infantry, nor to be safely pursued in this strong country by our cavalry. Our fear is, that instead of meeting us, they would slip by us into this province, were we to proceed far from it,[5] and might again stimulate the disaffected to serious insurrection. This apprehension you will judge, Sir, must greatly circumscribe our efforts. Indeed, Lord Cornwallis cannot hope that he shall be able to undertake any thing upon such a scale, as either to aid you, or[e] to benefit from you in [f]our present situation.[g] The Commander in Chief has signified to Lord Cornwallis, that his Lordship is at liberty to give you any [h]direction for farther co-operation which may appear to him expedient. But his Excellency has complied[6] so very fully[7] and completely[8] with Lord Cornwallis's request, by sending so powerful[9] a force to make a diversion in the Chesapeak, that his Lordship fears he should require too much, were he to draw you into the [i]immediate service of this district. His Lordship is likewise delicate [k]on this point,[10] because he does not know how far, by drawing you from the

b FS *omit to* detailed *and read* At present we fear

c FS *read* opposition would

d B *inserts* ever

e FS *insert* much
f BF *read* your
g FS *new* ¶

h BF *read* directions

i BFS *insert* more
k FS *read* in

5a with such an Enemy & in such a Country you are ever to dread it.

6a Very civil but not more than my conscience tells me I deserve.

7d fully *underlined.*

8d completely *underlined.*

9d so powerful *underlined.*

10d I wish his Lordship had persisted in that Delicacy. he would not have marched into Virginia.

Chesapeak, he might interfere with any other purposes[11] to which the Commander in Chief may have destined your troops. Under [a]these circumstances, Lord Cornwallis thinks himself obliged to leave you at liberty to pursue [b]whatever measures may appear to your judgment best for his Majesty's service, and most consonant [c]with the wishes of the Commander in Chief. [d]No time is specified to Lord Cornwallis as the limitation of your stay to the southward. Should your knowledge of Sir Henry Clinton's desires prompt you to make a trial upon North Carolina, Cape Fear river appears to us [e]to be the only part where your efforts are at present likely to be effectual. A descent there would be the surest means of joining and arming the friends of government, as well as of co-operating with this army.[f]

a B *reads* those

b B *reads* whatsoever

c FS *read* to the views of
d V *continues*

e B *omits* to be

f V *ends*
BF *run on*

This, therefore, would naturally be the point to which Lord Cornwallis would bring you, did he conceive himself at liberty so absolutely to dispose of you. It must be remarked, however, that there are two difficulties in this plan; the first is, that the country from Cape Fear to Cross-creek[g] (the Highland settlement) produces so little,[h] it would be requisite in penetrating through it to carry your provisions with you; the second is, that no vessel larger than a frigate can pass the bar of Cape Fear harbour. [i]Whatever you decide, Lord Cornwallis desires earnestly to hear from you as soon as possible.[k]

g S *omits* the Highland settlement
h FS *insert* that

i BF *read* whatsoever
k B *runs on*

'Tis uncertain yet what steps this army (if left to itself) must pursue; but it will be ready at least to act vigorously in aid [l]to any plan which you may undertake. Lord Cornwallis begs that you [m]will inform the Commander in Chief of our circumstances, and that you will have the goodness to mention how highly sensible[12] his Lordship is to the very effectual manner[13] in which his Excellency has endeavoured to

l F *reads* of

m FS *read* may

11d purposes *underlined.*
12d highly sensible *underlined.*
13d effectual manner *to* province *underlined.*

a FS *read* this

b F *omits* our

c B *runs on*

d B *reads* an

e F *new* ¶

f FS *read* will

gBFS*end* Sir, Your most Obedient & very faithful Servant (Signed) Rawdon

ease the operations of [a]his army. The measure must have been attended with the most favourable consequences, had not accidents,[14] which no foresight could expect, so greatly altered the complexion of [b]our affairs in this province.[c]

Lord Cornwallis desires me to add how much satisfaction he should feel in having your assistance upon this service, did it promise more favourably for you. But should the intentions of the Commander in Chief have left you at liberty to make [d]the attempt at Cape Fear, the success which would probably attend that essential service would be doubly pleasing to Lord Cornwallis, from the opportunity it would most likely give him of congratulating you in person. [e]Allow me to add my hopes that the course of the service [f]would put it in my power to assure you, personally, how much I have the honour to be,[g] &c. (Signed)

RAWDON.

14d Fergusons defeat.

23B: RAWDON to LESLIE, 24 October 1780, Copy PA 138/681.

Endorsed Copy Colonel Lord Rawdon to Major Gen[l] Leslie 24[th] October 1780. In Sir H[y] Clinton's (Separate) of 12 Nov[r] 1780[h] 34.

h *see* ii. 351

Same as No. 23 *with variations shown in margins pp* 271-276.

23F: RAWDON to LESLIE, 24 October 1780, Copy PA 156/515.

see ii. 356

Endorsed In Earl Cornwallis's of 18[th] Dec[r] 1780[i] (1.) 34.

Same as No. 23 *with variations shown in margins pp* 271-276.

23S: RAWDON to LESLIE, 24 October 1780, Copy HL N° 34.

Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to Major General Leslie, dated Camp near the Indian Lands of the Catawba River S[o] Carolina Oct[r] 24[th] 1780. Transmitted to Lord George Germain In Earl Cornwallis's Letter of 18[th] December 1780. R/ 17[th] Feb[y] 1781 N° 34

Same as No. 23 *with variations shown in margins pp* 271-276.

23v: RAWDON to LESLIE, 24 October 1780, Extract SACKVILLE 6/70.

Endorsed (F) Extract of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to The Hon^ble^ Major General Leslie (commanding on an Expedition). Dated Camp near Indian Lands West of the Catawba River S^o^ Carolina. Oct^r^ 24^th^ 1780. In Lord Cornwallis's of 18 Dec^r^ 1780.

Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to The Hon^ble^ Major General Leslie, Dated Camp near the Indian Lands West of the Catawba River S^o^ Carolina Oct^r^ 24^th^ 1780.

This is two parts of No. 23 *as shown in margins pp* 271-2, 275.

24 RAWDON to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [39 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, [a]camp between Broad River and the Catawba, [b]dated [c]October 29, 1780.

a BF *begin* Copy
b BF *omit* dated
c B *inserts* So Carolina

Sir, Lord Cornwallis having been so reduced by a severe fever, as to be still unable to write, he has desired that I should have the honour of addressing your Excellency in regard to our present situation. But few days have past since Lord Cornwallis received your Excellency's dispatch of the 20th [d]of September. In consequence of it, his Lordship [e]directed that I should immediately send a letter to meet Major-General Leslie in the Chesapeak ; giving him the fullest information respecting our prospects, and the present temper of the country, I have the honour to inclose a copy of that letter. Something remains to be said in addition to it, of a nature which [f]Earl Cornwallis judged inexpedient to unveil, excepting to your Excellency.

d B *omits* of

e F *reads* desired

f F *reads* Lord

For some time after the arrival of his Majesty's troops at Camden, repeated messages were sent to head quarters, by the friends of government in North Carolina, expressing their impatience to rise and join

the King's standard. The impossibility of subsisting that additional force at Camden, and the accounts which they themselves gave of the distressing scarcity of provisions in North Carolina, obliged Lord Cornwallis to entreat them to remain quiet, till the new crop might enable us to join them. In the mean time General Gates's army advanced. We were greatly surprised, and no less grieved, that no information [a]whatever of its movements was conveyed to us by persons so deeply interested in the event as the North Carolina Loyalists. Upon the 16th of August that army was so entirely dispersed, that it was clear no number of them could for a considerable time be collected. Orders were therefore dispatched to our friends, stating that the hour, which they had so long pressed, was arrived; and exhorting them to stand forth immediately, and prevent the re-union of the scattered enemy. Instant support was in that case promised [b]them. In the fullest confidence that this event was to take place, Lord Cornwallis ventured to press your Excellency for co-operation in the Chesapeak, hoping that the assistance of the North Carolinians might eventually furnish a force for yet farther efforts. Not a single man, however, attempted to improve the favourable moment, or obeyed that summons for which they had before been so impatient. It was hoped that our approach might get the better of their timidity; yet during a long period, whilst we were waiting at Charlotteburgh for our stores and convalescents, they did not even furnish us with the least information respecting the force collecting against us. In short, Sir, we may have a powerful body of friends in North Carolina,—and indeed we have cause to be convinced, that many of the inhabitants wish well to his Majesty's arms; but they have not given evidence enough either of their [c]number or their activity, *to justify the stake of this province, for the uncertain advantages that might attend immediate junction with them.* There is

a B *reads* whatsoever

b F *inserts* to

c BF *read* Numbers or of their

[a]reason to believe that such must have been the risk.[b1.2.3]

Whilst this army lay at Charlotteburgh, George-Town was taken from [c]the militia by the rebels; and the whole country to the east of the Santée, gave such proofs of general defection, that even the militia of the High Hills could not be prevailed upon to join a party of troops who were sent to protect our boats upon the river. The defeat of Major Ferguson, had so dispirited this part of the country, and indeed the loyal subjects were so wearied by the long continuance of the campaign, that Lieutenant-colonel Cruger, (commanding at Ninety-six) sent information to [d]Earl Cornwallis, that the whole district had determined to submit as soon as the rebels should enter it. From these circumstances, from the consideration that delay does not extinguish our hopes in North Carolina; and from the long fatigue of the troops, which made it seriously requisite to give some refreshment to the army; [e]Earl Cornwallis has resolved to remain for the present in a position which may secure the frontiers without separating his force. In this situation we shall be always ready for movement, whensoever opportunity shall recommend it, or circumstances require it. But the first care must be to put Camden and Ninety-six into a better state of defence, and to furnish them with ample stores [f]and salt provisions. [g]Earl Cornwallis foresees all the difficulties of a defensive war. *Yet his Lordship thinks they cannot be weighed against the dangers which must have attended an obstinate adherence to his former plan.*[4.5] I am instructed by [h]Earl Cornwallis to express,

a BF *read* too much reason to conceive
b B *runs on*
c B *reads* our
d BF *read* Lord
e F *reads* Lord
f B *reads* of
g BF *read* Lord
h F *reads* Lord

1a yes my good Lord Rawdon such has *proved* the Risk

2c alas my good Lord did not this reasoning operate still more after Cowpens.

3d how clearly his Lordship saw the fatal consequences that *would* attend L.C. march into N. Carolina.

4a notwithstanding all these opinions his Lordship forgets them all & a few weeks after marches into N. Carolina leaving South Carona under still worse circumstances than it ever had been since we had taken it.

5c what induced him to think otherwise after Cowpens.

in the strongest[6] terms,[7] his Lordship's feelings,[8] with regard to the very[9] effectual measures which your Excellency had taken to forward his operations. His Lordship hopes that his fears of abusing your Excellency's goodness [a]in that particular, may not have led him to neglect making use of a force intended by your Excellency to be employed by him. But as his Lordship knew not how far your Excellency might aim at other objects in the Chesapeak (to which point his Lordship's entreaty for co-operation was originally confined) he could not think of assuming the power to order Major-general Leslie to[b] Cape Fear river; though he pointed out the utility of the measure, in case it should be conceived within the extent of your Excellency's purpose.

Lord Cornwallis farther desires me to say[c] he feels infinitely obliged by the very flattering testimonies of approbation with which your Excellency has been pleased to honour his success on the 16th of August. He has signified your Excellency's thanks to the officers and men, who received them with grateful acknowledgement. I have the honour to be,[d] &c.

(Signed) RAWDON.[e]

a F *omits* in that particular

b F *inserts* the

c BF *insert* that

d B *ends* with the highest Respect Your Excellency's most Obedt & most humble Servant Rawdon

e F *ends*

6d strongest terms *underlined.*

7d if his Lordship argued thus before the misfortune of Cowpens, a plus forte raison after it he there reasons operated ten fold, but this proves the difference between the influence he was under at the different periods, Honour, Integrity, Capacity and a thorough knowledge of the Carte du pais he had in L.R. in C.R. it was very different. 17.

8d feelings *underlined.*

9d very *to* operations *underlined.*

24B: RAWDON to CLINTON, 29 October 1780, Copy PA 139/85. *Endorsed* Copy Colonel Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Camp between Broad River & Catawba October 29th 1780 Recd ℔ the Beaumont 5 December 1780 N° 9 In Sir Henry Clintons N° 112.[f]

Same as No. 24 *with variations shown in margins pp* 277-280.

f *see* ii. 355

24F: RAWDON to CLINTON, 29 October 1780, Copy RI 19/48.

Same as No. 24 *with variations shown in margins pp* 277-280.

25 CLINTON to GERMAIN, 30 October 1780, LS PA 138/501.
NARRATIVE [97] *p* 57, *with Clinton's MS. Note.*

Endorsed New York 30th Oct° 1780 Sir Henry Clinton. N° 107 R/ 30th November. 8 Inclosures.[a] Ent[d] N° 107. New York, October 30th 1780.

[b]My Lord, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's Original Dispatch marked N° 66, and Separate one of the 22[d] July, also Duplicates of those marked, 63, 64, and 65, of Your Secret and Separate Letters of the 4th July, with that of Your Private Letter of the 5th and Circular one of the 8th of that Month,—together with Two Original Letters, addressed to Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and myself, dated the 3[d] [c]of August, by the Swift Packet, which arrived here on the 12th Instant.

I have the pleasure to acquaint Your Lordship that the Fleet from England under Convoy of His Majesty's Ships Hyena and Adamant, with Recruits and Stores for [d]this Army, arrived here safe, after a favorable Passage, on the 15th Instant; and I have the honor to transmit Returns of the State and Number of Recruits received by this Opportunity.

Although I have received no Authentic Accounts from the Southward since Lord Cornwallis's Letter of the 29th [e]of August, (a Copy of which I have the honor to transmit,) yet I think it my duty to send to Your Lordship, some Extracts from Rebel News Papers lately received, without giving any Opinion upon them, except the improbability of any thing very important having happened in that Quarter, as it appears [f]from that Letter that his Lordship did not seem inclined to make any such Detachment from his Army without supporting it.—Should Major Ferguson, however, have met with a little Cheque, I hope it will not be productive of any very bad consequences, as I trust his Lordship's Abilities will soon recover it; to which the Expedition under Major General Leslie may in some degree contribute. A Copy of my Instructions to that General Officer, I

a *see* ii. 343

b F *begins*

c F *omits* of

d F *reads* the

e F *omits* of

f F *reads* by

have already had the honor of Communicating to your Lordship. Major General Leslie sailed from hence on the 16th, and I understand was seen
a F *omits* on entering the Chesapeak [a]on the 18th, with a fair wind, so that he would probably be on James River on the 20th, and consequently interrupt Mr Gates's Communication with Virginia, and I hope strike at his grand Depot at Petersburg soon after. Should General Leslie be so fortunate to succeed, it may be presumed Mr Gates will be prevented from pursuing offensive Operations; but should he already have received Supplies to enable him to make a Move with the Army he shall have collected, I am persuaded Lord Cornwallis with the assistance of the Cooperating Corps under Major General Leslie, which I have given entirely to his Lordship's Orders, will pursue such Measures as may oblige Mr Gates to retire from those Provinces: Lord Cornwallis was informed by me previous to General Leslie's sailing upon this Expedition of that General Officer's being to act from his Lordship's Orders, and I sent him at the same time a Copy of my Instructions to General Leslie.

By the Present opportunity I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship some Original Dispatches which were lately intercepted in a Rebel Mail, we were lucky enough to take entire, and contain matters of no small importance.—The Letters now sent appear to be such as are of the most consequence; those that are less so, shall be transmitted to Your Lordship by the next opportunity.

b B *begins* [b]I shall in a few days send to Charles-Town, all the
c B *inserts* which will be about eight hundred Recruits belonging to the Southern Army, [c]and then, including the Corps under General Leslie[1], Lord Cornwallis will have full 11,306, Effective rank and
d B *ends* file under his Orders.[d] Washington has not as yet detached a single Man to the Southward, and by all Accounts from General Arnold, Gates cannot have above 800 Continental Troops with him.

1a Gen. Leslie 3500.

General Washington still remains at, or near Tapaan, with a Corps of 11400 Men under his immediate Orders. The French have not moved from Rhode Island, but are adding Fortifications to that Place.—Admiral Arbuthnot is Watching Mons[r] Ternay.—While we remain superior at Sea, and can Command the Sound of Long Island, I do not think the Enemy will attempt anything against us; but should they get the Command of the Sound, Your Lordship must be sensible that my present Force is very inadequate to that which can be brought against [a]me.

a F *reads* us

Major Harnage of the 62[d] Regiment will have the honor of delivering my Dispatches. This Officer's Services with the Northern Army will, I doubt not, insure him Your Lordship's favor and Protection.[b]

b F *ends* I am &c. H. Clinton

I have the honor to be With the greatest Respect Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant H. CLINTON.

P.S.—I must observe to Your Lordship, that in the Effectives that I have stated as under the Orders of Earl Cornwallis, the Sick are included, and I am afraid their Numbers are not inconsiderable.—H. C.

Right Honorable Lord George Germain.

25B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 30 October 1780, NARRATIVE [97] *p* 57. *With Clinton's Manuscript Note.*

Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain.

This extract from No. 25 *is shown in margin p* 282.

25F: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 30 October 1780, Copy PA 308/183.

In margin New York 30[th] October 1780. Sir Henry Clinton. (N[o] 107) R/ 30[th] Nov[r].

Mem. at end Inclosures 1. Return of Officers & Recruits &c 2. State of Recruits &c 3. Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton 4. Extract from several Rebel News Papers 5. Copy of an intercepted Letter &c 6. Intercepted Dispatches &c 7. Do 8. An Intercepted Letter &c

Same as No. 25 *with variations shown in margins pp* 281-283.

26 RAWDON to CLINTON, 31 October 1780, ALS RI 19/49. OBSERVATIONS [43 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Endorsed Copy sent home Lord Rawdon to Sir H. Clinton K.B. Camp between Broad River & Catawba October 31st 1780 recd ℔ the Beaumont the 5th Decr 1780. No. 106.[a]

[b]Camp between Broad River & the Catawba, South Carolina, Octr 31st 1780.

[c]Sir, By Lord Cornwallis's directions, I had the Honor of writing to your Excellency on the [d]29th Instant; detailing to your Excellency the circumstances which had obliged Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the attempt of penetrating to Hillsborough; & enclosing the Copy of a Letter which his Lordship made me write to Major-General Leslie [e]upon that occasion.

On further consideration, His Lordship reflecting [f]upon the difficulties of a defensive war, & [g]the hopes which your Excellency would probably build of our success in this quarter, has thought it advisable not only to recommend more strongly to Major-General Leslie, a plan which may enable us to take an active part; but even to make it his request, in case it should not be incompatible with your Excellency's further arrangements.

Lord Cornwallis is particularly induced to invite Major-General Leslie to co-operation in [h]Cape Fear river, by the supposition that your Excellency may not want [i]these troops during the winter: [k]and [l]they may join your Excellency in the Spring, scarcely later than, should they on the approach of that Season, sail from any part of [m]the Chesapeak Bay.[n]

A further motive proceeds from the little prospect that the Expedition on its original plan should compass any service adequate to its force, & to your Excellency's expectations. However, as views might subsist which were not explained to Lord Cornwallis; His Lordship has not ventured absolutely to order the descent in Cape Fear River; And the enclosed Copy

a *one enclosure see* ii. 349
b F *inserts* Copy SV *begin*
c B *begins*
d SV *read* 28th
e B *reads* on
f B *reads* on
g B *inserts* of
h B *inserts* the
i FS *read* those
k B *italics to* Bay (4 *lines*)
l V *inserts* that
m B *omits* the
n B *ends*

of the second Letter written to Major-General Leslie, will satisfy your Excellency upon what terms the measure has been pressed. I have the Honor to be Sir, with the highest respect, Your Excellency's Most Obed[t] & most humble Serv[t], [a]RAWDON.
H.E. Sir H. Clinton, K.B.[b]
Commander in Chief, &c &c &c.

a S *inserts* (Signed)
b FSV *end*

26B: RAWDON to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [43 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.
Extract.—From Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp between Broad River, and the Catawba, South Carolina, October 31, 1780.
This extract from No. 26 *is shown in margin p* 284.

26F: RAWDON to CLINTON, 31 October 1780, Copy PA 139/93.
Endorsed Copy Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. October 31[st] 1780 N° 10 In Sir Henry Clintons N° 112.[c]
Same as No. 26 *with variations shown in margins pp* 284-285.

c *see* ii. 355

26S: RAWDON to CLINTON, 31 October 1780, Copy PA 156/535.
Endorsed In Earl Cornwallis's of 18[th] December 1780.[d] (3) 36.
Same as No. 26 *with variations shown in margins pp* 284-285.

d *see* ii. 356

26V: RAWDON to CLINTON, 31 October 1780, Copy HL N° 36.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to Sir Henry Clinton, dated 31[st] Oct[r] 1780. Transmitted to Lord George Germain In Earl Cornwallis's Letter of 18 Decemb[r] 1780. R/ 17[th] Febry 1781. N° 36.
Same as No. 26 *with variations shown in margins pp* 284-285.

---

27 CLINTON TO LESLIE,[1] 2 November 1780, Copy PA 138/633.
OBSERVATIONS [27 *Ap'x*] *p* 127, *with Clinton's MS. Note.*
Endorsed Copy of Instructions to Major Gen[l] Leslie dated 2[d] Nov[r] 1780. N° 1. In Sir Henry Clinton's N° 109.[a]

a *see* ii. 351

[b]Copy. New York 2[d] Nov[r] 1780

b F *begins*

[c]Sir, Having already put you under the orders of

c B *begins*

1d why does not L. Cornwallis produce my first instructions to Leslie as well as my second,—

Lord Cornwallis, who must of course be the best judge of Operations to the Southward, it may be needless to say anything more. But lest you should not receive any orders from His Lordship, or obtain certain intelligence relative to him, or have reason to Suppose you can better assist his Operations by a diversion made nearer him; I think it necessary to give you some hints respecting Cape Fear River, and how far the acting upon that River [a]will Operate, Should Lord Cornwallis have passed the Yadkin, and be advanced towards Hilsborough I think you cannot act anywhere so well as on James River, approaching sometimes towards the Roanoke but not passing that River without orders from Lord Cornwallis. If you have every reason to believe that his Lordship meets with Opposition at his passage of the Yadkin, I think a Move on Cape Fear River will operate effectually. I have had much conversation with General OHara on this subject. I have given him every Information respecting that Move; and I trust after consulting him, you will act in the best manner possible to fulfill the object of [b]*all* your Instructions—[c]a Diversion in favour of Lord Cornwallis. That you may be the better judge of his plan, I send you Copies of such of his Letters, which give any hints towards it.[d]

a B *reads* may

b B *not italics*

c B *italics to* Cornwallis

d B *stops*

Should you determine to quit Chesapeak, you will apply to the Officer Commanding in the Naval Line, to whom Sir George Rodney intends giving corresponding Instructions. As You will meet of course in Cape Fear River a considerable number of Gallies, Armed Vessels &c, I wish in case you quit Chesapeak that all those now with you may be sent back to us. [e]You will of course cautiously avoid inrolling any of the Militia [f]of Princess Ann or elsewhere—without you determine to Establish a Post. Those however who voluntarily join you must be taken care of.[g] I have the honor to be, &c, &c, (Signed)
Hon[ble] Major General Leslie[h] H. Clinton.

e B *continues*

f F *omits to* elsewhere

g B *ends* H. Clinton

h F *ends*

27B: CLINTON to LESLIE, 2 Nov. 1780, OBSERVATIONS [27 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Second Instructions to the Hon. Major-general Leslie, dated New-York, November 2, 1780.

This is two parts of No. 27 *as shown in margins pp* 285-286.

27F: CLINTON to LESLIE, 2 November 1780, Copy HL No 31.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to The Hon^ble^ Maj^r^ Gen^l^ Leslie dated New York 2^nd^ November 1780. Transmitted to L^d^ Geo: Germain In Sir H^y^ Clintons of 10^th^ Nov^r^ 1780 R/ 28^th^ Dec^r^ N^o^ 31.

Same as No. 27 *with variations shown in margins pp* 285-286.

28 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [26 *Ap'x*] *p* 127.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, November 6, 1780.

Your Lordship can judge of the strength of this part of the army, by that under your own orders; and will agree with me that it is scarcely possible for me to detach a greater force from it, or of our being able to make such efforts in Chesapeak Bay, as are now almost become necessary. However, when I know your Lordship's success in North Carolina, and your determination respecting a post on Elizabeth River, I will then consider what additional force I can spare.[1] If your Lordship determines to withdraw that post, I shall in that case think your present force, including General Leslie's, quite sufficient.

[a]By the copy of instructions last sent, and those now forwarded to General Leslie, your Lordship will perceive I mean that you should take the command of the whole. If my wishes are fulfilled, they are, that you may [b]*establish a post at Hillsborough, feed it from Cross Creek, and be able to keep that of Ports-*

[a] BF *begin*

[b] BF *not italics*

1a Instead of sending me calls to himself 2700. 3000 men after his Campaign He

mouth.[2·3·4] A few troops will do it, and carry on desultory expeditions in Chesapeak, [a]*till more solid operations can take place;—of which I fear* there is no prospect, without we are considerably reinforced.[5·6·7] The moment I know your Lordship's determination to keep a post at Portsmouth, I will, as I said before, consider what additional force I can spare. [b]*Once assured of our remaining superior at sea*,[8·9] I might possibly send two thousand more for this winter's operations.[c]

[d]Operations in Chesapeak [e]are but of two sorts.[10] Solid [f]operation with a fighting army, to call forth our friends and support them; or a post, such as [g]Portsmouth, carrying on desultory expeditions; stopping up in a great measure the Chesapeak; and by commanding James River, prevent the enemy from forming any considerable depots upon it, or moving in any force to the southward of it. Such, my Lord, are the advantages I expect from [h]a station at Portsmouth; and I wish it may appear to you in the same light.[i]

a BF *not italics*

b BF *not italics*

c F *runs on*

d B *inserts* Respecting

e B *inserts* they

f B *reads* Operations

g B *inserts* at

h B *reads* the

i BF *insert* ¶ *on p* 289

2d establish *to* Portsmouth *underlined.*

3a Lord Cornwallis quotes this passage as a prooff I approved nay planned his move into N. Carolina, but it is merely the rebound of his own words as may be seen Page 20.

4d when his Lordp had determined on making a *solid* move into N. Caroli to give that experiment a *fair* tryal I express my wishes thus but I never could approve of a Desultory move such as he made after he had lost all his light troops at Cowpens and had destroyed all his waggons to persue Morgan.

5a without assurances from me of a reinfort or at least without my approbation should his Lordship have forced operation there.

6d does not this clearly prove that till we were reinforced I had no Idea of *solid* operation in Chesapeak & that till assured of naval superiority I would send very little

7d reinforced *underlined.*

8d Once *to* sea *underlined.*

9d unless we were superior operation in Chesapeak must prove fatal.—

10c The First cant be attempted till we have recovered North Carolina, or are sure of a covering Fleet the last is always necessary to favour opns in N. Carolina.

28B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 6 Nov 1780, Extract PA 140/555.
Begins Extract. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York November 6th 1780.
This extract from No. 28 *shown in margins pp* 287-288 *contains the following additional paragraph:—*
You may in that Case probably take up, for this Winter at least, your Head Quarters there. As I have often said, except as a Visitor I shall not move to Chesapeak, without Washington goes there in great Force, which he does not seem inclined to do, nor indeed to send a single Man there, except Greene to Command."

28F: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 6 Nov. 1780, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 180.
Extrait de Sir Henri Clinton, au comte Cornwallis, datée de la Nouvelle-York le 6 nov. 1780.
This extract from No. 28, *shown in margins pp* 287-288, *contains the same additional paragraph.*

29 LESLIE TO CLINTON, 7 November 1780, Extract PA 138/677.
OBSERVATIONS [31 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from The Hon^ble^ Major Gen^l^ Leslie to Sir H. Clinton KB dated Portsmouth 7th Nov^r^ at Night. received 12th Nov^r^ In Sir H^y^ Clinton's (Separate) of 12th Nov^r^. 1780.[a] a *see* ii. 351

Extract of a Letter from Major General Leslie to His Excellency Sir H. Clinton KB. dated Portsmouth 7th Nov^r^ 1780, at Night.

[b]"This instant Lieu^t^ Gratton of the 64th is arrived Express from Charles Town in His Majesty's Ship Iris, with a Letter from Lord Rawdon—Lord Cornwallis being a little indisposed. b B *begins* Sir

I inclose Your Excellency a Copy of the Contents, I called on Commodore Gayton and Brigadier General Howard for their Opinion how we should Act. We all agree to go to Cape Fear as soon as possible, very sorry it is necessary, but my Orders from your Excellency is to Cooperate and Act with his Lordship to the utmost of my power.[c] c B *ends*

As a blind Pilots are ordered to be got for James River, and nobody to be intrusted with our destination, but those above mentioned.

I shall write his Lordship of Our Intentions, and there wait his Orders, and desire Balfour to send us Provisions from Charles-Town."

29B: LESLIE to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [31 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Extract.—From Major-general Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, Nov. 7, 1780, eight at Night.

This extract from No. 29 is shown in margin p 289.

30 GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 9 Nov. 1780, Draft PA 157/495. REPLY [9] *p* 143. *With Clinton's MS. Notes from* GERMAIN.

Endorsed Dra^t to Earl Cornwallis Whitehall 9^th Nov^r 1780 (N^o 1.) Ent^d Dup.

a V *begins*

(N^o 1.) [a]Whitehall, 9^th Nov^r 1780.

b S *begins*
c BFER *begin*

Earl Cornwallis, [b]My Lord, [c]I had the very great pleasure to receive from Captain Ross who arrived in London on the 9th of last Month, your Lordship's dispatches N^s 1. and 2. which I immediately

d B *italics to* satisfaction

laid before the King who read [d]with the highest satisfaction the Account contained in the latter of

e B *italics* very

the [e]very glorious and complete Victory obtained by your Lordship over the rebels near Camden on the

f B *omits* of

16th [f]of August.

g B *italics to* Rebellion (5 *lines*)

[g]The great Superiority of the Enemy[1] in Numbers over the Forces under your Command, His Majesty observed, distinguished this Victory from all that have been atchieved since the Commencement of the Rebellion; and though it might have been expected that the long Continuance of the War would have increased the Military Skill and Discipline of the Enemy[2] your Lordship's complete Success is a

1 a la premire combat qui a donné dans la Caroline,—[*at the first battle which took place in Carolina,*—]

2 le Gens du paye sont en generalle De miserables sans force du corps ou d'ame. les gens du nord sont au contraire robuste et valliant. [*the people of the country in general are wretched, without strength of body or of mind. The people of the north are on the contrary robust and valiant.*]

brilliant Testimony that the Spirit & Intrepidity of the King's Troops will always triumph over them, and that however they may exceed in Numbers, the Vigor and Perseverance of the British Soldiers will overcome all Resistance, when led on by an able and determined Commander, seconded by gallant and judicious Officers; It is therefore particularly pleasing to me to obey His Majesty's Commands by signifying to your Lordship His Royal Pleasure that you do acquaint the Officers and Soldiers of the brave Army under your Command that their Behaviour upon that glorious day is highly approved by their Sovereign, and you will particularly express to Lord Rawdon Lieutenant Colonels Webster and Tarleton His Majesty's Approbation of their judicious and spirited Conduct.[3] The latter indeed has a double Claim to Praise for his great Alertness in overtaking General Sumpter's detachment before they were apprized of Gates's defeat, and by their destruction rendering the Victory at Camden still more decisive. Captain Ross's Services have been rewarded in consequence of your Lordship's Recommendation with a Brevet of Major,[a] but you will perceive by the inclosed Copy of Lord Amherst's Letter to me that it is not judged fit at present to give Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton the same Rank in the Army which he holds in the Provincials.

[b]The steps your Lordship immediately took for [c]improving your Victory [d]were highly judicious and must be attended with the most important Consequences, nor was your determination to inflict exemplary punishment on those Traitors who had repeated the Violation of their Oaths of Allegiance or broken their Parole and taken Arms

a BFER *stop*

b BFER *continue*
c B *inserts* the
d B *italics* were highly judicious

3 Ce sont des complimens dusage dans les Cabinets mais Milord Cornwallis a meritè bien ces elosges par sa decision, avant l'affaire, et son scavoir faire dans le combat de ce jour. [*These are the customary compliments in Cabinets but Lord Cornwallis has well deserved such praises by his decision before the action and his skill and address in that day's combat.*]

against the King, less wise or promotive of the great Object of the War, the Restoration of the Constitution, for the most disaffected, will now be convinced that We are not afraid to punish and will no longer venture to repeat their Crimes in the hope of Impunity should they be detected; and those who are more moderate will be led to withdraw from a Cause which is evidently declining before it becomes desperate, and they expose themselves to the Consequences they may reasonably apprehend will fall upon such as persist in rebellion to the last.

a B *italics* The Civil Regulations

b B *italics to* Province (4 *lines*)

[a]The Civil Regulations you have made for South Carolina, as far as I am informed of them by your Lordship and Mr. Simpson, [b]appear extremely prudent and proper, and I am glad to find they are satisfactory to the Merchants here who are deeply connected with that Province. Such of the Civil Officers as are in England have received Orders to return, and the greatest Part will sail with the first Convoy. As the Province is not yet restored to Peace it is not judged proper to appoint a Governor but as the Lieu[t] Gov[r] is going out he can exercise all the functions of a Governor in Chief in consequence of His Majesty's Commission to Lord William Campbell which devolves to him; and as it is the King's Wish to convince the People of America that no Abridgment of their former Liberties is intended but that they will be restored to all the Privileges of their former Constitution, the Exercise of such Powers as it may be fitting to allow the Civil Authority to possess, in the present Situation of Affairs, being in the Hands of the Constitutional Officers of the Province, must have a good Effect. Your Lordship will, therefore, endeavor to throw the Conduct of Civil Matters into their former Channels, as far as you shall judge expedient, to permit the Civil [c]Officer to act. I impatiently expect to hear of your further Pro-

c BF *read* officers

gress, and that Sir Henry Clinton and Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot have found Means of sending a Force into the Chesapeak, to co-operate with you: for if that be done, I have not the least doubt, from Your Lordship's vigorous and alert Movements, [a]the whole Country South of the Delaware will be restored to the King's Obedience in the Course of the Campaign.[b]

a B *italics to* Campaign (3 *lines*)

b B *ends*

I understand the Congress evade an Exchange of the Convention Troops* with the Garrison of Charles Town, under the Pretence that the Time of Service of the greatest Part of it will expire in a little Time, and the Men will, then be no longer Soldiers, and not entitled to be considered as Prisoners of War, and as the Expence of maintaining these People is enormous, some Means must be found of relieving the Public from it, and counteracting the Chicane of that faithless Body.[c]

c SV *run on*

What appears to me the most practicable Measures for these Purposes are, the inducing the Prisoners to enter on board the Ships of War or Privateers, or to go as Recruits to the Regiments in the West Indies, or as Volunteers to serve upon the Expedition against the Spanish Settlements from Jamaica; and Your Lordship will, therefore, take the proper Steps for disposing of as many of them as possible in these several Ways, or in such others as may occur to you as more practicable & effectual.[d] I am &[ca] GEO. GERMAIN.[e]

d FER *end*
e SV *end*

* [*From Germain*] La convention dont il est ici question, est celle de Saratoga par laquelle l'armée du général Bourgoine se rendit prisonniere au général Gates.

30B: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 9 Nov. 1780, REPLY [9] *p* 143.
This is two parts of No. 30 *as shown in margins pp* 290-293.

30F: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 9 Nov. 1780, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 4.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Extrait d'une lettre du lord George Germain au comte Cornwallis, datée de Whitehall, le 9 novembre 1780.
This is two parts of No. 30 *as shown in margins pp* 290-293.

30S: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 9 Nov. 1780, Copy PA 432/184.
In margin Earl Cornwallis (N° 1.)
The same letter as No. 30.

30V: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, Copy SACKVILLE 9/183.
In margin Earl Cornwallis N° 1.
The same letter as No. 30.

30E: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, Extract LANSDOWNE 68/1.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Earl Cornwallis dated Whitehall 9th Novr 1780. N° 27. Ex Exd
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain, to Earl Cornwallis dated Whitehall 9th Novr 1780.
This is two parts of No. 30 *as shown in margins pp* 290-293.

30R: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 9 Nov. 1780, Extract HL N° 27.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain, to Earl Cornwallis, dated Whitehall 9th Novr 1780. N° 27.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain, to Earl Cornwallis, dated Whitehall 9th Novr 1780.
This is two parts of No. 30 *as shown in margins pp* 290-293.

31 CLINTON TO LESLIE, OBSERVATIONS [38 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.
Copy.—From Sir Henry Clinton, to Major-General Leslie, dated New-York, November 12, 1780.

Sir, I have this morning received your dispatches, and by that dated the 7th instant, I observe your intention of quitting the Chesapeak; and at the requisition of Earl Cornwallis, made to you in a letter written by Lord Rawdon, that you propose going to Cape Fear River with the force under your command. I entirely approve of your having obeyed Earl Cornwallis's directions and desire on this subject, which I hope will be attended with every favourable advantage.

It is not necessary for me to enter upon the matter of your operations in the Chesapeak, as they will now cease.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) H. CLINTON.

---

32 CORNWALLIS TO LESLIE, 12 November 1780, Copy RI 19/51. OBSERVATIONS [45 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

With Clinton's MS. Notes from OBSERVATIONS *and* TARLETON.

Endorsed Copy Lord Cornwallis to Major Gen[l] Leslie 12[th] Nov[r] 1780. N° 107.

Copy Camp at Winnsborough between Broad River & Wateree, 12[th] Nov[r] 1780.

D[r] Sir, [a]You will I hope have received some Letters written by Lord Rawdon during my Illness. I am now perfectly recovered and almost as strong as ever. Had I attempted to penetrate into the further part of N. Carolina, my small Army wou'd have been exposed to the utmost Hazard; and it wou'd have been as impossible to have co-operated with you in the Chesapeak as with Sir Henry Clinton at N York. [b]If you come to Cape Fear, of which at present I have little doubt, by the help of Gallies and small Craft which will be sent from Charlestown, you will easily secure a Water Conveyance for your Stores up to Cross Creek. I will on hearing of your Arrival in Cape Fear River instantly march with every thing that can be safely spared from this Province which I am sorry to say is most exceedingly disaffected, to join you at Cross Creek. [c]We[1] will then give our Friends in N. Carolina a fair Trial. If they[2] behave like Men it may be of the greatest Advantage to the Affairs of Britain. If they are as[3·4] [d]dastardly & pusilanimous as our Friends to the Southward we must leave them to their Fate [e]& secure[5] what [f]they

[a] S *begins*

[b] B *begins* S *new* ¶

[c] F *begins*

[d] BF *three words blank*

[e] BF *italics to* got

[f] BF *read* we

1dO We *to* trial *underlined.*

2dO they *to* advantage *underlined.*

3bcdO dastardly.

4T dastardly.

5dO and secure *underlined.*

have got.[a6] If you find it difficult from contrary Winds [b]into get into Cape Fear, the Entrance of which is not easy to Vessels coming from the Northward, by the projection of the Frying Pan [c]Shoe it will be very little out of your way to look into Charles Town.[d] And perhaps, tho' not probably Balfour may give you the 64th, instead of some of the Corps d'Elite, which you have brought with you. [e]At any rate we may settle our Operations more fully, & you [f]may enter Cape Fear River with every Assistance that can be procured from them. All the Men of War with you except the Romulus can go into Cape Fear if wanted; but I believe that will not be the Case, and the Sandwich will be of more use than any of them. I can only say that I most impatiently long for the day of meeting with You.[g]

I cannot help now mentioning a Thing which has given me the greatest Concern. Some of my Letters from the Northward have made me suspect that you thought that your Removal from Carolina was owing to an Application to me. I most solemnly declare upon my honor that nothing can be more false. When I came to Town after the Surrender Sir Henry mentioned my going with him to the Northward. I said that I was ready to serve wherever he thought fit to employ me & had no Objection to remain in Carolina, if he thought my Services could be usefull in that Province. He said something Civil about the Climate. He then wished me to take this Command. However painful & distressing my Situation has been, & however dark the Prospect then was, it cannot be supposed that as a Military Man, I shou'd not rather chuse to command to the Southward than be third at New York. But so far from expressing a Desire to have any other Officer remain with me in preference to you, I shou'd have

a BF *end*
b S *reads* to
c S *reads* Shoal
d S *stops*
e S *continues*
f S *reads* will
g S *ends*

6dO this letter was written before the defeat of Tarlton, does it not imply a fair solid tryal & a promise in case of failure of falling back on South Carolina to secure it.

wished for you in preference to all others. But I did not presume to interfere in any Degree with Sir Henry's Arrangements, nor did I say more or express myself stronger on the Subject of my own saying than I have described in this Letter. I shall therefore hope that we shall meet with the same Cordiality & continue on the same footing of Friendship which has hitherto subsisted between us, & that you will believe me to be &c

(Signed) CORNWALLIS.

Honble Major Gen[l] Leslie

32B: CORNWALLIS to LESLIE, OBSERVATIONS [45 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Major-general Leslie, dated Camp at Winnesborough, between Broad River and Wateree, November 12, 1780.

This extract from No. 32 *is shown in margins pp* 295-296.

32F: CORNWALLIS to LESLIE, 12 November 1780, TARLETON *p* 241.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Major-general Leslie, dated camp at Wynnesborough, Nov. 12th, 1780.

This extract from No. 32 *is shown in margins pp* 295-296.

32S: CORNWALLIS to LESLIE, 12 Nov. 1780, Extract PA 139/101.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Major General Leslie dated Camp at Winsborough, between Broad River & Wateree, November 12[th] 1780. N[o] 12. In Sir Henry Clintons N[o] 112.[a]

Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] General The Earl Cornwallis to Major General Leslie, dated, Camp at Winsborough, between Broad River & Wateree, November 12[th] 1780.

This extract from No. 32 *is shown in margins pp* 295-296.

[a] *see* ii. 355

---

33 LESLIE TO CLINTON, 19 November 1780, Copy RI 19/46.
OBSERVATIONS [38 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from The Hon[ble] M. Gen[l] Leslie to Sir H. Clinton K.B. dated Hampton Road

Virg[a] Nov[r] 19[th] 1780. received the 28[th] Nov[r] 1780. N° 103.

N° 4. On board the Romulus
Hampton Road 19[th] Nov[r] 1780.

Sir, I have the honor to send your Excellency Duplicates of three Letters sent by Lieutenant Salisbury of this Ship the 8[th] Instant—which I hope came to hand.

I told you in that of the 8[th] that in consequence of Lord Rawdon's Letter (the Original I now send you, a Copy went by M[r] Salisbury) that I had determined to reinforce Lord Cornwallis as soon as possible with the whole of my Command. Part of
[a] F *begins* the Troops embarked the 11[th].—[a]I then fixed on a Garrison to continue at Portsmouth as a Blind, the 15[th] I had all on board except 500 Men to Protect the Dep[y] Comm[y] General's Vessel that got on ground at high Water, but by Exertion she was afloat at two in the Morning, and the rear Guard embarked. the Wind then came favorable, and continued to bring us all into this Road— Our Anchor was no sooner down, than a hard Gale of Wind came on at N.W., and continued that Night —and the following day, had we met it in Elizabeth River most of the Ships would have got entangled or aground, and might have been insulted by the Enemy, but not a Shot has been fired, so they can't say we are drove from their Shore.

[b] F *no parenthesis* [b](The last twenty four hours was an unpleasant time, for until then the Refugees, & followers of the Army were ignorant of my design to Evacuate the Place, however there was a necessity for it, & no time was lossed.)

The Enemy are in some force at M[c]Kay's Mills under a General Mulenburg, its between Suffolk & Smithfield a strong Situation, when the Letter from Lord Rawdon arrived I was meditating to get round him by landing in two Divisions, the one in Nansemond River, the other in W[t] Bay, this would have

created a delay of some days, which I thought too precious to throw away on Mr Mulenburg.[a]

[a] F *runs on*

As to Naval Matters I refer your Excellency to Commodore Gayton's Letters, he has been most attentive, and active on every occasion.

[b]The People in general seem sorry at our leaving this District, and I believe would have been happy to have remained quiet at home, it is a plentiful Country all round our Posts. From my first hearing of Ferguson's fate, [c]*I inwardly* suspected what came to pass, therefore I never issued any Proclamation of my [d]*Own*, nor did I encourage the People to take Arms, many blamed me for it, but now they think I acted right.

[b] B *begins*

[c] B *not italics*

[d] B *not italics*

I left the Works entire, and I still hope [e]you will be [f]enabled to take up this ground, for it certainly is the Key to the Wealth of Virginia & Maryland. it is to be lamented, we are so weak in Ships of War, for there's a Fleet of Sixty Sail expected hourly from the West Indies, besides the valuable Ships or Craft ready to Sail from the Chesapeak.[g]

[e] B *inserts* that

[f] B *reads* able

[g] B *ends* F *stops*

Had we gone up the River we should have benefited as Individuals, loaded with Plunder & Tobacco, but I am confident we should have lost some of our large Ships, for they get aground on every Move, even the King's Ships, who never want for Pilots.

[h]One of my People sent to Ld Cornwallis fell into the hands of the Enemy, they made him drunk, and he produced my Slip of Paper, You will see it in their Papers I imagine, it contained nothing of Consequence.

[h] F *continues*

Since my last I am happy to inform Your Excellency of the good behaviour of the Troops, and I must say from the first being on Shore there has Not been a Complaint of a single Hessian, it is a most respectable Corps.

You will observe from the Returns, that the Provincial Troops lose Men by Desertion, most of those

gone are Recruits from the Enemy—they give now for Militia Men to serve till 1782 as Substitutes, from 4000 to 6000 Pound this Currency, and the Dollar about One halfpenny Sterling which may be the reason of those fellows leaving us.

The People in general seem tired of the War, and wish for their former Ease and Comforts, indeed as far as the Troops went, the Men in general were at home, except the very violent, and those gone as Militia Men, the better Sort in this Province are deep in debt to the Merchants in England, and of course violent to a degree.

[a] F *omits to us*

[a]I am sorry to observe the Women don't Smile upon us—

In consequence of the Depredations committed by the Seamen Transport & Privateers Men & Refugees &c in the different Creeks in Norfolk County, I left with the Clergyman of Portsmouth 100 Guineas to be distributed in small Portions to the poorer Sort, who had lossed *their all.* I think this Money will be well laid out, as it shews our intention was not to distress them.[b]

[b] F *stops*

I expect great Efforts from Col. Balfour as I told him all my Wants, this goes in a Schooner of M[r] Goodricks, who has been very useful, [c]about 20 Refugees have come with us, I shall Arm the whole.[d]

[c] F *continues*

[d] F *ends* Signed A. Leslie

I have the honor to be Sir Your most obedient & Most humble Serv[t] (Signed) A. Leslie.

N.B I am afraid the Move up the Delaware Your Excellency did me the honor to mention has not taken Place for I hear nothing of it—
had I continued a little longer here, I intended taking 500 Men and going on a trip to Baltimore, it could easily be done, it's rather early as yet for they don't fill their Granaries quite so soon.

The want of small Craft & light Armed Vessels, crampt us much, this is the finest Post for those Excursions.

I am afraid the Beaumond fell into the Enemy's hands for she never returned.

I long to hear from Your Excellency, the more so, as I shall be anxious to know if the Steps I have taken meet with your approbation, Circumstances must for ever make People alter their Plans —I am not deficient in Zeal, whatever I may be in Capacity.

Excuse this Scrawl—in regard to Provisions I refer you to M^r^ Wier, we have enough if we keep the Coast—every Precaution & Œconomy has been used to preserve it, and few Negroes taken on that Account.

N.B.

This Instant I hear Gov^r^ Hamilton is drove back to Hampton, something having happened to the Sloop in the late *Gale*.

33B: LESLIE to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [38 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Extract.—From Major-General Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, on board the Romulus, dated Hampton Road, November 19, 1780.

This extract from No. 33 *is shown in margin p* 299.

33F: LESLIE to CLINTON, 19 November 1780, Extract PA 139/97.

Endorsed Extract Major General Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. November 19^th^ 1780 Rec^d^ 28^th^ November N° 11 In Sir Henry Clintons N° 112.[a]

a *see* ii. 355

This is three parts of No. 33 *as shown in margins pp* 298-300.

34 BALFOUR to LESLIE, [November 1780], Copy RI 19/52.
OBSERVATIONS [45 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Copy Without date

[a]My dear General, I wrote you a few Days ago by the Express Sloop & have only to repeat that the [b]Safety of this Province *now*, is concerned in your getting as fast as possible near us.[c]

a B *begins*

b B *italics* safety

c B *stops*

The Dispatches for Sir Henry Clinton sent by the Beaumont are to explain every Thing that happened

here of late, the Requisition for your coming to Cape Fear &c &c Therefore Lord Cornwallis wishes by all means that they shou'd be sent by a Man of War as quickly as possible, and if necessary an official Requisition made for that purpose to the Officer Commanding the Navy.

A Pilot is sent in the Beaumont and more will be lying ready for you in the River when I know any thing certain of you by the Iris; as also all sorts of good Things, Rice, Salt Pork, &c

I am in haste most faithfully (Signed)

N. BALFOUR.

Honble Major Genl Leslie.

a B *continues*
b B *ends*

[a]Gates is advancing as we are told towards this Province & already near it.[b]

34B: BALFOUR to LESLIE, OBSERVATIONS [45 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.

Extract.—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, without date, to Major-general Leslie.

This is two parts of No. 34 *as shown in margins pp* 301-302.

---

35 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 3 December 1780, LS PA 139/393. OBSERVATIONS [49 *Ap'x*] *p* 128, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Endorsed Duplicate Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton December 3d 1780 Recd by the Halifax Feby 16th 1781. *also endorsed* Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, KB. December 3d, 1780 In Sir Hy Clinton's

a *see* ii. 361 *one enclosure see* ii. 352
b M *inserts* Copy
N *reads* Copy
c VE *begin*
d B *begins*
e BR *omit* just
f E *omits* of

No 119.[a] 43. (8.)

[b]Duplicate. [c]Camp at Wynnesborough Decr 3d, 1780.

[d]Sir, I am [e]just honoured with Your letters of the 5th & 6 of last Month; Lord Rawdon during my illness informed Your Excellency in his letters of the 28th & 31st [f]of October, of the various causes which prevented my penetrating into N. Carolina; I shall not trouble you with a recapitulation, except a few words about poor Major Ferguson. I had the honour to inform Your Excellency that Major Ferguson had taken infinite pains with some of the Militia of Ninety

six, He obtained my permission to make an incursion into Tryon County, whilst the Sickness of my Army prevented my moving. As he had only Militia and the small remains of his own Corps, without baggage or Artillery, and as he promised to come back if He heard of any Superior force, I thought He could do no harm, and might help to keep alive the Spirits of our Friends in N. Carolina, which might be damped by the slowness of our Motions: The event proved unfortunate, without any fault of Major Fergusons; A numerous and unexpected Enemy came from the Mountains, as they had good horses their movements were rapid; Major Ferguson was tempted to stay near the Mountains longer than he intended, in hopes of cutting off Col: Clarke on his return from Georgia, He was not aware that the enemy was so near him, and in endeavouring to execute my Orders of passing the Catawba and joining me at Charlotte-town, He was Attacked by a very superior force and totally defeated on King's Mountain.[1]

Wynnesborough, my present Position, is an healthy spot, well situated to Protect the greatest part of the Northern Frontier, and to assist Camden and Ninety Six. The Militia of the latter, on which alone we could place the smallest dependance was so totally [a]disheartened by the defeat of Ferguson, that of [b]that whole District we could with difficulty assemble one hundred, and even those I am convinced would not have made the smallest resistance if they had been Attacked. I determined to remain at this place until an Answer arrived from Gen[l] Leslie, on which my Plan for the Winter was to depend, and to use every possible means of putting the Province into a state of defence, which I found to be absolutely necessary, whether my Campaign was Offensive or Defensive.

a B *reads* dispirited
b B *reads* the

1a you thought it dangerous my good Lord even to trust Ferguson's Corps on your left & on the same side the Catawbaw what must we think of your placing such a River as the Catawba between you.

Bad as the state of our affairs was on the Northern Frontier, the Eastern part was much worse. Col. Tynes who Commanded the Militia of the High Hills of Santee, and who was posted on Black River, was Surprized and taken, and his Men lost all their Arms.

a F *begins*

[a]Col. Marion had so wrought on the minds of the People, partly by the terror of his threats & cruelty of his punishments, and partly by the Promise of Plunder, that there was [b]scarce an Inhabitant between the Santee and Pedee that was not in Arms against us, some parties had even crossed the Santee, and carried terror to the Gates of Charles-town. My first object was to reinstate matters in that quarter without which Camden could receive no supplies. I therefore sent Tarleton, who pursued Marion for several days, obliged his Corps to take to the Swamps, and by convincing the Inhabitants that there was a power superior to Marion who could likewise reward & Punish, so far checked the Insurrection, that the greatest part of them have not dared [c]openly to appear in Arms against us since his expedition.[d]

b B *reads* scarcely

c BF *omit* openly
d B *stops* F *ends*

The 63[d] Reg[t] under Major Wemyss had been mounted on indifferent horses of the Country for the purpose of reducing and disarming the Cheraws; It had afterwards been sent by Lord Rawdon for the security of Ninety six. When I sent L[t] Col. Tarleton to the Low Country, I ordered Major Wemyss to come down to Broad River, [e]to keep constantly moving on either side of the River he might think proper, for the Protection of the Mills from which the Army subsisted, and for the preservation of the Country. Sumpter then lay with about 300, Men partly [f]of Militia, and partly [g]of the Banditti who have followed him ever since the reduction of this Province, near Hills Iron works, between the Catawba and Broad River, about forty miles in our front; [h]Branan, Clarke and others had different Corps plundering the houses and putting to death the well affected Inhabitants between Tyger River and

e R *reads* and keep

f R *omits* of
g R *omits* of

h E *reads* Brenan

Pacolet. Major [a]Wemyss who had just past Broad River at Brierley's Ferry, came to me on the seventh of last Month and told me that he had information that Sumpter had moved to Moore's Mill within five miles of Fishdam Ford, and about twenty five Miles from the place where [b]63[d] then lay, that he had accurate accounts of his position and good Guides, and that he made no doubt of being able to Surprize and rout him. As the defeating so daring and troublesome a Man as Sumpter, and dispersing such a Banditti, was a great object, I consented to his making the trial on the 9[th], at day break, and gave him Forty of the Dragoons which Tarleton had left with me; desiring him however neither to put them in the Front, nor [c]to make any use of them during the night; Major Wemyss marched so early and so fast on the night of the 8[th], that He arrived at Moore's Mill soon after midnight, He then had information that Sumpter had marched that evening to Fishdam ford, where he lay with his rear close to Broad River on a low piece of ground. The Major immediately proceeded to Attack him in his new Position, & succeeded so well as to get into his Camp whilst the Men were all sleeping round the fires, but as Major Wemyss rode into the Camp at the head of the Dragoons, and the 63[d] followed them on horseback, the enemy's Arms were not secured, and some of them recovering from the first alarm got their Rifles and with the first fire wounded Major Wemyss in several places, and put the Cavalry into disorder; The 63[d] then dismounted and Killed and Wounded about Seventy of the Rebels, drove several over the River and dispersed the rest; The command however devolving on a very young Officer, who neither knew the ground nor Major Weymss's plan, nor the strength of the enemy, some few of which kept firing from the wood [d]on our People who remained in the enemy's Camp, and who were probably discovered by their fires; Our troops came away before day break,

[a] R *reads* Bruce

[b] R *inserts* the

[c] E *omits* to

[d] R *reads* upon

leaving Major Wemyss and 22 Serg^{ts} & Rank & File at a house close to the Field of Action. In the morning those who were left with a flag of truce with the wounded, found that the enemy were all gone, but on some of their scouting Parties discovering that our People had likewise retired, Sumpter returned & took Major Wemyss's Parole for himself and the wounded Soldiers. Major Wemyss is gone to Charles-town and is in a fair way of recovery.

The enemy on this event cried Victory, and the whole Country came in fast to [a]join [b]Sumpter, who [c]passed the Broad River and joined [d]Branan, Clarke &c; I detached Major M^{c}Arthur with the 1st Battalion of the 71st and the 63^{d} Reg^{t}, after having sent my Aid de Camp Lieu^{t} Money to take the Command of it, to Brierley's Ferry on Broad River, in order to cover our Mills, and to give some check to the enemy's march to Ninety six. At the same time I recalled Lieu^{t} Col. Tarleton from the Low Country. Tarleton was so fortunate as to pass not only the Wateree but the Broad River without Gen^{l} Sumpter's being apprized of it, who having increased his Corps to one thousand, had passed the Ennoree and was on the point of Attacking our hundred Militia at Williams's House, fifteen miles from Ninety six, and where I believe He would not have met with much resistance. [e]L^{t} Col. Tarleton would have surprized him on the South of Ennoree had not a deserter of the 63^{d} given notice of his march; He however cut to pieces his rear guard in passing that River, and pursued his main body with such rapidity that he could not [f]safely pass the Tyger, and was obliged to halt on a very strong position at a place called Black Stocks, close to it; Tarleton had with him only his Cavalry and the 63^{d} mounted, his Infantry and [g]3 Pounder being several miles behind; The Enemy not being able to retreat with safety, and being informed of Tarleton's approach and want of Infantry, by a Woman who passed him on the March, and

a ER *omit* join
b S *begins* Sumpter having
c V *inserts* having
d S *reads* Brannen
e ER *omit* Lt. Col.
f S *omits* safely
g S *inserts* a

contrived, by a nearer Road, to get to them, were encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, and began to fire on the 63d who were dismounted, Lt Col. Tarleton to save them from considerable loss, was obliged to Attack, altho' at some hazard; and drove the enemy with loss over the River. Sumpter was dangerously wounded, three of their Colonels Killed, and about [a]120 Men Killed, Wounded, or taken. On our side about 50 were Killed & wounded, Lieuts Gibson & Cope of the 63d were amongst the former, and my Aid de Camp Lieut Money, who was a most promising Officer, died of his Wounds a few days after. Lt Col. Tarleton as soon as he had taken care of his wounded, pursued & dispersed the remaining part of Sumpters Corps, and then having assembled some Militia under Mr Cunningham, whom I appointed Brigr General of the Militia of that district, and who has by far the greatest influence in that Country; He returned to [b]the Broad River, where he at present remains, as well as Major McArthur in the neighbourhood of Brierley's ferry.

a S *reads* one and twenty

b S *omits* the

It is not easy for Lt Col. Tarleton to add to the reputation He has acquired in this Province but the defeating 1000 Men posted on very strong ground and occupying log-houses, with 190 Cavalry and 80 Infantry, is a proof of that Spirit and those talents which must render the most essential services to his Country.—Lt Col. Tarleton commends much the good behaviour of the Officers and Men under his Command, and He particularly mentions Lieut Skinner of the 16th Regt of Infantry, who does duty with the Legion, as having distinguished himself. [c]Lt Col. Balfour by putting the Prisoners on board of Ships [d]is enabled to spare the 64th Regt from Charles-town, and sent them to secure the navigation of the Wateree from Nelson's Ferry, and to communicate with Camden. This is the present state of our affairs.[e]

c VE *new* ¶ S *ends*

d ER *read* was

e E *runs on*

Smallwood had been encamped from the beginning of last Month with about *thirteen* hun-

dred Militia, a Corps of 250 Continentals under Morgan, and 70 Dragoons Commanded by Washington about 12 Miles on this side of Charlotte Town; His front guarded by Davie and other irregular Corps, who have committed the most shocking cruelties, and the most horrid Murders on those suspected of being our friends, that I ever heard of; Gates joined him the Week before last with about 12 hundred Continentals and Six & Eighteen Months-men, and 300 Cavalry under White and Armand; Morgan's Infantry and Washington with 100 Cavalry, came down on the 1st, in the evening to Attack a Block house built by Col. Rugeley, in which he had placed [a]himself with 100 Militia; Lord Rawdon who Commands at Camden, and had notice of their approach, sent to Rugeley to Order him to retire to Camden, but He answered that as the Enemy had no Cannon he was determined to defend himself to the last extremity, and had no fear of being taken. The enemy's Infantry did not advance within six Miles of his Block house, but the Cavalry surrounded it and Summoned him, and He instantly surrendered without firing a shot. I am informed that Green is expected in a few days to relieve Gates.

a R *omits* himself with

[b]As it will be necessary to drive back the Enemy's army, and at the same time to maintain a superiority on both our Flanks, and as I thought [c]the co-operation of General Leslie even at the distance of [d]the Cape-Fear River would be attended with many difficulties I have sent Cruizers off the Fryingpan to bring him into Charles-town, and I hourly expect his arrival. [e]After every thing that has happened I will not presume to make Your Excellency any sanguine promises; [f]The force you have sent me is greater than I expected, and full as much as I think you could possibly spare unless the enemy detached in force to the Southward, the utmost exertion of my abilities shall be used to employ them to the best advantage.

b B *continues*

c E *inserts* that

d B *omits* the

e B *new* ¶

f B *italics to* spare(2*lines*)

Whenever our operations commence Your Ex-

cellency may depend on hearing from me as frequently as possible, and it is from events alone that any future Plan can be proposed.[a2] I have[b] the honour to be,[c] with great esteem, Your most Obedient and Most humble servant, [d]CORNWALLIS.[e]
His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. &c &c &c

2a about this time Col. Ross returned to America, & it will be seen as follows.

a B *ends*
b R *ends* &c. (signed) Cornwallis
c M *ends* &c. Cornwallis E *omits* with great esteem
d E *inserts* (Signed)
e V *ends*

35B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [49 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Copy.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Wynnesborough, December 3, 1780.
This is two parts of No. 35 *as shown in margins pp* 302-4, 308-9.

35F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, TARLETON *p* 200.
Extract of a letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp at Wynnesborough, December 3, 1780.
This extract from No. 35 *is shown in margin p* 304.

35S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, TARLETON *p* 203.
Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp, at Wynnesborough, December 3, 1780.
This extract from No. 35 *is shown in margins pp* 306-307.

35V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, LS PA 156/543.
Endorsed In Earl Cornwallis's of 18th December 1780.[f] (5) dr 43.
Same as No. 35 *with variations shown in margins pp* 302-309.

f *see* ii. 356

35E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, Copy PA 156/559.
Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated, Camp at Wynnesborough December 3d 1780.
Same as No. 35 *with variations shown in margins pp* 302-309.

35R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, Copy RI 19/59.
Same as No. 35 *with variations shown in margins pp* 302-309.

35M: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 3 December 1780, Copy HL No 43.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis, to

Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Camp at Wynnesborough December 3rd 1780. Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 27 Feby 1781. (8) R/ 25th April No 43.

Same as No. 35 *with variations shown in margins pp* 302-309.

---

36 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, 13 Dec. 1780, Copy RI 19/54.
OBSERVATIONS [46 *Ap'x*] *p* 128, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Duplicate New York 13th December 1780.

a B *begins* [a]My Lord, I am honored with Your Lordship's Letters of the 3d and 22d of September, by the Thames, which arrived here the 12th Ultimo. And on the 5th Instant I received by the Beaumont, those from Lord Rawdon,
b B *stops*] and Colonel Balfour to General Leslie.[b]

As that General received Your first Invitation on the 7th Ultimo, I naturally supposed that he would have sailed very soon after to join You at Cape Fear; but am sorry to find he did not move from the Chesa-
c B *continues* peak before the 22d. [c]Inclosed I send your Lordship
d B *new* ¶ a Return of the Force that embarked with him; [d]it was all I could spare, and I thought it fully adequate to the Services required. My first Instructions to General Leslie put that Corps entirely subject to Your Lord-
e B *new* ¶ ship's orders; [e]I did not, I confess, however, suppose it would move to Cape Fear. But having afterwards too good reason to dread Ferguson's Fate, I in a second Instruction recommended that Measure, as the only Salutary one under the Circumstances I appre-
f B *runs on* hended Ferguson's Defeat would place your Lordship.[f]

By a letter of Colonel Balfour's to General Leslie (without date) are these Expressions "I have only to repeat that the *Safety* of this Province *now* is concerned in your getting as fast as possible near
g B *reads by* us." I should be sorry to understand [g]from this, that the Province is really in danger. Wishing, however, to give your Lordship's operations in North Carolina, every Assistance in my Power, tho' I can ill spare it, I have sent another Expedition into the Chesapeak, under the Orders of Brigadier General

Arnold, Lieutenant Colonels Dundas, and Simcoe.[1] The Force by land is not equal to that which sailed with General Leslie; but I am not without Hopes it will operate [a]essentially in favor of Your Lordship, either by striking at Gates's Depôt at Petersburg, (which I have still reason to think is considerable) or finally by taking Post at Portsmouth, which I have ever considered as very important, for Reasons most obvious. If we take Post there, fortify, & assemble the Inhabitants; it ought not afterwards to be quitted: and therefore I cannot suppose Your Lordship will wish to alter the [b]destination of this Corps, without absolute necessity. [c]On the contrary I flatter myself, that, should Your Success be such as Your Lordship will, I hope, *now* have reason to expect, [d]You will reinforce that Corps, and enable it to act offensively. When that is your Intention, I am to request that the following Corps may in their Turn be considered for that Service, *Viz.* The Troop of 17th Dragoons, the Yagers, the Detachment of the 17th Foot, and the Provincial light Infantry, &c.[e]

a B *inserts* most

b B *reads* disposition

c B *new* ¶

d B *inserts* that

e B *runs on*

I need not tell Your Lordship that these Detachments have left me very bare indeed of Troops; nor that Washington still continues very strong—at least 12000 Men; that he has not detached a single Man as yet to the Southward, except Lee's cavalry —about 250. I need not tell You also that there are 6000 French already at Rhode Island; but I must acquaint Your Lordship that six compleat Regiments more are expected, under Convoy of a Number of Capital Ships. [f]Whatever may have been the Intention of the French in sending a Reinforcement to this Country,[g] I think, [h]however the Season is now too far advanced to expect the last; and, was I not clearly of that opinion, I should scarcely dare detach as I do.[i]

f B *inserts* But

g B *full point*

h B *omits* however

i B *runs on*

As I have always said, I think Your Lordship's [k]Movements to the Southward most important; and as I ever have done, so I will now give them all the

k B *reads* movement

1a I send still another detatchment into Chesapeak to act in favour of L. Cornwallis of 2500.

Assistance I can. It remains to be proved whether we have Friends in North Carolina—I am sure we had three years ago—That Experiment now will, [a]however, [b]be fairly tried;[2] if it succeeds, and we hold the Entrance of the Chesapeak, I think the Rebels will scarcely risk another Attempt upon those Provinces.[c]

a B *omits* however
b B *italics* be fairly tried
c B *ends*

I am very happy to find by Your Letter to General Leslie, that Your Lordship is so well recovered from your late Indisposition, which had given me the greatest Pain & Concern.

As Your Lordship's Dispatch of the 12th November, & Lord Rawdon's & Col[l] Balfour's Letters to General Leslie, brought here by the Beaumont, were addressed on His Majesty's Service; I took the Liberty to break the Seals, supposing they might contain Intelligence necessary for my Information.

Should your Lordship at any Time judge it expedient to reinforce the Corps under General Arnold, You will of course either continue it under his Orders, or send any other General Officer you think proper to take the Command, whenever you may think such Alteration necessary.

I have the honor to be Your Lordship's most obedient & most humble Servant

Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis.

2a nothing more true than this. &

36B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [46 *Ap'x*] *p* 128. *With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Copy.—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, December 13, 1780.

This is two parts of No. 36 *as shown in margins pp* 310-312.

---

37 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 22 Dec 1780, Copy RI 20/9. OBSERVATIONS 1·2 [52 *Ap'x*] *p* 128, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton. Dec[r] 22[d] 1780 N° 120.

1b compare this letter with the preceeding. Ross had returned to his Lordship and had advised him to hold this language

2d L C aid de Camp Capt Ross had joined him with C. Balfour the day before the date of this

Copy Wynnesborough 22d Decr 1780

[a]Sir, I have the [b]Pleasure to inform your Excellency that Major Genl Leslie arrived with his whole Fleet at Charlestown on the 14th of this Month; with no other Loss than the Dragoon Horses, and a great part of those for the Quarter Master General. The Species of Troops which compose the Reinforcement are exclusive of the Guards & Regiment of Bose, exceedingly bad.* I do not mean by representing this to your Excellency to insinuate that you have not sent every Assistance to me which you cou'd with [c]Safety & Prudence spare from New York. From the account which your Excellency does me the honor to send me of the Situation & Strength of Genl Washingtons Army, and the French Force at Rhode Island, I am convinced that you have done so. But I think it but Justice to the Troops serving in this District to State the Fact; lest the Services performed by the Southern Army shou'd appear inadequate to what might be expected from the Numbers of which it may appear to consist. The Fleet from New York with the Recruits arrived a few Days before Genl Leslie.[d]

It was entirely owing to accident that so many Oat Ships were left at Charlestown. They were

a B *begins*
b B *reads* honour
c B *reads* prudence and safety
d B *ends*

* [*From Observations*] When his Lordship made this remark, he had not seen the troops. He must have, therefore, formed his opinion from the report of others. But in justice to the corps who are spoken so slightingly of, it is necessary to observe, that they have all behaved in such a manner as to merit the applauses of the officers commanding them, and one of them (Fannings) has obtained a British establishment.3

3a I believe it will be acknowledged that the detatchment of 40 of the 17 dragoons were almost the only cavalry that acted with spirit at Cowpens. I could not help observing with not less concern than surprise the great alteration in Lord Cornwallis language & conduct towards me, even to suspect it originated in his Majts Cabinet in Europe, many of the members of which from various causes I could enumerate which rather to see his Lordship in the command than S. H. C. proves his Lordships willingness to take Responsibility on himself suiting their purpose better.

very near being lost in a Gale of Wind off the Bar, & were obliged to come in to refit. I have ordered some of them to be ready to sail with the first Convoy; which will go as soon as the Officers of the Navy think they can proceed with Safety.

As soon as the Victuallers are unloaded I shall apply to the Commanding Officer of the Navy for a Convoy to return with them to England taking also such Transports as are unfit to continue longer in the Service, on board of which the Invalids will be embarked.

The Want of Specie in this Province puts us under the greatest Difficulties. Every method has been pursued to keep the Money in the Hands of the Contractors for Government, and to prevent the Imposition of the Merchants. But the Sum actually in the Province is so inadequate to the necessary Demands, that we have scarcely been able to pay the Subsistence of the Troops.

I do not quite understand the State of the Cartel; but the Number of Prisoners at Charlestown is a great Inconvenience.

L^{t} Colonel Balfour informs me that Major Delancy requested in your Excellency's Name, that he wou'd endeavour to procure some Horses to be sent to Gen^{l} Vaughan; but the great Demand for the Service of this Province for Horses for Cavalry, mounted Infantry & Quarter Master General's Department, has put it out of his Power to do it. Cavalry Accoutrements at Charlestown are very dear & bad, Shou'd your Excellency have received from England more than are wanted for the Service at New York, they will be very useful here.

I am afraid the Expence of quartering the Troops at Charlestown will be very great but I do not know how it can be avoided without breaking the Capitulation in Regard to the Property in Town

I have the honour &^{c} (Signed) CORNWALLIS.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton.

37B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [52 *Ap'x*] *p* 128.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wynnesborough, Dec. 22, 1780.

This extract from No. 37 is shown in margin p 313.

38 CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 January 1781, Copy RI 22/15.
OBSERVATIONS [54 *Ap'x*] *p* 129, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton January 6th 1781. N° 123.

Copy Wynnesborough 6th January 1781.

[a]Sir, I am just honored with your Letter of the 13th ult°. I have written several Letters in the course of last Month, to give your Excellency an account of the State of the Provinces of South Carolina and Georgia, and of the military Transactions. I fear they are all still at Charlestown, as no Opportunity has offered of transmitting them to N. York. The present Addition to the Naval Force in this Quarter, will, I hope, enable me; or, if I am too distant, Lt-colonel Balfour, to transmit Reports more frequently.

a B *begins*

[b]The difficulties I have had to struggle with, have not been occasioned by the opposite Army.[1·2] They always keep at a considerable distance,[3] and [c]retire [4] on our Approach[5] [d]But the constant Incursions of Refugees, North Carolinians, and back Mountain Men, & the perpetual Risings in the different Parts of this Province; the invariable Successes of all these Parties against our Militia, keep the whole Country in continual Alarm, and renders the Assistance of regular Troops every where necessary.[e] Your Excellency will judge of this by the disposition of the Troops, which I have the honor to inclose to you.

b FSV *begin*

c B *reads* disappear
d B *new* ¶

e FSV *stop*

1a opposite army *underlined.*

2d proves that his Lordship was always superior.

3a considerable distance *underlined.*

4a *printed* disappear *underlined.*

5a From the hour Lord Howe & afterwards when S G. Collier left us, I never could get any of the naval chiefs to cooperate heartily. & if I had not established Vessels called Runners I should never have had any communication with the detatched Corps.

[a] FSV *continue*

[a]I shall begin my March to-morrow, (having been delayed a few Days by a Diversion made by the Enemy towards Ninety-Six) and propose keeping on the West of Catawba for a considerable distance. I shall then proceed to pass that River, and the Yadkin. Events alone can decide the future Steps. I shall take every

[b] B *ends*

Opportunity of communicating with Brig[r]-Gen[l] Arnold.[b]

I have directed L[t]-Col[l] Balfour to apply to the Commanding Officer of the Navy to send a Force into Cape Fear immediately and to embark about 200 Men & establish some Post for the Protection of the Victuallers and Vessels in the River.[c]

[c] FSV *stop*

The Expression made use of in the Letter from L[t] Col[l] Balfour to Major General Leslie, was only meant to convey his private Opinion of the Necessity of his complying with my request; and of the Danger to which the Province wou'd be exposed, if it was again left as destitute of Troops as in October last; He certainly had no Apprehensions whilst the Army remained on the Frontiers. I can with Truth assure your Excellency that L[t]-Col[l] Balfour, does not hold the Language of despondency, and that his spirited Exertions, & constant Attention to the good of the Service, have rendered me the most effectual Assistance.

In the hurry of Business your Excellency omitted answering the following Paragraph in my Letter of the 30[th] June. "Mr. Graham, L[t] Governor of Georgia has presented an Account of Money advanced for Refugees to which is added a Charge of 20/- ℔ Diem to the 24[th] of June as Inspect[r] of Refugees in Georgia. But as he informs me that his Commission for that Office is not signed, I beg to know your Pleasure whether this Account is to be allowed."

[d] FSV *continue*
[e] V *ends*

[d]I have the Pleasure to inform your Excellency that the Army here, is perfectly healthy and in good Order.

[f] FS *end*

(signed) CORNWALLIS.[f]

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton.

38B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [54 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wynnesborough, Jan. 6, 1781.
This extract from No. 38 *is shown in margins pp* 315-316.

38F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 January 1781, Extract PA 139/425.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] General Earl Cornwallis to General Sir Henry Clinton K.B. 6[th] January 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's N[o] 119.[a] 47. 12. E
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis to General Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Wynnesborough 6[th] January 1781.
This is three parts of No. 38 *as shown in margins pp* 315-316.
[a] *see* ii. 361

38S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 January 1781, Extract PA 631/161.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis to His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Wynnesborough 6[th] January 1781.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] General Earl Cornwallis to His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Wynnesborough 6[th] January 1781.
This is three parts of No. 38 *as shown in margins pp* 315-316.

38V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 6 January 1781, Extract HL N[o] 47.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] General Earl Cornwallis to Gen[l] Sir Henry Clinton K.B. 6[th] January 1781. Transmitted to L[d] Geo: Germain In Sir H[y] Clinton's of 27 Feb[y] 1781 12 R/ 25[th] April N[o] 47.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lieu[t] Gen[l] Earl Cornwallis to General Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Wynnesborough 6[th] January 1781.
This is three parts of No. 38 *as shown in margins pp* 315-316.

39 LESLIE TO CLINTON, 8 January 1781, Copy RI 22/16.
OBSERVATIONS [56 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
Copy Camden 8[th] January 1781.
[a]Sir, [b]I arrived here some Days ago with the Guards, the Regiment of Bose and Yagers. I went to Wynnesborough to see [c]Lord Cornwallis. He
[a] B *begins*
[b] FS *begin*
[c] B *reads* Earl

moves [a]this Day, and I march to-morrow with the above Troops, & N° Carolina Regiment. I meet his Lordship about 70 Miles from [b]hence.

The Troops are exceeding healthy & the Weather has been very favorable.[c]

As to News I refer your Excellency to your other Letters. I find my good friend Captain Gayton returns to the Chesapeak and Cap[t] Barclay continues at Charles Town, he was ready to go home in the room of the Camilla.

I wrote your Excellency on my Arrival in Carolina.

I have the honor &[c] (Signed) A LESLIE.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton

a B *reads* to-day

b F *reads* here

c BFS *end*

39B: LESLIE to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [56 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Major-general Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camden, Jan. 8, 1781.

This extract from No. 39 *is shown in margins pp* 317-318.

39F: LESLIE to CLINTON, 8 January 1781, Extract PA 139/433.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Major General Leslie to Sir H. Clinton K.B. Camden 8th January 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's N° 119[d] (14.) E

Begins Extract of a Letter from Major General Leslie to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Camden 8th January 1781.

This extract from No. 39 *is shown in margins pp* 317-318.

d *see* ii. 361

39S: LESLIE to CLINTON, 8 January 1781, Extract PA 631/163.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Major General Leslie to His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Camden 8th January 1781.

Begins Extract of a Letter from Major Gen[l] Leslie to His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Camden 8th January 1781.

This extract from No. 39 *is shown in margins pp* 317-318.

---

40 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 18 January 1781, LS RI 22/18.

ANSWER [1] *p* 84, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton. Camp on Turkey Creek, Broad River 18th January 1781. N° 125.

[a]Camp on Turkey Creek Broad River 18th Jany 1781.

[b]Sir, In my Letter of the sixth of this month I had the honour to inform Your Excellency, that I was ready to begin my March for North Carolina, having been delayed [c]some days by a diversion made by the Enemy towards Ninety Six.[1] General Morgan still remained on the Pacolet, his Corps by the best accounts I could get, consisted of about five hundred men, Continental & Virginia State Troops, & one hundred Cavalry under Colonel Washington, & six or seven hundred Militia, but that Body is so fluctuating, that it is impossible to ascertain its number, within some hundreds, for three days following [d]Lieut Colonel Tarleton with the Legion & Corps annexed to it, consisting of about 300 Cavalry & as many Infantry, & the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regt, and one three pounder, had already passed the Broad River, for the Relief of Ninety Six. I therefore directed Lieut Colonel Tarleton to march on the West [e]of Broad River, to endeavour to strike a blow at General Morgan, &, at all events, to oblige him to repass the Broad River. I likewise ordered, that He should take with him the 7th Regimt and one three pounder,[2] which were marching to reinforce the Garrison of Ninety Six, as long as he should think their Services could be usefull to him. The Remainder of the Army marched between the Broad River and Catawba. [f]As General Greene had quitted Mecklenburgh County, & crossed the Pedee, I made not the least doubt that General Morgan would retire on our advancing. The Progress of the Army was greatly impeded by heavy Rains, which swelled the Rivers & Creeks; yet Lieut Col[l] Tarleton conducted his March so well, & got so near to General Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make

a SVER *insert* Cop
b BF *begin*
c V *inserts* for
d BF *new* ¶
e SR *insert* Side
f BF *new* ¶

1a The last accounts I had from your Lordship are those of the 29th and 31 octr *80* Pages 32 to 40 my observations, by these the reader will observe I had no reason to suppose you had the least intention of marching into North Carolina.

2a in all about 1000.

it dangerous for him to pass Broad River, & came up with him at 8 [a]A. M. on the 17 Inst: Everything now bore the most promising Aspect. The Enemy were drawn up in an open Wood, and having been lately joined by some Militia, were more numerous; but the different Quality of the Corps under Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton's Command and his great superiority in Cavalry, left him no room to doubt of the most brilliant Success. The Attack was begun by the first Line of Infantry, consisting of the 7[th] Reg[t], the Infantry of the Legion & Corps of Light Infantry annexed to it, a Troop of Cavalry was placed on each Flank; the 1[st] Battalion of the 71[st],[b] and the Remainder of the Cavalry, formed the Reserve. The Enemy's Line soon gave way, & their Militia quitted the Field; but our Troops having been thrown into some disorder by the pursuit, General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them an heavy fire; This unexpected Event, occasioned the utmost confusion in the first Line[3], the 1[st] Battalion of the 71[st] & the Cavalry were successively ordered up but neither the exertions, intreaties [c]or Example of Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton could prevent the panic from becoming general; the two three pounders were taken, & I fear the Colours of the seventh Regim[t] shared the same fate; In justice to the Detachment of the Royal Artillery, I must here observe, that no [d]terrors could induce them to abandon their Guns, & they were all either killed or wounded in the defence of them. Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton with difficulty assembled fifty of his Cavalry, who having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated [e]by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to Victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse, retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy [f]who had taken possession of it, & after destroying what they could not conveniently bring

a BF *read* o'clock of themorning of the V *inserts* o'clock

b SER *insert* Regt.

c S *reads* nor

d F *reads* terror

e F *reads* with

f V *reads* that

3a from our flimsy order of it did not often happen.
2 deep and open files I wonder

off, retired with the Remainder, unmolested, to Hamilton's Ford, near the Mouth of Bullocks Creek. The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but, I fear, about 400 of the Infantry, are either killed, wounded or taken. I will transmit the particular account of the Loss, as soon as it can be ascertained.

It is impossible to foresee all the consequences, that this unexpected, & extraordinary event may produce,[4] but Your Excellency may be assured, that nothing but the most absolute necessity shall induce me to give up the important object of the Winters Campaign. [a]I shall direct Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour to transmit a Copy of this Letter, by the first opportunity, to the Secretary of State.

a BF *new* ¶

I have the Honor to be[b] Your most obed[t] & most humble Serv[t]

CORNWALLIS.

b BF *end* &c. Cornwallis SER *end* &c (Signed) Cornwallis c V *ends*

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &[ca] &[ca] &[ca][c]

4a turn to your letters & Lord Rawdons not above a month prior to the date of this. what did you then think of a move into N. Carolina. Even before you had levelled some of the works of Charles Town & left that place open, or had lost all your light troops, which was the case at Cowpens while acting under the advice of that honorable & able officer Lord Rawdon all went well, you did justice to my zeal & exertions to assist your operations but the fact that certain Ignorant evil councillors joined you, one of them lately from Europe you disapproved all the Com[r] in chief did, & which you had approved before you claimed fruit as an œconomist which you knew belonged to the Commander in chief, & with less means & less hopes than you ever had before & you move into N. Carolina for no other purpose I am convinced than to receive the Command from me

40B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 Jan. 1781, ANSWER [1] *p* 84.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Camp on Turkey-Creek, Broad River, Jan. 18, 1781.

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

40F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 January 1781, TARLETON *p* 249.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated camp on Turkey creek, Broad river, Jan. 18[th], 1781.

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

41

40S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 January 1781, Copy PA 139/429.
Endorsed Copy Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton Camp on Turkey Creek Broad River 18th January 1781. Received ℔ the Halifax the 16th February In Sir Hy Clinton's No 119.[a] 48 (13)

[a] *see* ii. 361

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

40V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 January 1781, Copy PA 157/31.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton Dated 18th Jany 1781. In Earl Cornwallis's of 18th Jany 1781.[b]

[b] *see* ii. 358

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

40E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 January 1781, Copy PA 631/162.
Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Camp on Turkey Creek Broad River 18th Jany 1781. received by the Halifax Sloop of War 16th Feby.

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

40R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 18 January 1781, Copy HL No 48.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated 18th Jany 1781. Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 27 Febry 1781. (13) R/ 25th April No 48

Same as No. 40 *with variations shown in margins pp* 319-321.

41 ARNOLD TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [61 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, January 23, 1781.

The line of works begun, which are necessary for the defence of this place, your Excellency will observe (by the plan inclosed) are very extensive, and from the situation of it, cannot be contracted. The engineer's opinion of them, and the number of men necessary for their defence, against a superior force, I do myself the honour to inclose. Lieutenant-colonels Dundas and Simcoe, are clearly of opinion with me, that three thousand men are necessary for

their defence. We have all been greatly deceived in the extent and nature of the ground. There are many places in the river much easier defended with half the number of men. From the sketch of the place your Excellency will judge whether our opinion is well founded or not.

This province and North Carolina, are collecting the militia, undoubtedly with a view to pay us a visit. Their numbers, from the best information I can obtain, are four thousand or five thousand. At present I can hardly imagine they will attack this post, though the works are of no manner of service to us; and all our force cannot complete them in three months: I therefore think it my duty to request a reinforcement of at least two thousand men, which would render the post permanent and secure against any force the country could bring, as detachments could always be made (leaving the garrison secure) to disperse the militia, whenever it was found they were collecting; and the advantages of transportation, which we may derive from light boats (of which I propose to build fifty) would enable us to move with double the celerity, that the militia could do with every exertion.

The country people have not come in, in numbers, as I expected; the necessity of General Leslie's removing from this place, after their being assured[1,2] of his intention to remain here, has impressed them with the idea that we shall do the same; which is not easily effaced, as they have many of them suffered severely since his departure. I have not with certainty been informed where he is at present—Reports, which are contradictory, say at Cape Fear; others that he is at Charles-town; and some say at neither. I know not what opinion to form; neither have I heard from Lord Cornwallis, but by reports, which say he is at or near Camden—No opportunity

1a look to my instructions to G. Leslie.

2a assured *underlined.*

has yet presented of writing to either of these gentlemen—but I am of opinion our diversion at Richmond will operate much in his favour, as I am informed the militia and light-horse, sent to reinforce the rebel army, under Greene, have been ordered to return.

42 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [63 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to General Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, February 5, 1781.

My Lord, I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a letter I have lately received from Brigadier-general Arnold, by which you will perceive that with scarcely one thousand men (for several of his transports, that had been separated on the voyage, had not then rejoined him) he penetrated to Richmond, the capital of Virginia, and has rendered important service, by destroying a valuable foundry, a considerable quantity of public stores, cannon, &c. &c. Indeed the whole of his operations upon the occasion appear to have been conducted in a manner which strongly marks his character of a very active and good officer—and I sincerely hope, that this important stroke will essentially aid your Lordship's operations.

43 ARNOLD TO CLINTON, 13 Feb. 1781, Extract PA 139/385. OBSERVATIONS [64 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Brig^r^ General Arnold to General Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Portsmouth 13^th^ February 1781. rec^d^ the 19^th^. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's N^o^ 119.[a] 7.

[a] *see* ii. 361

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Arnold to General Sir Henry Clinton K. B. dated Portsmouth 13^th^ February 1781.

[b] BF *begin*

[b]"No time has been lost in repairing the old and erecting New works here (in which the Negroes have been very serviceable) but none are yet Com-

pleat. Repairing Barracks, foraging, and patroling with large Parties, has engrossed the Time of a great part of the Troops. One hundred Men are posted at the Great Bridge. [a]Lieu[t] Colonel Simcoe, with near Four hundred Men, are in Princess Anne County, scouring the County of several parties and arranging matters with the Country people.

a B *new* ¶

The Enemy are at Suffolk with Two thousand five hundred, or three thousand Men; They threaten an Attack [b]on us, but I cannot suppose them capable of so much temerity; We are prepared for them at all points, and I believe nothing will induce them to Attack us, but the hope of succeeding in a surprize, and despair of keeping their tattered force together, through want of Provisions, and the necessity of their ploughing their Lands to prevent a famine the ensuing Year.[c]

b B *reads* upon

c B *ends*

I have requested a Ship from Commodore Symonds to send to My Lord Cornwallis—I have not received an answer, but if she is furnished me, I intend proposing to My Lord, if the Cooperation will be of Service to him, to send some Boats with four or five hundred Troops thro' Curratucks inlet, to Sweep the Albemarle Sound as high as Edington, & to go to Newburn and destroy their Shipping Stores &ca, while a few armed Vessels take Post at Ocracuck Bar, and a Frigate Cruises without—This Movement I am convinced will have a good effect, first, by destroying the Navigation of North Carolina, and thereby distressing the Inhabitants, and secondly by taking off their Attention from my Lord Cornwallis and General Leslie.

A number of my Boats are begun, & if Fifty or one hundred Ship Carpenters and Boat Builders could be procured in New York, or elsewhere and sent here, they might be employed to great advantage.

I have sent Six Vessels under Convoy of a Frigate to the Eastern Shore of Maryland, for forage, provision, and Lumber"

[a] F *omits* February 14th

[a]February 14th

Yesterday at one o'Clock P. M. anchored in Linn Haven Bay Three french Ships of War, one of 64 Guns and two Frigates, it remains a doubt where they are from, and whether they are King's Ships or Merchantmen, I believe the latter, tho' the Gentlemen of the Navy are of opinion they are the former, & from Rhode Island; A Vessel sails this Evening at my request for Charles Town to prevent Commodore Gayton, or any Frigate coming this way from falling into their hands."[b]

[b] F *ends*

43B: ARNOLD to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [64 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 13, 1781.

This extract from No. 43 *is shown in margins pp* 324-325.

43F: ARNOLD to CLINTON, 13 February 1781, Extract PA 606/152.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Arnold dated Head Q^rs^ Portsmouth February the 13th 1781.

Begins Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Arnold dated Head Quarters Portsmouth February the 13th 1781.

Same as No. 43 *with variations shown in margins pp* 324-326.

44 CLINTON TO ARNOLD, OBSERVATIONS [67 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Brigadier-general Arnold, dated New York, February 18, 1781.

Appearances at Rhode Island give me reason to suppose that the ships seen last Wednesday were the avant garde from that place. Should they pay you a visit from Rhode Island, you may rest assured every attention will be paid to your situation, and that our movements will be regulated by theirs.

I am afraid Tarleton's affair is too true; but I have reason notwithstanding to believe Lord Cornwallis is far advanced in Carolina.

45 CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, ANSWER [34] *p* 85.

[a]*By the Right Honourable* [b]*Charles Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-general of his Majesty's Forces, &c. &c. &c.*

a B *begins* S *inserts* copy
b F *begins* By Charles

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS it has pleased the Divine Providence to prosper the operations of his Majesty's arms in driving the rebel army out of this province; and whereas it is his Majesty's most gracious wish to rescue his faithful and loyal subjects from the cruel tyranny under which they have groaned for [c]several years, I have thought proper to issue this Proclamation, to invite all such faithful and loyal subjects to repair, without loss of time, with their arms and ten days provisions, to the Royal Standard now erected at Hillsborough, where they will meet with the most friendly reception: and I do hereby assure them that I am ready to concur with them in effectual measures for suppressing the remains of rebellion in this province, and for the re-establishment of good order and constitutional government.

c B *reads* many

Given [d]under my hand at head quarters at Hillsborough this 20th [e]day of February, [f]in the year of our Lord 1781, and in the twenty-first year of his Majesty's reign. [g]CORNWALLIS.

By his Lordship's command, H. BRODRICK, Aid de Camp.

God save the King.[h]

d S *reads* &c. at Hillsborough
e S *omits* day
f S *ends* 1781 (Signed) Cornwallis
g F *inserts* (Signed)
h B *ends*

45B: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 20 Feb. 1781, TARLETON *p* 256.
Same as No. 45 *with variations shown in margin p* 327.

45F: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 20 Feb. 1781, Copy PA 157/209.
Endorsed Copy of a Proclamation issued at Hillsborough, in North Carolina, by Earl Cornwallis. dated the 20th of Febry 1781. In Lord Cornwallis's No 7.[i]

i No. 58 *p* 354

Same as No. 45 *with variations shown in margin p* 327.

45S: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 20 Feb. 1781, Copy [k]RI 19/76.
Same as No. 45 *with variations shown in margin p* 327.

k *in* No. 77V: *p* 416

46 ARNOLD TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [65 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 25, 1781.

After my dispatches were closed (which were intended to go by the General Monk) three French ships, one a sixty-four, the other two frigates, arrived from Rhode Island, and anchored in Lynhaven Bay. On the 14th instant they arrived in Hampton road, and remained there until the 19th, when they left the Capes, and are said to be now cruizing to the southward of them.

Before the arrival of the French ships, the enemy's force did not exceed two thousand five hundred men, at Suffolk and in the vicinity, which was greatly augmented soon after their arrival. On the 18th they came down in force, near our lines, and surprised a piquet of six men; but soon retired. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe with four hundred men being in Princess Anne county, I did not think it prudent to leave our works to attack them.

I have very good intelligence that the rebels at Suffolk have been informed by express from General Greene, that on the 16th or 18th instant, my Lord Cornwallis crossed the Dan river, sixty miles above Halifax, and one hundred and twelve from Petersburgh, with one thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry, and was on the march for Petersburgh. Generals Greene and Morgan, with three thousand or four thousand men, chiefly militia, were retiring before him; in consequence of which a considerable part of their troops, have been detached to join General Greene. I have not been able to ascertain the number of troops remaining at Suffolk and in the vicinity; I expect to do it in a day or two, in which time every possible effort shall be made to complete our works in such a manner, that a considerable detachment may be made to proceed up the James river, with some ships to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis; and if he should have reached the

river, to furnish him with such supplies of provisions, &c. as we can spare, and his troops be most in need of.

47 ARNOLD TO CLINTON, 27 Feb. 1781, Extract PA 139/481. OBSERVATIONS [67 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Brig[r] Gen[l] Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton K. B. dated Portsmouth February 27[th] 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's N[o] 120[a] 35. Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General Arnold dated [b]Portsmouth February 27[th] 1781

[a] *see* ii. 364

[b] F *begins* Copy

[c] F *inserts* Sir

[c]"I had the honor of addressing Your Excellency the 25[th] Instant. My Dispatches were sent on Board the Bonetta, She was waiting for a fair Wind, when I was honored with Your Excellency's Letter of the 18[th] Instant which was delivered me this Morning.[d] I have not the least doubt, that every possible Attention will be paid to Our Situation. We are under no Apprehensions at present from the Force of the Country, and if the French should detach from Rhode Island to this place, I have not the least doubt of defending it against the Force of the Country and Two thousand French Troops, [e]'till a reinforcement can arrive from New York.

[d] B *begins*

[e] B *reads* until

Tomorrow I intend Embarking some Stores, and the next day about five hundred Troops, under the [f]order of Lieu[t] Colonel Dundas, to proceed up the James River, to make a diversion in favour of My Lord Cornwallis."[g]

[f] B *reads* orders

[g] B *ends* F *ends* I have the honour to be &c. (signed) B.Arnold.

47B: ARNOLD to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [67 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, K.B. dated Portsmouth, February 27, 1781.

This extract from No. 47 *is shown in margin p* 329.

47F: ARNOLD to CLINTON, 27 February 1781, Copy HL N[o] 4.

Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.

Endorsed Copy. Brig[r] Gen[l] Arnold to Sir Henry

Clinton K.B. Portsmouth 27th Feby 1781. In Sir
a see ii. 364 Hy Clinton's of 1st March 1781a (2.) (No 4)

Same as No. 47 with variations shown in margin p 329.

48 CLINTON TO ARNOLD, OBSERVATIONS [68 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Copy.—Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Brigadier-general Arnold, dated New York, March 1, 1781.

Sir, I suppose of course that the admiral, who knew your situation on the 21st, and heard at the same time, that the sixty-four and two frigates were from Rhode Island, has detached to your relief;—lest he should not, I have repeatedly pressed him to do it since.

The French fleet has not yet sailed from Rhode Island; if it does, encumbered with troops, the admiral will of course follow without incumbrance; and, when he has fixed them, it will be time enough to send troops. In case a fleet should appear under French colours, do not be alarmed, as I shall advise the admiral to send in that manner, to deceive the enemy.

There is information of from twelve to fourteen hundred troops being at Brunswick the 27th of February, on their way to the southward. These it is our business to watch.

The troops which are all ready embarked, are detained till I receive certain advice that the French ships are removed from the Chesapeak, there being nothing here but frigates to convoy them.

I have received a letter this day from the admiral, dated the 4th: he has given me no possitive information of the movements of the French; he will send a ship to observe their situation in Rhode Island, and will proceed accordingly. Should he call here, the troops will in all probability sail with him; if he does not, I shall send them as soon as I know the way to the Chesapeak is clear.

49 CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 5 March 1781,[1] Copy RI 22/69.
NARRATIVE [5] *p* 9, ANSWER [5] *p* 85 [Received June, 1781.2·3]
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes from ANSWER.

Copy New York March 5th 1781.

[a]My Lord, I was honoured with your Lordships Dispatches dated the 18th [b]Nov[r], the 3d 4th 6th 7th 22d & 29th [c]December, and 3d 6th and 18th [d]January by the Halifax Sloop of War on the 16th Ulto—And by the Mercury Packet which will sail in a day or two for Europe, I propose to transmit Copies of such of them to the Minister, as may be necessary for His Majesty's Information.

a F *begins*
b F *inserts* of
c F *inserts* of
d F *inserts* of

What your Lordship observes in your Letter of the 4th December, I am very sensible of; and am fully persuaded that no representation I can make will have any Effect upon men lost to every Sense of humanity.

I am sorry to say my Lord, that I have the same reason to lament the want of safe Conveyances for my Dispatches, which your Lordship regrets in your Letter of the 6th January having had several prepared for your Lordship ever since the beginning of that Month. And I am even now obliged to trust them by the precarious Conveyance of a Merchant Vessel, as I have in vain applied for a Ship of War for these two Months past for the purpose.[4]

I request your Lordship's Forgiveness for the omission I was guilty of in not answering the Paragraph of your Letter of the 30th June, relative to Lieut Governor Graham. As there are now no Refugees in Georgia and of Course no occasion for such an Office as that to which he was appointed;

1a recd by Col. Balfour the 6. of April. but he neglected to send it to L. C.

2b why not before. Col Balfour recd & read it on the 7th April.

3a This is one of the letters which Lord Cornwallis expected from C. Town when he marched into Virginia.

4a had repeatedly apply'd for a frigate to convey my dispatches, but the Admiral could never spare one, he certainly was the best judge how to employ the Navy but the land operations suffered for want often.

and as he is now in full Possession of his Property, and does not seem to wish for a continuance of the Employment, it is very proper that it shou'd cease, and but reasonable that Mr. Graham shou'd be
a F *inserts* for reimbursed [a]the Sums he has advanced as well as paid his Salary of 20s. ℔ Day for himself & Clerk from the 3d of March to the Period he ceased to act.

It gives me very great Pleasure to learn from your Lordship that the Army under your Command is now perfectly healthy and in good Order.

I am sorry the Oatships met with an Accident off Charlestown Bar. It is a risk in my Opinion which every Fleet runs that Anchors there. Surely it wou'd have been better for them to have stood off and on. But of those Sea Matters I am of course not a competent Judge.

I am glad to find that your Lordship intends to send the Victuallers and all such Transports to England as are unfit for Service, their speedy Return
b F *runs on* being most earnestly desired.[b]

I wou'd wish to have all such Invalids, whose Times of Service do not entitle them to Chelsea, & tho' unfit for Service in the Field may be able to do duty in Garrison; sent here from Time to Time that they may be placed in the Garrison Battalion which will finally ensure to them His Majesty's Royal Bounty.[5]

As I understand the Chatham, has brought out £50,000 in Specie to Charlestown your Lordships Difficulties with regard to Money will have been removed; but I cannot say so much for ours.

c F *omits that and inserts inverted commas* Lord George Germain having inform'd me [c]that as Major Ross was of opinion that many of the Prisoners in our Hands in Carolina might be induced to serve on board the King's Ships or in Privateers or enlist in the Regiments serving in the West Indies, or go as

5a this explains my motive for raising the G: Batallion, that the public should have their service as long as possible & they at the end of it receive the King's bounty of Chelsea.

Volunteers upon Expeditions in that Quarter; he had recommended to your Lordship to get rid of all you could in those several ways, or in any other your Lordship shou'd think fit to be adopted.[a] It is unnecessary for me to add any Thing upon that Subject, but to say that I leave them entirely to your Lordships disposal.[6]

a F *inverted commas end*

I wish it had been possible to have procured the Horses for Gen[l] Vaughan, as I fear the Troops may suffer from the drudgeries they were intended to perform.

I know not at present how it is possible my Lord, to avoid the Expence of quartering the Troops at Charlestown, consistent with the Terms of the Capitulation. But I will endeavour to find some means of doing it if it is practicable.

[b]I am most exceedingly concerned My Lord, at the [c]very unfortunate Affair of the 17th [d]of January.[e] From the Account your Lordship gives me of it, I fear Morgan has been in very great Force: that our first Line has been too impetuous, and that the Reserve has sustained[f] too nearly and probably in too loose Order; and that the Enemy has moved against them in that critical Situation. [g]I confess I dread the Consequences. But my hope is, as it ever will be, in your Lordships Abilities and Exertions.[h]

b B *begins*

c F *omits* very

d F *omits* of

e B *stops & inserts* (Cowpen's)

f F *inserts* the other

g B *continues*

h B *stops & continues p* 342 *l* 11

I shall always be happy in paying every Attention to your Recommendations in filling up the Vacancies in the 33d Regiment, as I shall be constantly guided by your Lordship's Wishes with respect to the Promotions of your own Regiment. I have already had an Opportunity of fulfilling my Intentions respecting Col[l] Webster, but this is too unsafe a Conveyance to trust the Commission by. I have[i] &c

(Signed) H. CLINTON.

i F *ends* the honour to be, &c H. Clinton.

Earl Cornwallis[7]

6a better have exchanged them for our own prisoners but this Mr Ross was ever busy in some Plan to Clogg us.

7a I wonder his Lordship did not introduce here all the letters I sent to the care of Col. Balfour.

49B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 5 March 1781, NARRATIVE [5] *p* 9.
Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Cornwallis, March 5, 1781.
Extracts from Nos. 49 *and* 53 *shown in margins pp* 333, 342-343.

49F: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 5 March 1781, ANSWER [5] *p* 85.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, March 5th, 1781. [Received June, 1781.]
Same as No. 49 *with variations shown in margins pp* 331-333.

50 GERMAIN TO CLINTON, 7 March 1781, LS RI 22/71.
REPLY [74] *p* 170.
With Clinton's MS. Notes from REPLY *and* GERMAIN.
Endorsed Triplicate N° 81. Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton K.B. Whitehall 7th March 1781 received the 27th June 1781. Revolt of the Pens[a] Line. Send an expedition to the head of Chesapeak. Board of associated loyalists—to encourage refugees to go to Penobscot. 156.

a V *begins*
b FERN *begin*
c N *omits to* King (3 *lines*)
d F *inserts of*
e F *omits to* inclusive
f BSMO *begin* F *new* ¶ N *continues*
g N *omits* and as
h N *omits* great

(Triplicate) [a]N° 81 [b]Whitehall 7th March 1781[1]
[c]Sir, Since my Letter to you of the 7th [d]Febry, I have received Your Dispatches [e]numbered from 113 to 117 inclusive, and laid them before The King. [f]The Revolt of the Pensylvania Line and Jersey Brigade though not attended with all the good Consequences that might have been expected, are certainly Events of very great Importance and must have very extensive Effects both in reducing Washington's present Force and preventing its being recruited by new Levies, [g]and as I doubt not You will avail Yourself of his Weakness, and Your own [h]great Superiority, to send a considerable Force to the Head of the Chesapeak[2] as soon as the Season will permit Operations to be carried on in that Quarter, I flatter myself the Southern Provinces will be recovered to His Majesty's Obedience before the long promised Succors (none of which are yet sailed,) can arrive

1R read in H. of Lords du Chevr Clinton. [*The King approves Sir H. Clinton's plan.*]
2G Le Roy approuve le Plan

from France, and[a] Mr Washington unable to draw Subsistence for his Troops from the West Side of Hudsons River,[b] be compelled to cross it & take Refuge in the Eastern Provinces. [c]I am very anxious to hear of Lord Cornwallis's Progress since General Leslie joined him, I have no doubt his Movements will be rapid and decisive, for His Lordship appears to be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of vigorous Exertions in the Service of this Country in its present Circumstances. [d]The Success of General Arnolds Enterprize up James River which the Rebel News Papers confirm, must greatly facilitate His Lordships Operations by cutting off [e]Green's Supplies and obliging the Militia to return to take Care of their own Property:[f] Indeed [g]so very contemptible is the Rebel Force now in all Parts, and so vast is Our Superiority every where, that no resistance on their Part is to be apprehended, that can materially obstruct the Progress of the Kings Arms in the Speedy Suppression of the Rebellion; and [h]it is a pleasing tho' at the same time a mortifying reflection when the Duration of the Rebellion is considered, which arises from [i]the View of the [k]Return of the Provincial Forces You have transmitted, that the American Levies in The King's Service are more in number than the whole of the Inlisted Troops in the Service of the Congress.[l]

I am very glad to find You have Commissioned a Board of Directors of the Refugees, and [m]I hope the Admiral will have been able to spare them Shipping to carry on their Operations on the Sea [n]Coasts of the New England Provinces; many of those within the [o]Lines who are unfit for Military Service are desirous of being settled in the Country about Penobscot, and require only to be supplied with Provisions for the first Year, some Tools for Husbandry and Iron Work for their Buildings, and as it is proposed to settle that Country, and this appears a cheap method of disposing of these Loyalists it is wished You would encourage them to go there under the Protection of

a F *inserts* that
b F *inserts* will
c BFSMO *new* ¶
d BS *new* ¶
e BF *read* Greene's
f B *ends* S *stops*
g MO *stop*
h SMO *continue*
i F *reads* a
k F *reads* returns
l SMON *stop*
m N *continues*
n F *reads* coast
o R *reads* Levies

the Associated Refugees, and assure them that a Civil Government will follow them in due time; for I hope in the course of the Summer the Admiral and You will be able to spare a Force sufficient to effect an Establishment at Casco Bay and reduce that Country to The King's Obedience.

a SMO *continue*
b N *omits to*
released

[a]I am very glad to find [b]by the List of the Officers released, that the Exchanges have been carried so far; but as it appears from M[r] Washington's last Letter to You, that they will not be carried on further, the Measure of enlisting their Prisoners for Service in the West Indies, should be adopted [c]immediately,[d] and indeed such has been the Mortality from Sickness among the Troops there, that I do not see any other Means of recruiting them.

c N *omits* immediately
d SMO *stop*

e SMO *continue*
N *omits to*
that

[e]I am sorry to acquaint You, that the General Prevalence of Westerly Winds for these last two Months, has prevented the Warwick and Solebay, with their Convoy, from getting further than Plymouth, where they are still detained.[f]

f FSMON *end*
g VER *end*
&ca Geo: Germain

I am,[g] Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant
Sir Henry Clinton K.B. GEO: GERMAIN.

50B: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, REPLY [74] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Whitehall, 7th March, 1781.
This extract from No. 50 *is shown in margins pp* 334-335.

50F: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, 8 GW 520.
Same as No. 50 *with variations shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50S: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 25.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extrait d'une lettre du lord George Germain à Sir Henri Clinton, datée de Whitehall, le 7 mars 1781.
This is four parts of No. 50 *as shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50V: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Draft PA 139/311.
Endorsed Dra[t] to Sir Henry Clinton 7[th] March 1781. (N° 81.) 39 Ent[d] dup
Same as No. 50 *with variations shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50E: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Copy PA 432/244.
In margin Sir Henry Clinton (N° 81.)
Same as No. 50 *with variations shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50R: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Copy SACKVILLE 9/220.
In margin Sir Henry Clinton (N° 81.)
Same as No. 50 *with variations shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50M: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Extract LANSDOWNE 68/5.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from L^d^ Geo. Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall 7^th^ March 1781. N° 40 Ex.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall 7^th^ March 1781.
This is four parts of No. 50 *as shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50O: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Extract HL N° 40.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall 7^th^ March 1781. N° 40.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall, 7^th^ March 1781.
This is four parts of No. 50 *as shown in margins pp* 334-336.

50N: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 7 March 1781, Fr trans FG 3734/12.
Endorsed Lettre interceptée du Lord George Germain au M^r^ Henry Clinton. 2^eme^
This is three parts of No. 50 *as shown in margins pp* 334-336.

51 GERMAIN TO CORNWALLIS, 7 March 1781, Draft PA 157/19.
REPLY [72] *p* 170, *with Clinton's MS. Note.*

Endorsed Dra^t^ to Earl Cornwallis 7th March 1781. (N° 2) 38. dup. Ent^d^

[a](N°2.) [b]Whitehall 7th March 1781.[1] Earl Cornwallis

[c]My Lord, I have had the honor to receive and lay before The King your Lordship's Dispatch of the 18th of Dec^r^ from Weymesborough transmitting

a V *begins* E *inserts* Copy
b S *begins*
c BF *begin*

1 read in H Lords the whole letter.

Copies of your own and Lord Rawdons Letters to Sir Henry Clinton & Brig[r] Gen[l] Leslie, and His Majesty observed with particular Satisfaction that you were in perfect Health when the former were written, and I beg leave to add my own [a]Congratulations upon your Lordship's recovery.

[a] B *reads* congratulation

The reasons which you assign for calling Gen[l] Leslie from Virginia are founded in Wisdom and could not fail being approved by the King ; and as I have had the pleasure to learn from Col Balfour that Gen[l] Leslie had joined you and you were in motion on the 11[th] of January, I make no doubt but your Lordship will by this time have had the honor to recover the Province of North Carolina to His Majesty, and I am even sanguine enough to hope from your Lordship's distinguished Abilities, and Zeal for the King's Service, that the Recovery of a part of Virginia will crown your Successes before the Season becomes too intemperate for Land Operations, as Sir Henry Clinton has informed me that he has sent a force under Brigadier General Arnold to replace General Leslies at Portsmouth and co-operate with your Lordship I am &c. GEO. GERMAIN.[b]

[b] BFSVE *end*

51B : GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 7 March 1781, REPLY [72] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Earl Cornwallis, dated Whitehall, March 7th, 1781.
Same as No. 51 *with variations shown in margins pp* 337-338.

51F : GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 7 Mar. 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 18.
Extrait d'une lettre du lord George Germain au Comte Cornwallis, datée de Whitehall, le 7 mars 1781.
The same letter as No. 51.

51S : GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 7 March 1781, Copy PA 432/252.
In margin Earl Cornwallis (N° 2.)
The same letter as No. 51.

51V : GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 7 March 1781, Copy SACKVILLE 10/2.
The same letter as No. 51.

51E: GERMAIN to CORNWALLIS, 7 March 1781, Copy HL N° 38.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Earl Cornwallis. 7th March 1781. N° 38.
The same letter as No. 51.

52 ARNOLD to CLINTON, 8 March 1781, Extract PA 139/485.
OBSERVATIONS [71 *Ap'x*] *p* 129, *with Clinton's MS. Note.*
Endorsed Extracts of a Letter from Brig[r] General Arnold to H. E. Sir H. Clinton dated Portsmouth March 8th 1781. Received by the Maria March 12th 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's N° 120[a] (4) 6.
Extracts of a Letter from Brigadier General Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth March 8th 1781.

a *see* ii. 364

[b]"On the 6th I received Information that [c]my Lord Cornwallis had not penetrated further than the Dan or Roanoke [d]Rivers, and that in consequence of the Misinformation (sent to the Rebel Army by Express as mentioned in my last) being contradicted, their Detachment had returned to their Army at Suffolk as well as M[r] Gregory to the Northwest Bridge. Their Force at the former Place 3,000 [e]Men, at the latter 500[1]. On this Change of Affairs, the Troops under the orders of [f]Colonel Dundas, who were designed up the James River, were countermanded ;[g] but as they were on board Ship, and a favorable Opportunity offering to attack the Enemy's Post at the halfway House between Hampton and York, twelve Miles from the former, Lieu[t] Col[l] Dundas being joined by Thirty dismounted Dragoons of the Queen's Rangers, proceeded in Boats on the Night of the 7th to the back River, thirty Miles from his Ships on the Chesapeak Bay, where he landed at 4 OClock about 200 Men, Two Boats with a part of his Detachment having parted with him in a thick Fog and heavy Squall of Wind and Rain. He marched three Miles

b B *begins* FS *begin* Sir
c B *omits* my
d BS *read* river
e B *omits* men
f B *inserts* Lieutenant
g B *stops*

1a and yet Lord Cornwallis asserts that a defensive Post in Chesapeak did not operate in the least in his favour in the Carolinas.

to the Enemies Post, which he found had been evacuated three Nights before. He however destroyed a small Magazine of about One hundred Stands of Arms, some Provision and Amunition, and on his way to New-Port-[a]News fell in with a Party of Forty of the Enemy; a Skirmish ensued, in which, fourteen of the Enemy were left dead on the Field and Seventeen made Prisoners. Among the former was a Colonel Mallery, and a Colonel Curl among the latter.

a F *reads* Mews

Lieu[t] Stewart of the 80[th] Regiment was killed in the Action. Lieu[t] Salisbury of the Romulus and two Privates slightly wounded. Lieu[t] Col[l] Dundas had his Horse shot under him, and upon this, as well as every other occasion, has behaved with great Bravery.

[b]The Enemy within two Days have moved with their Force, said to be upwards of three Thousand Men, to [c]Briskets Mills, twelve Miles from this Place, [d]and threaten an Attack upon us. I have every reason to believe, [e]that they have collected [f]this Force to cooperate with the French Ships and Troops which they hourly expect from Rhode Island "[g]

b B *continues*

c B *reads* Pricket
d F *omits to us*
e B *omits that*
f B *reads* their
g B *ends*

"I have invited the Commodore to meet Lieu[t] Col[ls] Dundas, Simcoe, Robinson & myself, with some of his Officers, to determine our mode of Defence in case of an Attack, which I expect will be done this Evening, or to morrow Morning. I am clearly of opinion that if the Commodore gives up Crany Island Bar, that every King's Ship and Transport here, will fall a Sacrifice in forty Eight Hours after the Arrival of a superior Fleet, and Army to ours."[h]

h F *runs on*

"We are however all in high Spirits, not doubting but that our Wants and critical Situation will be properly attended to."[i]

i FS *end* I have the honour to be &c. (Signed) B. Arnold.

52B: Arnold to Clinton, observations [71 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Brigadier-general Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, March 8, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 52 *as shown in margins pp* 339-340.

52F: ARNOLD to CLINTON, 8 March 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 75.
Extrait d'une lettre du brigadier-général Arnold à Sir Henri Clinton, chevalier du Bain, datée de Portsmouth le 8 mars 1781.
Same as No. 52 *with variations shown in margins pp* 339-340.

52S: ARNOLD to CLINTON, 8 March 1781, Copy HL No 5.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy. Brig-Gen[l] Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Portsmouth March 8[th] 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's of 1[st] March 1781.[a] (3) N[o] 5.
[a] *see* ii. 364
Same as No. 52 *with variations shown in margins pp* 339-340.

53 CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 2/5/8 March 1781, Copy RI 29/67. NARRATIVE [5] *p* 9, ANSWER [58] *p* 86, OBSERVATION [56 *Ap'x*] *p* 129, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from each.*

Copy New York 2d & 5th March 1781.

[a]My Lord,[1.2.3.4.5]

[b]March 2d. Your Lordship may probably hear that[6] the Army and Navy in [c]Chesapeak are blocked up by a superior French Naval Force to that under Capt Symonds. The first Account I had of it was from Gen[l] Arnold dated [d]the 14th Feby & I sent it immediately to the Admiral at [e]Gardners Bay. A Day or two afterwards, I had it confirmed that they

[a] FS *begin*
[b] F *omits* March 2d
[c] S *inserts* the
[d] S *reads* February 14
[e] FS *read* Gardiner's

1aA Col Balfour received this letter & to page 64 on the 6th of April but neglected to send them to Lord Cornwallis.

2dO this letter was delivered to Col. Balfour the 6th of April, but not sent to his Lordship by the many safe opportunities that offered, all those carried by C. Amherst were delivered to Col. Balfour the 6th April.

3aO delivered by him to Col. Balfour the 7th April.

4bO this letter was little likely to have tempted his Lordship into Virginia it was one of those which Col. Balfour neglected sending to L. Cornwallis from the 7th to the 24th tho he had frequent & safe opportunities, nor did he &c. &c.

5aO The following letters were delivered to Col. Balfour the 6th of April & if they were not sent to Lord Cornwallis at Wilmington before he left that Place on the 23d of April at least they might and ought to have been sent to him, & if he had received them, he could not have moved into Virginia. He would not have been taken at York-Town, & America would at this time have made a part of the British Empire.

6dO that *to* navy *underlined.*

were part of the Fleet from Rhode Island, which I have heard since sailed from thence on the 9th Ultimo. Notwithstanding which I greatly fear[7] he[8] has not sent a Naval Force to relieve them. Washington has detached some New England Troops under la Fayette & Howe that way.[a]

a F *runs on omitting* March 5th

March 5th. If so much Time is given I cannot answer for consequences. Portsmouth is safe at this Season against any Attack from the Suffolk Side; but not so from a landing in any of the Bays to the [b]Southward of Elizabeth River.[9] [c]I have much to lament that [d]the Admiral did not think it adviseable to send there at first, as Brigadier General Arnold's [e]projected Move in favor of your Lordship's Operations will have been stop'd.[f10] And if the Admiral Delays it too long, I shall dread still more fatal Consequences.[g11] I have Troops already embarked in a great proportion to that of the Enemy; but to send them under two Frigates only before the Chesapeak is our own, is to[12] sacrifice the Troops and their Convoy.

b F *reads* eastward
c B *continued from p* 333 *l* 26 S *new* ¶
d B *omits to* Brigadier
e S *omits* projected
f B *stops, adding* by the appearance of the French ships.
g S *new* ¶

I inclose[h] your Lordship all the News I have been able to collect: [i]Ethan Allen[13] has I think quitted Congress and put them at Defiance. Your Lordship will see his Plan by the News Paper of the 28th [k]February, said to be genuine. [l]Discontent runs high in Connecticut. In short my Lord there seems [m]nothing wanting to give a mortal Stab to Rebellion, but a proper Reinforcement[14,15] and a [n]permanent[16]

h F *inserts* to
i S *omits* Ethan Allen
k S *inserts* of
l B *continues* F *reads* Discontents run
m BFS *read* little
n S *omits* permanent

7dO was it under such information that Lord Cornwallis should have forced operations that required a Fleet to cover them.

8dO fear he *underlined.*

9aA does not this plainly tell his Lordship that I had determined on a Plan of operation to the northward of Chesapeak and if he had received those dispatches He must have considered them as prohibiting his interference.

10abdmN of War in the Chesapeak.

11aO Surely with this informn His Lordship was little likely to have engaged in operation in Virginia.

12dO to *to* Troops *underlined.*

13aO Allen

14aA proper reinforcement *underlined.*

15cN proper reinforcement *underlined.*

16cN permanent *underlined.*

Superiority at Sea [17·18] for the next Campaign, without which[19] any Enterprize depending[20] on Water Movements[21] must certainly run great Risque.[a] Shou'd the Troops already embarked for [b]Chesapeak proceed, & When there, be able to undertake any Operation in addition to what Brigadier Gen[l] Arnold proposes; I am confident it will be done. Major Gen[l] Phillips will command this Expedition.

[c]Till Col[l] Bruce arrives I am uncertain what Reinforcements are intended for this Army. The Minister has however assured me that every possible Exertion [d]shall be made.[e22·23·24·25·26·27·28·29]

a B *stops*

b S *inserts* the

c B *continues* Until

d BFS *read* will

e B *ends*

17aA permanent *to* sea *underlined.*

18aO *same as note* 1.

19aA without which *underlined.*

20dO depending on *underlined.*

21dO movements *underlined.*

22aA does not this also alarm him for any movement depending on a Fleet.

23aN this letter Coll Balfour rec[d] the 7th of April at C. Town had he sent it to L[d] Cornwallis any time before the 24th the day his Lordship quitted Wilmington for Virginia must have prevented his going there.

24bN this letter Col. Balfour rec[d] the 7th April at C. Town. had he sent it to Lord Cornwallis any time before the 24. the day his Lord[p] quitted Wilmington for Virginia: tis rather extraordinary L C should have decided on such a move without waiting to receive these dispatches, as so far from inviting him into Virginia, they all but forbid his going there read—pages 61. 62. 63. 64 of L. Cornwallis reply 57. 58. 59. 60 also.

25dN This letter with others and My Instructions to Gen[l] Phillips were delivered to Col[l] Balfour Com[t] at Charles Town on the 6th April 81 he opened them informed me on the 9th he would s[d] them to L[d] Cornwallis then at Wilmington 7 days sail from Charles Town. Ld. Cornwallis knew they were coming to him tis therefore extraordinary, that complaining he had no accounts from me he decides on a desperate move without My Approbation: Why Col[l] Balfour did not send them by some of the many Opportunities which offered is for him to explain. His letter to me of the 7th came by a Man of War it brought also Letters to me from L[d] Cornwallis of the 10th. surely such an opportunity should not have been missed there were others also

26kN this letter and others of the 2[d] & 8th March and copy of Instructions to Gen Phillips Balfour owned the receipt of in his letter to me 7th April by a Man of War who also brought me letters from L. Cornwallis of the 10th April. But C Balfour did *not* send my dispatches or the substance to L. C as was his duty by this, or any other safe

I shall tremble for our Post at Portsmouth shou'd the Enemy's Reinforcement arrive in that Neighbourhood, before the Force which I [a]now flatter myself the Admiral will order a sufficient Convoy for, arrives

8th March. I have received a Letter from Gen[l] Arnold dated the 25th Ult[o] wherein he tells me that the French left him on the 19th. [b]And in another letter of the 27th he says he has not the least doubt of defending his Post against the Force of the Country and 2000 French Troops, until a Reinforcement can arrive from New York. And that he proposed to send 500 Men under Col[l] Dundas up James River to make a Diversion in favour of your Lordship.

The Admiral informs me of the return of the French Ships to Rhode Island, and of their having taken the Romulus and carried her into that Place. But as the Admiral in his Letter of the [c]4th seems to think that the whole or [d]a great part of the French Fleet sailed[30] for [e]Chesapeak[31·32] on the 27th [f]Ult[o], and that he was at that Time ready to sail, I flatter myself he is either gone there, or has sent a sufficient Force to clear the Chesapeak. [g]The Troops under General Phillips have been embarked [h]for some Time,

a FS *italics*

b S *new* ¶

c F *reads* 2d instant
d FS *insert* at least
e S *inserts* the
f F *omits* Ulto.

g F *new* ¶

h F *omits* for

opporty but on the 23[d] he sent L. C. word that he judged by those dispatches I had resolved on solid operation in Virginia whereas those dispatches I do aver all declare the exact contrary.

27lN This letter was in Col. Balfours possession from the 7th of April 1781. he did not send it to Lord Cornwallis as he ought, had he done so tis presumed it would have prevented his Lordships going in to Virginia as it informed his Lordship that *the French fleet* was in Chesapeak, and consequently his Lordship would not have forced operation where it must be fatal under that Circumstance.

28mN this letter L C ought and might have recd before he left W. & marched into Virginia should not this have prevented his going where unless covd by Fleet he was undone.

29mN N.B. this is the first and only letter in which I gave them any hopes.

30dO sailed *underlined.*

31fO not in time for his lordship to go there.

32dO Chesapeak *underlined.*

and are now at[33] the Hook[34] waiting for the Admiral. or a Message[35] from him[36.37] Gen[l] Phillips commands and I am sure you know his Inclinations are to co-operate with your Lordship; and you will [a]therefore be pleased to take him under your Orders until [b]you hear further from me.[c]

Earl Cornwallis.

Signed. H. CLINTON[38]

a F *omits* therefore
b F *reads* your Lordship hears
c F *ends* I have the honour to be, &c. H. Clinton.
S *inserts* I have the honour, &c.

33aO now at *underlined.*

34aO Hook *to* Admiral *underlined.*

35aO message from him *underlined.*

36aA This informs his Lordsp that Phillips is waiting the event of a naval action to be detatched not as Lord Cornwallis affects to understand it that He had been detatched

37aO Lord Corns says that by the substance of my dispatches now coming to him, as asserted by Col. Balfour who had by my desire read them. His Lordship was informed that Gen. Phillips had been detatched to Virginia, how different from the Fact, will be seen,

38fO all the above letters were directed to Col. Balfour on the 6th of April but were not sent nor the substance to L. C before his lordship left Wilmington My Instructions to Gen Phillips ought to have been here also, to prove That so far from intending solid operation in Virginia to reduce that province I had determined to quit that unhealthy climate in May & drew most of the troops to southern operation.

53B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 5 March 1781, NARRATIVE [5] *p* 9.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Cornwallis, March 5, 1781.

Extracts from Nos. 49 *and* 53 *shown in margins pp* 333, 342-343.

53F: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 2/5/8/ Mar. 1781, ANSWER [58] *p* 86.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, March 2d, 1781.

Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia.

Same as No. 53 *with variations shown in margins pp* 341-345.

53S: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [56 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, March 2, 5, and 8, 1781. [Sent by Captain Amherst, in the Jupiter Merchant Ship.]

Same as No. 53 *with variations shown in margins pp* 341-345.

54 CLINTON TO BALFOUR, 9 March 1781, Copy RI 22/74.
OBSERVATIONS [64 *Ap'x*] *p* 129, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Copy New York March 9th 1781

a B *begins* [a]Sir, I was favored with your Letters dated the 25th & 31st Jany & 2d & 5th Feby by the Halifax
b B *stops* Sloop of War on the 16th Ultimo.[b]

As the disposal of the Rebel Prisoners in Carolina is submitted to Lord Cornwallis it is unnecessary for me to trouble you with Instructions on that Head. And with respect to Governor Dallings Letter & Instructions to Lord Charles Montagu, I must refer you also for Directions to Lord Cornwallis, who is of course the best Judge how far it will be for the good of the King's Service in the Southern Colonies to afford Lord Charles the Assistance which Genl Dalling solicits.

I expect to receive a Supply of Arms very soon. All those we had to spare were left in Carolina, or sent on the Expeditions to the Chesapeak.

c B *continues* [c]Capt Amherst of the 60th Regt who is so obliging to charge himself with my Dispatches[1] for Lord[2]
d B *ends* Cornwallis, will deliver them to your Care.[d3]

Lt Coll Balfour. Signed H. CLINTON.

1d my dispatches *underlined.*
2d Lord *to* care *underlined.*
3b these dispatches Col. Balfour owns the receipt of in his letter of the 7th April. page by Amphitrite which called also at Cape Fear & brought letters from L. Cornwallis why did not Col. Balfour send them by that oppty to Lord Cornwallis.

54B: CLINTON to BALFOUR, OBSERVATIONS [64 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Sir H. Clinton, K.B. to Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, sent by Captain Amherst, in the Jupiter merchant ship, dated New York, March 9, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 54 *as shown in margin p* 346.

55 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, 10 March 1781, ANSWER [61] *p* 86.

NARRATIVE [95] *p* 57, ANSWER [61] *p* 86 *and* [175] *p* 90, OBSERVATIONS [69 *Ap'x*] *p* 129, CORRESPONDENCE [19] *p* 134, REPLY [77] *p* 170.

With Clinton's MS. Notes from NARRATIVE, ANSWER, CORRESPONDENCE *and* REPLY.

Copy of Sir Henry Clinton's Instructions to Major-general Phillips, dated Head Quarters, [a]New York, March 10th, 1781. [b]Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia.

a RM *begin*

b RM *omit to* Virginia

[c]Sir, You will be pleased to proceed with the troops embarked under your command to Chesapeak Bay, and there form a junction as soon as possible with Brigadier-general Arnold, whom, and the corps with him, you will take under your orders.[d]

c S *begins*

d S *stops*

Should any unforeseen accident prevent your forming an immediate junction with Brigadier-general Arnold, you will, however, exert every endeavour to communicate with him. And as the principal object of your expedition is the security of him, the troops at present under his orders, and the posts he occupies [e]on Elizabeth River, near the mouth of James River in Virginia, you will, of course, use every means to attain this very material purpose.—The properest methods to be pursued on this occasion cannot be exactly pointed out to you, but [f]must be left to your discretion.

e R *reads* upon

f R *inserts* they

[g]When you shall have formed your junction with Brigadier-general Arnold, if you find that General acting under the orders of Earl Cornwallis, you will, of course, endeavour to fulfil those orders.—If this should not be the case; after receiving every information respecting his probable situation, you will make such movements with the corps [h]then under your orders as can be made consistent with the security of the post on Elizabeth River, or you shall think will most effectually assist his Lordships operations, by destroying or taking any magazines the enemy may have on James River, or at Petersburg, on the Appamatox.[i] After which, if it should be thought

g S *continues*

h S *italics*

i S *stops*

necessary, you will establish a post, or posts, at such stations on James River, as shall appear best calculated to open the way for, and secure the safety, as far as possible, of a rapid movement of troops to give jealousy for Upper James River, and to interrupt the course of supplies to the Carolinas.

a S *continues*

[a]The object of co-operation with Lord Cornwallis being fulfilled, you are at liberty to carry on such desultory expeditions for the purpose of destroying the enemy's public stores and magazines in any part of the Chesapeak, as you shall judge proper.

b BFVE *begin*
c S *reads* Admiral's
d S *italics* York Town Old Point Comfort
e S *italics to* loss
f S *italics to* Chesapeak
g BFSER *omit* shall
h FSVR *read* operation
i VR *omit* the
k BFVE *end*
S *stops*

[b1]If the [c]Admiral, disapproving of Portsmouth, and requiring a fortified station for large ships in the Chesapeak, should propose [d]York Town or Old Point Comfort, if possession of either can be acquired and maintained [e]without great risk or loss, you are at liberty to take possession thereof: [f]but[2] if the objections are such as you [g]shall think forcible, you must, after stating those objections, decline it, till solid [h]operations take place in [i]the Chesapeak.[k3·4·5·6·7·8·9·10·11]

1R in my narrative

2aC but *to* Chesapeak *underlined.*

3aA If Lord Cornwallis rests his defence of taking York Station on his not finding that of James a safe one He ought to recollect that unless He could give effectual Protection to large ships in York River & that Station could be acquired and maintained without great risk or loss, or if his objections were such as He thought forcible he was ordered to state such objections, & decline it.

4aA If Lord Cornwallis gives this extract as affecting his Lordship what does he prove by it. That if his objections to any Station are such as he thinks forcible he must decline taking Possession. &c.

5cA This very instruction to Genl Phillips proves that if a station can't be acquired & maintained witht great risk, or He has any objections He thinks forcible He must decline it. now if L.C. on being *ordered* to occupy a Place of arms had on examination found objections now if an Insn to Gen Phillips could operate on one to Lord Cornwallis of subsequent date, as His Lordship thought it did, as he objected to old Point Comfort & stated his objections; had he had any objections to that which he spontaneously chose in preference He should have said so, but the reader will observe He never gave the least reason to judge unfavorably of York Town till 3 days before he capitulated.

6aC I appeal whether this very

As to whatever relates to the people of the country, their being received and armed, or being more for the King's service that they should remain quietly at their houses, or respecting the oaths that should be offered to them, or for your general conduct in matters of this kind, I refer you to my Instructions to Major-general Leslie, and Brigadier-general Arnold, copies of which will be given to you.

And [a]concerning your return to this place, you will receive either my orders or Lord Cornwallis's, as circumstances may make necessary.[b]

[a] S *continues*

[b] S *stops*

'Tis presumed his Lordship will be able to spare troops to station at Portsmouth, &c. but should that not be the case, you are at liberty to leave either the regiment of Prince Hereditaire or the seventy-sixth, or both, for that purpose, under any officer, being a general officer, Lord Cornwallis may choose to appoint ; but if it should be an officer of your own appointing, [c]with the rank of Lieutenant-colonel; I think Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, as being acquainted with the spot, should remain.

[c] R *inserts* if

order to G. Phillips which became equally binding to L. Cornwallis who succeeded to him in that Command did not empower his Lordship to reject any post if he did not think it safe.

7bC does not this instruction clearly imply that his Lordship was at full liberty to object to taking a station if he thought ill of it or did it not at least require that he should make some report upon it which was not however done altho it had been done with respect to the post I had named.

8aN Lord Cornwallis says that standing in Genl Phillips Place He considered orders to that General as binding on him, by these Instions to G. Phillips had his Lordship's reasons for not occupying York & Glour been forcible, he should have said so.

9bN His instruction was delivered to L. Corn. on his arrival in Chesapeak, could I think after receiving it, he could take York & Gloucester for this very purpose if he did not think them safe and as he had disapproved of Old Point comfort, & told me why, was I not to suppose as he said nothing to the contrary when he took York & Glotr that they were safe posts, for if not as follows in this letter, we must not take them but content ourselves with covering frigates only.

10iN does not this call upon L. Cornwallis to report upon any Station he takes & to reject it if he disapproves.

11bN all these instructions L C. owns the receipt off and considers some of them as binding on him.

[a] S *continues*
[b] S *reads* that when
[c] S *omits* that
[d] S *omits* that
[e] S *italics to* place

[a]It is probable, [b]whenever the objects of this expedition are fulfilled, and [c]that you have strengthened the present works, and added such others as you shall think necessary, [d]that you [e]may return to this place.—In which case, you must bring with you Brigadier-general Arnold, the Light Infantry, Colonel Robinson's corps, or the seventy-sixth, and, if it should be possible, the Queen's Rangers.[f]

[f] S *runs on*

The moment you have communicated with Lord Cornwallis, and heard from his Lordship, you are to consider yourself as under his Lordship's orders, until he, or you shall hear further from me.[g]

[g] S *ends* (Signed) H. Clinton.
RM *insert paragraph p* 351 No. 55R:

Most heartily wishing you success, I have the honour to be, &c. [h]H. Clinton.[12]

[h] RM *insert* (Signed)

12aA all these letters above where the copy of Instruction to Gen Phillips were received by Col Balfour on the 6 of April they are those Lord Cornwallis mentions in his of the 23 April to L. G Germain page 50 the reader is requested to say whether any of them inform his Lordship that Gen Phillips *had been* detached to Virginia.—whether L C could have supposed from any of them, that S H C had determined on solid operation in Virginia, whether they do not all imply a doubt respecting our naval superiority in that bay of Chesapeak & whether they do not all but forbid L. Cornwallis going there, nay the very first line of that of the 2d march should have prevented his going. notg all this and that He laments he is about to make a desperate move without His Comr in Chief's approbation tho he expects dispatches hourly He moves.

55B: Clinton to Phillips, 10 March 1781, narrative [95] *p* 57.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract from Sir H. Clinton's Instructions to Major-General Philips, dated March 10, 1781.

This extract from No. 55 *is shown in margin p* 348.

55F: Clinton to Phillips, 10 March 1781, answer [175] *p* 90.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of the Instructions of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, March 10, 1781.

This extract from No. 55 *is shown in margin p* 348.

55S: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, OBSERVATIONS [69 *Ap'x*] *p* 129.

Extract.—From Instructions to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, March 10, 1781.

This is five parts of No. 55 *as shown in margins pp* 347-350.

55V: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, CORRESPONDENCE [19] *p* 134.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of the Instructions of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, to Major General Phillips, dated at Head-Quarters, New York, March 10, 1781.

This extract from No. 55 *is shown in margin p* 348.

55E: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 10 March 1781, REPLY [77] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract from Sir H. Clinton's Instructions to Major-General Phillips, dated March 10, 1781.

This extract from No. 55 *is shown in margin p* 348.

55R: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 10 March 1781, Copy PA 139/489.

Endorsed Copy. Instructions to Major General Phillips dated New York March 10th 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's N° 120[a] (5) (7) a *see* ii. 364

Same as No. 55 *with variations shown in margins pp* 347-350, *and the following additional paragraph:—*

In order that I may be furnished with every Information necessary to be Communicated to the Secretary of State to be laid before the King, I am to request that you will from time to time transmit to me, such Intelligence as you may think Interesting to His Majesty's Service.

55M: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 10 March 1781, Copy HL N° 6.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.

Endorsed Copy. Instructions to Major General Phillips dated New York March 10th 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's of 1st March 1781.[b] (4) N° 6. b *see* ii. 364

Same as No. 55 *with variations shown in margins pp* 347-350 *and the additional paragraph as in No.* 55R.

56 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, 14 March 1781, ANSWER [85] *p* 87.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated March 14, 1781, half past Two.

[Received at Petersburgh by Earl Cornwallis, May 20.[1·2]]

Dear Phillips, By the enclosed from the Admiral you will see that the want of intelligence has again lost us a fair opportunity of giving "*a mortal blow.*" I hope, however, he will still overtake them before they reach Chesapeak; they sailed in a snow storm on Wednesday, and I fear he was not out of Gardiner's Bay till Saturday. He was, however, left pursuing on the 11th, with all his coppers and a fair wind. I think, if he does not overtake them at sea, they will not risk an action in Lynhaven-bay, and will therefore proceed with their *whole* fleet to York, as I told the Admiral they would, and there, perhaps, lay; and I had almost said *fascinate* the Admiral till another fleet arrives; if from Europe, it ought not to come without a hint from thence; from the West Indies it will not probably come unaccompanied by our friend Sir George. 'Tis possible it only means to see the transports off the Chesapeak, and then proceed to the *West-Indies* with the fleet of men of war; 'tis possible, also, that the whole is gone to the West-Indies, for it is a bold move to evacuate Rhode-island, and proceed to the Chesapeak so encumbered, liable to be followed by an unencumbered superior copper fleet. God send our old Admiral success! I depend on early information from you, and shall prepare for every possible event.—Recollect that we have not a single transport

1a This letter was marked thus.–"Private and most Secret."

2a I cannot account for L. Cornwallis's publishing this and some other of my private letters found in poor *dead* Phillips Pocket. not a word in either of which could have been of the least use to him, nor could it answer any other purpose but to draw on altercation between the Admiral & me.

till you send some. With every wish for your health and success,

Believe me, &c. H. CLINTON.

The schooner shall attend you, though we can ill spare her. As often as possible communicate by these vessels; they make their passage better than the frigates.

P.S. I have received your letters.

In addition to what I have written above, pray observe me well in what I am saying.

I think, if the French are gone to Chesapeak, they will shelter themselves in York-River.—The Admiral will immediately hold his usual language—that he waits for the army. That from South-Carolina cannot come, as Colonel Balfour has very injudiciously sent home the transports.—I cannot move a man till you send back transports; but, if he proposes any thing to you, he must first declare in writing positively what he thinks his fleet will do, or at least attempt, before you can decide; and then, after consulting your officers, let me know your opinion what can be done, and what land force it will require to do it. If all agree that they will be unattackable in that station, it must be blocked, and then we must do our best to assist Lord Cornwallis's operations, or carry on desultory operations in the Chesapeak till some other plan can be settled; but all must be settled in formal council.

57 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, LS PA 157/189. ANSWER [22] *p* 85.

Endorsed N° 6. Guildford No: Carolina 17th March 1781 Lord Cornwallis (N° 6) R/ 4th June. Entd

[a]N° 6 Guildford 17th March 1781. [a] F *begins* Copy

[b]My Lord, Your Lordship's Dispatch N° 1, dated the 9th of November ult° was delivered to me by my Aide-de-Camp Major Ross. The Officers & Soldiers, who fought so gallantly on the 16th of August, [b] BS *begin*

received with the warmest sense of Gratitude, the Royal Approbation of their behaviour; And it is particularly pleasing to me, that my Conduct has given Satisfaction to His Majesty, and to his Ministers.

By the long interruption of our communication with South Carolina, I have not been informed, whether Lieu[t] Governour Bull, and the other Civil
a B *new* ¶ Officers have arrived in that Province; [a]I shall pay proper attention to your Lordship's directions upon that subject, as well as, relating to the Prisoners of
b S *reads* in War confined [b]at Charlestown; There are at present some hopes, that a negociation now on foot, between me and General Greene, will terminate in a Cartel for their Exchange; If it fails, I shall endeavour to dispose of them in the manner recommended by your Lordship, the expence and inconvenience of keeping
c F *ends* (Signed) Cornwallis. them being intolerable.[c]

d BS *end* &c. Cornwallis. I have the honour to be[d] with great respect My Lord your Lordship's Most obedient & Most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

Right Honorable Lord George Germain &c[a] &c[a] &c[a]

57B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, ANSWER [22] *p* 85.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 6, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781.

Same as No. 57 *with variations shown in margins pp* 353-354.

57F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy RI 19/79.

Same as No. 57 *with variations shown in margins pp* 353-354.

57S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy PA 309/38.

In margin Guildford N° Carolina 17[th] March 1781 Lord Cornwallis (N° 6.) R/ 4[th] June 1781.

Same as No. 57 *with variations shown in margins pp* 353-354.

---

58 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, LS PA 157/193.

ANSWER [23] *p* 85.

Endorsed N° 7 Guildford North Carolina 17[th] March
a No. 45F: *p* 327 1781 Lord Cornwallis (N° 7) R/ 4[th] June 1 Inclosure[a] Ent[d].

[a]N° 7 Guildford March 17 1781.

[b]My Lord, Having occasion to dispatch my Aide-de-Camp Captain [c]Brodrick, with the particulars of the Action of the 15th, in compliance with general directions from Sir Henry Clinton; I shall embrace the opportunity to give your Lordship an account of the operations of the Troops, under my Command, [d]previous to that event, and of those subsequent, untill the departure of Captain [e]Brodrick.

My Plan for the Winter's Campaign, was to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South Carolina in security against any probable attack in my Absence.[f]

Lord Rawdon, with a considerable body of Troops, had charge of the defensive, and I proceeded, about the middle of January, upon the offensive operations. I decided to march by the upper, in preference to the lower roads, leading into North Carolina, because Fords being frequent above the Forks of the Rivers, my passage there could not easily be obstructed, and General Greene having taken post on the Pedee, and there being few fords in any of the great Rivers [g]of this Country below their Forks, especially in Winter, I apprehended being much delayed, if not entirely prevented, from penetrating by the latter route. [h]I was the more induced to prefer this route, as I hoped in my way, to be able to destroy, or drive out of South Carolina, the Corps of the Enemy, commanded by General Morgan, which threatened our valuable district of Ninety Six; and I likewise hoped by rapid marches, to get between General Greene and Virginia, and by that means, force him to fight, without receiving any reinforcement from that province, or failing of that, to oblige him to quit North Carolina with precipitation, and thereby encourage our friends, to make good their promises of a general rising, to assist me in re-establishing His Majesty's Government.

The unfortunate Affair of the 17th of January, was a very unexpected and severe blow; for besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of 600 men;

a V *inserts* Copy
b BFS *begin*
c V *reads* Broderick
d V *inserts* and
e V *reads* Broderick
f BFS *run on*
g V *reads* in
h BFS *new* ¶

however, being thoroughly sensible, that defensive measures, would be certain ruin to the Affairs of Britain, in the southern Colonies, this event did not [a] deter me from prosecuting the original plan.

[a] BFS *run on*

That General Greene might be uncertain of my intended route, as long as possible, I had left General Leslie at Camden, untill I was ready to move from Wynnesborough, and he was now within a [b] march of me; I employed the 18th in forming a junction with him, and in collecting the remains of Lieut-Colonel Tarleton's Corps; after which, great exertions were made by part of the Army, without Baggage, to retake our Prisoners, and [c] to intercept General Morgan's Corps, on it's retreat to the Catawba; but the celerity of their movements, and the swelling of [d] the numberless Creeks in our way, rendered all our efforts fruitless. [e] I therefore assembled the Army, on the 25th at Ramsoure's Mill, on the South Fork of the Catawba, and as the loss of my light Troops, could only be remedied by the activity of the whole Corps, I employed a halt of two days in collecting [f] some Flour, and in destroying superfluous Baggage, and all my Waggons, except those loaded with Hospital Stores, Salt, and Ammunition, and four, reserved empty in readiness for Sick or wounded. In this measure, 'tho' at the expence of a great deal of Officer's Baggage, and of all prospect in future of Rum, and even a regular supply of provisions to the Soldiers, I must in justice to [g] this Army say, that there was the most general and chearfull acquiescence.

[b] BFS *insert* day's

[c] S *omits* to

[d] BFSV *omit* the

[e] BFV *new* ¶

[f] F *omits* some

[g] F *reads* the

In the mean time, the rains had rendered the North Catawba impassable, and General Morgan's Corps, the Militia of the rebellious Counties of [h] Rowan & Mecklenburgh, under General Davidson, or the Gang of Plunderers usually under the command of General Sumpter, not then recovered from his wounds, had occupied all the Fords, in a space of more than forty miles upwards from the Fork. during it's height, I approached the River by short marches, so as to give

[h] V *reads* Roan

the enemy equal apprehensions for several Fords, and after having procured the best information in my power, I resolved to attempt the passage at a private Ford (then slightly guarded) near M^c^Cowan's ford, on the morning of the 1^st^ [a]of February.

Lieu^t^ Colonel Webster was detached with part of the Army, and all the Baggage, to Beattie's Ford, six miles above M^c^Cowan's, where General Davidson was supposed to be posted, with 500 Militia, and [b]was directed to make every possible demonstration, [c]by cannonading and otherwise, of an intention to force a passage there, and I marched at one in the morning with the Brigade of Guards, Regiment of Bose, 23^rd^ [d]Regiment, 200 Cavalry, and two three pounders, to the ford fixed upon for the real attempt: [e]the morning being very dark and rainy, & part of our way through a wood, where there was no road, one of the three pounders, in front of the 23^rd^ Regiment and the Cavalry, overset in a swamp, and occasioned those Corps to lose the Line of March, and some of the Artillery Men, belonging to the other Gun, (one of whom had the match) having stopped to assist, were likewise left behind. The Head of the Column, in the mean [f]while, arrived at the Bank of the River, and [g]day began to break. I could make no use of the Gun that was up, and it was evident, from the Number of fires on the other side, that the opposition would be greater than I had expected. however as I knew that the Rain, then falling, would soon render the River again impassable, and I had received information, the evening before, that General Greene had arrived in General Morgan's Camp, and that his Army was marching after him, with the greatest expedition, I determined not to desist from the attempt; and therefore, full of confidence in the Zeal & Gallantry of Brig^re^ General Ohara, and of the Brigade of Guards under his command, I ordered them to march on, but, to prevent confusion, not to fire untill they gained the opposite bank. Their

a S *omits* of

b V *omits* was

c V *reads* of

d BFS *omit* Regiment

e BFS *new* ¶

f V *reads* time

g BFS *insert* the

behaviour justified my high opinion of them; for a constant fire from the enemy, in a ford upwards of five hundred Yards wide, in many places up to their middle, with a rocky Bottom and strong current, made no impression on their cool and determined valour, nor checked their passage. The light Infantry landing first, immediately formed, and in a few minutes killed or dispersed every thing, that appeared before them, the rest of the Troops forming and advancing in succession. We now learned, that we had been opposed by about three hundred Militia, that had taken post there, only the evening before, under the command of General Davidson: Their General, and two or three other Officers, were among the killed, the number of wounded was uncertain, [a]and a few were taken prisoners. On our side Lieu[t]-Colonel Hall and three men were killed and thirty six [b]wounded, all of the Light Infantry, and Grenadiers of the Guards. by this time the rear of the Column had joined, and the whole having passed with the greatest dispatch, I detached Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton, with the Cavalry and 23[rd] Regiment, to pursue the routed Militia. A few were soon killed or taken, and Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton having learned, that 3 or 400 of the neighbouring Militia, were to assemble that day at Tarrants's house, about ten miles from the ford, leaving his Infantry, he went on with [e]the Cavalry, and finding the Militia as [d]expected, he with excellent conduct and great spirit, attacked them instantly, and totally routed them, with little loss on his [e]side, and on theirs, between 40 and 50 killed, wounded, [f]or prisoners. This stroke, with our passage of the Ford, so effectually dispirited the Militia, that we met with no further opposition, on our march to the Yadkin, through one of the most rebellious tracts in America.

During this time, the Rebels having quitted Beattie's Ford, Lieu[t] Colonel Webster was passing his detachment and the Baggage of the Army, this

a F *omits* and

b BS *insert* men

c F *reads* his

d V *inserts* he

e F *inserts* own

f V *reads* and

had become tedious and difficult by the continuance of the rain and the swelling of the River, but all joined us soon after dark, [a]about six miles from Beattie's Ford. The other fords were likewise abandoned by the Enemy: the greatest part of the Militia dispersed, and General Morgan, with his Corps, marched all that afternoon, and the following night towards Salisbury. We pursued next morning, in hopes to intercept him between the Rivers; and after struggling with many difficulties, arising from swelled Creeks & bad Roads, the Guards came up with his rear, in the Evening of the 3rd, routed it, and took a few Waggons at the trading Ford of the Yadkin: He had passed the Body of [b]his Infantry in Flats, & his Cavalry and Waggons by the ford, during that day and the preceding night; but at the time of our arrival, the Boats were secured on the other side, and the ford had become impassable. The River continuing to rise, and the weather appearing unsettled, I determined to march to the upper Fords, after procuring a small supply of provisions at Salisbury. This, and the height of the Creeks in our way, detained me two days, and in that time, Morgan having quitted the Banks of the River, I had information from our Friends, who crossed in Canoes, that General Greene's Army, was marching with the utmost dispatch, to form a junction with him at Guildford. Not having had time to collect the North Carolina Militia, and having received no reinforcement from Virginia, I concluded [c]that he would do every thing in his power, to avoid an Action, on the South Side of the Dan; and it being my Interest to force him to fight, I made great expedition, and got between him and the upper Fords, and being assured that the lower fords are seldom practicable in winter, and that he could not collect many Flats at any of the Ferries, I was in great hopes, that he would not escape me without [d]receiving a blow. Nothing could exceed the

[a] V *omits* about

[b] F *reads* the

[c] F *omits* that

[d] V *omits* receiving

patience and alacrity of the Officers, and Soldiers, under every species of hardship and fatigue, in endeavouring to overtake [a]him; but our intelligence upon this occasion, was exceedingly defective, which, with heavy rains, bad roads, and the passage of many deep Creeks, and bridges destroyed by the Enemy's light Troops, rendered all our exertions vain; for upon our arrival at Boyd's Ferry, on the [b]15th, we learned, that his rear guard had got over the night before, his Baggage and main body having passed, the preceding day, at that and [c]a neighbouring ferry, where more flats had been collected, than [d]had been represented to me as possible. [e]My force being ill suited to enter by that quarter so powerfull a Province as Virginia, and North Carolina being in the utmost confusion, after giving the Troops a halt of [f]one day, I proceeded by easy marches to Hillsborough, where I erected the King's Standard, and invited by Proclamation, all loyal Subjects to repair to it, and to stand forth, and take an active part, in assisting me to restore order, and Constitutional Government. As a considerable body of Friends were said to reside between the Haw and Deep Rivers, I detached Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton on the 23[rd] with the Cavalry, and a small body of Infantry, to prevent their being interrupted in assembling. Unluckily a detachment of the Rebel light Troops, had crossed the same day, & by accident, fell in with about two hundred of our Friends, under Colonel Pyle, on their way to Hillsborough, who, mistaking the Rebels for Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton's Corps, allowed themselves to be surrounded, and a number of them were most inhumanly butchered, when begging for quarter, without making the least resistance. The same day I had certain intelligence, that General Greene, having been reinforced, had recrossed the Dan; which [g]rendering it imprudent to separate my Corps, [h]occasioned the recall of Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton's detachment, and forage and provisions

a F *reads* them

b F *reads* 12th

c F *reads* the neighbouringford
d V *reads* were
e BFS *new* ¶

f F *reads* a

g BFSV *read* rendered
h V *inserts* and

being scarce in the neighbourhood of Hillsborough, as well as the position too distant (upon the approach of the Rebel Army) for the protection of the body of our Friends; I judged it expedient to cross the Haw, and encamped near [a]Allamance Creek, detaching Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton, with the Cavalry, Light Company of the Guards, and 150 Men of Lieu[t] Colonel Webster's Brigade, a few miles from me on the road to Deep River, more effectually to cover the Country.

[a] BV *read* Allemance

General Greene's light Troops soon made their appearance, and on the 2[nd], a patrole having reported, that they had seen both Cavalry and Infantry near [b]to his Post, I directed Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton to move forward, with proper precautions, and endeavour to discover the designs of the Enemy; He had not advanced far, when he fell in with a considerable Corps, which he immediately attacked, and routed, but being ignorant of their Force, and whether they were supported, with great prudence desisted from [c]pursuit: he [d]soon learned from Prisoners, that those he had beat, were Lee's Legion, 3 or 400 back Mountain Men under Colonel Preston, with a number of Militia, and that General Greene, with [e]part of his Army, was not far distant. Our Situation for the former few days had been amongst timid friends, and adjoining to inveterate Rebels; Between them, I had been totally destitute of information, which lost me a very favourable opportunity, of attacking the Rebel Army. General Greene fell back to Thompson's house, near Boyd's Ford, on the Reedy Fork, but his light Troops and Militia still remained near us, and as I was informed, that they were posted carelessly at separate Plantations, for the convenience of subsisting, I marched on the 6[th] to drive them in and to attack General Greene if an opportunity offered. I succeeded completely in the first, and at Weitzell's Mill on the Reedy Fork, where they made a stand, the back mountain men and some [f]Virginia Militia,

[b] BFS *omit* to

[c] F *inserts* the
[d] V *omits* soon

[e] BFS *insert* a

[f] BFSV *omit* Virginia

suffered considerably with little loss on our side; but a timely and precipitate retreat, over the Haw, prevented the latter. I knew that the Virginia [a]Reinforcements were [b]upon their march, and it was apparent that the Enemy would, if possible, avoid risquing an Action before their arrival.

a BF *read* Reinforcement
b V *reads* on

The neighbourhood of the Fords of the Dan in their Rear, and the extreme difficulty of subsisting [c]my Troops in that exhausted Country, putting it out of my power to force them, my resolution was, to give our Friends time to join us, by covering their country as effectually as possible, consistent with the subsistence of the Troops, still approaching the communication with our Shipping in Cape Fear River, which I saw it would soon become indispensibly necessary to open, on account of the sufferings of the Army, from the want of Supplies of every kind; [d]at the same time, I was determined to fight the Rebel Army, if it approached me, being convinced, that it would be impossible to succeed in that great object of our arduous Campaign, the calling forth the numerous loyalists of North Carolina, whilst a doubt remained on their minds of the superiority of our Arms. With these views I had moved to the [e]Quaker Meeting in the [f]fork of [g]Deep River on the 13th, and on the 14th I received the information, which occasioned the movement, [h]that brought on the Action at Guildford, of which I shall give your Lordship an account in a separate letter.

c V *reads* the
d F *inserts* and
e F *reads* Quaker's
f BF *read* forks
g V *inserts* the
h V *reads* which

I have the honour to be, [i]with great respect, My Lord Your Lordships Most obedient & Most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

i BFS *end* &c Cornwallis V *ends* &c Signed Cornwallis

Right Honorable Lord George Germain &c[a] &c[a] &c[a]

58B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, ANSWER [23] *p* 85.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 7, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781.

Same as No. 58 *with variations shown in margins pp* 355-362.

58F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, TARLETON *p* 259.
Copy.—From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17th, 1781.
Same as No. 58 *with variations shown in margins pp* 355-362.

58S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy PA 309/39.
In margin Guildford North Carolina 17th March 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N° 7.) R/ 4th June.
Mem. at end Inclosure. Copy of a Proclamation issued at Hillsborough, in North Carolina, by Earl Cornwallis. dated 20th Feby 1781.
Same as No. 58 *with variations shown in margins pp* 355-362.

58V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy RI 19/80.
Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Lord G. Germain Guilford 17th March 1781.
Same as No. 58 *with variations shown in margins pp* 355-362.

59 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, LS PA 157/213.
ANSWER [35] *p* 85.
Endorsed N° 8 Guildford North Carolina 17th March 1781 Lord Cornwallis (N° 8) R/ 4th June 4 Inclosures.[a] Entd
N° 8[b] Guildford 17th March, 1781.
[c]My Lord, I have the satisfaction to inform Your Lordship, that His Majesty's Troops under my command, obtained a signal Victory on the 15th Inst over the Rebel Army, commanded by General Greene.

In pursuance of my intended Plan, communicated to your Lordship in my Dispatch, N° 7, I had encamped on the 13th Inst at the [d]Quaker Meeting[e], between the forks of Deep River. On the 14th I received information, that General Butler with a body of North-Carolina Militia, and the expected Reinforcements from Virginia, said to consist of a Virginia State Regiment, a Corps of Virginia eighteen months men, 3000 Virginia Militia, & Recruits for the Maryland Line, had joined General Greene; and that the whole Army, which was reported to amount

a *see* ii. 365
b V *inserts* copy
c BFS *begin*
d F *reads* Quakers'
e V *inserts* House

to 9 or 10,000 men, was marching to attack the British Troops. During the Afternoon intelligence was brought, which was confirmed in the night, that he had advanced that day to Guildford, about 12 miles from our Camp. Being now persuaded that he had resolved to hazard an engagement; after detaching Lieu[t] Colonel Hamilton with our Waggons, and Baggage, escorted by his own Regiment, a detachment of 100 Infantry, and 20 Cavalry, towards Bell's Mill on Deep River, I marched with the rest of the Corps, at day break, on the morning of the 15[th], to [a] meet the Enemy, or [a]to attack them in their encampment. About four miles from Guildford, our advanced Guard, commanded by Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton, fell in with a Corps of the Enemy, consisting of Lee's Legion, some back Mountain Men, and Virginia Militia, which he attacked with his usual good conduct and spirit, and defeated: And continuing our March, we found the Rebel Army posted on rising Grounds about a mile and a half from the Court House. The Prisoners taken by Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton, having been several days with the advanced Corps, could give me no account of the Enemy's Order or position, and the Country people were extremely inaccurate in their description of the Ground. Immediately between the head of the Column, and the Enemy's Line, was a considerable Plantation, one large Field of which, was on our left of the Road, and two others, with a Wood of about two hundred yards broad between them, on our right of it; beyond these fields the Wood continued for several miles to our right. The Wood beyond the Plantation in our front, in the Skirt of which the Enemy's first Line was formed, was about a mile in depth, the road then leading into an extensive space of [b]cleared Ground about Guildford Court House. The Woods on our right and left [c]were reported to be impracticable for Cannon, but as that on our right, appeared [d]to be most open, I

[a] F *omits* to

[b] S *reads* clear

[c] V *reads* being impracticable

[d] BFV *read* the most

resolved to attack the left Wing of the Enemy, and whilst my disposition was making for that purpose, I ordered Lieutenant Macleod to bring forward the Guns and cannonade their Center. The Attack was directed to be made in the following Order.

On the right, the Regiment of Bose, and the 71st Regiment, led by Major General Leslie, and supported by the 1st Battalion of Guards, on [a]their left the 23rd and 33rd Regiments, led by Lieut Colonel Webster, & supported by the Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion of Guards, commanded by Brigadier General O'hara, The Yagers and Light Infantry of the Guards remained in the wood on the left of the Guns, and the Cavalry in the road, ready to act as circumstances [b]might require. Our preparations being made, the Action began [c]about half an hour past one in the afternoon; Major General Leslie after being obliged, by the great extent of the enemy's Line, to bring up the 1st Battalion of Guards to the right of the Regiment of Bose, soon defeated every thing before him; Lieut Colonel Webster, having joined the left of Major General Leslie's division, was no less successfull in his front, when on finding that the left of the 33rd was exposed to a heavy fire from the right Wing of the Enemy, he changed his front to the Left, & being supported by the Yagers & Light Infantry of the Guards, attacked & routed it. The Grenadiers & 2nd Battalion of [d]Guards, moving forward to occupy the Ground, left vacant by the movement of Lieut Colonel Webster.

[a] BF *read* the

[b] V *reads* required

[c] BF *insert* at

[d] F *inserts* the

All the Infantry being now in the Line, Lieut Colonel Tarleton, had directions to keep his Cavalry compact, and not to charge without positive orders, except to protect any of the Corps from the most evident danger of being defeated. The excessive thickness of the woods rendered our bayonets of little use, and enabled the broken enemy to make frequent stands, with an irregular fire, which occasioned some loss, and to several of the Corps, great

delay, particularly on our right, where the 1st Battalion of [a]Guards, and Regiment of Bose, were warmly engaged, in front, flank, & rear, with some of the enemy, that had been routed on the first attack, and with part of the extremity of their left wing, which by the closeness of the [b]wood had been passed unbroken, The 71st Regiment, & Grenadiers & 2nd Battalion of [c]Guards not knowing what was passing on their right, and hearing the fire advance on their left, continued to move forward, the Artillery keeping pace with them on the road followed by the Cavalry. The 2nd Battalion of Guards first gained the clear ground near Guildford Court house, and found a Corps of Continental Infantry, much superior in number, formed in the open field on the left of the Road. Glowing with impatience to signalize themselves, they instantly attacked and defeated them, taking two six pounders, but pursuing into the wood with too much ardour, were thrown into confusion by a heavy fire, and immediately charged and driven back into the field, by Colonel Washington's Dragoons, with the loss of the six pounders they had taken. The Enemy's Cavalry was soon repulsed, by a well directed fire from two three pounders, just brought up by Lieut Macleod, & by the appearance of the Grenadiers of the Guards, and of the 71st Regiment which having been impeded by some deep [d]Ravines, were now coming out of the wood, on the right of the Guards, opposite to the Court house. By the spirited exertions of Brigre General O'hara, tho' wounded, the 2nd Battalion of [e]Guards was soon rallied, & supported by the Grenadiers, returned to the charge with the greatest alacrity; The 23rd Regiment arriving at that instant from our left, & Lieut Colonel Tarleton having advanced with part of the Cavalry, the enemy were soon put to flight, & the two six pounders once more fell into our hands, two Ammunition Waggons, & two other six

a BF *insert* the

b BF *read* woods

c F *inserts* the

d B *reads* rains

e F *inserts* the

pounders, being all the Artillery they had in the field, were likewise taken. About this time the 33rd Regiment and Light Infantry of the Guards, after overcoming many difficulties, completely routed the Corps, which was opposed to them, and put an end to the Action in this quarter; The 23rd & 71st Regiments, with part of the Cavalry, were ordered to pursue, the Remainder of the Cavalry was detached with Lieut-Colonel Tarleton to our right, where a heavy fire still continued, and where his appearance & spirited attack, contributed much to a speedy termination of the action. The Militia with which our right[a] had been engaged, dispersed in the woods, the Continentals went off by the Reedy Fork, beyond which, it was not in my power to follow them, as their Cavalry had suffered but little; our troops were excessively fatigued, by an action which lasted an hour & a half, and our [b]numerous wounded, dispersed over an extensive space of Country, required immediate attention: The Care of our wounded, and [c]the total want of provisions in an exhausted Country, made it equally impossible for me to follow the blow [d]next day. The enemy did not stop untill they got to the Iron-works on Troublesome Creek, 18 miles from the field of Battle.

a BF *insert* wing

b BFV *omit* numerous

c V *reads* a

d BF *insert* the

From our [e]own observation, and the best accounts we could procure, we did not doubt but the Strength of the enemy exceeded 7,000 men; Their Militia composed their Line, with parties advanced to the Rails of the [f]Fields in their front, the Continentals were posted obliquely in the rear of their right wing. Their Cannon fired on us, whilst we were forming, from the center of the Line of Militia but were withdrawn to the Continentals before the Attack.

e BF *omit* own

f FV *read* field

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship, the list of our killed and wounded; Captain Schutz's wound is supposed to be mortal, but the Surgeons assure me, that none of the [g]other Officers are in

g V *reads* rest of the

danger, and that a great number of the men will soon recover. I cannot ascertain the loss of the enemy, but it must have been considerable, between 2 & 300 dead were left upon the field; many of their wounded that were able to move, whilst we were employed in the care of our own, escaped and followed the routed enemy; and our Cattle Drivers and [a]foraging parties have reported to me, that the houses in a circle of 6 or 8 miles round us are full of others; Those that remained we have taken the best care of in our power. We took few prisoners, owing to the excessive thickness of the Wood facilitating their escape, and every man of our army being repeatedly wanted for Action.

[a] BF *read* forage

The Conduct and Actions of the Officers and Soldiers, that compose this little Army will do more justice to their merit, than I can by words. Their persevering intrepidity in Action, their invincible patience in the hardships and fatigues of a march, of above 600 miles, in which they have forded several large Rivers, and numberless Creeks, many of which would be reckoned large rivers in any other Country in the world, without Tents or covering against the Climate, and often without provisions, will sufficiently manifest their ardent zeal for the honour and interests of their Sovereign and their Country.

I have been particularly indebted to Major General Leslie, for his gallantry and exertion in the Action, as well as his Assistance in every other part of the Service. The zeal & Spirit of Brig[re] General O'hara, merit my highest commendations, for, after receiving two dangerous wounds, he continued in the field whilst the Action lasted; By his earnest attention on all other occasions, seconded by the Officers and Soldiers of the Brigade, His Majesty's Guards are no less distinguished by their order and discipline, than by their Spirit and valour.[b]

[b] BF *run on*

The Hessian Regiment of Bose deserves my warmest praises for it's discipline alacrity and Courage,

and does honour to Major Du Buy who commands it, and who is an Officer of superior merit.[a]

a BF *run on*

I am much obliged to Brigadier General Howard, who served as Volunteer, for his spirited example on all occasions.[b]

b BF *run on*

Lieu[t] Colonel Webster conducted his Brigade like an Officer of experience and Gallantry. Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton's good conduct & spirit in the management of his Cavalry, was conspicuous during the whole action; & Lieu[t] Macleod, who commanded the Artillery, proved himself, upon this, as well as all former occasions, a most capable & deserving Officer. The attention and [c]exertion of my Aids-de-Camp, and of all the other publick Officers of the Army, contributed very much to the success of the day.

c BF *read* exertions

I have constantly received the most zealous assistance from Governor Martin, during my command in the southern district, hoping that his presence would tend to incite the loyal Subjects of this Province to take an active part with us, he has chearfully submitted to the fatigues and dangers of our Campaign, but his delicate constitution has suffered by his publick spirit, for by the advice of the Physicians, he is now obliged to return to England for the [d]recovering his health.

d BFSV *read* recovery of

This part of the Country is so totally destitute of subsistence, that forage is not nearer than nine miles, and the Soldiers have been two days without bread; I shall therefore leave about 70 of the worst of the wounded cases, at the New Garden Quaker Meeting house, with proper Assistance, & move the remainder with the Army to-morrow morning to Bell's Mill. I hope our friends will heartily take an active part with us, to which I shall continue to encourage them; still approaching our shipping by easy marches, that we may procure the necessary Supplies for further operations, and lodge our sick and wounded, where proper attention can be paid to them.

This Dispatch will be delivered to Your Lordship by my Aide-de-Camp Captain [a]Brodrick, who is a very promising Officer, and whom I beg leave to recommend to Your Lordship's Countenance and Favour.

I have the honour[b] to be[c] with great respect My Lord Your Lordship's Most obedient & Most humble Servant CORNWALLIS.

a V *reads* Broderick

b V *ends &c.* Cornwallis

c BFS *end &c* Cornwallis

59B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, ANSWER [35] *p* 85.
Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 8, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, 17th March, 1781.
Same as No. 59 *with variations shown in margins pp* 363-370.

59F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, TARLETON *p* 303.
Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 8, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, 17th March, 1781.
Same as No. 59 *with variations shown in margins pp* 363-370.

59S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy PA 309/53.
In margin Guildford North Carolina 17th March 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N° 8.) R/ 4th June.
Mem. at end Inclosure. N° 1. Return of Killed & wounded in various actions preceding the Battle of Guildford 15th March 1781. 2. Field Return of the Troops under the Command of Lt Genl Earl Cornwallis in the action of 15 March 1781. 3. Return of the Killed & Wounded & Missing of the Troops under the Command of Lt Genl Earl Cornwallis in the Action of 15th March. 4. Return of Ordnance Ammunition & Arms taken at the Battle of Guildford 15th March.
Same as No. 59 *with variations shown in margins pp* 363-370.

59V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 17 March 1781, Copy RI 19/81.
Endorsed Copy Earl Cornwallis to Lord Geo: Germain Guilford 17th March 1781.[d]
Same as No. 59 *with variations shown in margins pp* 363-370.

d *one enclosure see* il. 365

60 CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, ANSWER [47] *p* 85.

[a]NORTH CAROLINA.

[b]*By Charles Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General of his Majesty's Forces, &c. &c. &c.*

A PROCLAMATION.

WHEREAS by the blessing of Almighty God, his Majesty's arms have been crowned with signal success, by the compleat victory obtained over the Rebel forces on the 15th instant, I have thought proper to issue this proclamation to call upon all loyal subjects to stand forth, and take an active part in restoring good order and government. And whereas it has been represented to me that many persons in this province who have taken a share in this unnatural rebellion, but having experienced the oppression and injustice of the Rebel government, and having seen the errors into which they have been deluded by falsehoods and misrepresentations, are sincerely desirous of returning to their duty and allegiance, I do hereby notify and promise to all such persons (murderers excepted) that if they will surrender themselves with their arms and ammunition, at head quarters, or to the officer commanding [c]in the district contiguous to their respective places of residence, on or before the 20th day of April next, they shall be permitted to return to their homes, upon giving a military parole, and shall be protected in their persons and properties from all sort of violence from the British troops, and will be restored as soon as possible to all the privileges of legal and constitutional government.

Given under my hand at head quarters, this 18th day of March, [d]A.D. 1781, and in the twenty-first year of his Majesty's reign.

[g] [e]CORNWALLIS.[f]

60B: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 18 March 1781, TARLETON *p* 312. *Same as No.* 60 *with variations shown in margin p* 371.

a F *begins* SV *insert* Copy

b B *begins* By the Right Honourable

c S *omits* in

d S *omits* A.D.

e V *inserts* signed

f BF *end*

g SV *insert* God save the King.

60F: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 18 March 1781, Copy PA 157/247.
Endorsed Copy of A Proclamation issued in North Carolina by Earl Cornwallis. dated the 18th of March 1781. In Lord Cornwallis N° 9. 18th April.[a]
The same as No. 60.

[a] No. 77 *p* 414

60S: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 18 March 1781, Copy PA 140/95.
Endorsed Copy. Proclamation by Lieutenant General The Earl Cornwallis. North Carolina, 18th March 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's N° 124.[b]
Same as No. 60 *with variations shown in margin p* 371.

[b] No. 90 *p* 458

60V: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, 18 March 1781, Copy HL N° 17.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy. Proclamation by Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. North Carolina 18th March 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's of 23d & 30 April & 1st May 1781.[c] N° 17.
Same as No. 60 *with variations shown in margin p* 371.

[c] No. 90E: *p* 463

60E: CORNWALLIS, PROCLAMATION, Copy SSI 87/4. *see* ii. 365.

61 ARBUTHNOT TO ARNOLD, OBSERVATIONS [72 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
Extract.—From Admiral Arbuthnot to General Arnold, dated Chesapeak, March 19, 1781.

The French fleet sailed from Rhode-island on or about the 8th instant, intending a co-operation with Mr. Washington, to attack you. I followed them on the 10th, and came up with them on the 16th: an action ensued of about an hour and an half, when they fled off with their whole squadron.

I shall put to sea again immediately with the squadron, and endeavour to bring them to a second action. Should I be unable to do so, I shall return with the squadron to New York, which must be exposed in my absence, and I must withdraw the ships that are now with you.

62 CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 24 March 1781, ANSWER [87] *p* 87.
ANSWER [87] *p* 87, OBSERVATIONS [73 *Ap'x*] *p* 130, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from each.*

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 24, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 20.]

Dear Sir, [a]I believe that Lord Cornwallis has finished his campaign, and, if report says true, very handsomely, by taking all Greene's cannon, and recovering the greatest part of his own men who had been made prisoners by Mr. Greene. If that should be the case, and Lord Cornwallis [b]does not want any co-operation to assist him, and you see no prospect of striking an important stroke elsewhere, I shall probably request you and General Arnold to return to me, with such troops as I have already named in my instructions. But all this will depend on the information I shall receive from you, and your opinion respecting the post [c]at Portsmouth, and such others as you propose to establish on James river, with their importance considered, either as assisting Lord Cornwallis's operations, or connected with those of the navy.[d]

When you return, you will be pleased to bring with you a small proportion of howitzes, mortars, cohorns, &c. so placed in the vessel in which they are embarked, as to be ready to land directly, as it is very likely we may proceed upon some operation immediately on your arrival.

I believe Fayette is intrenched at Annapolis, and that his corps does not now exceed nine hundred men, though he started with thirteen hundred. You may possibly attempt him in earnest: he will, at all events, serve as a mask to your return to us.

[e]You will probably hear from Lord Cornwallis before you determine on any attempt at a distance from him. I wish much to know what [f]troops he thinks he can spare from the troops under his Lordship's

a B *begins*

b B *reads* should

c B *reads* of

d B *stops*

e B *continues*

f B *reads* force he can spare

immediate orders; for, till I do, 'tis impossible to fix any plan. Three complete regiments will, I hope, arrive at Charles-town in the course of a few days, if Captain Elphinston should think it too early in the season to come directly here; and three more are hourly expected from the West-Indies, both which divisions will, of course, join me.

The French certainly expect an early reinforcement; if it comes from Europe, we must, I think, hear from thence long before it arrives[1]: if from the Havannah, copper-bottomed sloops or frigates, which the Admiral will doubtless have on the look out, will announce their arrival, and give you time to determine what, in that case, [a]will be best to be done. [b]And here I take the liberty of hinting to you, that (from the appearance on the map) when you have once obtained a naval force in Curratŭck and Albemarle Sounds, by holding the bridges of Pequimans and Pasquotank rivers, you secure a short passage across the Albemarle-sound, and communication with Lord Cornwallis; or, by destroying the bridges on those rivers, you prevent the enemy's approach by the bridge at North West landing.[c2,3]

a B *reads* is best
b B *new* ¶
c B *ends*

Upon those hints I request your opinion, in cypher, as soon as possible. In the mean time I shall prepare for what may probably be your determination, after talking with Brigadier-general Arnold.

I beg you will be so good to forward the enclosed to Lieutenant-colonel Moncrief by the first opportunity to Charles-town, and that you will bring Mr.

1aA The Enemys Fleet generally brought the news of its arrival.

2aA surely this was no bad hint to Lord Cornwallis also had he remained at Portsmouth holding old Pt Comfort to secure the best naval station & had suffered Genl Arnold to Continue his boat buildg: He might when pressed or threatened have retired by water to Wilmington.

3aO Surely this information was thought of some importance by L. Cornwallis & yet so little that immediately on his arrival in Virginia He sent G. Leslie to prepare privately for evacuating Portsmouth.

Fyers, of the corps of engineers, with you, when you return to this place.

I have the honour to be &c. H. CLINTON.

P. S. Pray send Brigadier-general Arnold here by the first good opportunity, if you should not have particular occasion for his services.

62B: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, OBSERVATIONS [73 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.

With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, March 24, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 62 *as shown in margins pp* 373-374.

63 PHILLIPS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [73 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.

Extract.—From Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Chesapeak, on board the Royal Oak, in Lynhaven Bay, March 26, 1781.

The fleet containing the troops under my orders, arrived off the Chesapeak yesterday, when Captain Hudson gave the Orpheus liberty to make sail and carry me into this bay, where we knew by intelligence from frigates we met at sea, that Admiral Arbuthnot was with his fleet.

Our fleet sailed from the Hook on Tuesday the 20th instant, and with variable winds, and good weather, is arrived; and now beating up to the rendezvous at Hampton, with hopes, not a certainty, of getting there this evening.

With respect to intelligence, it is not in my power to give you any at a certainty. I hear that at York the rebels have been and are fortifying, and that there are heavy cannon there.

64 State of the TROOPS that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, ANSWER [53] *p* 86.

DATES.	RANK AND FILE PRESENT, AND FIT FOR DUTY.										TOTAL.
	BRITISH.					GERMAN.		PROVINCIALS.			
	Brigade of Guards.	7th Regiment.	16th Regiment, 3 Companies.	23d Regiment.	33d Regiment.	71st Regiment, 1st Battalion.	71st Regiment, 2d Battalion.	71st Regiment, Light Company.	Regiment of Bose.	Yagers.	British Legion, &c. &c.	North Carolina Volunteers.	
Jan. 15, 1781.	690	167	41	286	328	249	237	69	347	103	451	256	3224
Feb. 1, 1781.	690	—	—	279	334	—	234	—	345	97	174	287	2440
Mar. 1, 1781.	605	—	—	258	322	—	212	—	313	97	174	232	2213
Apr. 1, 1781.	411	—	—	182	229	—	161	—	245	97	174	224	1723

65 PHILLIPS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [75 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract.—Major General Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated Portsmouth, April 3, 1781.

I have from the moment of my landing here, pursued the first object of your Excellency's instructions: "The security of the post upon Elizabeth "river, near the mouth of James river."

And your Excellency may be assured, I shall use every means to attain this very material purpose, so necessary, and which alone can enable me, with four thousand militia in our front and near us, to pursue the second part of your instructions: "A move in force upon the enemy's communications between Virginia and North Carolina, at Petersburgh, in assistance to Lord Cornwallis." And I shall do this the moment it may be possible, consistent with the security of the post on Elizabeth river.

It is unlucky for us, that we know so little of Lord Cornwallis, in favour of whom, and his operations we are directed by your Excellency to exert our utmost attention. I shall do all in my power to assist and co-operate with his Lordship, and shall from inclination, as well as in obedience to your Excellency's instructions, do all I can to effect this most desirable end.

I apprehend from various rebel accounts that Lord Cornwallis, although he kept the field, has suffered very much after the action of the 15th ultimo, and to be fortifying to the west of the *Haw* river, near Guildford, which seems a good position, having that river in front of the communication quite down to Cross-Creek and Cape Fear.

Should his Lordship want support, he must in course draw it from Charles-town to Cape Fear river, by directing Lord Rawdon to abandon the frontier, and keep only a garrison in Charles-town.

I embrace your idea, Sir, that should La Fayette remain at Annapolis, which must proceed from the

enemy's fear of being attacked in Maryland, it will be possible to carry him Annapolis and Baltimore; and if you will send me the British grenadiers and forty-second regiment, I will, with almost certain hopes of success, go upon the attempt; and will make an expedition in Virginia at the same instant, as shall effectually prevent any support from thence to Maryland.

I come now to the particulars of this post, and as it is not possible in so short a time, to go through the proper form of a regular report of the commanding engineer, who came with me, I will, until that can be done, very freely offer my opinion that it has not been, I should imagine, properly explained to your Excellency, by Generals Matthews and Leslie. The object of the post, from its situation, respecting James river and the Chesapeak, with its connection with the waters to and in Albemarle sound, and the consequent connections it may have with any army in the Carolinas, are subjects I do not think myself at liberty to touch upon. I mean to confine myself merely to the locality of the post itself; and under that description, I declare, I think the present situation not calculated for a post of force, or for one for a small number of troops. In the first idea, I think three points should be taken, as at *Mill Point* and *Norfolk* positively; the third must depend on more examination of the Elizabeth river, than I have yet been able to give. These points taken would mutually assist the navy stationed here, which might lay within, and be protected; and one point forced, a retreat is left by the other two: and your Excellency will immediately observe, that it must require a large force indeed, to attack the three points at once.

Should it be required by your Excellency merely to keep a post here, without intending more than a station, I think Mill Point, where the old fort stood, well calculated for such a purpose; and it would require not more than a strong battalion equal to six hundred effective rank and file to be the garrison.

In both instances the Chesapeak must be secure, for even allowing every exertion of defence against a fleet, it would be difficult to preserve the river under the first idea of an extensive plan. Under the latter, I consider it scarcely to be done. Old Point Comfort shall be explored, as it seems a point which a small force might defend, and the shipping have scope to act in, and by trying various methods of winds and tides, would be able possibly to escape from even a superior naval force; whereas, once blocked up in Elizabeth river, the ships must at last fall with the post.

I come now to the Norfolk and Princess Ann counties, where we cannot much depend for assistance. They are timorous, cautious, at best, but half friends, and perhaps some, if not many, concealed enemies. Supposing them perfectly ours, we should not be able to arm more than five or six hundred men, who would become a charge to us while we remained, and being left, would be undone. At present, they act a sort of saving game, but are of no use to us. Upon the whole, Sir, it may be perceived that I lean in favour of a small post, where the army can assist the navy, and the latter have a chance of escaping, supposing a superior force to arrive in the bay; and where the post can be maintained with five or six hundred men, for some time, even perhaps till some reinforcement *naval* and land might be sent to raise a siege.[1]

1a a marked perference for Old Point Comfort.

66 GERMAIN TO CLINTON, 4 April 1781, LS RI 22/92.

NARRATIVE [8] *p* 11.

Endorsed Duplicate No. 84, Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton Whitehall 4th April 1781. received by the June 27th. On the subject of operations to the Southward &c. 159.

[a] S *begins and omits* Duplicate
[b] VE *begin*
[c] FRM *begin*

[a]No 84) Duplicate. [b]Whitehall 4th April 1781.

[c]Sir, Since my Letters to you by the March Packet, I have received your's of the 24th of February by a private Ship, and was much alarmed by the Extract from the Newspaper inclosed in it, which gave an account of Colonel Tarleton's having received a Check; I however had the Satisfaction to find, by Dispatches I received three days afterwards from Lord Cornwallis & Colonel Balfour, that although the Newspaper Article was well founded, his Lordships Operations had not been suspended, but that after obtaining two Advantages over the Rebels, in one of which Colonel Tarleton commanded, his Lordship had passed beyond Salem in North Carolina. The little Expedition to Cape Fear appears also to have had all the Success & good Effects expected from it, and as I am informed by the Master of the Ship who brought me your Letter, that the Transports were fallen down to receive the Troops you intended sending into the Chesapeak, I have the strongest Expectations that thro' General Arnold's Cooperation the whole Country to the West of James River is by this time recovered to His Majesty's Possession.[d]

[d] FSVER *run on*

The Extraordinary Gazette published at New York the 3d of February, found its way to England some time before that which you inclosed, and as the Truth of the account it contained could not be doubted, it gave general and great Satisfaction; Your Transmission of it, however gives it the Authenticity it wanted, and I have in consequence received the King's Commands to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure that you do acquaint Brigadier General Arnold, Colonel Simcoe, & the other Officers and Soldiers under his Command, that their Conduct & Behaviour are approved by His Majesty. Some private Accounts which I have seen [e]from the Eastern Side of the Chesapeak, and which appear to deserve Credit, represent the Inhabitants [f]of Worcester,

[e] FRM *omit to* Chesapeak
[f] FRM *omit to* Counties

Somerset and Accomack Counties, as refusing all Obedience to the usurped Powers, and eagerly soliciting for Arms, and an Opportunity of using them, in Conjunction with the King's Forces, for the Restoration of the Constitution. I hope they have found means to make their Circumstances & Desires known to you, for in the present low Condition of Washington's Army the Opportunity of assisting them is as favorable as could be wished.[a]

Our Intelligence from France [b]gives us Reason to believe no part of the Land or Sea Force that has been so long preparing at Brest will be sent directly to North America. A Fleet consisting of 26 Sail of the Line, under the Command of the Count de Grasse, and Transports with from Seven to Twelve Thousand Land Forces were ready to sail the 20th of last Month, and it is said they did sail on the 22d. Six of these Ships and 3,000 of the Troops are to go to the East Indies, and all the others to the West Indies, where their Islands are in great Distress for want of Supplies, none of any Importance having reached them from France this Year, & their usual Resources thro' St. Eustatius being cut off by the Capture of that Island. [c]The Lateness of the Season will I imagine prevent Monsieur de Grasse undertaking anything against the King's Possessions [d]there, but it is probable as soon as he has thrown Supplies into the several Islands, he will proceed to North America, and join the french Forces at Rhode Island, & endeavour to revive the expiring Cause of Rebellion; but as Sir George Rodney's Force is [e]but little inferior to his, and he will be watchful of his Motions, I am not apprehensive he will give him time to do you any material Injury before he comes to your Succour.[f]

The Packet you informed me was to sail in a few days after the private Ship is not yet arrived.

Our grand Fleet under Admiral Darby was waiting off Cape Clear the 25th of last Month for the

a FSVER *run on*
b E *reads* give
c B *begins*
d B *reads* in the West Indies
e B *omits* but
f *ends*

Victuallers from Corke, which were detained there by contrary Winds, but we hope they got out the 26th.

I am happy to learn, from private Letters, that the Associated Refugees are fully sensible of the kind Attention you have shewn them, and express great Impatience to shew their Zeal for the King's Service by some vigorous Attack upon the Sea Coasts of the Revolted Provinces which the want of Shipping only prevents them from undertaking. Should the Admiral continue to find it difficult to supply them, I could wish you would enable them to purchase what may be necessary, rather than they should remain inactive, and altho' I only desired Rations for them while they were in actual Employment, it will be equally necessary to furnish them with them while they are collecting, and preparing for Service, and to allow them to give to all such as may join them upon their Expeditions.[a]

[a] FRM *end*

I am,[b] Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant

[b] SVE *end &c.* Geo: Germain

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. GEO : GERMAIN.

66B: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, NARRATIVE [8] *p* 11.

Extract from Lord George Germain's letter to Sir Henry Clinton, April 4, 1782.

This extract from No. 66 is shown in margin p 381.

66F: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 29.

Extrait d'une lettre du Lord George Germain à Sir Henri Clinton, chevalier du Bain, datée de Whitehall, le 4 avril 1781.

Same as No. 66 with variations shown in margins pp 380-382.

66S: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Draft PA 139/337.

Endorsed Draft to Sir Henry Clinton 4th April 1781. (N° 84.) Entd 42. dup.

Same as No. 66 with variations shown in margins pp 380-382.

66V: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Copy PA 432/281.

In margin (N° 84) Sir Henry Clinton.

Same as No. 66 with variations shown in margins pp 380-382.

65E: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Copy SACKVILLE 10/16.
In margin Sir Henry Clinton (N° 84)
Same as No. 66 *with variations shown in margins pp* 380-382.

66R: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Extract LANSDOWNE 68/6.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated 4th April 1781. N° 42. Ex.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton K.B Dated Whitehall 4th April 1781.
Same as No. 66 *with variations shown in margins pp* 380-382.

66M: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 4 April 1781, Extract HL N° 42.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated 4th April 1781. N°. 42.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Dated Whitehall 4th April 1781.
Same as No. 66 *with variations shown in margins pp* 380-382.

67 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 5/20 April 1781, LS PA 140/25.
NARRATIVE [97] *p* 57, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Endorsed New York, 5th & 20th April 1781. Sir Henry Clinton N° 123. R/23d June. 5 Inclosures.[a] Entd.

[a] *see* ii 367

[b]N°. 123. New York April 5th 1781.

[b] S *inserts* Copy

[c]My Lord, [d]In my Dispatch, marked N° 121, I had the honor to inform Your Lordship that the Expedition under the Command of Major General Phillips sailed for the Chesapeak on the 20th Ultimo. And a Letter I have this day received from that General Officer affords me the pleasure of acquainting You that he arrived with the Troops at Portsmouth on the 26th without meeting with any accident on his Voyage.

[c] F *begins*
[d] V *begins*

Not having been favored with any Letter from Vice Admiral Arbuthnot since that of the 21st

Ultimo (of which I had the honor to transmit Your Lordship a Copy) I cannot communicate to You any other intelligence of the Proceedings of the Fleet under his Command, than that they were lying in Lynhaven Bay the 31st.—That [a]of the French (it is reported here, and universally credited) returned to Rhode Island on the 26th—but it has not been yet properly authenticated.

[a] F *omits* of

I have the satisfaction to acquaint Your Lordship that another Rebel Mail has been intercepted, which has given me very important information, Copies of those Letters which appear most interesting, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship with this Dispatch.

I have likewise the honor to inclose a Hand Bill published at Philadelphia, containing the Account of an Engagement between Lord Cornwallis & the Rebel General Green, near Guildford Court House in North Carolina, on the 15th of March. Wherein it appears from their own confession that His Lordship has gained a very considerable advantage—and, as they acknowledge so much, we shall without doubt find it of much greater consequence when we receive Lord Cornwallis's Account of the Action; particularly with respect to the number of Prisoners he has taken.

Major General Phillips's arrival in Virginia so very opportunely after this Event will most probably produce the happiest Effect, especially as he reports to me that the Vice Admiral has allotted an adequate Naval Force for the Service of the Chesapeak, which I hope will effectually enable the Major General to carry into as speedy execution as possible the Operations recommended to him in my Instructions—the principal, and immediate object of which, in all the Expeditions sent thither, has been the favoring those of Lord Cornwallis in Carolina.

By the arrival of my Aid de Camp Lieut[t] Colonel Bruce, who delivered to me the Original of Your Lordship's Dispatch Marked N° 71, I am made acquainted with the Reinforcements His Majesty has

been graciously pleased to order for the Army under my Command. The three Battalions from Corke will, I hope, by this time have got to Charlestown; and will probably have been directed by Lord Cornwallis to proceed to Cape Fear River. The other Three that went by the way of the West Indies, I have reason to believe arrived at Barbadoes in January last; and as Lieut[t] Colonel Bruce tells me they had positive Orders to join me without delay, I flatter myself that it will not be long before they arrive on this Coast. Should these also touch at Carolina, I am persuaded Lord Cornwallis will not detain them there, nor indeed the first three unless his Lordship should find that circumstances absolutely require it.

[a]After the Reduction of Charlestown, Lord Cornwallis informed me that he thought the force I left with him fully competent to the defence of South,[1·2·3] and most probably the Reduction of North, Carolina. I had therefore at that time no other Intention, (threatned as we were by the expected arrival of a French Fleet & Army [b]at Rhode Island) than to send an Expedition into Chesapeak merely by way of making a diversion in his Lordship's favor, until more solid Operation might take place—which I was in hopes that adequate Reinforcements[4·5] from Europe would have enabled me to undertake early in the present Year. Events[6·7·8·9·10] however, notwithstand-

a B *begins*

b B *reads* ii

1c in Georgia & S. Carolina

2b 11306 m[n] Les[le]

Arnold	2500
Phillips	3000
Voight	1100
	17,906

3b When 17,906 men had been detatched to the Southward, besides the 3 Regts from Ireland, & stgd S. H. C. arm, taken from him in 78. what could remain at New York. not 12.000. to guard all those Islands & detain M[r] Roch, &c &c.

4i Leslie 3000.

5c 3000

6i Fergusons defeat.

7c The loss of Ferguson and Consequences.

8d Ferguson's defeat, & the consequences. S. Carolina thrown back in Rebellion.

9b Fergusons misfortune, lost L. C. all the militia, threw the province back in Rebellion left the N. Carolinians to be massacred, and was the first great loss of his command.

10c Events *underlined.*

ing the very glorious Exertions which were made at Camden, altered Lord Cornwallis's Situation so much, as to make it necessary for him to call the Corps I had sent to Chesapeak with General Leslie[11] (and which I had put under his Lordship's Orders) to a nearer Co-operation.—Being therefore still desirous to secure a Post in that Bay, to cover the King's Frigates which might be acting there; and at the same time wishing to give Lord Cornwallis every assistance in my power, I sent thither another Detachment[12] under the Orders of Brigadier General Arnold,[13·14]—which, tho' not so considerable as the former,[15] met with the fullest Success; [a]as I have already had the honor to inform Your Lordship; and will I doubt not have greatly aided the movements of the Army in Carolina.[b]

a B *omits to* Lordship

b B *runs on*

General Washington having detached a Body of Troops to the Southward, and the French having embarked in their Fleet another from their Army at Rhode Island, with an apparent intention of interrupting our Operations in Virginia, and the Carolinas, I was induced to send to the Chesapeak another[16] Expedition, drawn principally from the Elite of my Army, under Major General Philips[17]. All [c]these several Detachments[18·19] Your Lordship will perceive are acting, either with, or in favor of Lord Cornwallis. But, as General Washington's Letter to M[r] Harrison, a Copy of which Your Lordship will see amongst the intercepted Letters inclosed, intimates that there will not be opposed to his Lordship above Two Thousand Continentals more than General Green had with him before [d](which I have reason to believe could not exceed 1200,) I am led to hope, that when his Lordship has established himself in North Carolina, a very considerable Portion[20] of his Army may be spared

c F *reads* the

d B *omits to* 1200

11c Leslie *underlined.*
12c detachment *underlined.*
13ac 2500.
14i Arnold 2500.
15b 2400.
16c another *underlined.*
17a 2700.
18b 3500.
19i 3500.
20c 3000.

to assist in carrying into Execution such further Operations as Lord Cornwallis may have to Propose, or the whole, or such part as shall be found practicable of those I [a]had designed, and accordingly explained[21] to Major General Phillips in some Conversations I had with him before his departure,[b] the Substance of which I have the honor to inclose for Your Lordship's information.[c]

[a] F *reads* have

[b] B *stops*

[c] V *ends*

It will not, I am persuaded, escape Your Lordship's observation, that these many & considerable Detachments from the part of the Army under my immediate Command will have reduced it much under what I think absolutely necessary, even for the defence of this Post; especially since the supposed Return of the French to Rhode Island. But whilst we remain Superior at Sea, I shall of course be under no apprehensions; And should a fair opportunity offer of acting offensively with the Small force, (which might possibly be spared for a Movement of short duration in the neighbourhood of this Post) I shall not fail to make use of it.

I feel myself, My Lord, particularly flattered by the manner in which Your Lordship does me the honor of expressing Yourself in Your Letter of the 5th of December, respecting a Plan, which had it succeeded would certainly have had the most important consequences. And I may, with truth, presume to say, Your Lordship does but Justice to my Zeal, in supposing, that I shall not let slip any favorable opportunity of rendering His Majesty and my Country so essential a Service, as the securing (even by a regular Attack) the important Post of West Point, whenever the Attempt can be made with propriety.—As to Brigadier General Arnold's [d]Opinions regarding this business, I can only say, that whatever he may have represented to Your Lordship, Nothing he has yet communicated to me on the subject, has convinced me that the Rebel Forts in the Highlands can be reduced

[d] F *reads* opinion,

21c accordingly explained *underlined.*

by a *few days* regular Attack. But, even if that had been my own opinion,—to have attempted them when Washington was in the neighbourhood with twice the Force I could have marched against them, exclusive of the numbers which might have been readily collected in the three Populous & Warlike Provinces adjoining, and the support he might have received from the French Armament at Rhode Island, would surely have been so very unjustifiable, that I trust the impropriety of the Measure under such circumstances must be obvious to Your Lordship. Nor would it have been practicable during the Winter Months for reasons equally manifest. However, if General Arnold convinces me now, in the present reduced State of the Rebel Army, that Success is probable (for to fail would be Death to our Cause in the present Stage of the War,) I shall most likely be induced to make the Attempt. I have therefore requested that General Officer to send his Plan of Operations to me without delay, and to follow, or accompany it himself. In the meantime I am preparing for every Exertion within the Compass of my very reduced Force—Which after the several large Detachments sent to the Southward, Amounts to no more than 6,275, Auxiliary Troops, 4,527, Regular British, and 906, Provincials, fit for Service in the field.

a B *continues* [a]If an Attempt upon the Forts in the Highlands
b B *reads* on shall not [b]upon mature deliberation be thought advisable, and nothing else offers in this Quarter, I shall probably reinforce[22] Major General Phillips,
c B *reads* and direct [c]directing him to carry on such Operations as may
d B *reads* until most effectually favor those of Lord Cornwallis—[d]till
e B *reads* on some Plan can be determined [e]upon for the Campaign. For until I know his Lordship's Success, the Force he can in consequence of it spare from the Carolinas, and the certainty of the Arrival of the Six Regiments intended to Reinforce us, it will be impossible to

22a 1500.

decide finally upon it. Your Lordship will, however, see by the inclosed Opinions what were the Operations I had Planned for the ensuing Campaign, upon the supposition that Lord Cornwallis succeeded in the Carolinas, and was able to spare a Considerable force from thence. With the 10,000, Men I requested, I should not have had a doubt of Success, but in my present reduced State and Prospects, I dare not flatter myself with any; and if the French should [a]be still reinforced, Your Lordship will I am persuaded judge our Situation to be even Critical. For with regard to our Efforts in the Chesapeak, Your Lordship knows how much their Success and even the safety of the Armament there will depend upon our having a decided Naval[23] Superiority[24] in these Seas. And I [b]am therefore fully persuaded that every Precaution will be taken to give me at least timely Notice of the contrary being likely to happen, as my Ignorance of such an Event might be most fatal[25·26·27] in its consequences.[28]

a B *reads* still be

b B *reads* therefore cannot doubt that

The Reinforcement I asked for was only what I Judged to be barely adequate to the Services required —And I most sincerely wish it had been possible to have sent it in the full[29] extent of numbers, and in the time[30] I requested,[c] as our Prospects would in that case have certainly been brighter. But the present reduced State of [d]Washington, the little probability there is I hope of an Augmentation to the French Armament, and the certainty there is I [e]hope also of the Six British Regiments and One Thousand Recruits joining me in a [f]very short time,[31] together with the [g]expectations I have of Lord Cornwallis's Success in Carolina enabling [h]his Lordship to send me a con-

c B *omits to* brighter *and continues* However the

d B *inserts* General

e B *reads* likewise hope of S *reads* also hope

f B *omits* very

g B *reads* expectation

h B *reads* him

23c decided naval *underlined.*

24b Baltimore Philadelphia & finally assembling friends on Delaware neck. perfectly safe against a Temporary naval superiority of the enemy.

25b as alas it did prove!

26g too Fatal it proved.

27c fatal *underlined.*

28fiklmnopqrs as was the case

29c full *underlined.*

30c time *underlined.*

31b none of them ever came.

siderable Reinforcement from thence, render the [a]appearance of my Situation less Critical.—And I shall [b]only add, My Lord, that whilst the King does me the honor to trust me with the Command of this Army, I will employ it to the utmost [c]extent of my poor Abilities for the promoting his Service—taking the liberty however to[32] represent (as I think it my duty) what advantages [d]might be obtained by an Additional Force, and what Evils may be apprehended from the want of a sufficient One[e]

a B *reads* appearances
b B *inserts* therefore
c B *omits* extent
d B *reads* may
e B *ends*

It gave me, My Lord, great Satisfaction to be informed in Your Lordship's Dispatch, N° 71, that Vice Admiral Arbuthnot was appointed to relieve Sir Peter Parker on the Jamaica Station. And I confess that I wait with some impatience for that Event taking place—as every land Movement in the present stage of the War depends so entirely upon the assistance and the Cooperation of the Navy, that unless it is given in the extent, and with the dispatch required, the hoped for Success will but too often escape us. But I shall for the present decline to give Your Lordship any further trouble, than to express my gratitude for the gracious attention with which my Royal Master has been pleased to honor my Representations—as I am in the hope of being soon relieved from my Anxieties on that Subject.—for unless that shall be the Case, and the promised Reinforcement arrives soon from England, I shall be constrained, tho' reluctantly, to Avail myself of the Permission His Majesty has been graciously pleased to give me to resign this Command, which I humbly presume I ought to hold no longer than whilst I have a prospect of doing it with advantage to His Service, and to my own honour—the contrary of which, Your Lordship is sensible, may happen when there is a want of Confidence between the Commanders in Chief of the Land and Sea Forces.

April 20th.—As the Vice Admiral, who returned

32c *printed* present, *altered to* represent

here on the 10th Instant, informed me he had sent a Frigate to England, and Major General Phillips will probably have taken that opportunity to communicate to Your Lordship the Rebel Accounts of Lord Cornwallis's Success, I deferred sending the Packet, in the hopes of soon receiving the Confirmation of it from his Lordship, from whom I have not heard since his Letter of the 18th January.[a]

I have the honor to be,[b] With the greatest Respect Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant H. CLINTON.

Right Hon^ble^ Lord George Germain.

a F *ends* I am &c. H. Clinton
b S *ends &c.* (Signed) H. Clinton.

67B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 5 April 1781, NARRATIVE [97] *p* 57.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letter to Lord George Germain. April 5th, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 67 *as shown in margins pp* 385-390.

67F: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 5 April 1781, Copy PA 309/93.

In margin New York 5th & 20th April 1781, Sir Henry Clinton N° 123. R^d^ 23^d^ June

Mem. at end Inclosures. N° 1. Substance of Opinions by Sir H. Clinton to Maj^r^ Gen^l^ Phillips 2. Copies of two Letters from a Philadelphia Rebel Paper 31st March 1781 3. Copy of an intercepted Letter from Gen^l^ Washington. 23^d^ March 1781 4. Ditto 27th March 1781 5. Ditto 28th March 1781.

Same as No. 67 *with variations shown in margins pp* 383-391.

67S: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 5 April 1781, Copy RI 22/93.

Endorsed N° 123 Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain New York April 5th 1781. Original ℔ the Thynne Packet Duplicate ℔ the Confederate 211

Same as No. 67 *with variations shown in margins pp* 383-391.

67V: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 5 April 1781, Extract HL N° 10.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain dated New York 5th April 1781.[c] R/ 23^d^ June. N° 10

c *for enclosures see* ii. 367

Begins Extract from a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain dated New York 5th April 1781.
This extract from No. 67 is shown in margins pp 383-387.

68 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, OBSERVATIONS [79 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
Copy.—Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 5, 1781.

Dear Sir, I need not say how important success in the Highlands would be. I beg you will without loss of time, consult General Arnold upon the subject. I beg I may have his project, and your opinion, as well as his, respecting it, as soon as possible. When I have considered it, and if I determine to undertake it, I will send for him; and if operation should be at a stand in the Chesapeak at the time, I will request you also to be of the party; the proportion of artillery I desired you to make, will of course be ready.

P. S. If General Arnold does not think it expedient at *this time* to attempt it, which however, I should be sorry for, perhaps a combined move between us against Philadelphia, may take place. You, by landing at the head of Elk; I, at Newcastle, or Chester;—if the first, General Arnold must let me have his plan as soon as possible, and be ready to follow it himself, or may bring it, if you can spare him.

69 BALFOUR TO CLINTON, 7 April 1781, Copy RI 19/65.
OBSERVATIONS [82 *Ap'x*] *p* 130, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Copy Charles Town April 7th 1781.

a B *begins* [a]Sir, I am honored with your Letters of the 2d of January & [b]9th of last Month as also with one of the 14th Ultimo, by your Excellency's [c]Direction from Capt Smith.[d]

b B *reads* 19th
c B *reads* directions
d B *stops*

About a Week since the Fleet from England sailed, & as only such Transports as were wholly unfit for Service went home with it, I am happy in this respect to have complied with your Excellency's

Intentions. Those that can be spared from this will be sent with the Convoy to New York, and only the Prison Ships remain here.

I took the Opportunity of the Assurance's Fleet being obliged to Water, to take out the Cloathing for the British Regiments here, & likewise some for the Provincial Troops stationed & raising in the Southern Provinces. And as the want of all kinds of Ordnance Stores, especially small Arms, was great, & the demands for them pressing I have taken the Liberty of procuring a small Supply from the Juliana, the particulars of which will be transmitted by Major Traile ; but must agreeable to the Wish of Lord Cornwallis request in the strongest manner a further Quantity of small Arms, the Consumption of which is very considerable, from the frequent Loss of them in Action, and the Arming of New Levies and Militia both here and in Georgia. To which I must add my having been obliged to send 1000 Stand to Cape Fear & the total unfitness for Service of those left at this Place.

[a]As Lord Cornwallis is in the greatest want of every Supply, I have sent him to Cape Fear what cou'd be procured here. And as he will have many Calls [b]in the Hospital, in consequence of the late Marches & Action, I have taken Care to furnish a Supply of Officers and Stores to that Department at Wilmington, & shall by that way forward to his Lordship [c]your[1] Excellency's Dispatches whenever an Occasion offers.[d2·3·4·5]

[a] B *continues*

[b] B *reads* on

[c] B *italics to* Dispatches

[d] B *ends*

1df your Excellency's Dispatches *underlined.*

2f that occasion did offer but S H C dispatches were not sent.

3b it would seem no opportunity offered before the 24th but the Amphitrite & Swallow both sailed for Cape Fear & came to N York bringing letters from L Cornwallis to me prooff they might have carried these dispatches.

4a this Amphitrite brought me also letters from L. Cornwallis of the 10th April. Why did not that ship carry my dispatches to L. Cornwallis, or the Speedy packett or the Runner by which Lord Cornwallis says he had received dispatches from Col. Balfour on the 22d of April.

5c this very man of war you knew was going to Cape Fear why did you not send the dispatches by it, or by the Speedy packet.

The very extensive Demands here for Money have hitherto been mostly answered by Government Bills of Exchange which till lately passed current at the rate of 4/8 ℔ Dollar. But the Merchants are at present unwilling to receive them at a less discount than they bear at New York. However as their wish is only to have the Exchange the same at both Places, they have agreed to continue it as usual until this point is adjusted, & I can be honored with your Excellency's Commands on this essential Subject.

I do myself the honor to transmit your Excellency the Copy of a Letter from Captain M^{c}Namara, of His Majesty's Sloop Hound, by which will be seen the Danger which threatens W. Florida. On receiving this account I immediately forwarded the same to Governor Dalling & General Vaughan, that if possible some Aid might be afforded by them to the Garrison of Pensacola, and have sent to S^{t} Augustine such Supplies of Ammunition & Provisions as cou'd be spared from this; which, together with a strong Galley sent there, the Presence of L^{t} Col^{l} Clarke, & a small Reinforcement he takes with him from Savannah, will I trust give Security to that Place.

Subsequent to these Advices, Information has been received by an Express, to a Merchant at Augusta that about the 10th Ultimo, the Spanish Fleet arrived at Pensacola; that the Army, nearly 2000, was landed on Roses Island, & that the Ships of War were Cannonading the Works on Red Cliffs.

Enclosed I have the honor to transmit the Proceedings of a General Court Martial held here, & which from the occasion for it, your Excellency will judge to have been unavoidable.

In some of my former Letters I have had occasion to mention to your Excellency the Inroads which the Enemy were daily making into the Heart of this Province, & the distresses, both to the People of the Country and Army, which attended them. I am therefore sorry the occasion still exists for the like

Informations; owing in a great Measure to the Extent of the Communications, & the want of Cavalry (for which there are no Appointments here) to cover them from the Incursions of small Parties; which tho' singly of no Moment, yet produce when so often occurring the worst Consequences.

Lieu[t] Sutherland, of the Engineers is now with Major Craig; but shall be sent to New York, whenever he can be got at, agreeable to your Excellency's Directions.

Tho' my Lord Rawdon has the honor to communicate the Accounts of Lord Cornwallis's Victory over the Rebels at Guilford. I cannot deny myself the honor of congratulating your Excellency on an Event so fortunate in its Consequences, & so reputable to the Army serving under your Command.

I have the Honor &[c] (Signed) N. BALFOUR.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton

69B: BALFOUR to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [82 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, received by the Amphitrite man of war, dated Charles-Town, April 7, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 69 *as shown in margins pp* 392-393.

70 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 10 April 1781, LS RI 19/66.
ANSWER [9] *p* 85, OBSERVATIONS [84 *Ap'x*] *p* 130, REPLY [6] *p* 141.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes from ANSWER *and* REPLY.

Endorsed Duplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Sir. H. Clinton, K.B. April 10[th] 1781. rec[d] 22[d] May 1781 by the Speedy Packet N[o] 148.

[a]Duplicate. [b]Camp near Wilmington 10[th] April 1781

[c]Sir, [d]I am just informed that I have a chance of sending a few lines to New York by the Amphitrite,[1·2] but as it depends upon my being expeditious,

a E *reads* Copy
b R *begins*
c BF *begin*
d O *begins*

1aA by this very Amphitrite he should have received my dispatches as she brought me Col. Balfours receipt of them.

2bA why did not this same Amphitrite carry my dispatches to Lord Cornwallis, she left Charlestown the 8[th] & brought

I cannot attempt to give your Excellency a particular account of the Winter's Campaign, or the battle of
[a] F *stops* Guildford.[a] I have however the satisfaction of informing you, that our military operations were uni-
[b] E *reads* at formly successfull; and the Victory [b]of Guildford, altho' one of the bloodiest of this War, was very complete. The Enemy gave themselves out for nine or ten, & undoubtedly had seven thousand Men in the field,[3] upwards of two thousand of which, were
[c] ER *run on* eighteen-months men, or Continentals.[c]

Our force was 1360 Infantry, rank & file, and about 200 Cavalry.[4,5,6] General Greene retreated the night of the Action to the Iron-works, on Troublesome Creek, eighteen miles from Guildford, leaving us four six-pounders, being all the Cannon
[d] E *new* ¶ he had in the field. [d]The fatigue of the Troops, and the great number of wounded, put it out of my power to pursue beyond the Reedy Fork, in the Afternoon of the Action; and the want of Provisions, and all kinds of necessaries for the soldiers, made it
[e] BERO *insert* the equally impossible, to follow the blow, [e]next day. I, therefore, issued the inclosed Proclamation; and, having remained two days on the field of battle, marched to Bell's-Mill on Deep-River, near part of the Country, where the greatest number of our friends were supposed to reside. Many of the Inhabitants rode into Camp, shook me by the hand, said they

me Col. Balfour's receipt of them dated the 7th of April. they all but forbid L. Cornwallis going into Virginia the Steady Packet sailed the 13th from C. Town to L. Cornwallis at Wilmington but my dispatches to him still not sent!!!

3bA read what Gates, what Green, what Ramsay say of the wretched beings of Southern militia.

4aA from 3200 when he passed the Catawba in January he is reduced by sickness and desertion to 1300. and after the Victory, which was brilliant to 700. with those, without provisions or arms he invites by proclamation these poor people to join him!!!

5bA passes Catawba with 3500 men but is reduced to 1300 at Guildford.

6bA notwithstanding which calls the poor people to join him tho he had no arms to put in their hand, provisions to subsist them, and was at the moment in precipitate retreat.

were glad to see us, and to hear that we had beat Greene, and then rode home again ; [a]for I could not get 100 men in all the Regulator's Country, to stay with us, even as Militia.

a R *omits* for

With a third of my Army sick & wounded, which I was obliged to carry in Waggons, or on horseback, the remainder without Shoes, and worn down with fatigue, I thought it was time to look for some place of rest & refitment; I, therefore, by easy Marches,[7] taking care to pass through all the Settlements, that had been described to me as most friendly, proceeded to Cross-Creek.[8] On my arrival there, I found, to my great mortification, & contrary to all former accounts, that it was impossible to procure any considerable quantity of provisions, and that there was not four days forage within twenty miles :[9·10] The Navigation of Cape Fear [b]River, with the hopes of which I had been flattered, was totally impracticable, the distance from Wilmington by water being 150 miles, the breadth of the river seldom exceeding one hundred yards, the banks generally high, and the Inhabitants on each side, almost universally hostile.[11·12] Under these Circumstances I determined to move immediately to Wilmington.[c] By this measure, the Highlanders have not had so much time as the people of the upper Country, to prove the sincerity of their

b B *omits* River

c O *stops*

7bA your exertions were wonderful, & deserved a better fate.

8aA Lord Cornwallis movements in the Field do him infinite credit; his activity, Zeal, resources would do honour to any general; but he does not seem to have looked forward to probable consequences, ever too fond of detatchments.

9bA How could you expect it my good Lord.

10bA that small quantity of provisions and forage would have carried you to the Santee L. Rawdon from Camden would have helped you over that river you then would have obeyed your orders, covered S. Carolina, you would have saved your army, and we should have saved America.

11aA For these very reasons my good Lord you should have gone to Camden, in obedience to my orders not to expose Charles Town at that time open & to fulfil your own promises to Gen Leslie, you were nearer to it than to Wilmington, safe & shorter.

12bA for these very reasons you should not have gone down the banks of Cape Fear river

former professions of Friendship: But, tho' Appearances are rather more favourable among them, I confess they are not equal to my expectations.[13]

a O *continues* [a]General Greene marched down as low as the mouth of Deep-River, where he remained four days ago; He never came within our reach after the action, nor

b B *reads* Ramsey's has a shot been since fired,[14] except at [b]Ramsay's-Mill on Deep-River, where Colonel Malmedy, with about 20 of a gang of plunderers that are attached to him, galloped in among the Sentries, and carried off three Yagers.

I cannot sufficiently commend the behaviour of both Officers and Men under my Command.[15] They not only shewed the most persevering intrepidity in action, but underwent with chearfulness such fatigues & hardships as have seldom been experienced by a British Army, and justly merit every mark of favour and reward. The great assistance which I received from Generals Leslie and O'Hara, & Lieu[t] Colonel Tarleton, deserves my warmest acknowledgments, & highest commendations.

I am now employed in disposing of the sick & wounded, and in procuring supplies of all kinds, to put the troops into a proper state to take the field. I am, likewise, impatiently looking out for the expected reinforcement from Europe, part of which will be indispensibly necessary, to enable me either to act offensively, or even to maintain myself in the upper parts of the Country, where alone I can hope to preserve the Troops, from the fatal Sickness, which so nearly ruined the Army last Autumn.

c F *continues* SVM *begin* [c]I am very anxious to receive your Excellency's commands,[16] being as yet totally in the dark, as to

13bA have you, could you in the force and state you were give them a fair tryal. can you doubt their zeal. look back to Febry 76. and April 80.

14aA how could he come nearer you put the deep river between you

15abA This is all realy / very true.

16R in the first part of this letter his lordsp implys that he is going as soon as possle into the back of S. Carolina this letter was read in the H of Lords

the intended operations of the Summer.[17·18] I cannot help expressing my wishes, that the Chesapeak may become the Seat of [a]War, even (if necessary) at the expence of abandoning New-York ; Untill Virginia is in a manner subdued, our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious. The Rivers [b]of Virginia are advantageous to an invading Army, But North-Carolina is, of all the Provinces [c]in America, the most difficult to attack, (unless material Assistance could be got from the Inhabitants, the contrary of which, I have sufficiently experienced) on account of its great extent, of the numberless Rivers and Creeks, & the total want of interior navigation.[d]

a O *inserts* the

b FSRM *read* in

c F *reads* of

d FSVM *end*

In compliance with your Excellency's general directions, I shall dispatch my Aid-de-camp, Captain Brodrick, to England, with the particular accounts of the Battle of Guildford, of the Winter's Campaign, and the present State of the Province, Copies of which, I shall have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency with my next dispatch.[e]

I have the honour to be[f] with great respect, Sir, Your most obedient & Most humble Servant

[g]CORNWALLIS.

e O *ends* [a]Iam &c. (Signed) Cornwallis

f B *ends* &c. Cornwallis

g ER *insert* (Signed)

17aA How can your Lordship say you are totally in the dark as to the intended operns. read my letter 6th of Novr at least by that you will perceive that unless I am reinfor'd & am sure of a covering Fleet I am determined against solid operation in Virginia such as you are about to force.

so anxious that when you hear they are actually at Charles Town & may be expected every hour you march into Virginia &c &c &c without waiting to receive them.

18bA and yet when he hears they are arrived makes a desperate move into Virginia without waiting to receive them. and in the dark is resolved to remain.

70B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, ANSWER [9] *p* 85.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Camp near Wilmington, April 10, 1781.

Same as No. 70 *with variations shown in margins pp* 395-399.

70F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [84 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clin-

ton, received by his Majesty's ship Amphitrite, dated Camp, near Wilmington, April 10, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 70 *as shown in margins pp* 395-399.

70S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, REPLY [6] *p* 141.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp before Wilmington, 10th April, 1781.

This extract from No. 70 *is shown in margins pp* 398-399.

70V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 182.

Extrait d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis, à Sir Henri Clinton, datée du camp devant Wilmington le 10 avril 1781. (Recue le 22 avril.)

This extract from No. 70 *is shown in margins pp* 398-399.

70E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, Copy PA 157/255.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Camp near Wilmington 10 April 1781. In Lord Cornwallis of the 18 April N° 10.[a]

a No. 78 *p* 416

Same as No. 70 *with variations shown in margins pp* 395-399.

70R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, Copy PA 140/131.

Endorsed Copy. Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton KB. Camp near Wilmington April 10th 1781. received the 22d April. In Sir Hy Clinton's N° 124.[b]

b No. 90 *p* 458

Same as No. 70 *with variations shown in margins pp* 395-399.

70M: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, Extract PA 140/556.

Endorsed Extract from the Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak & an Expedition against Philadelphia. (11) In Sir Henry Clinton's Letter of the 13th July[c] 90

c *see* ii. 378

Begins Extract. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Camp near Wilmington 10th of April 1781. Received the 22d of April.

This extract from No. 70 *is shown in margins pp* 398-399.

70O: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 10 April 1781, Extract HL N° 90b.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated Camp near Wilmington 10th April 1781. N° 90b.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated Camp near Wilmington 10th April 1781.
This is two parts of No. 70 *as shown in margins pp* 395-399.

71 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, 11 April 1781, ANSWER [90] *p* 87.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major General Phillips, dated New-York, April 11, 1781.
[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

Your letter of the 3d instant, by Captain Chads, which I am this day favoured with, makes me apprehensive lest you may have misconceived my intentions with regard to the order in which I wished that the different objects recommended to you in my instructions should be attended to; and that your having in consequence proposed to commence with strengthening the works at Portsmouth, may occasion some delay of the operations desired to favour those of Lord Cornwallis, whose situation after the action of the 15th ult. might not only derive the greatest advantage from, but indeed might possibly be so critical as even to require a timely exertion of the troops under your command[1].

You will, therefore, have the goodness to forgive me, if I request you to recollect, that at the time those instructions were drawn up, General Arnold was partly invested by a considerable body of militia, and threatened with an attack from the French armament from Rhode-island, and Fayette's corps then on their march to Virginia, which naturally pointed out the *security of him, the troops under his*

1a while it was possible for Lord Cornwallis to act in those unhealthy Climates it will be observ'd that My principal object was ever to favour his operatns.

orders, and the posts on Elizabeth-river, as the principal object of your expedition; which words were certainly intended to mean no more than relieving them from their supposed danger, by either forming a junction with General Arnold, or taking such measures against the enemies opposed to him as might most effectually enable you to throw into his lines an immediate supply of provisions and men; for how could I imagine that the post at Portsmouth, which General Arnold had but just informed me, in his letter of the 27th of February, he could defend against the force of the country, and two thousand French troops, until a reinforcement arrived from hence, would require additional works for its security, after you had joined him with so considerable a reinforcement, or was acting against the rebel stations in its neighbourhood? And I could not but suppose that you yourself comprehended what I intended to be the first object of my instructions, when you tell me in your letter, by Serjeant Coulter, that the proposed consultation would go, "*in the first instance to the* "*security of this post*, and in the *next* to the fulfilling "the *first object* of your Excellency's instructions."[2] Which, (excuse me for repeating it) has been invariably in all my instructions to the General-officers sent to the Chesapeak, *operation in favour of Lord Cornwallis.* But, if you will have the goodness to read those I gave you once more, I am sure you will perceive that what I have said about *strengthening the present works on Elizabeth-river, and adding such others as you shall think necessary*, is placed subsequent in order to most of the other objects recommended to you, and they were of course designed to have been taken into consideration after those had been accomplished, and you were upon the point of returning to me with part of your present force.

2a had Lord Cornwallis seen these instructions a copy of wch were with Col. Balfour before aluded to. He surely would not have engaged in operations so totally depending on a Fleet.

[a]I am always happy to receive your opinions respecting the different operations of the war in this country, particularly those immediately connected with your own station. I, therefore, of course, shall pay every attention to what you say about the post at Portsmouth, and feel myself greatly obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to investigate its good and bad properties. My ideas of a post on Elizabeth-river have continued uniformly the same since I first took a view of it, having always considered it merely as a station to protect the King's ships, which might occasionally sail from thence to cruize in the waters of the Chesapeak, and command its entrance. I, therefore, only wished to have there such a number of troops as might be sufficient for its defence, and which, being occasionally reinforced, as circumstances should require and our abilities admit, might act offensively in distressing and embarrassing the measures of the enemy in its neighbourhood.—[b]For, God forbid I should think of burying the elite of my army in Nansemond and Princess Anne! these ideas I communicated to the General officers I sent on that service; and they each adopted such as appeared to them best calculated to answer the intended purpose. My own opinion indeed was that we should possess a close work at [c]*Mill Point*, (which Fyers fortified by my order in 1776, as he will remember,) another at Norfolk, and [d]a third somewhere on the [e]*opposite side* of the river: but as I had been there only for a very short time, I could not of course but be influenced by the representations of the General officers and Engineers on the spot, who had more time, and better opportunity to examine all the different positions on that river. General Leslie therefore having informed me that he had, with the unanimous suffrage of the sea and land officers on the expedition, made choice of Portsmouth, (which probably he did with a view of putting our friends of Princess Anne, &c. under cover and protection, [f]but

a B *begins*

b B *omits to* Anne

c B *not italics*

d B *reads* another

e B *not italics*

f B *omits to* them all

by your account, a small house, I fear, will be sufficient for them all,) and his Engineer, Captain Sutherland, having in consequence began a work there, which he was of opinion could in a few days be in a state to be perfectly secure with a small garrison; I was induced to recommend to General Arnold the occupying the same ground: and though I must do the justice to that General officer to acknowledge that he gave me, in his letter of the 23d of January, a very different representation of the post at Portsmouth, from the one given me by [a]Major-general Leslie; circumstances became so critical at the time I received it, in consequence of the French preparations at Rhode-Island, and the numerous militia who were collecting in Virginia and North Carolina, that I thought it an improper time to change the station, because good or bad, such as it was, it must for the present be defended. I accordingly thought it right to defer, to some more proper occasion, the writing to General Arnold on the subject; and I was afterwards happy to find by his letter to me of the 27th of February, that his works there were in such forwardness[b]; and that he was even preparing to send up James River, an expedition of five hundred men. All these circumstances considered, I was led to suppose that the post at Portsmouth, was now rendered an eligible one by the manner in which it was fortified. However, as I intimated before, it is by no means a position of my choice, and if you and General Arnold have such good reasons to condemn it, it may be right to return to our original object, [c]*a station to protect the King's ships, which is capable of being maintained by a garrison of about five or six hundred men*; and if Mill-Point will answer these purposes without Norfolk, and the corresponding station on the opposite side of the river, I can have no objection; but leave it to you to act as you judge best for the King's service.[d]

I have the honour to be, &c. H. CLINTON.

a B *omits* Major

b B *inserts* 3 *lines see p* 405

c B *not italics*

d B *ends*

71B: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 11 April 1781, Extract PA 140/113.
Endorsed Extracts from Gen[l] Sir H: Clintons Letters to Maj[r] Gen[l] Phillips N° 3 In Sir Henry Clintons N° 124 of 23[d] & 30[th] April & 1[st] May 1781[a]
Begins Extracts of Letters from General Sir Henry Clinton to Major General Phillips.

[a] No. 90 *p* 458

This extract from No. 71 *is shown in margins pp* 403-404.
Page 404 *line* 22 *insert the following words:—*
that he could defend the Post against the Force of the Country & 2000 French Troops until a Reinforcement arrived from hence.

72 CLINTON to PHILLIPS, OBSERVATIONS [80 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
Extract.—Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 13, 1781.

In addition to what I have said in those letters (April 5) I scarce need mention, that I am persuaded you will not delay to make such movements in favour of Lord Cornwallis as you judge best, with the force you have left after garrisoning the different works at Portsmouth; which after reading the report of your engineer, I flatter myself will be perfectly secure with six or eight hundred men. In that case you will be at liberty to act with the remainder, being as good troops as any in this country, in such operations as you shall judge most conducive to assist those of his Lordship.

73 CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 13 April 1781, ANSWER [18] *p* 85.
Duplicate. Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated [a]New-York, April 13, 1781.

[a] B *begins* Copy

My Lord, As it appears, even from the Rebel account of the action, that your Lordship has gained a victory over Greene; and it is probable he may in consequence have repassed the Roanoke, I beg leave to submit to your Lordship, the propriety of your coming to Chesapeak Bay in a frigate as soon as you have finished your arrangements for the security of the Carolinas, and you judge that affairs

there are in such a train as no longer to require your presence; directing at the same time such troops to follow you thither, as your Lordship is of opinion can be best spared.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce's arrival I am made acquainted that six British regiments are intended as an immediate reinforcement to the army under my command; should therefore any of these corps stop at Carolina your Lordship may probably direct them either to replace such troops as follow you, or to proceed immediately to the Chesapeak.

Agreeable to what I have already said to your Lordship in my letters of the 1st of June and 6th of November, it is my wish that you should continue to conduct operations as they advance northerly: for, except as a visitor, I shall not probably move to Chesapeak, unless Washington goes thither in great force. The success which has hitherto attended your Lordship excites the fullest assurance of its continuance; and as it is my inclination to assist your operations to the utmost extent of my power, I am convinced, from your disinterestedness, that you will not ask from me a larger proportion of troops than I can possibly spare.

As this goes by an unarmed vessel to Chesapeak, Major General Phillips will add what he thinks necessary to it, and forward it to Cape Fear.

The Admiral has at last consented that the Medea shall sail for Cape Fear, as soon as she is ready. Perhaps your Lordship may take that opportunity of returning in her; and, if we can prevail upon the Admiral, or Commanding Naval officer here, to spare Captain Duncan to conduct the naval part of our business in the Chesapeak, I think we shall have gained a great point.[a]

[a] B *ends* H. Clinton

I have the honour to be, &c. H. CLINTON.

73B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 13 April 1781, Copy RI 22/95.
The same letter as No. 73.

74 PHILLIPS TO CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [81 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
Extract.—Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Portsmouth, in Virginia, April 15, 1781.

I am free to declare Portsmouth to be a bad post, its locality not calculated for defence, the collateral points necessary to be taken up so many, that altogether it would require so great a number of troops as no general officer I imagine would venture to propose to the Commander-in-chief to leave here for mere defence —— A spot might be found, I apprehend, for a post for five hundred men, should it be necessary to have one in Elizabeth River.

75 PHILLIPS TO CLINTON, 16 April 1781, NARRATIVE [6] *p* 9.
"I cannot sufficiently express my extreme joy at reading Washington's letter. It is such a description of distress, as may serve to convince, that with a tolerable reinforcement from Europe, to enable your Excellency to determine on an offensive campaign, the year 1781 may probably prove the glorious period to your command in America, by putting an end to the rebellion."—Letter from Major-general Phillips to Sir H. Clinton, Portsmouth, Virginia, April 16, 1781.

76 PHILLIPS TO CLINTON, 15/19 April 1781, Extracts PA 140/99.
OBSERVATIONS [81 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.

Endorsed Extracts from Major Gen[l] Phillips Letters to Sir H. Clinton. N° 2. In Sir Henry Clintons N° 124 of 23[d] & 30[th] April & 1[st] May 1781.[a]

[b]Extracts from Major General Phillips's Letters.

Portsm° in Virginia April 15. 1781

Finding the putting this Place in a proper State of Defence rather beyond the Calculation in point of Time, I made up that Deficiency by Numbers of Men, which rendered the State of the several Redoubts

a No. 90 *p* 458
b F *begins* S *inserts* Copy

and Lines so tolerably complete as to enable me without any probable Risk to move with 2000 Troops upon that Expedition first directed to be undertaken; and everything was ready for a Movement on the 11th Instant. Unfortunately the Winds blew directly contrary, & very strong on that day & every one after until yesterday, when it changed in a degree to allow some Transports with Troops to go down to Hampton Road—and I had ordered the Light Infantry & Queen's Rangers to march from their Cantonments to embark in the Boats prepared for them at Norfolk, when a most violent Storm of Wind and Rain obliged me to postpone moving the Troops.

I must refer your Excellency to my former Letters, particularly my last, for my Sentiments upon what may be attempted against La Fayette, against that Quarter in the Chesapeak, and the consequent Operations leading to the opening the Campaign, after the first Object of your Excellency's Instructions & Orders shall be accomplished. But this must depend upon a Reinforcement in force; or all Enterprizes here will be merely desultory, which may in a degree annoy the Enemy, but answer, I apprehend, no great Object.

I have the Honor to inclose You a Letter I have written to Lord Cornwallis; whom I believe to have been victorious in his late action with General Green, but still not in a State to make any great advantages of his Victory. I conceive myself restricted from pursuing any Movements over the Roanoke; and indeed with the present Force it would be not possible for it to be done. But perhaps, with a Reinforcement and Your Excellencys Permission & Orders, a Junction might be made, at any Rate a Cooperation, with Lord Cornwallis, which would force Mr Green from the Power of giving any Interruption to his Lordship settling the Situation of Affairs in North Carolina—

Portsm° Virginia 16th April 1781

I am clear that Lord Cornwallis pursued the Enemy to the Ford with great Slaughter, for I observe the Enemy industriously give an Account only of their Continentals not their Militia; there is therefore Reason to believe the Victory complete. But forgive me for thinking that he may have bought it dear, and that his Lordship remained a little crippled after the Action. The Move of these Troops, as I hope, to Morrow, cannot fail of being a most usefull Cooperation with that Army; and should your Excellency have judged it necessary to reinforce me, it may be in my Power from a Communication with Lord Cornwallis to join in the dispersing Mr. Greens army.

I am confirmed in my Idea from reading the intercepted Letter of General Washington, of what I took the Liberty of mentioning to Your Excellency respecting La Fayette; and that he will never venture to move Southward. And it leads me to suppose that he remains at Baltimore waiting Events. Should an Expedition proceed against him, he possibly may retire to Washington; in which Case Maryland and the Susquehannah to Yorktown, & from thence back to Frederick Town on the Potowmack with that River, would in a degree be in our Power. Should he on the Contrary remain to protect Baltimore or Annapolis, he certainly may be carried with his Troops. But the Attempt, Sir, cannot be made with the Forces at present here; for it would be incompatible with the Situation of Portsmouth to take from its Defence, for so distant an Operation, more than 16 or 18,00 Men.

Forgive me, Sir, for once more observing that without a Reinforcement to this Corp of Troops, little can be done except plundering of Tobacco, which is not an object of mine. With a Reinforcement I think a great deal may be done by the End of May.

In Your Letter, Sir, You are so good to do me Justice in being persuaded I shall not delay the Movements to be made in favor of Lord Cornwallis. Had the Winds & Weather permitted, it would have been done on the 11th Instant. As it is, it must depend upon a favorable Change of the Weather, which I trust will happen to Morrow or the next day at farthest.

I have in all my Letters taken the Liberty to remark that I think this Post cannot be perfectly Secure without a great Number of Troops.. But taking into Consideration the Sort of Enemy, tho' numerous, in our Front, That a Movement I shall make will probably occasion one from them, I am of Opinion the Post will be secure with the Troops I shall leave in it, which amount, including the Post at the Great Bridge, and a Guard upon the General Hospital at Norfolk, to 900 Men: and there will be about 300 left sick in the General and Regimental Hospitals. In the effective Numbers I do not include the artillery, armed Artificers, nor Sailors.

Joint Letter from M. G. Phillips & B. G. Arnold dated 18th Apl 1781

N° 6. From the Reasons stated, Namely the little Likelyhood of a quick personal Interview with Lord Cornwallis, we take the Liberty of submitting an opinion to the Commander in Chief—That, previous to the real opening of the Campaign (with which we suppose Lord Cornwallis will be materially connected, and on which a consultation with his Lordship may be necessary) it may be possible to effect several essential Purposes, by which the Rebels may be much harrassed and distressed, and that such Distresses must ultimately reach Mr Washington's Army in the Jersies; which cannot fail, we imagine, of proving an advantageous Prelude to the Campaign.

N° 7. We are of opinion that was this Corps of

Troops more in Number by 1800 or 2000 Men, a Post in force might be taken at Petersburg, from whence Detachments might be made in such Strength as to break up entirely M^r^ Greens Communication with Virginia and might otherwise be able to operate upon a proper Communication had with and a Plan settled with Lord Cornwallis, as would probably have dispersed M^r^ Greens Army. But Time is so far advanced, as to render perhaps such an operation depending upon a Reinforcement inconsistent with the Time of, and the Views in, opening the Campaign; to which must be added the Difficulty there will always be in any free and certain Communication by Land with Lord Cornwallis.

N^o^ 8. We now take the Liberty of giving an opinion of what may be done in Chesapeak previous to the Month of June, supposing all Cooperation over with the Southern Army. And we profess to conceive that if the Marquis de la Fayette remains with his Corps of 1500 Men at Baltimore an Attempt may be made upon him, Baltimore and Annapolis, with great Probability of Success. But it cannot be undertaken we imagine without a Reinforcement of effective 1600 or 2000 Men, and a Proportion of heavy Artillery for constructing Batteries against the works we understand to have been constructed at Baltimore.

N^o^ 9. Should the Marquis de la Fayette retire upon the Approach of a Corps of Troops against him, Maryland would be left defenceless and the Enemy's Magazines in that Country extending to the Potowmack River, would in Course be destroyed, as would also the Arms & Ammunition belonging to the Militia, as well as Boats, Shipping & Small Craft in the Rivers.

N^o^ 10. We are of opinion these operations, delineated for the Chesapeak, if undertaken about the first of May, would terminate the latter End of that Month. After which Period, it would be in the

Power of Your Excellency to direct the future Operation of this Corps of Troops,[a] either to make an Attempt upon Philadelphia, and take Post in the lower Counties of the Delaware; for which we apprehend this Force sufficient, [b]or to return to New York and operate with your Excellency's main Army for the Campaign.

[a] S *stops*

[b] S *continues*

N° 12. We have only one Point more to submit to Your Excellency's Consideration. It is respecting the Post of Portsmouth, which we conceive to be a bad one—taken only in one View, that of the Number of Troops, necessary to defend it. There are many other Points which render the Post weak, which an order has been given by Major General Phillips to the commanding Engineer to delineate. We imagine that to protect Princess Anne County, and to have a Point for Troops to resort to, and for Expeditions in the Chesapeak to be sent from; a Post for Six hundred or one Thousand Men might be established elsewhere to more Advantage than this of Portsmouth.[c]

[c] S *stops*

The Idea formed of Princess Anne does not answer to the real Temper and Disposition of the Inhabitants. They are scarcely Friends, and perhaps many of them Enemies; although Necessity from the Situation of the King's Troops oblige the latter to remain quiet —The former are not inclined to be active in our favor.

[d] S *continues*

[d]Hampton Road on board the Maria April 19^{h} 1781

In my Way down to the Assembly of Transports and Boats Yester Evening this Vessel which I am in run on Ground, And while I was waiting for a Swell of the Tide, an Express Boat arrived to me with a Letter from Lord Cornwallis, which the Amphitrite had brought.

I have read the Copy of the Dispatch to your Excellency alluded to, and it is a plain Tale of many Difficulties and Distresses, great Perseverance and

Resolution, and Honour. The Action of the 15th was glorious; but, as I feared, that Sort of Victory which ruins an Army. I most sincerely hope the Medea Frigate is already with Lord Cornwallis, or at least will be soon. I imagine Your Excellency's Letter will cause his Lordship (joined to the not being able to move his Army immediately) to set out for the Chesapeak. I shall be sincerely glad of it; as in that Case, your Excellency will have the Assistance of his Lordship's Council and Cooperation.

[a]The Face of Affairs seems changed. [b]I have nothing farther to add, than that I conceive Lord Cornwallis will not have it in his Power to bring with him many Troops. It will depend on Your Excellency, from his Lordship's Letters, and from those of Brigadier General Arnold and me, whether you shall think it proper to have an operation in Force in Chesapeak—If Yes, the Troops here are too few—if no, too many.[c]

The [d]operation I had proposed against Williamsburg shall take place to Morrow Morning. But I think it my Duty to call a Council of War, circumstanced as Lord Cornwallis is, to judge whether an attempt on Petersburg may now be proper.[e]

a B *begins*
b B *inserts* 4 *lines, see* 76B:

c B *inserts* 4 *lines, see* 76B:
d B *reads* operations

e BFS *end*

76B: PHILLIPS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [81 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.

Extract.—Major-general Phillips to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Hampton Road, on board the Maria, April 19, 1781.

This extract from No. 76 is shown in margin p 413.

Page 413 *line* 11 *insert the following words:—*

and the Carolinas, like all America, are lost in rebellion. My letters of the 15th, 16th, and yesterday, will go now in the Amphitrite, for I stopped the express boat last night.

Page 413 *after line* 18 *insert the following words:—*

I hope to hear from your Excellency directly, and perhaps it may not be so well to trust such a serious dispatch, as your next, Sir, will probably be, to an unarmed vessel, but that a frigate will be sent.

76F: PHILLIPS to CLINTON, 19 April 1781, Extracts HL No 56.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.
Endorsed Extracts from Major General Phillips's Letters to Sir Henry Clinton. Transmitted to L^d^ Geo: Germain In Sir H^y^ Clintons of 23^d^ & 30^th^ April and 1^st^ May 1781 (2) R/ 23^d^ June N^o^ 56
The same extracts as No. 76.

76S: PHILLIPS to CLINTON, 19 April 1781, Extracts HL No 18.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.
Endorsed Extracts from Major General Phillips's Letters to Sir Henry Clinton. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's of 23^d^ & 30^th^ April & 1^st^ May 1781.[a] (2) N^o^ 18.
This is three parts of No. 76 as shown in margins pp 407-413.

a No. 90E: *p* 433

77 CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, LS PA 157/243.
ANSWER [44] *p* 85.
With Clinton's MS. Notes from ANSWER *and* TARLETON.
Endorsed N^o^ 9. Wilmington 18^th^ April 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N^o^ 9) R/ 4^th^ June. (1 Inclosure.[a]) Ent^d^ N^o^ 9. [b]Wilmington 18^th^ April 1781.

a No. 60 F: *p* 372
b V *begins* Copy
c BFS *begin*

[c]My Lord, I marched from Guildford on the morning of the 18^th^ of March, and next day arrived at Bell's Mill, where I gave the Troops two days rest, and procured [d]a small supply of provisions. From thence I proceeded slowly towards Cross Creek, attending to the convenience of subsistence, & the movement of our wounded, On my way I issued the inclosed Proclamation, & took every other means in my power to reconcile enemies, & to encourage our friends to join us.

d V *inserts* them

From all my information I intended to have halted at Cross Creek, as a proper place to [e]refresh and refit the Troops, and I was much disappointed on my arrival there, to find it totally impossible: Provisions were scarce, not four days forage within twenty miles, and to us, the Navigation of [f]the Cape Fear River to Wilmington, impracticable; for the distance by water is upwards of [g]an hundred miles, the breadth seldom above [h]an hundred Yards, the banks high, and

e V *reads* refit and refresh

f F *omits* the

g F *reads* one
h B *reads* one

the Inhabitants on each side generally hostile. Under these Circumstances I was obliged to continue my march to this place, in the neighbourhood of which I arrived on the 7th Inst.

I have been busy since my arrival in disposing of our sick & wounded, and in procuring the necessary Supplies, to put the troops in a proper state, to take the field. I am in daily expectation of seeing the reinforcement from [a]Europe, and of receiving the Commander in Chief's directions for the further operations of the Campaign.[1,2]

a V *reads* England

Captain Schutz died a few days after the action, as we expected, but I am sorry to inform Your Lordship, that, notwithstanding the flattering appearances & the Assurances of the Surgeons, Colonel Webster, (whose loss is severely felt by me & the whole Army) Captain Maynard of the Guards, [b]Captain Wilmousky and Ensign De Trott of the Regiment of Bose are since dead.[c]

b BF *insert* and

c BFV *insert* 3 *lines, see p* 416

Major Craig who took possession of this place [d]on the latter end of January, has conducted himself with great Zeal & Capacity, having with a very small force, not only secured the Post from all insults, but made himself respectable in this part of the Country, by several successfull excursions.

d BFV *read* in

I shall not trouble Your Lordship on the subject of South Carolina, having directed Lord Rawdon who commands on the Frontiers, and Lieut Colonel Balfour Commandant of Charles town, to take every opportunity of communicating to Your Lordship, as well as [e]to the Commander in Chief, the state of affairs in that Province; as they are both Officers of capacity & great merit, I trust that their conduct will have given satisfaction.

e F *omits* to

1aA Those directions are now laying at Charles Town in the hands of Col. Balfour who received them the 7th April.

2T they were laying ready for his Lordship at Chs Town & had been from the 7th april. but Col. Balfour did not send them tho frequent and safe opportunities offered.

a S *ends &c.* Cornwallis V *ends &c.* (Signed) Cornwallis b BF *end &c* Cornwallis

I have the honour[a] to be[b] with great respect, My Lord, Your Lordship's Most obedient & Most humble Servant. CORNWALLIS.
Right Honorable Lord George Germain. &c[a] &c[a] &c[a]

77B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, ANSWER [44] *p* 85.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 9, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18, 1781.
Same as No. 77 *with variations shown in margins pp* 414-416.
Page 415 *line* 19 *insert the following words :—*
the rest of the officers are recovering fast, and many of the wounded soldiers have already joined their regiments.

77F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, TARLETON *p* 322.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 9, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18, 1781.
Same as No. 77 *with variations shown in margins pp* 414-416.
Page 415 *line* 19 *insert the same words as in No.* 77B

77S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, Copy PA 309/64.
In margin Wilmington 18th April 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N° 9.) R/ 4th June.
Mem. at end Inclosure Copy of a Proclamation issued in N° Carolina by Earl Cornwallis. 18th March 1781.
Same as No. 77 *with variations shown in margins pp* 414-416.

---

c *enc'losing* No. 458 : *p* 327

77V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, Copy[c] RI 19/75.
Endorsed Copy Earl Cornwallis to Lord G. Germain Wilmington 18th April 1781.
Same as No. 77 *with variations shown in margins pp* 414-416.
Page 415 *line* 19 *insert the same words as in No.* 77B

---

78 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, LS PA 157/251.
ANSWER [48] *p* 85, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed N° 10 Wilmington N. Carolina 18th April 1781 Lord Cornwallis (N° 10) R/ 4th June (1 Inclosure)[a] Ent[d]

a No. 70E : *p* 410 b V *begins* Copy c BFS *begin*

N° 10 [b]Wilmington 18th April 1781.
[c]My Lord, As Governor Martin returns to England

by this opportunity, I shall beg leave to refer your Lordship to him for many particulars [a]relating to this Province: But I think it incumbent on me to be explicit to your Lordship, as his Majesty's Minister, on one or two capital points.

[a] F *reads* relative

The principal reasons for undertaking the Winter's Campaign were, the difficulty of a defensive War in South Carolina, & the hopes that our friends in North Carolina, who were said to be very numerous, would make good their promises of assembling & taking an Active part with us, in endeavouring to re-establish His Majesty's Government. Our experience has shewn that their numbers are not so great as had been represented and that their friendship [b]was only passive; For we have received little assistance from them since our arrival in the province, and altho' I gave the strongest[1] & most[2] publick assurances[3] that after refitting & depositing our Sick & Wounded, I should[4] return to the upper Country, not above two hundred have been prevailed upon to follow us either as Provincials or Militia. [c]This being the case, the immense extent of this Country cut with numberless [d]Creeks & rivers and the total want of internal navigation, which renders it impossible for our Army to remain long in the heart of the Country, Will make it very difficult to reduce this province [e]to obedience by a direct Attack upon it. [f]If therefore it should appear to be the interest of Great Brittain to Maintain what she already possesses, & to push the War in the Southern provinces, I[5] take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid plan,[6] Because successfull operations

[b] V *reads* is

[c] BF *new* ¶

[d] BFV *read* rivers and creeks

[e] V *omits* to obedience

[f] BF *new* ¶

1d strongest *underlined.*

2d most public assurances *underlined.*

3d how comes it my good Lord that after such assurances you marched into Virginia.

4d should *to* country *underlined.*

5d I *to* Plan *underlined.*

6b his Lordps advice influenced the Cabinet to *order* solid operation in this most hostile & sickly province at the worst of seasons; & to reject my plan till July 81.

might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, & ultimately to the submission of North Carolina. The great reinforcements sent by Virginia to General Greene, whilst General Arnold was in the Chesapeak, are convincing proofs that small expeditions do not frighten that powerfull Province.

a S *ends* &c Cornwallis
b BF *end* &c Cornwallis
c V *inserts* (Signed)

I have the honour[a] to be [b]My Lord Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant
Right Hon[ble] [c]CORNWALLIS.
Lord George Germain &c. &c. &c.

78B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, ANSWER [48] *p* 85.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 10, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18th, 1781.
Same as No. 78 *with variations shown in margins pp* 416-418.

78F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, TARLETON *p* 324.
Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 10, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18, 1781.
Same as No. 78 *with variations shown in margins pp* 416-418.

78S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, Copy PA 309/67.
In margin Wilmington North Carolina 18 April 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N° 10.) R/ 4th June.
Mem. at end Inclosure Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton 10th April 1781.
Same as No. 78 *with variations shown in margins pp* 416-418.

78V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 18 April 1781, Copy RI 19/74.
Same as No. 78 *with variations shown in margins pp* 416-418.

---

79 BALFOUR TO CLINTON, 20 April 1781, LS RI 19/70.
OBSERVATIONS [90 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Duplicate. [a]Charles Town, April 20th, 1781.

a F *begins* Copy
b B *begins*
c B *inserts* the

[b]Sir, I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency, that by [c]Letters from Lord Rawdon of the 12th, 13th, and 15th Instant, there is the fullest information, that General Greene, with his Army is advancing

into this Province, & that his Light Troops have actually passed the Pedee: the object of this Movement there is every reason to believe is Camden, which, at present, is but weak, Lord Rawdon having detached Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, with two Battalions from that Post; so that in the end it may be expedient, for combining our Force, to relinquish every thing on the other side Santee, a measure, however, which Your Excellency may be assured, will not be taken but in case of the utmost necessity.

[a]As this movement of Greene's may considerably change Lord Cornwallis's views, (who is now at Wilmington) I have judged it fit to lay before Your Excellency[b] this Intelligence, which is likewise forwarded to Lord Cornwallis by an Express Boat.[1·2·3]

I have the honor[c] to be[d], Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient & humble servant, N. BALFOUR.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton K.B. &c &c &c

a B *italics to* Wilmington

b B *inserts* as soon as possible

c B *ends* &c (Signed) W. Balfour

d F *ends* &c (Signed) N. Balfour

1a your Lordship must have been determined indeed on your march to Virginia if this did not induce you to return to Charles Town.

2b Surely this intelligence should have stopt his Lordship's march into Virginia particularly as C. Balfour must have told his Lordship as he did Lord Rawdon, that the old works of Charles town were thrown down, & others not raised, and that that place was in great danger & if he did how could his Lordp consistent with my positive orders to the contrary go into Virginia at the risk of Charles Town.

3d Lord C. had this inforn before he marched for Virginia tis pity C. Bal. did not send my dispatches &c for Lord Cornwallis at the same time.

79B: BALFOUR to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [90 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, received by the Speedy packet, which called at Cape Fear, dated Charles-Town, April 20, 1781.

Same as No. 79 *with variations shown in margins pp* 418-419.

79F: BALFOUR to CLINTON, 20 April 1781, Copy PA 140/251.
One of several letters under this endorsement Copies and Extracts of Letters from Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour to

H. E. Sir H. Clinton Received 20th May In Sir Henry Clintons N° 127.[a]

a No. 94 *p* 474

Same as No. 79 with variations shown in margins pp 418-419.

80 CORNWALLIS TO GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, LS PA 157/267. ANSWER [50] *p* 85, OBSERVATIONS [92 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, REPLY [66] *p* 170. *With Clinton's MS. Notes from* ANSWER, OBSERVATIONS, REPLY, TARLETON *and* GERMAIN.

Endorsed N° 11. Wilmington No. Carolina 23d April, 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N° 11) R/ 4th June. Entd

a M *begins* b ON *begin* Copy c BFSVER *begin*

[a]N° 11 [b]Wilmington 23 April 1781.[1]

[c]My Lord, I yesterday received an express, by a small Vessel[2] from Charlestown, informing me, that a Frigate was there,[3·4] but not then able to get over the bar, with Dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton, Notifying to me, that Major General Phillips, had[5] been[6·7] [d]detached into the Chesapeak, with a considerable force, with[8] instructions to co-operate with this Army[9], & to[10] put himself under my orders. This Express likewise brought me[11] [e]the disagreeable[12] accounts,[13·14] that the upper posts of South Carolina,

d V *reads* dispatched

e S *omits* the

1R read in the house of Lords

2fO this Boat certainly brought his lordship the intelligence on the other side, how could he therefore after receiving such intelligence go into Virginia! as "the best mode of employing his army."

3bA & had been there since the 7th April.

4T those dispatches had been there from the 7th april.

5aO had *underlined.*

6aO No my good Lord waiting the event of a naval action to be detatched.

7cO waiting (the event of a sea action) to be detatched.

8dA with *to* army *underlined.*

9dA read these instructions page 61.

10dA to *to* orders *underlined.*

11bO me *to* accounts *underlined.*

12bA disagreeable accounts *underlined.*

13bA surely this acct informed him also that the old works of Charles Town were down.

14bO this is the express boat mentioned before, why did it not carry my dispatches to his Lordp delivered as he owns to Col. Balfour the 7th he would have found by these dispatches that so far from telling his Lordship that P. was under his orders, they would have told him that was no longer than 10th May & that after that he was positively ordered to begin operation to the northward.

were in the most imminent danger from an alarming Spirit of Revolt among many of the people, and by a movement of Gen[l] Greene's Army[a15]

Although the expresses [b]I sent from Cross Creek, to inform Lord Rawdon of the necessity I was under of coming to this place, and to warn him of the possibility of such an attempt of the Enemy, had all miscarried, Yet his Lordship was lucky enough to be apprized of [c]General Greene's Approach, at least six days before he [d]could possibly reach Camden, and I am therefore still induced to hope from my opinion of His Lordship's Abilities, & the precautions taken by him, & Lieu[t]Colonel Balfour, that we shall not be so unfortunate, as to lose any considerable Corps.[16]

The distance from hence to Camden, the want of forage and subsistence, on the greatest part of the Road, and the difficulty [e]of passing the Pedee, when opposed by an Enemy, render it utterly impossible for me to give immediate assistance, And I apprehend a possibility of the utmost hazard to this little Corps, without the chance of a benefit, in the attempt; For if we are so unlucky, as to suffer a severe blow in South Carolina, the spirit of Revolt in that Province, would become very general, and the numerous Rebels in this Province, be encouraged to be more than ever active & violent; This might enable General Greene to hem me in among the great Rivers, & by

a BVN *run on*

b BVMON *insert* that F *inserts* which

c S *omits* General
d BMON *read* possibly could

e BN *read* in

15aO and therefore you get out of the scrape as soon as you can.

16bO better gone yourself my good Lord in obedience to my orders and your own promises. you had not half the distance to go.—but it looked too much like retreat. and Ross told you, you must go into Virginia (tho you had failed this time) for that on your arrival there he Ross hoped S H Clinton out of humour that Arbuthnot was not recalled would resign the command to your Lordship. this my good Lord, not the Idea of employing the troops to better advantage there induced you to go, and to tell the Minister that operation in the most inimical and unhealthy province at the worst of seasons and without a covering fleet was the best way of employing those troops, and because your Lordp offered terms to Govt of responsibility which it suited them to accept, they were weak and wicked enough to reject S H Clinton's plan which they had approved till May & did again approve in Sepr alas too late ! !

cutting off our subsistence, render our Arms useless. And to remain here for Transports to carry us off, would be a work of time,[17] would lose our Cavalry, & be otherways as ruinous and disgracefull to Britain, as most events could be. I have therefore, under so many embarrassing circumstances,[a] (but looking upon Charlestown as safe from any immediate Attack[b] from the Rebels[18·19·20·21]) resolved to take advantage of General Greene's having left the back part of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province, to attempt a junction with General Phillips

I have more readily decided upon this measure because if General Greene fails in the object of his March, his retreat will relieve South Carolina; And my force being very [c]insufficient for offensive operations in this province may be employed usefully in Virginia, in conjunction with the Corps under the Command of General Phillips.

I have the honour[d] to be[e] with great respect My Lord Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant [f]CORNWALLIS.

Right Honorable Lord George Germain &c[a] &c[a] &c[a]

a F *italics to* Rebels

b F *reads* of

c S *reads* sufficient

d FO *end* &c (Signed) Cornwallis R *ends* &c Cornwallis

e BV *end* &c Cornwallis SEN*end*&c (Signed) Cornwallis

f M *inserts* (Signed)

17cO You are two days march from Waggamaw Gallies & boats are there to pass you over & a corps at George Town to receive you

18bA if Col. Balfour did his duty he informed you it was not safe—read Lord Rawd letter page

19bO If Balfour did his duty he told your Lordship it was in danger.

20aO read Tarltons History & Lord Rawdons letter May 24. page *91.*

21G qui dit Lord Rawdon et Le colonel Balfour au sujet de Charles Town, ne dissent ils pas quelle est ouvert et Exposèe [*what is said by Lord Rawdon and colonel Balfour on the subject of Charles-town, do they not say that it is open and exposed*]

80B: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, ANSWER [50] *p* 85.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 11, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 23d, 1781.

Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80F: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, OBSERVATIONS [92 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 23, 1781.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80S: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, REPLY [66] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, North Carolina, 23d April, 1781.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80V: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, TARLETON *p* 325.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 11, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 23d, 1781.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80E: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 80.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copie d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis, au lord George Germain, datée de Wilmington dans la Caroline Septentrionale le 23 avril 1781.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80R: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, Copy PA 309/71.
In margin Wilmington North Carolina 23^{d} April 1781. Lord Cornwallis (N^{o} 11.) R/ 4th June.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80M: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, Copy PA 140/263.
Endorsed Copy of a Dispatch N^{o} 11. From Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain dated 23^{d} April 1781. In Sir Henry Clintons N^{o} 128 [a]N^{o} 1
[a] No. 96 *p* 473
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80O: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, Copy RI 19/77.
Endorsed Copy Earl Cornwallis to Lord G. Germain Wilmington 23^{d} April 1781.
Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

80N: CORNWALLIS to GERMAIN, 23 April 1781, Copy HL N^{o} 8.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington North

Carolina 23rd April 1781. R/ 4th June. The Inclosure referred to in this Letter is amongst those papers laid before the House 18 Febʸ Nº 57. Nº 8.

Same as No. 80 *with variations shown in margins pp* 420-422.

81 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 23 April 1781, ANSWER [20] *p* 85. REPLY [69] *p* 170, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from* ANSWER, REPLY *and* GERMAIN.

a SVER *begin* Copy

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, [a]dated Wilmington, April 23, 1781[1].

b BF *begin*

[b]Sir,[2] I have the honour to inclose to you a duplicate of my letter of the 10th, sent by the Amphitrite, and copies of all my letters to the Secretary of State; as they contain the most exact account of every transaction of the campaign, of the present state of things in this district, of my great apprehensions from the [c]movement of General Greene towards Camden, and my [d]resolutions in consequence of it, I have nothing to add to [e]it for your Excellency's satisfaction. Neither my cavalry [f]or infantry are in readiness to move; the former are in want of every thing, the latter of every necessary but shoes, of which we have received an ample supply; I must however begin my march to-morrow. It is very disagreeable to me to decide upon measures so very important, and of such consequence to the general conduct of the war, without an opportunity of procuring your Excellency's [g]directions or approbation; but the delay and difficulty of conveying letters, and the impossibility of waiting for answers, [h]render it indispensibly necessary.[3] [i]My present undertaking sits heavy on

c V *reads* movements
d V *reads* resolution
e V *reads* them
f BSVE *read* nor
g V *reads* direction
h E *reads* renders
i BF *new* ¶

1R read in the House of Lords.

2aA This letter is undoubtedly misplac'd in His Lordships letter to Lord G Germain of this date page 92 My observations informs L G that his Lordship had the day before received an express from C Town informing him that my orders were arrived & then laying at C Town & coming to him in his letters of the 24th to Genl Phillips & to me.

3G Le Ministre qui Envoyoit les lettres pour etre lis etoit milord Stormount, et un certain Monr Knox etoit son Deputy. on a produit les deux lettres de Lord Cornwallis au Gen. Phillips et au Gen. Clinton mais on a pas jugè apropos de Faire Lire le lettre de Lord Cornwallis a Milord G. Germain on aura vu que L.

my mind; I have experienced the [a]distresses and dangers of marching some [b]hundreds of miles, in a country chiefly hostile, without one active or useful friend; without intelligence, and without communication with any part of the country. The situation in which I leave South Carolina adds much to my anxiety; yet I am under the necessity of adopting this hazardous enterprise hastily, and with the appearance of precipitation, as I find there is no prospect of speedy reinforcement from Europe, and that the return of [c]General Greene to North Carolina, either with or without success, would put a junction with General Phillips out of my power.[d]

I have the honour[e] to be,[f] &c. CORNWALLIS.

a BFSVER *read* dangers and distresses

b E *reads* hundred

c BF *omits* General

d BFR *end* I am, Sir, &c. (Signed) Cornwallis

e VE *end* &c Cornwallis

f S *ends* with great respect, Your Excellency's Most obedient and Most humble Servt, Signed Cornwallis.

Cornwallis y fait mention que les depeches du G. Clinton sont a Charles Town et qu'il les attendoit a chaque Instant ou dans la suitte on verra plusiers neglicences de cette Espece, ou de milord Stormont ou de son Deputy Knox, il est a esperer que toute cela netoit pas *intentioné.* [*The minister who sent the letters to be read was Lord Stormont, his deputy being a certain Mr. Knox. The two letters of Lord Cornwallis to Genl. Phillips and to Genl. Clinton were produced but it was not judged fitting to cause the letter of Lord Cornwallis to Lord Germain to be read; it would have been seen that Lord Cornwallis there made mention of the dispatches of Genl. Clinton being at Charles town and that he was expecting them every moment or immediately: several mistakes of the same kind either by Lord Stormont or his deputy Knox will be observed, it is to be hoped that all this was not* intentional.]

81B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, REPLY [69] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington, 24th April, 1781.

Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

81F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 117.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copie d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis, à Sir Henri Clinton, datée de Wilmington le 24 avril 1781.

Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

81S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 23 April 1781, Copy PA 140/267.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to

Sir H. Clinton K.B. Wilmington 23d April 1781. recd 22d May ℔ the Speedy Packet. 59 In Sir Henry Clintons of the 22d May N° 128a N° 2.

a No. 96 *p* 478

Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

81V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 23 April 1781, Copy RI 19/82.
Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

81E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, Copy LANSDOWNE 68/18.
Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

81R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 23 April 1781, Copy HL N° 58.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated Wilmington 23d April 1781. Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 22 May 1781 (2) R/ 23d June. N° 58
Same as No. 81 *with variations shown in margins pp* 424-425.

82 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 24 April 1781, ANSWER [55] *p* 86. ANSWER [55] *p* 86, OBSERVATIONS [94 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, REPLY [71] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note from REPLY.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated aWilmington, April 24, 1781.[1]

a ERM *begin* Copy

bSir, I have reflected very seriously on the subject of my attempt to march into Virginia, and have in consequence written a letter to Major-general Phillips, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy to your Excellency. cI have, likewise, directed Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to send transports and provisions to this dport, in case I should find the junction with Major-general Phillips einexpedient or impracticable, and that I should have the mortification of seeing that there is no other method of conveying his Majesty's troops to South-Carolina, without fexposing them to the most evident danger of being lost.g

b BFSV *begin*

c BFE *new* ¶ d R *reads* place e R *omits* inexpedient or f S *omits* exposing them to g FVM *end* I am, &c. (Signed) Cornwallis

I have the honourh to be,i &c. kCORNWALLIS.[1]

h B *ends* &c. (Signed) Cornwallis i E *ends* with great Respect, Sir, Your Excellencys Most obedient and Most humble Servant, Signed Cornwallis

1R read in H Lords.

k R *inserts* (Signed) l S *ends*

82B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [94 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
Copy.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton,

dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

82F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, REPLY [71] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington, 24th April, 1781.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

82S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, TARLETON *p* 327.
Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

82V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 119.
Copie d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis, à Sir Henri Clinton, datée de Wilmington le 24 avril 1781.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

82E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, Copy PA 140/271.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir H: Clinton K B. Wilmington 24th April 1781. recd 22d May by the Speedy Packet. In Sir Henry Clintons of the 22d May No 128[a] No 3. 57.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

[a] No. 96 *p* 478

82R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, Copy[b] RI 19/83.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

[b] *encloses* No. 83M: *p* 430

82M: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 24 April 1781, Copy HL No 59.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton dated Wilmington 24th April 1781 Transmitted to Ld Geo : Germain In Sir Henry Clinton's of 22d May 1781 (3) R/ 23d June No 59.
Same as No. 82 *with variations shown in margin p* 426.

83 CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, LS PA 157/275.
ANSWER [56] *p* 86, OBSERVATIONS [95 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, REPLY [63] *p* 170, *with Clinton's MS. Notes from each, and also from* GERMAIN.
Endorsed In Lord Cornwallis's of the 24h April[a]
[b]Wilmington 24th April 1781[1].

[a] *see* ii. 363

[b] R *begins* MO *begin* Copy N *begins* Copy Duplicate

[1] R This letter was laid before the House of Lords. first in the list consequently that enquiry begins with L. C. reasons for moving into Virginia.

a BFSVE *begin*

[a]Dear Phillips, My situation here is very distressing, Greene took the advantage of my being obliged to come to this place, and has Marched to South Carolina. My expresses to Lord Rawdon on my leaving Cross-Creek, warning him of the possibility of such a Movement, have all failed, Mountaineers & Militia have poured into the back part of that province, and I much fear that Lord Rawdon's posts will be so distant from each other and his Troops so scattered as to [b]put him [c]in [d]the greatest danger of being beat in detail, and [e]the worst of consequences may happen to most of the Troops out of Charlestown ;[2] [f]By a direct Move towards Camden I cannot get time enough to relieve Lord Rawdon,[3] and should he have fallen, My Army would be exposed to the utmost danger, from the great rivers I should have to pass, the exhausted state of the Country, the numerous Militia, the almost universal spirit of revolt which prevails in South Carolina and the strength of Greene's Army, whose Continentals alone are at least as numerous as I am, And I could be of no use on my arrival at Charlestown, there being nothing [g]at present to apprehend for that post.[4] I shall therefore [h]March immediately up the Country [i]by Duplin Court house, pointing towards Hillsborough, in hopes to withdraw Greene, if that should not succeed, I should be much tempted to [k]try [l]to form a junction with you. [m]The[5] Attempt is exceedingly hazardous, and many unforeseen Difficulties may render it totally impracticable,[6] so that you must not take any steps that may

b R *reads* put into the
c BSVMON *read* into
d F *omits* the greatest
e BFSVMON *insert* that
f FR *new* ¶

g BSVON *read* to apprehend at present
h BFSVMON *read* immediately march
i S *reads* to
k VR *omit* try to
l F *reads* make
m F *italics to* impracticable

2bO he might have added to Chs Town also.

3bA is that so sure read Lord Rawdons letter to Lord Cornwallis page. does he not say that Col. Balfour had informed him that not expecting that L. Cornwallis after Guildford would have exposed C. Town he had thrown down all the old works of that place and if L. Rawdon did not quit Campden. & garrison C. Town that place would be, but was it not C. Balfour's duty to give this information to L. Cornwallis ?

4G vous oubliez milord que vous l'avez presq demantele [*you forget, my lord, that you have almost dismantled it*]

5aA The *to* impracticable *underlined.*

6bO The *to* impracticable *underlined.*

expose your Army to the danger of being ruined.[7·8] I shall March to the lowest ford of the Roanoke, which I am informed is about 20 Miles above Taylor's Ferry; Send every possible intelligence to me by the Cypher I inclose, and make every Movement in your power to facilitate our Meeting which must be somewhere near Petersburgh, with safety to your [a]Army. [b]I mention the lowest ford because in a hostile Country Ferrys cannot be depended upon, But if I should decide [c]upon the measure of endeavouring to come to you, I shall [d]endeavour to surprize the boats at some of the ferries from Halifax upwards.[e]

I am [f]dear Phillips Most faithfully y[rs]

Maj[r] Gen[l] Phillips. [g]CORNWALLIS.[h]

a BFSVMON *insert* own
b F *italics to* ford
c BVO *read* on
d BFV *read* try
e F *ends* &c. (Signed) Cornwallis
f BV *end* &c Cornwallis SE *end* Yours, &c. (Signed) Cornwallis ON *end* I am Yours most sincerely (signed) Cornwallis
g M *inserts* Signed
h R *ends*

7aO and yet you think tis the safest and best way of employing the Troops!

8bO and yet he says it was the best & most advantageous way of employing the troops. but I must do his Lordp the Justice to say this hint to Phillips was prudent; but if Green had beaten L. Rawdon and march'd after L. Cornwallis, and beat him, after joining La Fayette Phillips would have become an easy prey.

83B: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, ANSWER [56] *p* 86.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to Major-general Phillips, dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781.

Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 428-429.

83F: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, OBSERVATIONS [95 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Earl Cornwallis to Major-general Phillips, dated April 24, 1781.

Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 428-429.

83S: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, REPLY [63] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis to Major-General Phillips, dated Wilmington, 24th April, 1781.

Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 428-429.

83V: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, TARLETON *p* 328.

Copy of Earl Cornwallis's letter to Major-general Phil-

lips, dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781.
Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 428-429.

83E: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 114.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copie d'une lettre du lieutenant-général comte de Cornwallis au major-général Philips, datée de Wilmington le 24 avril 1781.
Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 428-429.

[a] *enclosed in* ii. 368

83R: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, Copy[a] LANSDOWNE 68/17.
Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 427-429.

[b] in No.82R: *p* 427

83M: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, Copy[b] RI 19/84.
Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 427-429.

830: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, Copy HL No 57.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lieut General Earl Cornwallis to Major General Phillips dated Wilmington 24th April 1781 Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 18 May 1781 (1.) R/ 23d June No 57
Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 427-429.

83N: CORNWALLIS to PHILLIPS, 24 April 1781, Copy PA 140/223.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis to Major General Phillips dated Wilmington April 24th 1781. In Sir Henry Clinton's No 126 No 1.

[c] *see* ii. 371

Same as No. 83 *with variations shown in margins pp* 427-429.

84 CLINTON, conversations with PHILLIPS, ANSWER [100] *p* 87. NARRATIVE [96] *p* 57, ANSWER [100] *p* 87 *and* [175] *p* 90, CORRESPONDENCE [19] *p* 134, REPLY [78] *p* 171, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Substance of several Conversations had with Major general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither.
[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.]

[a] ERMO *begin*

[a]Until I know Lord Cornwallis's success to the southward, and what force can be spared from the southern district for further

[b] RM *read* operation

[b]operations, and until the

reinforcements expected to [a]this army arrive; such troops as are in [b]the Chesapeak may be employed, first in assisting his Lordship's operations, and then in either establishing a permanent post near the entrance of that bay, (if the naval commander does not approve of the one in Elizabeth River,) where large ships as well as small may lie in security during any temporary superiority of the enemy's fleet;[1] [c]or if such a post cannot be found, in employing what remains of the season in carrying on desultory expeditions against such towns, stations, magazines, &c. as the enemy may have there;—to convince those people more by what we can do, than what we really do, that they are in our power; and finally, in pursuing the same plan (supporting friends,) in a more northerly and healthy climate.

[d][2]With regard to a station for the protection of the King's ships, I know of no place so proper as York Town, if it could be taken possession of,[e] fortified, and garrisoned with[3] [f]one thousand men;—as, by having one thousand[g] more at a post somewhere in Elizabeth River, York and James Rivers would be ours, and our cruizers might command the waters of the Chesapeak. Troops might likewise be spared from these posts to carry on expeditions during the summer months, when probably nothing can be risked in that climate but water movements.[4] [h]But[5] if the Heights of York and

a M *reads* the
b R *omits* the
c M *omits* or
d FS *begin*
e M *inserts* and
f S *reads* four
g O *inserts* men
h BV *begin*

1aA my opinions for a Naval Station for Large Ships clearly ever were for Hampton Road. the chanel to which is narrow & a good close work or two on old point Comfort with another at Willouby or Sewells point would I knew protect that road, it commanded also the principal river, & was near the entrance of the bay. I never thought York & Gloucester would protect any ships tho they had been favorably represented to me & tis clear I was right for the Enemy burned every one that was not sunk.

2aA this opn originated in that of L. Cornwallis.

3hiklC *printed* four, *altered to* one.

4aC and again as marked below. If therefore Lord Cornwallis did not think York and Gloucester answered this description he should not have preferred them to old point Comfort, at least he should after he got there have given his opinion of them as he promised, from *all* accounts till the day preceeding his capitula-

a BV *insert* the
b V *italics* hors d'insult

those on[a] Gloucester side cannot be so well and so soon fortified[6] as to render that post [b]hors d'insult, before the enemy can move a force, &c. against it, it may not be adviseable to attempt it:[7] in that case, something may possibly be done at Old Point Comfort to cover large ships lying in Hampton Road, (which

c BV *omit* to winter

is reckoned a good one, [c]and not so liable to injury from gales at N.E. as that of York, particularly in winter.[8]) If[9] neither[10] can be secured, we must content ourselves with keeping the Chesapeak, with frigates and other

d M *inserts* a

armed vessels,[11] which will always find[d] security, against

e BV *end* 8 *new* ¶

a superior naval force, in Elizabeth River.[e12] As our operations in proper season may re-commence in the Upper James, perhaps a station might be found at the entrance of the narrows of that river that may be of use in future day, and held with a small force. Jamestown seems a proper spot for such a station; as does

f FSEO *end*

the place where the narrows and windings begin.[f13]

tion, I thought the ground well chosen, plan good and the works in tolerable compleat order.

5aC But *to* attempt it *underlined.*

6fiklmnpqrsN does not this letter clearly prove that if a secure post could not be found, he was at liberty to reject any; but I am free to own, so certain was I of a covering fleet that if his Lordship had told me the post was bad I would still have directed him to take the best he could, knowing that without a place of arms to cover frigates, all was lost the instant the Enemy obtained even a temporary Naval superiority in that bay.

7bN this order L. Cornwallis owns he considers as affecting him; in the face of it, if he had thought ill of Y. & G. should he not have informed me of it.

8aC Here again if no secure post can be found we must not attempt to take one but hold Elisabeth river with frigates and a small post at Mill point.

9dA If *to* vessels *underlined.*

10aC If neither *underlined.*

11bA Lord Cornwallis affects to say that I never hinted at a place of arms to cover large ships till it was proposed by the Admiral July 11th 81. does not this letter prove I had such intention & that I preferred old Pt Comfort but it says also if none can be found secure and hors d'insult we must hold only one to cover frigates: this letter L. Cornwallis tells us he recd on his arrival. it certainly authorised him to reject any but such as was safe; if what he took in preference to the one I ordered was not safe he should have said so; but he says the contrary read his letter 22d Augst page 174.

12R in my Narrative.

13cA tis here repeated in an opinion to Gen. Phillips.

At a proper time of the year operations must still go northward—either by a direct movement—stationing your supplies in the navigable rivers which lie favourable for it—in which you are, however, exposed to a temporary naval superiority of the enemy—or by proceeding up the Chesapeak, if a force equal to the attempt can be collected; (for when [a]it can, I[b] should propose to take a station, threatening all the provinces bordering on Chesapeak with a desultory war;) prevent those provinces from being succoured; —by menacing communications; and availing ourselves of a supposed numerous band of friends, who otherwise may be forced to arm against us. Had we a force sufficient for two movements, that would be best;—four thousand men to proceed in transports up to Baltimore, taking a station within a certain distance of the Susquehannah, and having vessels always ready for a rapid move with part, or even the whole, to a corresponding station in the Eastern Neck; while a corps of ten thousand men, or more, (according to the force that can be brought against you,) occupies the Eastern Neck, and can, in its turn, succour the western corps. Whether the eastern corps acts alone, or in co-operation, it must be in very great force for reasons obvious. I do not know enough of this Neck to say what force, or whether any, can be placed in security. The most advanced station would certainly be the best, particularly at first, to enable our friends, who, we are told, are at Lancaster, Little York-town, and Chester, to join us.—Iron Hill may perhaps be it; and as marshy creeks run up from Delaware and Chesapeak, the heads of which are not far asunder, many good posts may be found for corps of different strength;—for while we command those bays, there can be no danger of operation against our flanks and rear; and if the enemy should be superior in [c]one, he cannot be so in [d]both:—we should therefore have always a communication open. This corps

a M *reads* I
b M *reads* wou'd

c M *underlined* one
d M *underlined* both

should be very strong indeed,—or there should be one acting in favour of it in Jersey. The preference must be given to that plan, against which Washington can bring the least force. He undoubtedly can bring a greater force into Jersey than any where, as the New-England troops [a]may be prevailed on to go there,—and they cannot so easily be drawn into the Eastern Neck, or even over the Delaware. Besides, if Washington moves into Jersey, his [b]meal and flour have both but a short portage; but once deprived of the eastern counties, his cattle in that case coming chiefly from New England, will increase his difficulty of subsistence; for as we may, under those circumstances, attempt to occupy King's Ferry, he will be [c]reduced to the Detour. I therefore should prefer a single corps in the Eastern Neck, sufficient, however, for the purpose. As the French have added considerably to Washington's force, I do not think an army less than Sir William Howe had could be sufficient—fifteen thousand men. But where are they to be found? My whole force, rank and file, fit for duty, is nearly twenty-four thousand. It is presumed Lord Cornwallis will be content with six thousand for the southward; two thousand we suppose in the Chesapeak—twelve thousand are required for New York;—there remains only four thousand for that operation. I did expect ten thousand men as an augmentation to my present army.—Had they come, this project might have taken place; but I am now told, I am to expect only four thousand—which will not be sufficient.—However, once convinced that the French will not send [d]reinforcement, and that we shall be permanently superior at sea, and have an active co-operating naval commander,—I should be tempted to try:—but until all this combines, I dare not:—and if it is delayed too long, our friends in Pennsylvania may be forced from us, or cajoled.[e]

If we could hold the Chesapeak by the posts on

a M *reads* can

b R *reads* meat

c M *reads* returned

d M *reads* reinforcements

e M *runs on*

Elizabeth and York rivers, Oxford, and Port Penn, and the two Eastern on the sea-costs, and threaten our enemies of Virginia and Maryland, and protect our friends of all these countries, I think we should in that case leave the French little to induce them to support the war.

26th April. These however I give you merely as my opinions at the time we talked [a]this on subject; and they will influence you, of course, no further, than as they correspond with your own now.[b] [c]With respect to the number and disposition of [d]friends in Pennsylvania, I am telling you more what I wish than what I expect to find; for we have been too often deceived by representations of sanguine friends.[e]

H. CLINTON.

a RM *read* on this

b M *inserts* (Sign'd) H. Clinton

c R *inserts* Postcript

d RM *insert* our

e RM *end*

84B: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, 26 April 1781, NARRATIVE [96] *p* 57.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract from the Substance of Conversations held with General Phillips, sent to that General Officer for his Guidance.

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 431-432.

84F: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, 26 April 1781, ANSWER [175] *p* 90.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of the Substance of several Conversations that his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither, dated April 26, 1781.

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 431-432.

84S: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, CORRESPONDENCE [19] *p* 134.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of several Conversations that His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton had with Major General Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither.

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 431-432.

84V: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, 26 April 1781, REPLY [78] *p* 171.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Extract from the Substance of Conversations held with General Phillips, sent to that General Officer for his Guidance.

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 431-432.

84E: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 84.
Substance des opinions données au major-général Philips dans diverses conversations avant son embarquement au sujet des opérations dans la Chesapeak.

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 430-432.

84R: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, 26 April 1781, Copy PA 140/39.
Endorsed Substance of Opinions given by Sir H: Clinton to Major General Phillips previous to his Embarkation for the Chesapeake. In Sir Hen^{y} Clintons N^{o} 123. of 5th & 20th April 1781.[a] N^{o} 1.
Begins Substance of Opinions given to Major General Phillips in several Conversations previous to his Embarkation, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak.

[a] No. 67 *p* 383

Same as No. 84 *with variations shown in margins pp* 430-435.

84M: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, Copy LANSDOWNE 68/13.
Begins Substance of several Conversations had with Major General Phillips on the Subject of operations in the Chesapeak before his embarkation on his Expedition thither 26 April 1781.

Same as No. 84 *with variations shown in margins pp* 430-435.

840: CLINTON and PHILLIPS, 26 April 1781, Copy HL N^{o} 11.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Substance of Opinions given by Sir H^{y} Clinton to M Gen^{l} Phillips, previous to his Embarkation for the Chesapeak In Sir H^{y} Clinton's of 5 & 20 April 1781[b] (1) N^{o} 11
Begins Substance of Opinions given to Major General Phillips, in several Conversations previous to his Embarkation, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak.

[b] No. 67V: *p* 391

This extract from No. 84 *is shown in margins pp* 430-432.

85 CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 26/30 April 1781, ANSWER [95] *p* 87. NARRATIVE [105] *p* 57, ANSWER [95] *p* 87, REPLY [79] *p* 171.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes from NARRATIVE.

Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Major-General Phillips, dated New-York, April 26th, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

Dear Sir, Your letters of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th instant, were delivered to me on the 22d by Captain Biggs of his Majesty's ship Amphitrite. And I should have now entered largely into, and given a detail answer (agreeable to your desire) to the several subjects thereof, if I had not from the purport of Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 10th, and yours of the 19th, judged it to be unnecessary at present to give either you or myself that trouble.

What you say in your letter of the 15th instant, respecting the post at Portsmouth, and the choice of another somewhere else on Elizabeth River, you will find fully answered in mine to you of the 11th which accompanies this: for (though written above a fortnight since) I had no safe opportunity before the present of sending it to you.

[a]Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington has considerably changed the complexion of our affairs to the southward, and all operations to the northward must probably give place to those in favour of his Lordship, which at present appear to require our more immediate attention. I know nothing of his Lordship's situation but what I have learnt from his letter to me of the 10th, which you have read;[b] and as I have the strongest reason to believe that he had above three thousand men (exclusive of cavalry and militia) when he entered North Carolina, I am totally at a loss to conjecture how his numbers came to be reduced before the day of action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, except by supposing (as you have done) that he had previously weakened his army by detachments. Of this however, I shall probably be informed when I receive

[a] BF *begin*

[b] BF *stop*

the copy of his Lordship's letter to the Minister; and I shall most likely be at the same time informed what prospects he may still have of arming the numerous friends we were taught to expect his finding in the districts he has visited in his march to, and retreat from, Guildford; without whose assistance we shall, I fear, hold those provinces by a very precarious tenure.

a BF *continue*
b BF *read* this letter
c BF *read* spare me

[a]I had great hopes before I received [b]Lord Cornwallis's letter, that his Lordship would have been in a condition to [c]have spared a considerable part of his army from Carolina for the operations in Cheasapeak, but you will observe from it that, instead of sending any part of his present force thither, he proposes to detain a part of the reinforcement coming from Europe for his [1]more southern operations, even though they should be defensive. I shall therefore take the opinions of the General officers near me upon the present state of our affairs, and [d]I propose afterwards [e]to send you such a further [f]detachment from this army as we may judge can be done with tolerable security to this post, at least while we remain superior at sea.[g2]

d BF *omit* I propose
e BF *omit* to
f BF *read* reinforcement
g BF *end*

With so large a force as you will then have, I flatter myself that you will be able to make the most effectual exertions either directly or indirectly in Lord Cornwallis's favour, as far as your efforts on the shores of the Chesapeak can co-operate with what he may be doing in Carolina. What these, however, may be, you, as being upon the spot, must certainly be the best judge, until you either hear further from or see his Lordship.

h S *begins*

[h]In yours and Brigadier General Arnold's joint letter, you mention that from one thousand six hundred to two thousand more men, would enable you to take a post in force at Petersburg; from whence you might break up Mr. Greene's communi-

1c more southern *underlined.* 2i 1500.

cations with Virginia, and in co-operation with Lord Cornwallis, probably disperse the Rebel army. And that you could moreover, with this increased strength, attempt Fayette's corps, Baltimore, and Annapolis, with great probability of success, and finally attempt Philadelphia, and take post in the lower counties of Delaware, for which you apprehend your force would then be sufficient.

[a]The security of the two Carolinas is certainly an object of the greatest importance, and should at all events be first attended to. Success also against any considerable corps of the enemy, which may be collected any where within reach, and the taking or destroying their public stores, magazines, &c. are undoubtedly very important advantages. But there is in my humble opinion still another operation, which if successful would be most solidly decisive in its consequences, and is therefore well worth our consideration. It is the trying the same experiment (which has hitherto unfortunately not succeeded to the southward) in other districts, which have been represented as most friendly to the King's interests.[b] Virginia has been in general looked upon as universally hostile; Maryland has not been as yet tried, but is supposed to be not quite so much so: but the inhabitants of Pennsylvania on both sides of the Susquehannah, York, Lancaster, Chester, and the Peninsula between Chesapeak and Delaware, are represented to me to be friendly. There or thereabouts [c]I think this experiment should now be tried, but it cannot be done fairly until we have a force sufficient [d]not only to go there, but to retain a respectable hold of the country [e]afterwards, should it be judged necessary. I wish that our numbers were competent to the occupying two corresponding stations [f]at Baltimore and Elk river. Agreeable to what I mentioned to you in the conversations we have had together on this subject,[g] to which that you may be able on occasion to refer, I have committed the substance

a V *begins*

b V *stops*

c V *continues*

d V *omits to* but

e V *omits* afterwards

f V *omits to* river

g V *ends*

of them to writing, and send them to you inclosed. This I should have done sooner, had I had a safe opportunity before. I have now the greater reason to be convinced that the opinions I then gave you were right, from a conversation I have since had with a very intelligent friend of ours from [a]the country, known to Colonel Simcoe, who goes to you by this opportunity, and will be able to give you the fullest information thereon.[b]

[a] S *reads* that

[b] S *ends*

April 30th. I expected that the Medea would have been sent to Lord Cornwallis, and that Captain Duncan would have been appointed by the Admiral to conduct the naval operations in the Chesapeak, for which he is particularly qualified from his knowledge of those waters, and his having had the management of that business in Lord Howe's command. But the Admiral has just wrote to me that he cannot possibly at present spare Captain Duncan, and that he has appointed Captain Hudson of the Richmond to carry my dispatches to Chesapeak and Cape Fear, and afterwards attend this service. My dispatches will therefore go in her under the charge of Lord Chewton, and as we both know Captain Hudson's great zeal to co-operate with the troops on all occasions, I hope every thing will go on under his direction perfectly to your satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c. H. CLINTON.

85B: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 26/30 April 1781, NARRATIVE [105] *p* 57. *With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Inclosed in the above letter the following extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's letters to Major General Phillips.

This is two parts of No. 85 *as shown in margins pp* 437-438.

85F: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 26/30 April 1781, REPLY [79] *p* 171.

Inclosed in the above letter the following extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's letters to Major General Phillips.

This is two parts of No. 85 *as shown in margins pp* 437-438.

85s: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 26/30 April 1781, Extract PA 140/116.
One of several extracts under this endorsement Extracts from Gen[l] Sir H: Clintons Letters to Maj[r] Gen[l] Phillips N[o] 3 In Sir Henry Clintons N[o] 124 of 23[d] & 30[th] April & 1[st] May 1781.[a]
Begins Extracts of Letters from General Sir Henry Clinton to Major General Phillips.
This extract from No. 85 *is shown in margins pp* 438-440.

a No. 90 *p* 453

85v: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 26/30 April 1781, Extracts HL No 19.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.
One of several extracts under this endorsement Extracts of Letters from Gen[l] Sir H. Clinton to Major Gen[l] Phillips dated 26[th] & 30[th] April & 3[d] May 1781. In Sir H[y] Clinton's of 23[d] & 30[th] April & 1[st] May 1781[b] (3) N[o] 19.
Begins Extracts of Letters from General Sir Henry Clinton to Major General Phillips. New York 26[th] April 1781.
This is two parts of No. 85 *as shown in margin p* 439.

b No. 90E: *p* 463

86 CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, ANSWER [13] *p* 85. ANSWER [13] *p* 85, OBSERVATIONS [85 *Ap'x*] *p* 130, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from each.*

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated [a]New-York, April 30, 1781. [b][Received, June, 1781.]

[c]My Lord, Captain Biggs, of his Majesty's ship Amphitrite, who arrived here the 22d, has delivered to me your Lordship's two letters from Wilmington, of the 10th instant, informing me of your having obtained a compleat victory over the rebel General Greene, near Guildford, on the 15th ult. on which occasion I beg leave, [d]my Lord, to offer your Lordship my most hearty congratulations, and to request you will present my thanks to Major-General Leslie, Brigadier-[e]general O'Hara, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, for the great assistance you received from them, and to the officers and men under your

a FSVE *begin* Copy
b FSVE *omit to* 1781
c B *begins*
d B *omits* my Lord
e B *omits* general

command, for their great exertions on the march through Carolina, and their persevering intrepidity in action.

The disparity of numbers between your Lordship's force and that of the enemy opposed to you, appears to be very great: and, I confess, I am at some loss to guess how your [a]Lordship came to be reduced before the action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, as, by the distribution sent to me in your letter of the 6th of January, I am to suppose it was your intention to take with you the regiments mentioned in the margin, † which (notwithstanding the loss of the[1] seventy-first and legion, in the unfortunate affair of [b]Cowpens) I should imagine must have amounted to considerably above three thousand, exclusive of cavalry and militia.

[a] F *reads* Lordship's

[b] B *inserts* the

Before I was favoured with your Lordship's letter, the rebel account of the battle of Guildford had led me, indeed, to hope, that its consequences would have been more decisive, and that Greene would have re-passed the Roanoke, and left your Lordship at liberty to pursue the objects of your move into North Carolina. Under the persuasion, therefore, that you would soon be able to finish your arrangements for the security of the Carolinas, I submitted to you in my letter of the 13th instant, [c](a duplicate of which I have the honour to enclose) the propriety in that case of your going in a frigate to Chesapeak, and directing such corps to follow you thither as you judged could be best spared. But, as it is now probable that your Lordship's presence in Carolina cannot be so soon dispensed with, [d]I make no doubt [e]that you will think it right to communicate to Major-general Phillips, without delay, the plan of your future operations in that quarter, to-

[c] FVE *omit* to enclose

[d] R *begins*

[e] B *reads* but

1aA 7th

† Brigade of Guards, Twenty-third, Thirty-third, Seventy-first, [f]two Battalions, Yagers, Regiment of Bose, Light Infantry, Seventy-first, [g]and Legion, North-Carolina Regiment.

[f] S]*reads* 2d Battn

[g] BS*omit* and

gether with your opinion how the Chesapeak army can best direct their's to assist them. That General-officer has already under his orders three thousand five hundred men, and I shall send him one thousand seven hundred more, which are now embarked, and will sail whenever the Admiral is ready.[a]

With these, my Lord, which are rank and file fit for duty, and great part of them taken from the elite of my army, General Phillips is directed by his instructions to act in favour of your Lordship, to the best of his [b]own judgment, until he receives your orders, and afterwards [c]in such manner as you may please to command him, &c. But I [d]shall be sorry to find your Lordship continue in the opinion that our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious, until Virginia is in a manner subdued, as that is an event which, I fear, would require a considerable space of time to accomplish, and, as far as I can judge, it might be not quite so expedient at this advanced season of the year to enter into a long operation in that climate. — This, however, will greatly depend upon circumstances, of which your Lordship and General Phillips may probably be better judges hereafter.

With regard to the operations of the summer, which your Lordship is anxious to receive my directions about,[2] you cannot but be sensible that they must in [e]great measure depend on your Lordship's successes in Carolina, the certainty and numbers of the expected reinforcement from Europe, and, likewise, [f]on your Lordship's sending back to me the corps I had spared to you, under Major-general Leslie, which [g]Colonel[3] Rawdon, in his letter of the 31st [h]of October, told me you could return in the spring. For until I am informed of the particulars of your Lordship's march through North Carolina, the effective strength of your moving army, your

a BFSR *run on*

b R *omits* own
c FVE *omit* in such manner
d R *reads* shou'd

e B *inserts* a

f B *omits* on

g BFSVE *read* Lord
h FS *omit* of

2aA you might have seen them had you received my dispatches from Coll Balfour.
3aA Lord.

plan of operations for carrying[a] those objects you had or may have in view, into execution, as well by the corps acting under your [b]own immediate orders, as those acting in co-operation under Major-general Phillips, it must be obviously impossible for me to determine finally upon a plan of operations for the campaign.

I was indeed in great hopes that your successes in North Carolina would have been such as to have put it in my power to avail myself of a large portion of your Lordship's army, the whole Chesapeak corps, and the [c]entire [d]reinforcement from Europe, for this campaign's operations to the northward of Carolina: but I observe with concern, from your Lordship's letter, that so far from being in a condition to spare me any part of your present force, you are of opinion that part of the European reinforcement will be indispensibly necessary to enable you to act offensively, or even to maintain yourself in the upper parts of the country.[4,5]

Had I known what your Lordship's further offensive measures were intended to be for the remaining part of the season, I might now have given an opinion upon them, as well as [e]upon the probable co-operation of the corps in [f]the Chesapeak, without having which it will be [g]scarce possible for me to form any; for as I said before, I fear no solid operation can be carried on to the northward of Chesapeak before those to the southward of it are [h]totally at an end, either from success, or the season; and my letter to your Lordship of the 6th [i]of November will have informed you what were my ideas of the operations proper to be pursued in Chesapeak, and my expectations from them, had circumstances admitted of my pursuing the plan to its full extent.

a S *inserts* on

b B *omits* own

c B *omits* entire
d BFSR *read* reinforcements

e BFSR *read* on
f B *omits* the
g BSR *read* scarcely

h B *reads* entirely

i SR *omit* of

4aA It clearly seemed by Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 10th April, not only that he intended to return to the Upper Carolinas, but that he had promised the poor Loyalists of N. Carolina to do so.

5bO If his Lordp had had the least Idea of going into Virgina he should have said so on his first arrival at Wilmington.

But I must now defer [a]fixing ultimately on a plan for the campaign, until I am made acquainted with the final success of your Lordship's operations, your prospects and sentiments, and I can judge what force I can collect for such measures as I can then determine [b]upon.[c]

I have the honour[d] to be, &c. [e]H. CLINTON.

a BFR *insert* the

b F *reads* on
c R *ends*
d B *omits* to be
e BFSVE *insert* Signed

86B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [85 *Ap'x*] *p* 130.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.
Copy. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, April 30, 1781.
Same as No. 86 *with variations shown in margins pp* 441-445.

86F: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, Copy PA 140/123.
Endorsed Copy. Sir Henry Clinton to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. April 30th 1781. N° 4 In Sir Henry Clintons N° 124 of 23d & 30th April and 1st May 1781.[f]
Same as No. 86 *with variations shown in margins pp* 441-445.

f No. 90 *p* 458

86S: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, Copy RI 19/68.
Same as No. 86 *with variations shown in margins pp* 441-445.

86V: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, Copy HL N° 20.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis dated April 30th 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's of 23d & 30th April & 1st May 1781.[g] (4) N° 20.
Same as No 86 *with variations shown in margins pp* 441-445.

g No. 90E: *p* 463

86E: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, Copy HL N° 55.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York 30th April 1781. Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 1st May 1781. R/ 23d June. N° 55.
Same as No 86 *with variations shown in margins pp* 441-445.

86R: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 30 April 1781, Extract PA 140/557.
One of several extracts under this endorsement Extracts from the Correspondence between Sir Henry

Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak & an Expedition against Philadelphia. (11) In Sir Henry Clinton's Letter of
a *see* li. 378 the 13th July[a] 90 *also endorsed* Sent 4th May.
Begins Extract. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York April 30th 1781.

This extract from No. 86 *is shown in margins pp* 442-445.

---

87 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 30 April 1781, 1S PA 140/71.
NARRATIVE [35] *p* 42, *with Clinton's MS. Note.*

Endorsed New York, 30th April 1781 Sir Henry Clinton PRIVATE. R/ 23d June.

Private. New York 30th April 1781.[1]

My Lord, I am not insensible of the Justness of the Reasonings your Lordship has honored me with in Your Letter, No 76. And I dare flatter myself that so much Justice will be done to my Zeal for the King's Service, and the Interests of my Country, as to believe I shall not fail to use every Exertion & the utmost Endeavors in my Power to bring the American War to a Conclusion. To attain which great Object, I may with Confidence assert, that I have seized every Advantage, and profited by every Occasion, which have presented themselves since I have been honored with this Command.

At the Time I informed Your Lordship, in my Letter of the 12th of November, that Major General Leslie was called by Earl Cornwallis from the

[1] this letter was written as a consilliatory one when they had forced me to serve still another Campn but promised me the means of finishing it without affront, but it cannot mean to Ease the Cabinet of that day of a charge which I shall ever consider deserving of *impeachment*, the advising his Majesty to reject the plan of the Comr in chief (which they had repeatedly approved), the ordering him to adopt that of a Subaltern General which they at last disapprove, and reapprove that of the Commander in Chief alas to late and when he is deeply and dangerously engaged in that they had ordered him to adopt. His Maj Cabinet of that day were Lord North Lord G. Germain Lord Amherst Lord Chanr *Thurlow* Lord Gower, Lord Sandwich and I believe Lord Mansfield.

Chesapeak to Cape Fear, I told you that my then threatened Situation rendered it inexpedient for me immediately to reoccupy the Post he had taken in Elizabeth River. But the Importance of the Objects I had in View, when I sent that Expedition thither, was too forcibly impressed on my Mind to permit me to neglect doing it, the very moment the Causes which restrained me were removed. And I am happy to find, I have been so fortunate to anticipate His Majesty's Pleasure in this particular, by having so soon afterwards detached Brigadier General Arnold on that Service, and further strengthened our Hold of the Chesapeak by the Reinforcement sent thither under Major General Phillips.

It gives me Pain, my Lord, when I feel myself obliged to trouble your Lordship with my Distresses. But my Regard to the King's Interests and the Duties of the very important Command He has honored me with, cannot but excite in me the most anxious Solicitude. Your Lordship will therefore, I am persuaded, forgive me if I recall your Attention to the very disagreeable Predicament in which I now stand,—being on the Eve of opening the Campaign before I know the Naval Chief, to whom I am to communicate my Plans, and with whom I am to consult upon the Measures to be pursued in the Course of our Operations. Eight long Months have elapsed since your Lordship did me the Honor of telling me that His Majesty was graciously pleased to listen to my Representations, and had appointed Admiral Arbuthnot to relieve Sir Peter Parker; and that another Flag Officer then on the List would be immediately named to the Naval Command in North America. Being in Consequence of this Information unwilling to trouble the Vice Admiral with a Consultation upon Operations, which his Removal from the Naval Command here would of Course prevent his being concerned in; and not having received

any Intimation from him of his Intentions of going to Jamaica ; I thought it my Duty to endeavor to ascertain what they were. I therefore in the Presence of a General Officer, and in the civilest Manner I was capable of, requested that the Admiral would inform me whether he proposed leaving us soon, and gave him my Reasons. His Answer was, that he never had received any Official Intimation of the King's Pleasure, respecting his relieving Sir Peter Parker, nor any public Letters of a later Date than October. As this Conversation was subsequent to the Arrival of the Cormorant, which did not sail from Torbay before the latter End of February, I own I am at a Loss to account for what he said. I shall, however, wait the Arrival of another Packet. By which, if Admiral Arbuthnot is not recalled; I trust, that His Majesty from His gracious Goodness will pardon me, if I avail myself of the Permission He has been pleased to give me to resign this Command to Lord Cornwallis. For I must be free to own to Your Lordship, that I cannot place a Confidence in Vice Admiral Arbuthnot; who, from Age, Temper, and Inconsistency of Conduct, is really so little to be depended on, that was I to continue to serve with him, I should be constantly under the most distressing Apprehensions of the Miscarriage of such Enterprizes as we might be engaged in.

I beg leave, my Lord, to take the Liberty now of saying a few Words to a Part of the Message your Lordship did me the Honor of sending to me by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce, who delivered it to me in writing, and it is as follows.

"Lord George Germain strongly recommends it "to Sir Henry Clinton, either to remain in good "Humour, in full Confidence to be supported as "much as the Nature of the Service will admit of, or "avail himself of the leave of coming home; as no "Good can arise to the Service, if there is not a full

"Confidence between the General and the Ministers."

By this, my Lord, it would appear that your Lordship thought I had expressed myself with some Impatience in the Representations I had made to Your Lordship of our Wants, in regard to the necessary Supplies. I therefore feel myself called upon to assure Your Lordship, that I have been always too sensible of your ready Attention to all my Requisitions, to address myself intentionally to your Lordship in such a Stile. But when your Lordship reflects, that I have been more than once, since I have had this Command, within a very few days of a most dangerous Want of Provisions—and that no Part of the last Year's supply sailed from Europe before August, notwithstanding the Orders issued (as I am convinced) by the Treasury Board for their being ready early in the Year.—I am persuaded you will acquiesce in the Necessity I was under of soliciting in the strongest Terms, that this Army might not be again reduced to the like alarming Situation. To this, my Lord, I beg leave to add, that, notwithstanding Major General Pattison applied in March for small Arms to replace those lost in an Ordnance Ship, and to answer other Deficiencies, which he of course explained to the Board of Ordnance—none were received here in Return for thirteen or fourteen Months afterwards: and that altho' the Commanding Officer of Artillery here made a Requisition, by my Orders, in October last for 20,000, Stand of small Arms; and the Application was repeated immediately after in the most urgent Terms thro' Brigadier General Dalrymple, I am at this Hour uncertain whether they are even on their Passage, tho' the most serious Operations may probably be soon at a Stand for Want of them. Forgive me, my Lord, if I likewise take the Liberty of reminding your Lordship, that, tho' only a third of the Reinforcement, which I was a Supplicant for from a Conviction of the absolute Necessity there was for it, was granted

me; even that, small as it is, will not I fear arrive here before we are far advanced in the Campaign—the Commencement of which ought not (in my Opinion) to be delayed beyond the Month of May.

Besides these, my Lord, I could perhaps mention many other Instances, in which I have and am suffering for Want of a more timely Compliance with my Requisitions.—[a]I am, however, aware of the Difficulties Administration must necessarily be exposed to, from the Variety of important Matters which demand its Attention; and far be it from me, my Lord, to impute the Delays I have experienced, to any of the King's Ministers;—But I cannot [b]but lament, that they do happen; and I tremble for the fatal Consequences, which may possibly some time or other ensue.[c]

a B *begins*

b B *reads* avoid lamenting

c B *ends*

I have the Honor to be With the greatest Respect Your Lordship's Most Obedient & Most humble Servant. H. CLINTON.

Right Hon[ble] Lord George Germain.

87B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 30 April 1781, NARRATIVE [35] *p* 42. *With Clinton's Manuscript Note.*

Sir Henry Clinton's letter to Lord George Germain, dated April 30, 1781.

This extract from No. 87 *is shown in margin p* 450.

88 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, ANSWER [105] *p* 87. NARRATIVE [106] *p* 57, ANSWER [105] *p* 87, REPLY [80] *p* 171, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from each.*

(Secret, and most private.)[1]

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New York, 30th April, 1781.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg.]

1bA is not this to be considered as a very private letter. should it have been printed? could the publishing answer any other purpose but setting the old Admiral & S H Clinton at variance—& of delivering up Col. Rankin and a whole district to the resentment of Congress? I appeal! ! !

[a]Dear Phillips, I cannot judge from Lord Cornwallis's letter, whether he proposes any further operations in the Carolinas—what they may be—and how far you can operate in his favour. If I was to give a private opinion from reading his letter —I would say, I cannot conceive from it that he has any offensive object in view. He says, that North-Carolina is a country, in which it is impossible for an army to act or move without the assistance of friends: he does not seem to think we have any there—nor do you. I shall give no opinion respecting that at present, or until I receive his Lordship's account of the state of the province, and of his winter campaign.

His Lordship tells me that he wants reinforcement.—With nine British battalions, and detachments from seven more, (besides those from the Artillery and seventeenth Dragoons)—five Hessian battalions, and a detachment of Yagers—and eleven Provincial battalions, exclusive of the cavalry and infantry of the Legion, and the Provincial Light Infantry;—I would ask,—How can that be possible? And if it is, what hopes can I have of a force sufficient to undertake any solid operation?

[b]To be brief—[c]If his Lordship proposes no operation to you soon,[d] and you see none that will operate for him [e]directly—(that is, before the [f]first of June,) —I think the best [g]indirect one in his favour will be, what you and General Arnold [h]proposed to me in No. 10. of your joint letter of the 18th instant, [i]beginning with the attempt on Philadelphia. The only risk you run is from a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea.[k]—Land and naval reinforcements [l]from France are talked of—If they come immediately from Europe, we must have some information of them, and they will, I hope, be followed;—if from the West-Indies, I hope the same. [m]It is however an important move, and ought (in my opinion) to be tried, even with some risk.[n] If our friends are as

a S *begins*

b VE *begin*
c BF *begin* If Lord Cornwallis
d BFVE *here insert words in parenthesis*
e BF *italics* directly
f BF *read* month
g BF *italics* indirect
h BFV *insert* have
i BFV *omit to* Philadelphia
k BF *stop*
l S *reads* are talked of from France
m BF *continue*
n BFE *stop*

numerous and hearty as Colonel [a]Rankin[2] represents them to be, with their assistance added to what you carry thither, you will be able to maintain yourself. But if, after having given the experiment a fair trial, you find it will not do; you may either retire to Portsmouth, or by transports and boats in Delaware pass to Jersey—where, at all events, I must pick you up, by receiving you at, or near, Mount Holly. [b]Give me timely [c]notice of your intended move, and, if possible, I will follow you into[d3·4·5·6] Delaware with such a small reinforcement as I can at the time spare.[e]

[f]As my invitation to Lord Cornwallis[7·8] to come to the Chesapeak was upon a supposition that every thing would be settled in the Carolinas, I do not think he will come;—if however, he determines to do so as a visitor, he will get Barklay or some other to bring him,[g] for the Admiral has this day only ordered a ship for the purpose—and the one he has ordered cannot (I apprehend) get over the bar of Cape Fear.

Our Admiral is grown, if possible, more impracticable than ever.[9] He swears to me that he knows nothing of his recall—to others he says, he is going home immediately. [h]If the next packet does not satisfy[10] me in [i]this particular,[11·12·13·14] I shall probably retire, and leave [k]him to Lord [l]Cornwallis's [m]management.[15·16] —To whom it will be my advice to try the only experiment[17] that (in my opinion) can

a V *reads* R.
b V *new* ¶ BF *continue*
c BFV *read* information
d V *inserts* the BF *omit* Delaware
e BF *stop* S *runs on*
f E *continues*
g VE *stop*
h BF *continue as new* ¶
i BF *omit* this particular
k BF *read* the command
l BF *read* Cornwallis
m BF *omit* management

2aA this gentlemans name should not have been mention'd.
3bcN Delaware
4fN Delaware
5bN Baltimore Philadelphia &c.
6cN Baltimore Philadelphia & Isthmus of Delaware.
7bA Cornwallis *underlined.*
8bA in person only.
9aA this also should have been left out: it seems to have been introduced merely to make bad blood between the Admiral & I, & the Navy and Army.
10cN not satisfy *underlined.*
11aN in respect to Admiral Arbuthnots recall.
12aN that Mr Arbuthnot quits the command of the Fleet.
13bN Mr Arbuthnots removal
14fiklmnopqrsN. Arbuthnot recalled.
15bN I fear this information reached L. Corns & made him form the desire of command so anxiously, "look northward."

operate, if the one in Carolina has failed.—[a]As to Virginia, I know none which can reduce that province in one campaign[b].—[18·19] Though it is certainly a great exertion, the only one that appears to me is the above. If I stay it shall be tried. Without a co-operating naval Chief, the risk is doubly great:—it would be sufficiently so with one. But if it succeeds, its consequences must be very decisive.

a BF *insert* For

b BF *stop*

May 2d. The reinforcement is embarked, and fallen down to Staten Island, where they wait only the Admiral's pleasure for their proceeding to Chesapeak. Two days ago he offered to take them thither under the escort of his fleet—to-day he writes to me, "that he thinks he cannot be justified in losing a "moment to proceed off the Chesapeak; but if I "think it of greater consequence to land the rein- "forcement of troops proposed to be sent there, than "to intercept the enemy, he will take the transports "with him—otherwise, he shall certainly leave them "behind, until it is known where the enemy's fleet "is lodged, of which he will transmit the earliest "information to me, and then appoint a convoy to "bring them on." [c]In answer, I have acknowledged the very great importance of intercepting the French fleet—but that it is also of [d]importance that this reinforcement should join you immediately, and leave to him (as being the best judge) the properest mode of accomplishing it with safety.—Thus the matter rests.

c S *new* ¶

d S *inserts* great

16cN respect to adl Arbuthnot I had been often assured that the good Old Admiral should be Employed elsewhere but Lord Sandwich opposed it, I had said that if it did not take place soon I would quit, Lord Cornwallis *knew* this, and I believe it was his principal reason for forcing himself near me, in the hope I should resign to him.

17cN only experiment *underlined*.

18cN particularly if it commenced with the sickly season (in June) nor could we ever hold that inimical Province any longer than we were covered by a Fleet, I was always convinced that the better way of conquering that Province was by holding Delaware neck &c & healthy safe & well stocked

19aN Philadelphia Delaware neck with a Corresponding Corps on Susquehanna.

May 3*d*. As I am (from the Admiral's strange conduct) doubtful when or whether the [a]reinforcement will ever join you, I do not now send Colonel Rankin to you, as I at first proposed—but I enclose his proposals. You will see by them that he is not much of an officer—but he appears to be a plain, sensible man, worth attending to—And Simcoe can explain a thousand things respecting him and his associates, which I cannot in a letter. [b]As you seemed to think (before you [c]received Lord Cornwallis's letter[d]) that all direct [e]operations in favour of his Lordship would cease by the end of May[f]; should the [g]expedition not sail from hence before the 20th inst. and I do not hear further from you, I will not send it:[h] for, in that case, I think the experiment on the peninsula may be tried to more advantage up Delaware than round by Chesapeak: in which case I shall expect General Arnold and you, with such troops as you can spare, to meet me at [i]the head of Elk or Bohemia, and form a junction. I can certainly spare more troops from [k]hence for such a move than I can send to Chesapeak, for reasons obvious. [l]Pray let me receive General Arnold's and your [m]opinions [n]upon Colonel [o]Rankin's proposals as soon as possible. I confess I am not sanguine; but if the experiment can[20] be tried without any other risk than from the enemy's superiority at sea, I should wish to do it[p].[21] Therefore if [q]General Arnold and you like it, I shall be reconciled to it, and it shall[22] be tried, after I know your opinions on it, and the inclosed proposals—and if you approve, about what time you think the attempt may take place. I am persuaded, that on application, Captain Hudson will give you a frigate for your dispatches. If we move up Delaware, Captain

a S *reads* reinforcements

b BFVE *continue as new* ¶

c V *reads* saw

d VE *insert* to me

e BFS *read* operation

f BF *stop* & *insert &c.*

g VE *read* reinforcement

h E *stops*

i V *omits* the

k S *reads* here

l BFE *continue*

m BF *read* opinion

n BFE *omit to* proposals

o V *reads* R.

p BFVE *stop*

q S *reads* you and General Arnold should like it

20cN can *underlined.*

21bA by G. Phillips Corce with S H C. L. C said he approved it, Arnold advised his Lordship to try it, ought not this letter therefore have been considered as an order to L Cornwallis as it was to Genl Phillips to try it.

22bA shall *underlined.*

Duncan, (Lord Howe's Captain,) will conduct us. I have already talked to him on the subject, and he approves.

[a]If Lord Cornwallis proposes any thing necessary for his operations, you of course must adopt it if you can, letting me know your thoughts thereon. But [b]should his Lordship determine on a defensive in the Carolinas, he surely cannot want any of the European [c]reinforcement, and will of course send it to you, and all such other as shall arrive. Thus reinforced, if after leaving a sufficient garrison in Elizabeth river, you can proceed [d]to [e]the peninsula[23·24·25]; I think we shall be in force to give this a fair trial:[f] and I may leave you in the command there, unless things should take a more favourable turn in the Carolinas, and Lord Cornwallis's presence there be no longer necessary[26]; for, until they do, I should imagine he will not [g]leave Carolina.[27]

a VE *continue*

b BF *continue as new* ¶ should Lord Cornwallis

c S *reads* reinforcements

d E *omits* to the peninsula

e BF*omit* the peninsula

f VE *end*

g BF *end* quit them

You will think me long-winded. But as safe opportunities are not frequent, I must make the best use I can of this. I refer you for more information to Lord Chewton, who is the bearer of my dispatches.[28]

[h]H. CLINTON.

h S *inserts* Sincerely Your's (Signed)

23aN Head of Elk.

24iN Baltimore &c.

25cN Baltimore & Delaware neck.

26bN I never had Idea of solid operation in Virginia in the sickly season, tis plain I never wished to keep the bay but with frigates, till the Carolinas were reduced & we could go into Chesapeak in force.

27bN contrary to my orders.

28R I suppose this letter is introduced to prove that was discontented, & that my plans were rejected, what says L. G. Germain of the 7th & 14. July. that they were adopted and expressing a wish that I might not resign to L. Cornwallis but it proves also that I could have no Idea of L. C coming into Virginia, & proves that when he did come he saw my plan for the campaign if he had not prevented it.

88B: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, NARRATIVE [106] *p* 57. *With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

April 30, 1781. To the same.

This is six parts of No. 88 *as shown in margins pp* 451-455, *with the following additional words:*

N.B. These two letters with other dispatches fell

into Lord Cornwallis's hands on General Phillips's death and were opened by his Lordship ; and the expedition thereinproposed[1·2]recommended to his consideration.[3·4]

88F: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, REPLY [80] *p* 171.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

April 30, 1781. To the same.

This is six parts of No. 88 *as shown in margins pp* 451-455.

88S: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, Copy LANSDOWNE 68/14.

One of several copies under this endorsement Copies of Letters between Sir H^y^ Clinton Earl Cornwallis L Gen^l^ Phillips relative to the Operations of the Southern army April May June 1781.

Same as No. 88 *with variations shown in margins pp* 451-455.

88V: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, Extract PA 140/119.

One of several extracts under this endorsement Extracts from Gen^l^ Sir H: Clintons Letters to Maj^r^ Gen^l^ Phillips. N^o^ 3 In Sir Henry Clintons N^o^ 124 of 23^d^ & 30^th^ April & 1^st^ May 1781.[a]

In margin Private & most Secret. N York April 30^th^ 1781.

a No. 90 *p* 453

This is three parts of No. 88 *as shown in margins pp* 451-455.

88E: CLINTON to PHILLIPS, 30 April 1781, Extract HL No 19.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 February 1782.

One of several extracts under this endorsement Extracts of Letters from Gen^l^ Sir H. Clinton to Major Gen^l^ Phillips dated 26^th^ & 30^th^ April & 3^d^ May 1781. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's of 23^d^ & 30^th^ April & 1^st^ May 1781.[b] (3) N^o^ 19.

Begins Private & most secret. New York April 30^th^ 1781.

b No. 90E : *p* 463

This is five parts of No. 88 *as shown in margins pp* 451-455.

1fklmnoprsN nay ordered.

2iN nay ordered for all that Phillips had been ordered to execute it became Lord Cornwallis to persue.

3aN and which Gen Phillips was *ordered* to carry into execution.

4cN The reason for the above blanks was that the war was not finished when this was written.

89 State of the TROOPS that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis. ANSWER [77] *p* 86.

DATE.	RANK AND FILE PRESENT, AND FIT FOR DUTY.								TOTAL.
	BRITISH.					GERMAN.	PROVINCIALS.		
	Brigade of Guards.	Regiment. Twenty-third	Thrty-third Regiment.	Seventy-first Regiment, Two Battalions.	Eighty-second Regiment, Light Company.	Regiment of Bose.	British Legion.	North Carolina Volunteers, Light Company.	
May 1, 1781.	387	194	209	175	36	228	173	33	1435

90 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 23/30 April & 1 May 1781, LS PA 140/83.
NARRATIVE [103] *p* 57, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Endorsed New York, 23d & 30th April & 1st May 1781. Sir Henry Clinton N° 124. R/ 23d June (9 Inclosures[a]) Ent[d].

[b]N° 124. New York 23d April 1781.

[c]My Lord, I have the Honor to acknowledge the Receipt of Your Lordship's Original Dispatch, N° 76, Two Letters from Mr Knox, dated 4th of January, and Duplicates of your Lordship's Dispatches, mark[d] Nos 74 & 75, Separate Letter of the 6th: and circular One of the 7th December; Which, having been taken out of the Cormorant Sloop at Sea, by His Majesty's Ship Chatham, were delivered to me Yesterday.

His Majesty's Ship Amphitrite having also at the same time brought me Dispatches from Carolina, I have the Honor to inclose to your Lordship the Copy of a Letter I [d]received by her from Earl Cornwallis, dated the 10th Instant. This being the only authentic Information I have as yet had of his Lordship's March, and the Battle of Guildford, [e]and his Lordship having proposed to send one of his Aid's de Camp immediately to England, with a particular Account of all his Proceedings, I shall decline troubling your Lordship with any other Observations thereon; than to confess myself at a Loss to conceive how his Lordship's Numbers came to be reduced before the Action to 1,360, Infantry, as he says all his Military Operations were uniformly successfull; and as from every Information given me I have great Reason to believe his Lordship had above 3,000, Men, besides Cavalry, and Militia, when he entered North Carolina.

In the Hope that Lord Cornwallis's Success amongst our Friends in North Carolina, which was the principal Object of his March into that Province, would have been such as to have restored it, and South Carolina to Tranquility; I had, in a Letter I wrote to his Lordship on the 10th Instant, submitted

a No. 60S: *p* 372; No. 70R: *p* 400; No. 71B: *p* 405; No. 76 *p* 407; No. 85S: *p* 441; No. 86F: *p* 445; No. 88V: *p* 456; *see also* ii. 368-369

b V *begins*

c FSE *begin*

d V *inserts* have

e V *omits* and

to him the Propriety in that Case of his coming in a Frigate to the Chesapeak. And, tho' it is now probable that he may not think his Presence in Carolina can be so soon dispensed with; it is possible, as he seems of Opinion that his Army cannot be in a Condition again to act before it is reinforced, that his Lordship may perhaps avail himself of that Invitation to go thither, to consult with Major General Phillips. In which Case such Plans will of Course be settled between them, as may best assist what further Operations his Lordship may still propose to carry on in the Carolinas during the Remainder of the Season. After those are over, such others will take Place to the Northward of them, as the Reinforcements we may receive shall enable us to undertake. For I have ever been sensible of the very great Importance of Operations in Chesapeak; tho' I am aware that they are attended with great Risk, unless we are sure of a permanent Superiority at Sea[a]—with less, however, in the District between Chesapeak, & Delaware, than in any other. [b]But I must [c]beg leave, my Lord, in this place to observe, that I cannot agree to the Opinion given me by Lord Cornwallis in his last Letter, that the Chesapeak should become the Seat of War, even (if necessay) at the Expence of abandoning New York[d]: as I must ever regard this Post to be of the utmost Consequence, whilst it is thought necessary to hold Canada, with which, & the Northern Indians, it is so materially connected. We should moreover by such a Measure leave to the Mercy of the Enemy, nearly 25,000 Inhabitants of a very valuable & extensive District, which is in general supposed to be loyal; and relinquish the only Winter Port the King's Ships have to the Northward. To these, my Lord, might be added a thousand other Considerations (amongst which, its Proximity to the undecided District of Vermont is not the least in Weight) but that I am persuaded they are too

a FE *stop*

b FE *continue*
c V *reads* my Lord, beg leave

d FE *stop*

obvious to Your Lordship to require my troubling You with the Recital.

[a] FE *continue* [a]April 30th—I have the Honor to inclose to your Lordship Extracts from such Parts of Major General Phillips's last Dispatches, and my Answers, [b] V *reads* appears to him & Lord Cornwallis as [b]appear to be most material; and to inform You, that after consulting General Knyphausen and General Robertson upon [c] S *reads* this [c]his Requisition for a still further Reinforcement, I do not hesitate to send him one as soon as [d] FE *stop* the Admiral's Fleet is prepared for Sea[d], tho' I shall thereby leave this Post with a Force very inadequate [e] FE *continue* to its Defence.—[e]But, as the Plans I had in View for the Campaign must necessarily have undergone a considerable Change since the Knowledge given me of Lord Cornwallis's Situation, in his Letter of the [f] V *omits* Instant 10th [f]Instant, it may not be necessary to say much to your Lordship on some of those we had in Meditation before the Receipt of it; it being probable that Lord Cornwallis will of course have given General Phillips Directions to employ the Chesapeak Corps in such Operations, as he judges may best assist his own in Carolina, with which however, your Lordship will perceive that I am as yet totally unacquainted.

As soon as the Inclemency of the Season shall have put an End to Lord Cornwallis's offensive Measures in the Carolinas, Operation will of Course [g] FE *stop* begin to the Northward of them[g]. And, should Circumstances at the Time render it expedient, it may not be improper to give a fair Trial to, perhaps the only Experiment, which may be then left us, of ascertaining the Temper, Firmness and Zeal of our Friends in the Districts bordering on the upper Chesapeak. But this Experiment, tho' so likely to be most important in its Consequences, should it succeed, ought not (for Reasons but too obvious) to be risked, unless we are at the Time of making it in Force sufficient to give it the fairest Trial, and

finally to establish ourselves there in their Support, should it be judged necessary to do so. For Experience, my Lord, has but too fatally taught us, that if by desultory Movements we tempt our Friends to rise and join us, and are afterwards obliged to leave them (no matter from what Causes) we leave them to Ruin, —and of course lose their future Confidence, and with it, our Hopes of finishing this Business. [a]Your Lordship will have seen, in the Paper I had the Honor to send You in my last Dispatch, what Force I judged would be requisite for this Service—not less, my Lord, than 10,000[b]1 Rank & File fit for Duty— indeed I wish they could be more. But the inclosed Returns will shew your Lordship, that after leaving [c]this Place to its present Garrison [d](which is very inadequate indeed, and such as I dare not trust it to in a more advanced Season), and leaving 1,000, Men in the Post in Elizabeth River, (supposing it may not be found necessary to occupy another Station [e]there,) I shall not have quite 5,000, Men for it.—Unless the three Battalions expected from the West Indies arrive in proper Time, & Condition for Service, or Lord Cornwallis should be able to spare from his Defensive in Carolina (when he determines [f]on it)2 a considerable Part of the Army under his immediate Command—which however, his Lordship's Letter of the 10[h] [g]gives me no Hopes of— or indeed that he will even spare me the three Regiments coming from Ireland. [h]With these 5,000, however, my Lord, [i]circumstanced as your Lordship's Letter N° 76 describes us to be, I may possibly determine to risk (even by desultory Movements) the Trial of this Experiment; should I find the Report given me of our Friends in that Country properly founded[k]. For one of the Principal of them, who

a B *begins*

b B *inserts* men

c B *reads* these posts to their present garrisons

d B *omits to* Season

e B *omits* there

f B *reads* upon

g B *inserts* instant

h B *new* ¶

i B *omits to* us to be

k B *stops*

1a Rank *to* Duty *run through.*

2b depending on my orders to His lordship and his promise I expected when he had finished operation in N. Carolina that would take a healthy defensive in the back country and send me what he could spare.

is now with me, assures me, that the Distresses the People have suffered under their new Government (which they declare they cannot possibly live under any longer) have greatly increased in that District the Number of Wellwishers to the old Constitution, and that a very considerable Body of real & respectable Friends will heartily join us, whenever we make our Appearance there. I shall give no Opinion yet upon this Business, and shall only again say, my Lord, that, once convinced the French do not mean to send a Reinforcement to this Country, I may perhaps determine to try the Experiment, should a favorable Moment for it appear. [a]If it succeeds as fully as our sanguine Friends would persuade us to hope, we may possibly be able to maintain ourselves there with a small Force. But, if we are in a Situation to give the Experiment a fair[3] Trial, and it then fails, I shall, I confess, have little Hopes afterwards of reestablishing Order on this Continent;—which, I am free to own, I think can never be effected without the cordial Assistance[4] of numerous[5] Friends.[b]

a B *continues*

b B *ends &c*

c FE *continue* S *new* ¶

[c]May 1st.—The Admiral having this day signified to me, that he means to lose no Time in proceeding to Sea with his Fleet; the Transports with the Troops intended for Chesapeak immediately fell down to Staten Island; where they wait his Pleasure to go thither, either under the Convoy of such Ships of War as he may appoint, or under that of his Fleet, should he think proper to take them along with him—which will of course depend on the Situation of the Enemy's Squadron at Rhode Island, which by the last Accounts from thence was said to be ready to sail.[d]

d FE *end* S *ends* I am &ca H. Clinton

I have the Honor to be[e] With the Greatest Respect Your Lordships Most Obedient & Most humble Servant H. Clinton.

e V *ends &c* (Signed) H. Clinton

Right Honorable Lord George Germain

3c fair *underlined.*

4c cordialassistance *underlined.*

5c numerous *underlined.*

90B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 30 April 1781, NARRATIVE [103] *p* 57.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
One of several extracts under this heading Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain.
Begins April 30, 1781.
This is two parts of No. 90 *as shown in margins pp* 461-462.

90F: CLINTON to GERMAIN, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 87.
Extrait d'une lettre de Sir Henri Clinton, au lord George Germain, datée de la Nouvelle-York les 23 30 avril & 1 mai 1781.
This is five parts of No. 90 *as shown in margins pp* 458-462.

90S: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 23/30 April & 1 May, Copy PA 309/104.
In margin New York, 23d & 30th April & 1st May 1781 Sir Henry Clinton N° 124. Rd 23d June.
Mem. at end Inclosures N° 1. Copies of a Letter to Sir Hy Clinton & a Proclamation by Lord Cornwallis, with a List of Officers killed & wounded on the Action of the 15th of March 1781. 2. Extracts from Major General Phillips's Letters to Sir Henry Clinton. 3. Extracts from Sir Hy Clintons letters to Genl Phillips. 4. Copy of a Letter from Sir Hy Clinton to Earl Cornwallis. 5. State of several Corps under Sir Hy Clinton. 6. State of the Troops under General Phillips.
Same as No. 90 *with variations shown in margins pp* 458-462.

90V: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 23/30 April and 1 May, Copy RI 22/96.
Endorsed N° 124. Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, April 23d to May 1st 1781. Origl ℔ the Thynne Packet. Duple ℔ the Confederate. Vide Correspondences referred to. 212.
Same as No. 90 *with variations shown in margins pp* 458-462.

90E: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 23/30 April & 1 May, Extracta HL N° 16.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 25 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, dated 23d & 30th April, & 1st May 1781. R/ 23d June. Earl Cornwallis's

a *six enclosures* No. 60V : *p* 372 No. 76S : *p* 414 No. 85V : *p* 441 No. 86V : *p* 445 No. 88E : *p* 456 *see also* ii. 369

Letter to Sir Hy Clinton enclosed in this Letter is amongst those papers laid before the House 18 Feby No 90 No 16.

Begins Extract of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain dated New York 23d April 1781.

This is five parts of No. 90 *as shown in margins pp* 458-462.

91 GERMAIN TO CLINTON, 2 May 1781, LS RI 22/100.
NARRATIVE [8] *p* 11 *and* [51] *p* 56.
With Clinton's MS. Notes from NARRATIVE *and* GERMAIN.

Endorsed Duplicate. Secret. Lord Geo: Germain to Sir H. Clinton K.B. Whitehall 2d May 1781 Concerning operations in America 160.

a V *begins and omits* Duplicate b ER *begin* c SOM *begin*

[a]Secret (Duplicate) [b]Whitehall 2d May 1781.

Sir, [c]By the Mail of the MercuryPacket, I received, on the 25th of last Month, your Dispatches numbered from 118 to 122, one of the 28th February, one of the 1st, two of the 8th, and one of the 9th March, marked separate, & immediately laid them before the King. A Vessel, sent Express by Vice Admiral Arbuthnot from the Chesapeake, had arrived the day before,[d] and brought the very agreeable and important Intelligence of his having defeated the french Admiral's Project, of carrying his Squadron, and a Detachment of french Troops to attack General Arnold in concert with the Rebel Forces, and of the Arrival of Major General Phillips in James River with his Reinforcement.[e] The Plan of the Enemy was certainly judiciously laid, and if Admiral Arbuthnot had not had the good Fortune to overtake the french Fleet before they entered the Chesapeake, the Destruction of General Arnold & his small Corps would probably have been effected, which must have put a Stop to Lord Cornwallis's Progress, & blasted all Our hopes of recovering the Southern Provinces this Campaign. Although therefore I greatly regret that all the french Ships escaped, I rejoice exceedingly in the Success

d R *omits* and

e S *inserts* n'est pas moins importante.

we have had, as it has delivered Us from such great and imminent danger, and given Confidence to Our hopes that Lord Cornwallis will be able to effect a Junction with General Phillips, whose Co-operation, with the considerable Force he Commands, must greatly facilitate his Approach, and by convincing the Loyalists that the Recovery of the Southern Provinces is the unalterable Object of the King's Measures, excite them to exert themselves for the Accomplishment of it. Indeed had we any doubt of the Wisdom of the present Plan of pushing the War in that Quarter, and of the vast Importance of the Possession of Virginia, the Conduct of the Rebels would confirm Us in Our Judgment, for they could not give stronger Proofs of the high Opinion they entertain of its Importance, than by the great Efforts they made, and the hazards they ran, in their Attempts to preserve it; As nothing less than the Apprehension of the most fatal Consequences to their Cause from its Loss could have prevailed on them to detach so large a part of Mr. Washington's best Troops to such a distance, at a time when his Army was so greatly reduced, and so early in the Season that no Draughts [a]from the Militia could be brought to join him, and thereby expose his Posts on the Hudson River to your Attacks, when the little Force that remained with him could not enable him to give them hopes of Relief. [b1]Conceiving therefore so highly[2] as I do of the Importance

[a] M *reads* of

[b] F *begins*

[1a]N there are very few of the following notes necessary, they are so many evd prooffs of what by this time the reader is I believe convinced

[2e]N In this sort of language the Cabinet wrote to me, from Ross acct of L. Cornwallis brilliant Victory of Campden, nor did they change their tone till they found that by his Lordships ill judged move into Virginia we were likely to be undone then my plans the plans of the Comr in chiefs "were the only plans that "could succeed" had this plan been approved at first it may be seen that that campaign could not have ended unfortunately, according to that plan not above 1000 men would have been in Chesapeak, the rest at N. York defensive or offensive as might happen. Philadelphia probably visited, the french fleet at R. Island certainly destroyed.

of the Southern Provinces, and of the vast Advantages which must attend the Prosecution of the War upon the present Plan [a]of extending Our Conquests from South[3] to North,[4·5] it was a great Mortification to me to find, by your [b]Instructions[6] to Major General Phillips, that it appeared to be your Intention that only a part[7·8] of the Troops he carried with him should remain in the Chesapeak,[9·10] and that [c]both he and General Arnold should return to New York,

a SMO *omit to* Conquests

b F *reads* Instruction

c F *omits* both

3cN south *underlined.*

4aN These Instructions were among the dispatches Lord Cornwallis says are coming to him when he marched into Virginia, tis presumed if he had received them he would not as he says have had an Idea that I had resolved on solid operation in that Province and therefore as that was his principal object in going there it would have prevented him.

5cN north *underlined.*

6iN which Instruction Col. Balfour had in possession long before L. Cornwallis marched into Virginia, & might & ought to have sent to his Lordship, & would have convinced his Lordship as it seems to have done the Minister that S H Clinton had no intention of solid operation in the sickly inimical Prov. of Virginia, in the worst season.

7bN rejects my plan for the Campaign orders me to support that of L. Cornwallis till 7 & 14 July 81. & then seeing the danger of L. Cornwallis approve of mine alas too late, how can Lord Cornwallis say I had ever intended solid establishment in Virginia, does not this prove that I intended only leaving *part* of the troops and mostly to leave garrisons.

8bN a part *underlined.*

9cN from the instant we got possession of Georgia this system had been fixed the very order here given brakes through it, for N. Carolina was left behind unconquered, & witht friends we could neither conquer or keep there were none in Virginia, much danger in operations there without a fleet, no certainty of having one and an Enemy far more dreaded than armies I was sure would meet us in those districts in July, I therefore had determined to withdw every thing except a small station to cover frigates, & carry on operation during the heats, more northerly, healthy, safe and plentiful in supply, in the midst of friends &c.

10aN L. Cornwallis it seems forgetting all the *orders* of S H C some of them given while he was in the same Camp with S H Clinton) has asserted that a certain ecconomical system mentioned in the 7th report originated with his Lordship: Mr Pitt has since by desire of S H C read the letter of the Treasury to S H C thanking him for having establishd it many months before the date of L C orders for his Lordship's sake tis pity he had not recollected this circumstance or the Commissioners known it when they gave & his Lordship took the merit of having established it to himself.

leaving only a sufficient Force to serve for Garrisons in the Posts they might Establish in Virginia.[11] Your Ideas therefore of the Importance of recovering that Province appearing to be so different from mine, I thought it proper to ask the Advice of His Majesty's other Servants upon the Subject, and their [a]Opinion concurring entirely with mine, it has been submitted to the King, and I am commanded by His Majesty to acquaint you, that the Recovery of the Southern Provinces, and the Prosecution of the War [b]by pushing Our Conquests from South[12] to North,[13·14] is to be considered as the Chief[15] and principal[16] Object[17] for the Employment of all the[18] Forces under your Command, which can be spared from the defence of the Places in His Majesty's Possession, until it is accomplished;[c19] but as it might be dangerous to the health of the Troops to carry on offensive Operations to the South of the Delaware in the Summer Months, and that being the fittest Season for attacking the Enemy's Posts upon the [d]Hudson River, and annoying the New England Provinces, His Majesty leaves you at full Liberty to employ the Troops in any offensive Undertaking to the North[e] of the Delaware at such times as you shall judge it improper to continue them in the Field upon [f]active Service to the South of it, nor is it the King's Intention to restrain you from availing yourself of any favorable Event, or Change

a F *reads* opinions

b SMO *omit to* Conquests

c F *stops*

d VEM *read* Hudson's

e M *inserts* Side

f E *reads* actual

11cN this plan had been approved, was again approd alas too late, my intention was however to return to Chesapeak in proper season in such force as I could and carried on such operation as would probably have recovered all the provinces bordering on Chesapeak bay.

12cN south *underlined.*

13cN north *underlined.*

14bN the Conquest of Virginia to be considered as the principal object; in another place L. G. G. says

15bN chief *underlined.*

16bN principal *underlined.*

17aN This and his forbidding me from taking a man from Virginia till that Province was Conquered (in another letter) would have convinced Lord Cornwallis I could not have disposed of his Corps as I chose, unless I had shewn as good a disposition to disobey the Kings orders as his Lordship had to disobey mine.

18aN all the *underlined.*

19eN malgre moi I am forced into operation in Virginia.

of Circumstances, which may happen at any other time in the Northern Provinces, it being only His Majesty's Purpose that the War should be [a]conducted upon a permanent and settled Plan [b]of Conquest, always securing and preserving what has been recovered, and not by desultory Enterprizes, taking Possession of Places at one time, and abandoning them at another, which never can bring the War to a Conclusion, or encourage the People to avow their Loyalty, and exert their Endeavours to relieve themselves from the Tyranny of the Rebel Rulers, and enable His Majesty to restore to them their constitutional Liberty, which is the most fervent Wish of His Royal Breast.

a M *reads* concluded
b M *omits* of Conquest
O *omits to always*

I daily expect to hear that the German Troops are sailed from Bremer Lehe, where those which were embarked at Stade have been ordered to join them, & the whole to proceed together to New York.

[c]The three Regiments from Ireland, and the [d]British Recruits that went with them, are, I trust well on their way by this time to Charles Town, [e]and as Sir George Rodney will bring you three more Regiments[20·21·22·23] from the Leeward Islands before the Hurricane Months,[24·25] the Augmentation of your Force, must, I should think, be equal to the utmost of your Wishes[f26·27]; and clearly prove to you how essential an Object the Recovery of America is to this Country, & that His Majesty's entire Conviction

c F *continues*
d S *omits* British
e B *begins*
f BF *end*.

20aN The Fleet brought one Regt & took it back

21bN not a Regt came except the 52 which S S Hood took back with him.

22dN only one Regt arrived in the Fleet and it went back with it.

23kN those never came

24cN S. S. Hood Confirmd all this to Adl Graves and I. told us De Grasse's Fleet was much disabled, & that not above 10 or 12 sail could come to Chesapeak and that Lord Rodney was clearly of the same opinion.

25lN apply to R for confirmation of this.

26cN in proper time and season yes.

27G ni Sir George ni aucune de les Regs sont venues nous joindre [*neither Sir George nor any of the Regiments came to join us*]

that the most valuable part of it may be recovered in this Campaign has excited him to make the utmost Efforts to supply you with a Force fully sufficient for the purpose.[a]

a SMO *stop*

I am glad to hear you have found means of corresponding regularly with General Haldimand, and that every thing continued quiet during the Winter in Canada. The private Accounts I have seen of Ethan Allen's Transactions give me hopes that he is acting under General Haldimand's Directions, and that when the Season admits of the General's sending up a Body of Troops into Vermont, the Inhabitants will declare for the King, which, with [b]the Reduction of the Southern Provinces, must give the Death Wound to the Rebellion notwithstanding any Assistance the french may be able to give it, and if that were the Case, a general Peace would soon follow, and this Country be delivered from the most burthensome and extensive War it was ever engaged in. As so much therefore depends upon Our Successes in America, you cannot be surprized that the Eyes of all the People of England are turned upon you, nor at the Anxiety with which the King, and all His Servants wait for Accounts of your Movements, and as I am most immediately interested of any of them in your Success, you will, I hope, excuse the Earnestness & Frequency of my Exhortations to Decision in Council, & Activity, Vigour & Perseverance, in Execution of His Majesty's Pleasure, which you are now fully informed of.[28]

b SMO *continue as new* ¶

I have communicated to the Lords of the Admiralty your separate Letter of 20th February, & I am sure[c] their Lordships will do every thing in their power to increase the number of Frigates on the American Station, and to strengthen the Squadron,

c MO *insert* that

28G laissez moi donc faire Milord ne me gene pas ne me force pas de suivre les Plans d' autrui [*allow me then to do so, my lord, do not restrain me do not compel me to follow the plans of others*]

that the Admiral may at all times have it in his power to furnish [a]sufficient Convoys[b].[29]

I am[c], Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant
Sir Henry Clinton K.B. GEO: GERMAIN.

a M *reads* different b SMO *end* c VER *end* &ca Geo. Germain

29G il ne mas pas fourni aucun cependant [*he has not furnished me with any however*]

91B: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, NARRATIVE [8] *p* 11.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

One of six extracts under this heading Extracts from Lord George Germain's letters to Sir Henry Clinton: *Begins* May 2, 1781.

This extract from No. 91 *is shown in margin p* 468.

91F: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, NARRATIVE [51] *p* 56.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, dated May 2, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 91 *as shown in margins pp* 465-468.

91S: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 34.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extrait d'une lettre du lord George Germain à Sir Henri Clinton, chevalier du Bain, datée de Whitehall, le 2 may 1781.

This is two parts of No. 91 *as shown in margins pp* 464-470.

91V: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Draft PA 130/623.

Endorsed Dra[t]. to Sir Henry Clinton 2[d] May 1781. (Secret.) 49 Ent[d].

Same as No. 91 *with variations shown in margins pp* 464-470.

91E: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Copy PA 685/217.

In margin Sir Henry Clinton K.B. (Secret.)

Same as No. 91 *with variations shown in margins pp* 464-470.

91R: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Copy SACKVILLE 11/118.

In margin Sir Henry Clinton K.B. (Secret.)

Same as No. 91 *with variations shown in margins pp* 464-470.

91M: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Extract LANSDOWNE 68/7.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall 2[nd] May 1781. In L[d]. G.G. to S[r]. H.C. 2[d] Aug[st] 1781 N°. 78 N°. 49. Ex.

Begins Extract of a Letter from L^d George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated Whitehall 2^nd May 1781.
This is two parts of No. 91 *as shown in margins pp* 464-470.

910: GERMAIN to CLINTON, 2 May 1781, Extract HL No. 49.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Henry Clinton dated Whitehall 2^d May 1781. N° 49.
Begins Extract of a Letter from Lord Geo: Germain to Sir Henry Clinton K.B dated Whitehall 2^d May 1781.
This is two parts of No. 91 *as shown in margins pp* 464-470.

92 BALFOUR TO CLINTON, 6 May 1781, LS RI 19/73.
OBSERVATIONS [97 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*
Endorsed N° 157 Duplicate. Lieut. Col. Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Charles Town May 6^th 1781. received on Sunday Morning, May 20^th 1781, in N° 127 157.
Duplicate. Charles Town May 6^th 1781.

[a]Sir, [b]In my Letters of the 20th & [c]22nd Ultimo, I had the honor to inform Your Excellency, that our Post at Wright's Bluff was invested by the Enemy, & the apprehensions I was, then, under of Camden being in the same situation.[1]

a B *begins*
b F *begins*
c B *reads* 23d

I am now to [d]acquaint you, that the former has since been surrendered; the circumstances which led to this cannot be more fully explained, or with more honor to himself, than by Lieut: M'Kay's Journal of the Siege, which, together with the Articles of Capitulation, I therefore Enclose for Your Excellency's Inspection.[e]

d B *reads* inform

e B *stops*

On the 19^th of last Month General Greene, with about fourteen hundred Continentals, & a Body of Militia, came before Camden, where he continued,

1c had you done Lord Cornwallis the honour also to inform his Lordship of these Circumstances, as was your duty. His Lordship would not have deserted you & gone to Virginia.

changing his Positions, 'till the 25th; in the Morning of which Lord Rawdon, with the greater part of his Garrison, upwards of Eight hundred, marched out, & about ten O'Clock attacked him in his Camp at Hobkirk's Hill, with that Conduct & Spirit which claimed the Victory he gained, tho' long contested & against superior Numbers, especially of Cavalry, the Enemy's advantage in which hindered the Pursuit being continued further than three Miles, & enabled them to take off their Cannon, which they at first, preserved by drawing out of the Road, into Thickets, where they escaped the Troops, eager in pursuit of the flying Rebels.

To this decided Line of Conduct, which has produced the best Effects, Lord Rawdon was induced by knowing, that General Greene was in expectation of Reinforcements, which in a day or two must arrive, & that he had Detached to bring forward his Supplies, an Occasion which His Lordship's Abilities & zeal did not fail to embrace.

The Enemy's Loss on this Occasion is estimated, by Lord Rawdon, at about five hundred; his own appears, from the Returns, as he informs me, two hundred & twenty, in which number is one Officer killed & eleven wounded, but not dangerously.

The consequences of this Defeat of the Rebel Army gave Lord Rawdon an opportunity of drawing from the Country a Supply of Provisions, of which he was in want, & obliged Greene immediately to retire to Rugeley's where he was joined by the Corps under Brigadier Marrian & Colonel Lee, & from whence he has since moved, but I have not yet learnt in what direction.

[a] B *continues* [a]By to-morrow, I am in hopes, Lord Rawdon will be Re-inforced by Lieut.-Colonel Watson, with his Corps & the 64th Regiment.

[b] B *reads* Lord Rawdon's [b]But notwithstanding this brilliant Success I must inform Your Excellency, that the general State of the Country is most distressing, that the Enemy's

Parties are every where, the communication, by land, [a]with Savannah no longer exists, Colonel Brown is Invested at Augusta, & Colonel Cruger in the most critical Situation at Ninety Six, nearly confined to his Works, & without any present Command over that Country.[2] Indeed I should betray the Duty I owe Your Excellency, did I not represent the Defection of this Province so universal, that I know of no mode short of depopulation, to retain it.[b]

a F *reads* to

b B *runs on*

This Spirit of Revolt is, in [c]some measure, kept up by the many Officers Prisoners of War here; & I should therefore think it advisable to remove them, as well as to make the most striking Examples of such as, having taken Protection, snatch every occasion to rise in arms against us.[3]

c B *reads* a great

I have the honor[d] to be, Sir, Your Excellency's Most obedient humble Servant N. BALFOUR.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c &c &c

d B *ends* &c (Signed) W. Balfour
E *ends* &c (Signed) N. Balfour

2c If such the prospects after Lord Rawdons Victory what would it have been had he been defeated My good Ld Cornwallis reflect !!!

3a does not all this information which was of course sent to Lord Cornwallis turn his attention towards the Carolinas.

92B: BALFOUR to CLINTON, 6 May, OBSERVATIONS [97 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Copy.—From Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Charles-town, May 6, 1781.

This is two parts of No. 92 *as shown in margins pp* 471-473.

92F: BALFOUR to CLINTON, 6 May 1781, Extract PA 140-253.

One of two extracts under this endorsement Copies and Extracts of Letters from Lieut Colonel Balfour to H. E. Sir H. Clinton Received 20th May In Sir Henry Clintons N° 127[e].

With this general heading Extracts of Letters from Lieut Colonel Balfour to His Excellʸ Sir H. Clinton K.B. Received the 20th of May 1781

Begins May 6th

e No. 94 *p* 474

Same as No. 92 *with variations shown in margins pp* 471-473.

93 CLINTON TO PHILLIPS, 11 May [1781], ANSWER [111] *p* 87.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated May 11.

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 24.]

Dear Phillips, I was in hopes that the fleet would have sailed long since, but although the Admiral dates his letter the 10th,[1] off Sandy Hook, I fear he is still within.[2,3]

Report says that the French had not sailed from Rhode-Island a few days ago, they might, however, have sailed yesterday: the only news we have is a riot at Philadelphia, and all paper-money refused in payment; it works finely.

No news from Lord Cornwallis since his letter of the 10th of April.

Washington some days since called in Burgoyne; by a letter from him this day, that is countermanded or suspended; their councils seem a little unsettled, —it is reported and believed, that the French troops are to join Washington, and are now on their route. I am, &c. H. CLINTON.

Lord Chewton sailed three days since for Lord Cornwallis.

1d 10th, *underlined.*

2a tis really very illiberal in Lord Cornwallis thus to publish these private letters. to what purpose except to occasion altercation between the Admiral and I.

3d within *underlined.*

94 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 20 May 1781, LS PA 140/247.
NARRATIVE [109] *p* 58, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Endorsed New York, 20th May 1781. Sir Henry
a No. 79 F: *p* 419 Clinton N° 127. R/ 23d June. 1 Inclosure[a]. Entd.
No. 92 F: *p* 473 N° 127. New York May 20th 1781
see also ii. 372 [b]My Lord, The Packet being still detained at
b F *begins* Sandy Hook by contrary Winds, affords me an opportunity of transmitting to Your Lordship, Extracts of some Letters which I have this instant

received from Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour, and will inform Your Lordship of Lord Rawdon's having attacked the Rebel Corps under General Green, on the 25[th] Ultimo, and gained a considerable advantage.

[a]But should Lord Cornwallis persist in his intention of joining Major General Phillips, as mentioned in his [b]Lordship's Letter to that General Officer, [c]a Copy of which was inclosed in my last Dispatch, I shall be under some apprehensions[1] for every part of South Carolina,[2] except Charlestown,[3·4·5] and even for Georgia, unless the Speedy arrival of the Reinforcement[6] expected from Europe, may enable the Officer Commanding in South Carolina, to take Post in force in some healthy Station in the back Country[d].[7·8]

I have the honor to be With the greatest Respect Your Lordship's Most obedient and Most humble Servant H. CLINTON.

Right Hon[ble] Lord George Germain.

a B *begins*

b B *omits* Lordship's

c B *omits to* Dispatch

d BF *end* I am &c H. Clinton

1a I could have no apprehensions for Charles Town then as I did not know that part of the works had been thrown down and the Place open and exposed and L. Cornwallis had assured me it was safe. Tarlton reports it open and exposed in January. Col. Balfour to L. Corn. the 6[th] of April by Maj Benson, & Lord Rawdon to L. Cornwallis 20[th] may. how his Lordp came to think it so safe on the 23[d] April I am at a loss to guess.

2c South Carolina *underlined*.

3fiklmnopqrs read Balfours letter to Lord Rawdon in may, & then see what risk even Charles Town run.

4c Charles-town *underlined*.

5i nor can I doubt as it was his duty that he reported this to Lord Cornwallis also before his Lordship marched into Virginia.

6c 1500.

7b L. C. himself expects to lose every thing out of C. Town. Balfour in its open and dismantled state trembles for that, L. C. corps risked much by his own acct & Phillips was certainly exposed at Petersberg.

8c I did not then know what I now do. that C. Town was open when Lord Corwallis marched into Virginia.

94B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 20 May 1781, NARRATIVE [109] *p* 58.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

One of two extracts under this heading Extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain, May 20, 1781.

This extract from No. 94 *is shown in margin p* 475.

94F: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 20 May 1781, Copy PA 309/122.
In margin New York 20th May 1781. Sir Henry Clinton N°. 127. Rd. 23d June.
Mem. at end Inclosure. Copies & Extracts of Letters from Lt. Colonel Balfour to Sir Henry Clinton.
Same as No. 94 *with variations shown in margins pp* 474-475.

95 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 20 May 1781, LS RI 19/86.
ANSWER [64] *p* 86.
With Clinton's MS. Notes from ANSWER *and* TARLETON.
Endorsed Duplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton K.B. Petersburg 20th May 1781. N° 162.

a VE *read* Copy
b BFS *begin*

[a]Duplicate Petersburgh 20th May 1781.
[b]Sir, You will easily conceive how sensible an Affliction it was to me, on entering this province, to receive an account of the death of my friend General Phillips, whose loss, I cannot sufficiently lament, from personal or publick considerations.

The Corps which I brought from North Carolina, arrived here this morning. The information conveyed by your Excellency to General Arnold, relative to the probable movements of the French Armament,[1] restrains me at present, from any material offensive operations; but as soon as I can hear any satisfactory

c BFE *read* accounts

[c]account of the two Fleets, I will endeavour to make the best use in my power, of the Troops under my command.[2] General Arnold being of opinion, that Portsmouth, with its present Garrison, is secure against a Coup de main; I would wish to avoid making a precipitate movement towards that place, without absolute necessity, because it would lessen our reputation in this province,[3] but I have sent to assure the Commanding Officer, that I will do every

1T and which he might have received at Willmington had Col. Balfour so pleased. and would have prevented his coming into Virginia.

2aA the same uncertainty should have prevented his going into Virginia.

3aA I fear my good Lord you have already lost it by going there at such a season.

thing I can, to relieve him, in case the French should attack the post.[a]

a BF *run on*

La Fayette is at Wilton, on the other side of James River, not far from Richmond. I have not heard that Wayne has yet joined him.

It is with infinite satisfaction that I inclose to your Excellency, copies of two Letters from Lord Rawdon, which [b]have relieved me from the most cruel anxieties. His Lordship's great abilities, courage, & firmness of mind, cannot be sufficiently admired and applauded.[c]

b F *reads* has

c BF *run on*

There is now great reason to hope that we shall meet with no serious misfortune in that province; if however Gen[l] Greene should persevere in carrying on offensive Operations against it, we must, I think, abandon Camden, & probably Ninety-six, and limit our defence to the Congaree & the Santee; this will [d]only be giving up two bad posts, which it is difficult to supply with provisions, & quitting a part of the Country, which for some months past, we have not really possessed.

d BFE *read* be only

I have taken every means to inform Major Craig, of my having passed the Roanoke, on which event, it was previously concerted between us, that he should fall down to Bald Head,[4] & from thence proceed to Charles-town, as soon as Transports arrive to carry him.[e]

e S *ends* J'ai l'honneur d'être &c. Signée Cornwallis VE *stop*

The Legion being in the utmost distress, for want of Arms, Clothing, Boots, & indeed appointments of all kinds, I must beg that your Excellency will be pleased to direct the Inspector General, to forward a Supply of every article with the greatest dispatch.

[f]I have the honour to be[g], with great respect, Sir, Your most obedient & most humble Servant

f VE *continue*
g BF *end* &c Cornwallis
h VE *insert* (Signed)

[h]Cornwallis.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. &c &c &c

4a A so far from falling back, major Craig kept the Post long after Lord Cornwallis' surrender.

95B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 20 May 1781, ANSWER [64] *p* 86.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Petersburgh, in Virginia, 20th May, 1781.

Same as No. 95 *with variations shown in margins pp* 476-477.

95F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 20 May 1781, TARLETON *p* 340.
With Clinton's Manuscript Note.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Petersburg, in Virginia, 20th May, 1781.

Same as No. 95 *with variations shown in margins pp* 476-477.

95S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 20 May 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 120.

Copie d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis, à Sir Henri Clinton, chevalier du Bain, Petersburgh le 20 mai 1781.

Same as No. 95 *with variations shown in margins pp* 476-477.

95V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 20 May 1781, Copy PA 140/319.

Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. Petersburg 20th May 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's (No 130) of 9 June 1781.[a] (1) 62. E.

[a] *see* ii. 374

This extract from No. 95 *is shown in margins pp* 476-477.

95E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 20 May 1781, Copy HL No 62.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.

Endorsed Copy. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton KB Petersburg 20th May 1781. Transmitted to Ld Geo. Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 9th June 1781 (1) R/ 12th July No 62

This extract from No. 95 *is shown in margins pp* 476-477.

96 CLINTON TO GERMAIN, 22 May 1781, LS PA 140/259.
NARRATIVE [109] *p* 58, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes.*

Endorsed New York 22d May 1781 Sir Henry Clinton No 128 R/23d June 3 Inclosures[a] Entd.

[a] No. 80M: *p* 423 No. 818: *p* 425 No. 82 E: *p* 427

[b] No 128. New York May 22d 1781

[c] My Lord, Since [d] the closing my Dispatch No 127, I have received, by way of Charles Town, two Letters from Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, of

[b] S *begins*
[c] F *begins*
[d] S *omits* the

which I have the Honor to inclose Copies for Your Lordship's Information. And as his Lordship has transmitted to me Copies of his Dispatches to your Lordship, I think it right also to inclose one of a Letter he wrote to You on the 23[d] Ultimo, lest any Accident [a]may delay the Arrival of the Original.

[b]Notwithstanding the Purport of these Letters, I am yet in Hopes (from Lord Cornwallis's[c] to me of the 24[h]) that his Lordship will not persist in attempting a Junction with Major General Phillips ; as I am apprehensive it may be attended with some Risk, not only to his own Corps, but to that[1] of General Phillips,[2] should that General Officer not have been joined in Time by the Reinforcement[3] I have sent him. And I even have my Doubts whether his Lordships March to the Northward will draw after him (as he expects) the Rebel General Green,[4] who I fear will endeavor either to invest Camden, or by [d]placing himself between that Place & Charlestown render Lord Rawdon's Situation very hazardous.[e5]

I am therefore induced to flatter myself that Lord Cornwallis, when he hears of Lord Rawdon's Success against Green, will rather march into South Carolina, either by the direct Route of Cross Creek, and Camden, or by that of Georgetown,[6] or even by Embarkation (tho' he should be obliged to leave his Cavalry[7] behind untill Vessels can be sent for them) than attempt the proposed Junction with General Phillips in the Way he mentions[8]; which, I must freely own, appears to me, for the Reasons I have stated, not only dangerous to both Corps in the

a S *reads* should
b B *begins*
c BS *insert* letter
d B *reads* stationing
e B *runs on*

1c that *underlined.*
2c General Phillips *underlined.*
3c reinforcement *underlined.*
4fiklmnopqrs It turned out exactly so.
5b it did not but if it had it might have been to his or P. distraction he marched against Campden, but was beat
6c there is no doubt he might have marched the whole to S. Carolina by way of Wagamaw.
7c cavalry *underlined.*
8b tis presumed this letter convinced L. G. G. of the folly of this Virg. expedition, & occasioned his letters of 7 & 14 July. page.

Attempt, but replete with the worst Consequences to our Southern [a]Possessions, in their present State.[b9]

I have the Honor to be[c] With the greatest Respect, Your Lordship's Most Obedient & Most humble Servant H CLINTON

Right Hon[ble] Lord George Germain

a B *reads* Provinces
b B *ends* F *ends* I am &c H. Clinton
c S *ends* &c (Signed) H. Clinton

9c the above letter, with other Information & opinions that L. C. Plan was dangerous turned the Cabinet and induced them to reapprove my Plan alas too late.

96B: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 22 May 1781, NARRATIVE [109] *p* 58.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

One of two extracts under this heading Extracts from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain, May. 22.

This extract from No. 96 *is shown in margins pp* 479-480.

96F: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 22 May 1781, Copy PA 309/123.

In margin New York 22[d] May 1781. Sir Henry Clinton N° 128. R[d] 23[d] June.

Mem. at end Inclosures N° 1 Copy of a Dispatch N° 11 from Earl Cornwallis to Lord George Germain. 23[d] Ap[l] 1781. 2. Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton 23[d] Ap[l] 1781. 3. Copy of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton 24[th] Ap[l] 1781.

Same as No. 96 *with variations shown in margins pp* 478-480.

96S: CLINTON to GERMAIN, 22 May 1781, Copy RI 22/106.
Same as No. 96 *with variations shown in margins pp* 478-480.

---

97 RAWDON to CORNWALLIS, 24 May 1781, Copy PA 140/427.
OBSERVATIONS [91 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, *with Clinton's MS. Notes.*

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to Lieu[t] General the Earl Cornwallis dated, Camp at Monks Corner 24[th] May 1781. rec[d] at New York by Sir H. C. the 26[th] June ℔ the Warwick In Sir Henry Clintons N° 131[a]. 2.

a *see* II. 376
b V *begins*
c S *begins*

[b]Copy. Camp at Monks Corner 24[th] May 1781.

My Lord, [c]The Situation of Affairs in this Province has made me judge it necessary for a Time, to

withdraw my Force from the Back Country, and to assemble what Troops I can collect at this Point. I hope a recital of the Circumstances which have led to this determination, will satisfy your Lordship as to the Expediency of the Measure.

After the Action [a]on the 25th April, (an account of which I had the honor of transmitting to your Lordship) Major General Greene remained for some days behind the farthest Branch of Granny's-Quarter Creek.[b]

[a] S *reads* of the 25th of

[b] S *runs on*

A second Attempt upon his Army could not in that Situation be undertaken upon the Principles which advised the former. In the first instance I made so short an Excursion from my Works that I could venture without Hazard to leave them very slightly guarded; and I had the Confidence that had fortune proved unfavorable, we should easily have made good our Retreat, and our loss in all probability would not have disabled us from the further Defence of the Place. To get at General Greene in his retired Situation, I must have made a very extensive Circuit in order to head the Creek; which wou'd have presented to him the fairest Opportunity of slipping by me to Camden: And he was still so superior to me in numbers, that had I left such a Garrison at my Post as might enable it to stand an Assault, my Force in the Field would have been totally unequal to Cope with the Enemy's Army. I had much to hope from the Arrival of [c]Reinforcement to me; and little to fear from any probable Addition to my Antagonists Force.

[c] S *reads* reinforcements

Whilst upon that Principle I waited for my expected Succours, Gen[l] Greene retired from our Front, and crossing the Wateree took a position behind Twenty five Mile Creek. On the 7th of May, Lieu[t] Colonel Watson joined me with his Detachment, much reduced in Number, thro' Casualties, Sickness and a Reinforcement which he had left to strengthen the Garrison at Georgetown. [d]He had

[d] V *new* ¶

crossed the Santee near its Mouth & had recrossed it
[a] S *stops* a little below the Entrance of the Congaree.[a]

By him I received the unwelcome intelligence that the whole interior Country had revolted, and that Marion & Lee (after reducing a small Post where Lieut Col Watson kept his Baggage at Wright's Bluff), had crossed the Santee to support the Insurgents upon the same Night which he passed it to join me. Information reached me the same day, that the Post at Motte's House near the Mouth of the Congaree was invested and Batteries opened against it. I had been long sensible of the necessity for my retiring within the Santee; but whilst Lee and Marion were in a Situation to retard my March in front, at the same Time that my Rear was exposed to Greene, I conceived it impracticable without the disgrace of abandoning my Stores and particularly my Wounded
[b] V *runs on* at Camden.[b]

The Measure even now could only be effected at Neilson's Ferry which was Sixty Miles from me.

I determined to undertake it immediately, but I thought it first requisite to attempt reaping some Advantage from the additional Strength which I had received.

[c] S *continues* [c]On the Night of the 7th I crossed the Wateree at Camden Ferry, proposing to turn the Flank and attack the Rear of Greene's Army, where the Ground was not strong, tho' it was very much so in Front.

The Troops had scarcely crossed the River when I received Notice that Greene had moved early in the
[d] S *reads* information Evening, upon getting [d]intimation of my being reinforced. I followed him by the direct Road, & found him posted behind Sawney's Creek.

Having driven in his Picquets, I examined every point of his Situation. I found it every where so strong, that I could not hope to force it without suffering such Loss, as must have crippled my Force for any future Enterprize, and the retreat lay so open
[e] S *omits* that for him, [e]that I could not hope that Victory would

give us any Advantage sufficiently decisive to counterbalance the Loss.

The Creek (tho' slightly marked in the Maps) runs very high into the Country. Had I attempted to get round him he would have evaded me with ease; for as his Numbers still exceeded mine, I could not separate my force to fix him in any point, and Time (at this Juncture most important to me) would have been thus unprofitably wasted. I therefore returned to Camden the same Afternoon, after having in vain attempted to decoy the Enemy into Action by affecting to conceal our Retreat.

On the 9th I published to the Troops and to the Militia my design of evacuating Camden, offering to such of the latter as chose to accompany me, every Assistance that we could afford them. During the ensuing Night I sent off all our Baggage &c under a strong Escort and destroyed the Works, remaining at Camden with the rest of the Troops till 10 o'Clock the next day in order to cover the March.

On the Night of the 13th I began to pass the River at [a]Neilson's Ferry, & by the Evening of the 14th, every Thing was safely across. Some mounted Militia had attempted to harrass our Rear Guard on the March, but a party of them having fallen into an Ambuscade, the rest of them gave us no further Trouble. We brought off all the Sick & Wounded excepting about thirty, who were too ill to be moved; and for them I left an equal Number of Continental Prisoners in Exchange. We brought off all the Stores of any kind of Value, destroying the rest; and we brought off, not only the Militia who had been with us [b]in Camden, but also all the well affected Neighbours on our Route together with the Wives, Children, Negroes and Baggage of almost all of them.

[a] S *reads* Nelson's

[b] S *reads* at

My first News upon landing at [c]Neilson's was that the Post at Motte's House had fallen. It was a simple Redoubt, & had been attacked formally by Sap. Lieut McPherson had maintained it gallantly,

[c] S *reads* Nelson's

till the House in the Centre of it was set in Flames by fire Arrows, which obliged his Men to throw themselves into the Ditch, & surrender at discretion[a]; the Stroke was heavy upon me, as all the Provisions had been forwarded from Neilsons to that Post, for the Supply of Camden.

a S *stops*

b BF *begin*
c BF *read* Nelson's
d F *inserts* and
e B *italics to* Instances (6 *lines*)
f BF *read* its
g BF *read* defection
h BF *read* thence
i BF *end*
k S *continues as new* ¶

[b]Lieu[t] Col[l] Balfour was so good as to meet me at [c]Neilsons. He took this Measure that he might represent his Circumstances to me. He stated that the Revolt was universal, [d]that, from the little reason to apprehend this serious invasion* [e]the old Works of Charlestown had been in part levelled[1·2·3] to make way for new Ones, which were not yet constructed, that [f]his Garrison was inadequate to oppose any Force of consequence, and that the [g]disaffection of the Towns People shewed itself in a thousand Instances. I agreed with him in the Conclusion to be drawn from [h]hence, that any Misfortune happening to my Corps might entail the Loss of the Province[i].[4·5·6] [k]But as Major M[c]Arthur had joined me with near 300 Foot and 80 Dragoons, I conceived I might without hazarding too far, endeavour to check the Enemy's Operations on the Congaree. On the 14[th] at Night

* [*From Observations*] It is presumable that Colonel Balfour likewise communicated this material information to Lord Cornwallis.

1c N.B. it was done by L. C. order in Janry 81.

2d this also C. Balfour of course told Lord Cornwallis if so how could his Lordship say that C. Town was in no immediate danger page 94.

3a By Tarlton. It appears that such had been the exposed state of C. Town from January to 24[th] May, there cannot be the least doubt but that the Commandant *Col. Balfour* had reported this to Lord Cornwallis as well as to Lord Rawdon if he did not he is highly Reprehensible.

4a This information I must suppose in Justice to Col. Balfour was sent to your Lordship but still alas without Effect.

5c The same conclusion L. Cornwallis must have drawn on receiving the above information, he therefore disobey'd orders in not going to C. Town immediately.

6c what Col. Balfour reported to Lord Rawdon it was his duty & there can be no doubt but he had reported to Lord Cornwallis; how then could his Lordship after such report say that Charles Town was in no danger, or neglect going there by Waggamaw to secure it.

I marched from [a]Neilsons and on the Evening of the 15th I reached the Point, where the Roads from [b]Congaree & McCoards Ferry unite. Various Information was brought to me thither [c]by Spies whom I had detached, that Greene had passed the Congaree at McCord's Ferry and had pushed down the Orangeburgh Road. The Accounts, tho' none of them positive or singly satisfactory, corresponded so much that I was led to believe them, and the matter was of such moment that it would not admit of my pausing for more certain Information; therefore after giving the Troops a little Rest I moved back to Eutaws the same Night, but hearing nothing there I pursued my March hither.[d]

a S *reads* Nelson's

b S *reads* Congarees

c S *omits to* detached

d S *stops*

I had been five Days within the Santee before a single Man of the Country came near me. My first Intelligence on this Ground was that it had been only Sumpter with his Corps who had marched to Orangeburgh, & that Greene had marched to Congarees, when the Post, (unable to oppose such Force) had been surrendered to him on the 14th.

I dispatched Emissaries immediately to Ninety Six, directing Lieut Col Cruger to retire to Augusta, and I desired Lieut Col Balfour to forward the same Order by different Routes.

Should Lieut Col Cruger not have received this Order I fear his Situation will be dangerous. I did not think it practicable to assist him, without running hazards which I judged the general State of the Province would not allow. Besides I had no deposit of Provisions left on the Frontier, and as to the Expectation of gleaning them as I advanced in a wasted country and surrounded as I shou'd have been by a swarm of Light Troops and mounted Militia; I conceived that my whole Force must have been so employed in procuring its daily Subsistence, that little else could have been effected with it.

[e]By my present [f]position I cover those Districts from which Charles Town draws its [g]principal Supplies; I

e S *continues*

f S *reads* situation

g S *reads* present

am in readiness to improve any favorable Occurrence,
[a] S *omits* I — and [a]I guard against any untoward Event.

It is a secondary but not a trifling advantage, that I have been able to supply the Troops with Necessaries; for the want of which (occasioned by the long
[b] S *reads* communication — Interruption of our [b]Communications) they suffered serious Distress.

I am using every Effort to augment our Cavalry; in
[c] S *omits to* Danger — hopes that the Arrival of some force [c]which may put Charles Town out of Danger, will speedily enable us
[d] S *ends* — to adopt a more active Conduct.[d]

But the plundering parties of the Enemy have so stripped the Country of Horses, and there is such difficulty in getting Swords and other Appointments made at Charlestown, that I get on but slowly in this undertaking.

I have the Honor to be with great Respect Your Lordships Most obedient & affectionate Servant

Signed RAWDON.

[e] V *ends* — Lieu[t] General Earl Cornwallis &c. &c. &c.[e]

97B: RAWDON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [91 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, May 24, 1781.

This extract from No. 97 *is shown in margin p* 484.

97F: RAWDON to CORNWALLIS, 24 May 1781, TARLETON *p* 328.

Extract. From Lord Rawdon to Earl Cornwallis. dated May 24, 1781.

This extract from No. 97 *is shown in margin p* 484.

97S: RAWDON to CORNWALLIS, 24 May 1781, TARLETON *p* 475.

Extract of a letter from Lord Rawdon to Earl Cornwallis, dated camp at Monk's corner, May 24, 1781.

This is four parts of No. 97 *as shown in margins pp* 480-486.

97V: RAWDON to CORNWALLIS, 24 May 1781, Copy PA 606/179.

Endorsed Copy of a Letter from Lord Rawdon to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis May 24th 1781.

Same as No. 97 *with variations shown in margins pp* 480-486.

98 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 26 May 1781, ANSWER [79] *p* 86.
Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Byrd's Plantation, James River, May 26, 1781.

Sir, I have consented to the request of Brigadier-general Arnold to go to New York; he conceives that your Excellency wishes him to attend you there, and his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of service. He will represent the horrid enormities which are committed by our privateers in Chesapeak-bay; and I must join my earnest wish, that some remedy may be applied to an evil which is so very prejudicial to his Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, &c. CORNWALLIS.

99 CORNWALLIS TO CLINTON, 26 May 1781, LS RI 19/94.
ANSWER [80] *p* 87, OBSERVATIONS [105 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, REPLY [13] *p* 143 *and* [76] *p* 170, *with Clinton's MS. Notes from each, also from* GERMAIN.

Endorsed Duplicate. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton KB. Byrd's Plantation North of James River 26th May 1781. Received by the Charon Man of War. N° 167.

[a]Duplicate [b]Byrd's Plantation, North of James River. 26 May 1781.[1·2]

[c]Sir. The Reinforcement is safely arrived in James River, and I opened all your dispatches to poor Phillips, marked [d]*On His Majesty's Service*[e].[3·4]

[f]I hope that your Excellency has received my Letters from Wilmington, and one of the 20th from Petersburgh; as the latter went by an uncertain conveyance, I send a duplicate of it.

[g]The arrival of the reinforcement, has made me easy about Portsmouth, for the present, I have sent General Leslie thither[5·6] with the 17th Regt and the

a OTC *read* Copy
b M *begins*
c BRN *begin*
d M *reads* in
e N *stops*
f V *begins*
g F *begins* Sir
E *begins*
N *continues*

1R read in H. of Lords the whole of it.
2R why not the whole of this letter
3aA not only such my good Lord but private, & published them also.
4dA These my good Lord you did right to publish but why that of the 30 April "*Secret & most private*" page 105. ! ! !
5cO with private orders to prepare to evacuate

a E *omits* Regiment
b BE *run on*

two Battalions of Anspach, keeping the 43d [a]Regiment with the Army.[b]

c V *reads* magazine
d V *omits* for

I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light Troops to destroy any [c]Magazines or Stores in the Neighbourhood, which may have been collected, either for his use or [d]for General Greene's Army, From thence I purpose to move to the Neck at Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, & where some subsistence may be procured, and keep myself unengaged from operations, which might interfere[7] with your plan for the Campaign,[8·9·10·11] untill I have the Satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information, than has hitherto been in my power to procure, relative to a proper harbour, & place of Arms: At present I am inclined[12] to think well[13·14] of York[e15·16]: The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong, without an Army to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy, and can give no protection to a Ship of the Line. Wayne has not yet joined La Fayette, nor can I positively learn where [f]he is, [g]nor what is his force. Greene's Cavalry are said to be coming this way, but I have no certain accounts of it.[h]

e V *ends*

f O *omits* he
g FONT *read* or

h E *ends* M *runs on*
i S *begins*
k S *reads* General
l FSMOTC *read* opinions
m SRC *omit* to proposal
n F *leaves blank* N *n italics*

[i]Your Excellency desires [k]Generals Phillips & Arnold to give you their [l]opinion [m]relative to M[r] [n]*Alexander's* proposal; As General Arnold goes to New York by the first safe conveyance, you will have an opportunity

6cO thither *underlined.*

7dO might interfere *underlined.*

8dO your *to* campaign *underlined.*

9aA I wish this had occurred to you before you marched into Virginia

10dO It will be observed that his Lordship had already broke in upon my plan by coming into Vira. & advising the Cabinet to adopt solid operation there—

11bO keeps himself disengaged & when he receives my instructions does not pay the least attention to them—

12G je suis porté *underlined.*

13cO think well *underlined.*

14G bien penser de York *underlined.*

15dA does not this imply that York has not these defects.

16aO it will be observed that His lordship from the information he had received thought well of York.

of hearing his sentiments in person; [a]Experience has made me less sanguine, and more Arrangements seem to me necessary, for [b]so important an expedition, than [c]appear to occur to General Arnold.[d]

M^r [e]*Alexander's* conversations bear too [f]strong a resemblance to those of the emissaries from North Carolina, to give me much confidence, and from the experience I have had, and[g] dangers I have undergone, one maxim appears to me to be absolutely necessary for the safe & honourable conduct of this War, which is, that we should have as few posts as possible, & that wherever the King's Troops are, they should be in respectable force[17]; By the vigorous exertions of the present Governors of America, large Bodies of men are soon collected, and I have too often observed, that when a Storm threatens, our friends disappear.[h]

In regard to taking possession of Philadelphia by an incursion,[18] (even if practicable) without an intention of keeping or burning it, (neither of which appear to be adviseable) I should apprehend, it would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain.

[i]I shall take the liberty of repeating, that if offensive War is intended, Virginia appears to me, [k]to be the only Province, in which it can be carried on, and in which there is a Stake; But to reduce the Province & keep possession of the Country, a considerable Army would be necessary, for with a small force, the business would probably terminate unfavourably, tho' the beginning might be successfull.[l] In [m]case it is thought expedient, & a proper Army for the attempt can be [n]formed, [o]I hope your Excellency will do me the justice to believe, that I neither [p]wish nor expect to have the command of it, leaving you at New York on the defensive, such sentiments are so far from my heart, that I can with great truth assure

a B *new* ¶ S *italics to* Arnold
b SOTC *read* such an
c F *reads* appears
d SRC *stop*
e F *leaves blank* N *not italics*
f FONT *read* great
g BFMONT *insert* the
h N *runs on*
i C *continues* SR *continue* I take
k N *omits* to be
l N *stops*
m S *italics* in case
n S *reads* found
o S *italics to* of it (3 *lines*)
p S *small capitals* wish

17dA why then force new operation in Virginia
18aA all the Rebel Trade lay then at Philadelphia that Infant Bank, & Burgoynes Army.

you, that few things could give me greater pleasure, than being relieved by your presence, from a situation of so much anxiety & responsibility.

a N *continues*
b M *reads* 21st

[a]By my Letter of the [b]20th, your Excellency will observe, that instead of thinking it possible to do anything in North Carolina,[19] I am of opinion that it is doubtfull, whether we can keep the posts in the back [c]part of South Carolina, and I believe[d] I have stated in former letters, the infinite difficulty of protecting a frontier of three hundred miles, against a persevering Enemy, in a country where we have no water communication, and where few of the Inhabitants are active or usefull friends.[e]

c FSN *read* parts
d M *inserts* that
e N *ends*

In enumerating the Corps employ'd in the southern district, Your Excellency will recollect that they are all very weak, and that some of the British as well as provincial Regiments, retain nothing but the Name. [f]Our weakness at Guildford was not owing to any detachment, unless that with the Baggage,[g] but to [h]our losses by action, Sickness[20·21·22·23·24] [i]&c[a] during the Winter's Campaign.[k]

f B *new* ¶
g S *italics to* Campaign
h FSOTC *omit* our
i S *reads* and
k FSROTO *end*

I saw with concern, that You thought Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour had acted injudiciously, in sending home some Transports; that business has, I apprehend, been misrepresented by persons, interested in retaining rotten Vessels in the Service of Government; The circumstances I do not now perfectly recollect, but I believe you will find, that the Ships sent home, were either Victuallers, which the Treasury desired in the strongest manner, or Transports, which were so exceedingly bad, that they could never have gone out with safety, after a stay of three months in Charlestown harbour; Whatever was [l]done in it, was

l M *omits* done

19aA all this should have been known before you forced open in N. Carolina.

20aA & you may add desertion.

21dA desertion &c. &c.

22bA by desertion, maurauding &c &c in that same Tartar march he passed 3300. he had 1300 at Guildford.

23cO among the &cs desertion marauders killed by friends & foes.

24G et désertions [*and desertions*]

with my approbation at the time, appearing evidently for the good of the Service, I therefore think it my duty to exculpate Lieu[t] Colonel Balfour, whom I have found on all occasions, a most zealous, intelligent, and deserving Officer.

Colonel Robinson's Corps is so weak & deserts so fast, that at the recommendation of General Arnold, I have consented that it shall return in the Transports to New York.

I have the honour to be[a] with [b]great respect Sir Your most obedient & most humble Servant

CORNWALLIS.

His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton KB &c[a] &c[a] &c[a][c]

a B *ends* &c. Cornwallis
b M *reads* the greatest
c M *ends*

99B: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, ANSWER [80] *p* 87.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Byrd's Plantation, North of James River, 26th of May, 1781.

Same as No. 99 *with variations shown in margins pp* 487-491.

99F: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, OBSERVATIONS [105 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Bird's Plantation, North of James-river, May 26, 1781.

This extract from No. 99 *is shown in margins pp* 487-491.

99S: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, REPLY [13] *p* 143.
This is two parts of No. 99 *as shown in margins pp* 488-490.

99V: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, REPLY [76] *p* 170.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated at Bird's Plantation, North of James River, 26th May, 1781.

This extract from No. 99 *is shown in margins pp* 487-488.

99E: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, TARLETON *p* 343.

Copy. From Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. dated Byrd's plantation, north of James river, 26th of May, 1781.

This extract from No. 99 *is shown in margins pp* 487-488.

99R: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 122.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.
Extrait d'une lettre du comte Cornwallis à Sir Henri Clinton, chevalier du Bain, datée de la plantation de Byrd, au nord de la rivière de James, le 26 mai 1781.
This is two parts of No. 99 *as shown in margins pp* 487-490.

99M: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May, Copy LANSDOWNE 68/19.
One of eight letters under this endorsement Copies of Letters between Sir H^y^ Clinton Earl Cornwallis L Gen^l^. Phillips relative to the Operations of the Southern army April May June 1781.
Same as No. 99 *with variations shown in margins pp* 487-491.

990: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, Extract PA 140/327.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton KB dated at Byrd's Plantation North of James River 26^th^ May 1781. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's (N° 130) of 9 June 1781.[a] (3.) 64. E.
a *see* ii. 374
This extract from No. 99 *is shown in margins pp* 487-490.

99N: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, Extract PA 140/568.
One of twelve extracts under this endorsement Extracts from the Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak & an Expedition against Philadelphia. (11) In Sir Henry Clinton's Letter of the 13^th^ July.[b] 90.
b *see* ii. 378
With this general heading Extracts from the Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak and an Expedition against Philadelphia &ce.
Begins Extract. Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Byrds Plantation North of James River 26^th^ May 1781 Received 9^th^ June.
This is two parts of No. 99 *as shown in margins pp* 487-490.

99T: CORNWALLIS to CLINTON, 26 May 1781, Extract PA 589/136.
Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir H: Clinton dated at Byrd's Plantation North of James River 26^th^ May 1781.
This extract from No. 99 *is shown in margins pp* 487-490.

99c: Cornwallis to Clinton, 26 May 1781, Extract HL No 64.

Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.

Endorsed Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton K.B. dated at Byrd's Plantation North of James River 26th May 1781. Transmitted to L[d] Geo: Germain In Sir H[y] Clinton's of 9th June 1781 (3). R/ 12th July No 64.

This is two parts of No. 99 as shown in margins pp 487-490.

100 CLINTON TO CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, ANSWER [67] *p* 86.

ANSWER [67] *p* 86, OBSERVATIONS [99 *Ap'x*] *p* 131, *with Clinton's Manuscript Notes from each.*

Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated [a]New-York, May 29th, 1781.

[b][Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. Macpherson.]

[c]My Lord, [1]I had the honour of writing to your Lordship by Lord Chewton, who sailed from hence in the Richmond the 4th instant, to join you at Wilmington; but your Lordship's departure from thence will have prevented his meeting you there, and I hope he has since then joined you in the Chesapeak.

[d]When I first heard of your Lordship's retreat from Cross Creek to Wilmington,[2] I confess that I was in hopes[e] you had reason to consider Greene so totally [f]*hors de combat* as to be perfectly at ease for Lord Rawdon's safety. [g]And after your arrival at Wilmington I flattered myself that, if any change of circumstances should make it necessary, you could always have been able to march to the Walkamaw, where I imagined vessels might have[h] passed you over to George-town. I cannot therefore conceal from your Lordship the apprehensions I felt on reading your letter to me of the 24th ult. wherein you [i]inform me of the critical situation which you supposed the Carolinas to be in, and that you should probably

a S *begins* Copy

b S *omits this line*

c B *begins*

d FVER *begin*

e S *inserts* that

f BE *not italics*

g F *omits to* Wilmington

h S *reads* been able to pass

i B *reads* informed

1cA Those who read this letter will probably be of opinion that

2cO Balfour recommended this and prepared for his passage.

attempt to effect a junction with Major-general Phillips.[a]

Lord Rawdon's officer-like and spirited exertions, in taking advantage of Greene's having detached from his army, have indeed eased me of my apprehensions for the present. But in the disordered state of Carolina and Georgia, as represented to me by Lieutenant-colonel Balfour,[3] I shall dread what may be the consequence of your Lordship's move, unless a reinforcement arrives very soon in South Carolina, and such instructions are sent to the officer commanding there, as may induce him to exert himself in restoring tranquillity [b]in that province at least. These I make no doubt your Lordship has already sent to Lord Rawdon, and that every [c]necessary measure for this purpose will be taken by his Lordship in consequence of them, should he remain in the command.[d] But as there are many officers [e]in the regiments coming out who are older than Lord Rawdon, I have to lament the probability of his being superseded in it, [f]as I can scarce flatter myself that any of them will be possessed of the knowledge requisite for conducting operations in Carolina without having ever served in that country, or be so competent to the command there as officers of more local experience. I therefore beg leave to submit to your Lordship the propriety of sending either Major-general Leslie or Brigadier-[g]general O'Hara to Charles-town, to take the command of the troops in that district; which in the present critical situation of affairs in the Southern Colonies, will certainly require an officer of experience, and a perfect knowledge of the country. [h]Had it been possible for your Lordship in your letter

a BFVE *run on*

b V *reads* to

c S *reads* measure necessary

d B *stops*

e SE *omit* in the regiments

f SE *insert* especially

g E *omits* general

h B *continues* FSE *new* ¶

3cA and which Col. Balfour represented also to L. C. before his Lordship left Wilmington and seems to be convinced they would operate in making his Lordship give up his Virginia Plan and return to Carolina the open state of which he had of course represented to him as he had done to Lord Rawdon, but neither this nor his being in hourly expectation of my dispatches from Charles town could divert him from his march into Virginia.

[a]to me of the 10th ult. to have intimated the probability of your intention to form a junction with General Phillips, I [b]should certainly have endeavoured to have stopped you, as I did then, as well as now, consider such a move as [c]likely to be dangerous to our interests in the Southern Colonies. And this, my Lord, was not my only fear; for I will be free to own, [d]that I was apprehensive for the corps under your Lordships immediate orders, as well as for that under Lord Rawdon: and I should not have thought even the one under Major-general Phillips in safety at Petersburg, at least for so long a time, had I not fortunately on hearing of your being at Wilmington sent another detachment from this army to reinforce him.[e]

a B *omits* to me

b B *reads* certainly should

c B *reads* like

d S *omits* that

e FVR *stop*

I am persuaded your Lordship will have the goodness to excuse my saying thus much; but what is done, cannot now be altered: and as your Lordship has thought proper to make this decision, I shall most gladly avail myself of your very able assistance in carrying on such operations [f]as you shall judge best in Virginia, until we are compelled, as I fear we must be, by the climate, to bring them more northward. [g]Your Lordship will have been informed of my ideas respecting operations to the northward of the Carolinas,[4] by my instructions to the different General officers detached to the Chesapeak; and the substance of some conversations [h]with General Phillips [i]on [k]that subject, which I committed to writing and sent to him with my last dispatch, with directions to communicate it to your Lordship.[l] By these your Lordship will observe that my first object has [m]ever been [n]a co-operation with your measures; but your Lordship's situation at different periods, made it necessary for me occasionally to vary my instructions to those General officers according to circumstances.

f B *italics to* Virginia

g FVR *continue*

h S *reads to*

i FVR *omit* on that subject

k BS *read* the

l FVER *stop*

m B *omits* ever

n B *reads to* co-operate

4bO this is the first letter S H C wrote to L. C. after his Lordship arrived in the Chek it first leaves him to his own plans, if he has none *refers him* clearly to those Gl Phillips had been directed to persue.

They were originally directed to assist your Lordship's operations in securing South and recovering North Carolina; their attention was afterwards pointed to the saving South Carolina; [a]and now your Lordship may [b]possibly think it necessary to employ your force in recovering both or either of [c]those provinces, by either a direct or indirect operation. With respect to the first, your Lordship must be [d]the sole judge; with respect to the last, you have my opinions, [e]which may however probably give way to yours, should they differ from them, as they will have the advantage of being formed on the spot, and upon circumstances, which [f]at this distance I cannot of course judge of: I shall therefore leave them totally to your Lordship to decide upon, until you either hear from me or we meet.[g]

I should be happy [h]to be able to ascertain the time when our reinforcements may arrive; but as I have received no letters from the minister of a later date than the 7th of February, I am at a loss to guess how soon we may expect them. [i]As I [k]had judged the force I sent to the Chesapeak fully sufficient for all operations there, even though we should extend them to the Experiment (mentioned in the conversations referred to) [l]at the Western Head of Chesapeak about Baltimore, &c. and your Lordship will perceive [m]that it was Generals Phillips and Arnold's opinion, they were sufficient [n]for even that on the Eastern; (which however might certainly require a [o]much greater force,) it is possible [p]that the additional corps your Lordship has brought with you, may enable you to return something to me for this post: but I beg your Lordship will by no means consider this as a call; for I [q]would rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive, until there was an appearance of serious [r]operations against me, than cramp yours in the least.[s] But (as I said in a former letter) I trust to your Lordship's disinterestedness, that you will not require from me more troops than[t] are absolutely

a B *new* ¶ E *continues*
b BE *omit* possibly
c BE *read* these
d B *omits* the
e B *reads* My opinions may B *italics to end of* ¶
f E *reads* I cannot at thisdistance
g E *stops*
h S *omits* to be able
i FVER *continue*
k VR *omit* had
l FR *omit to* &c
m S *omits* that
n R *omits to* Eastern
o B *omits* much
p S *omits* that
q B *reads* should
r S *reads* operation
s FVR *end*
t SF *insert* what

wanted[a]; and that you will recollect a circumstance, which I am ever aware of in carrying on operations in the Chesapeak, [b]which is, that they can be no longer secure than whilst we are superior at sea.[5·6·7] That we shall remain so, I most sincerely [c]hope; nor have I any reason to suspect we shall not: but at all events, I may at least expect timely information will be sent me of the contrary being likely to happen. In which case I hope your Lordship may be able [d]to place your army in a secure situation during such temporary inconvenience; for should it become permanent I need not say what our prospects in this country are likely to be. The Admiral being now off the Hook, gives me an opportunity of communicating with him by letter; and I have in the most pressing terms requested his attention to the Chesapeak, having repeatedly told him, that should the [e]enemy possess it even for forty-eight hours your Lordship's operations there may be exposed to most imminent danger.[8] General Robertson has also endeavoured to impress him with the same ideas; but until I have an answer in writing I cannot be sure that he will, as I do, consider the Chesapeak as the first object. For he at present seems rather inclined to lead his fleet to open the Port of Rhode-Island, and to cruise to the northward of Nantucket, for a fleet which he has heard is coming from Europe with a small reinforcement to the French armament, and which I am of opinion is bound to Rhode-Island. I have, however, taken every occasion to represent to him the necessity of hearty co-operation and communication; if they fail, I am determined it shall not be on my side.[f]

a E *ends*

b B *italics to* sea

c B *italics* hope

d B *italics to* inconvenience

e B *italics to* danger

f B *ends* I have the honour, &c (Signed) H. Clinton

5aA superior at sea *underlined.*

6aA His Lordship had always considered this as the sine qua non of operation in Chesapeak & seems to have forgot it at the only Period when it was most material for him to remember it.

7cA His Lordship knew this full well, & therefore without a certainty of a Superior Fleet should not have forced operations there.

8aA the same opinions His Lordship had often delivered.

The requisitions your Lordship has made in your letter to me of the 20th instant, for horse accoutrements, &c. shall be supplied to the utmost extent of our abilities; and the inclosed extracts of letters from [a]Leitenant-colonel Innes to his deputy at Charles-Town, &c. will explain to your Lordship why they are not more ample.

[a] S *reads* Lieutenant

June 1st. I have this moment received the Admiral's answer to my letter; and [b]I am to suppose from it that he will do every thing in his power to guard the Chesapeak. The copy is inclosed for your Lordship's information. I heartily wish he may continue in this disposition; the necessity of which I shall not fail to urge by every opportunity he may give me of communicating with him.

[b] S *omits* I

As I shall frequently send one of my advice boats to your Lordship with any information which may deserve your[c] attention, I hope to hear often from you by the same conveyance. Lord Chewton has a cypher, which was given him for that purpose; but should he not have joined you, we may make use of Colonel Dundas's until he does.

[c] S *inserts* Lordships

I shall spare your Lordship and myself the pain of saying much to you on the loss of our valuable friend; I feel it too sensibly for expression.

I have the honour to be, &c. [d]H. CLINTON.

[d] S *inserts* (Signed)

100B: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, OBSERVATIONS [99 *Ap'x*] *p* 131.
With Clinton's Manuscript Notes.

Extract.—From Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. to Lord Cornwallis, dated New York, May 29, 1781.
At end [Sent by Lieutenant-colonel M[c]Pherson, in the Loyalist, June 15.]

This is two parts of No. 100 *as shown in margins pp* 493-497.

100F: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 126.
One of two extracts under this heading Extrait d'une lettre de Sir Henri Clinton, au lieutenant-général comte Cornwallis, datée des 29 mai & 8 juin 1781.

This is three parts of No. 100 *as shown in margins pp* 493-496.

100S: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, Copy RI 19/91.
Same as No. 100 *with variations shown in margins pp* 493-498.

100V: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, Extract PA 140/335.
One of two extracts under this endorsement Extracts of Letters from Sir H. Clinton to L^t^. Gen^l^. Earl Cornwallis, dated May 29^th^ & June 8^th^ 1781. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's (N^o^ 130.) of 9 June 1781.[a] (4.) 65. E
With this general heading Extracts of Letters from Sir H. Clinton to Lieu^t^ General Earl Cornwallis.
Begins 1781. May 29^th^
This is three parts of No. 100 *as shown in margins pp* 493-496.

a *see* ii. 374

100E: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, Extract PA 140/561.
One of twelve extracts under this endorsement Extracts from the Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak & an Expedition against Philadelphia. (11.) In Sir Henry Clinton's Letter of the 13^th^ July.[b] 90.
With this general heading Extracts from the Correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeak, and an Expedition against Philadelphia &ce.
Begins Extract. Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis dated New York May 29^th^ 1781.
This is three parts of No. 100 *as shown in margins pp* 493-497.

b *see* ii. 378

100R: CLINTON to CORNWALLIS, 29 May 1781, Extract HL N^o^ 65.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.
One of two extracts under this endorsement Extracts of Letters from Sir H^y^ Clinton to L^t^ Gen^l^ Earl Cornwallis dated May 29^th^ & June 8^th^ 1781 Transmitted to Lord George Germain In Sir H^y^ Clinton's of 9^th^ June 1781 (4.) R/ 12^th^ July N^o^ 65
With this general heading Extracts of Letters from Sir H Clinton to Lieut Gen^l^ Earl Cornwallis.
Begins 1781. May 29^th^
This is three parts of No. 100 *as shown in margins pp* 493-496.

101 WASHINGTON to SULLIVAN, 29 May 1781, Copy PA 140/361. Reply [105] *p* 171.

Endorsed Copy of an Intercepted Letter from Gen[l] Washington to General Sullivan dated Head Quarters New Windsor 29[th] May 1781. In Sir H[y] Clintons (N[o] 130) of 9 June 1781.[a] (8.) 69. 3.

[a] *see* II. 374

Head Q[rs] New Windsor May 29[th] 1781.

[b] F *begins*

[b]Dear Sir, I have been favoured with your two Letters of the 2[d] & 17[th] of May; the former reached me at Weathersfield after I had met the Count de Rochambeau at that place—from which time to the present moment, my whole attention has been so occupied by a variety of concerns, that I have been hitherto involuntarily prevented from doing myself the pleasure of writing to you.

[c] S *begins* Dear Sir, [d] S *inserts* very

[c]No Arguments were necessary to convince me of the[d] great public utility, which would result from the Success of the plan, you proposed laying before Congress.—Had I been unapprised of the advantages which might be derived to our Cause from a Successful Attempt, or even a powerful diversion in that Quarter, the reasons you have offered, would have carried irrefragable demonstration with them, and induced me to be of your Opinion. But the [e]perplexed, distressed & embarrassed State of our Affairs on account of Supplies, (with which you are well acquainted).—The languid efforts of the States to procure men, and the insuperable difficulties in the way of transportation, would I apprehend, have rendered the scheme [f](however devoutly to be wished & desired) abortive in the first instance. And I must inform you, that there is yet another obstacle, which makes the Attempt you have Suggested [g]*absolutely impracticable* [h]with the means you propose, but which I [i]dare not commit to paper, for fear of the same Misfortune which has already happened to some of my Letters.

[e] S *omits* perplexed

[f] S *omits to* desired

[g] S *not italics*

[h] S *reads* by

[i] S *reads* am not at liberty to commit

[k] R *begins*

[k]You will have seen, before the receipt of this, by my public Letter to Congress of the 27[th] Ins[t]

the result of the deliberations of the Count de Rochambeau and myself at Weathersfield. That plan, upon the maturest consideration, and after combining all the present circumstances and future prospects, appeared (though precarious) far the most eligible of any we could possibly devise, whilst we are inferior at Sea. The object was considered to be of greater magnitude, and more within our reach than any other. The weakness of the Garrison [a]of New York, the [b]Centrical position for drawing together Men and Supplies, and the Spur, which an Attempt against that place, would give to every exertion, were among the reasons which prompted to that undertaking, and [c]which promised the fairest prospect of Success, unless the Enemy should recall a considerable part of their force from the Southward. And even in this case, the same Measure which might produce disappointment in one quarter, would certainly in the Event afford the [d]greatest relief in another.[e]

While an Opportunity presents itself of striking the Enemy a fatal blow—I will persuade myself, [f]the concurring exertions of Congress, of the several States immediately concerned, and of every individual in them, who is well affected to our cause, will be united in yielding every possible aid [g]on the occasion. At this crisis, while I rejoice at the Appointment of the Minister of Finance, I have sincerely to regret, that the Ministers of the other departments have not also been appointed especially a Minister of war. At the same time I am happy to learn, [h]the mode of promotion is on the point of being finally established. With the highest Sentiments of regard[i] & Esteem I am Dear Sir Y[r] Obed[t] Serv[t]

Hon[ble] Gen[l] Sullivan (Signed) G[o] Washington[k]

a S *reads* at

b S *reads* central

c S *omits* which

d B *small capitals* greatest relief, *italics* in another

e B *ends* S *runs on*

f S *inserts* that

g S *omits* on the occasion

h S *inserts* that

i S *ends* I am &c

k F *ends*

101B: Washington to Sullivan, 29 May 1781, reply [105] *p* 171.

Extract of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to General Sullivan, dated New Windsor, 29th May, 1781.

This extract from No. 101 *is shown in margins pp* 500-501.

101F: WASHINGTON to SULLIVAN, 29 May, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 144.
Copie d'une lettre interceptée du général Washington, au général Sullivan, datée du Nouveau-Windsor, le 29 mai 1781.
Same as No. 101 *with variations shown in margins pp* 500-501.

101S: WASHINGTON to SULLIVAN, 29 May 1781, 8 GW 58.
This extract from No. 101 *is shown in margins pp* 500-501.

102 WASHINGTON TO LUND WASHINGTON, Copy PA 140/373.
REPLY [106] *p* 171.

Endorsed Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to Mr Lund Washington dated New Windsor 31st May 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's (No 130) of 9 June 1781.[a] (11.) 72. 6.

[a] *see* ll. 374

[b] S *begins*
[b]Copy. New Windsor 31st May 1781.

[c] F *begins*
[c]Dear Lund, I returned last Saturday from a Conference with the Count de Rochambeau at Weathersfield, on Connecticut River, and found your Letter of the 9th Instant; and the last Post brought me another of the 16th.

We have heard nothing yet of the Detachment (consisting of about 2000 Men) which left New York the 13th Instant, nor do we know whether those Troops were bound for Virginia, North or South

[d] B *begins* Dear Lund,
Carolina, or elsewhere. [d]A Report prevails, and is believed by some, that the Enemy are about to quit New York altogether, but I shall withhold my Opinion of the Matter yet a little longer—If such an Event should take Place it will be an Evidence in my Mind that they expect Matters are drawing to a Conclusion and that they have a Mind to get as fast hold on the

[e] B *ends*
Southern States as possible.[e]

I have already given you my Opinion (in some late Letters) with respect to my moveable Property—after removing the most valuable, and least bulky Articles the rest, with the Buildings, must take their Chance.—I am prepared for the worst that can happen to them, to hear therefore of their being

plundered, or burnt, will be no Surprise to me.—In case a Body of Troops should come into that Part of the Country (belonging to the Enemy) public, as well as private Considerations, require that Horses and Stock of all kinds should be driven out of their Reach.

I am Dear Lund, Your Affectionate Servant

Signed, G° WASHINGTON.[a]

a FS *end*

102B: WASHINGTON to LUND WASHINGTON, REPLY [106] *p* 171.

From General Washington to Mr. Lund Washington, 31st May, 1781.

This extract from No. 102 *is shown in margin p* 502.

102F: WASHINGTON to L. WASHINGTON, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 150.

Copie d'une lettre interceptée, du général Washington, datée du Nouveau-Windsor, le 31 mai 1781.

The same letter as No. 102.

102S: WASHINGTON to L. WASHINGTON, 31 May 1781, Copy HL No 72.

Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 February 1782.

Endorsed Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to Mr. Lund Washington dated New Windsor 31st May 1781. Transmitted to L^d^ Geo: Germain in Sir H^y^ Clinton's of 9th June 1781 (11) R/ 12th July N° 72.

The same letter as No. 102.

---

103 WASHINGTON TO LA FAYETTE, Copy PA 140/381.

REPLY [107] *p* 171.

Endorsed Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to The Marquis de la Fayette dated New Windsor 31st May 1781. In Sir H^y^ Clinton's (N° 130) of 9 June 1781.[a] (13.) 74. 8.

[b]Head Quarters [c]New Windsor 31st May 1781.

[d]My Dear Marquis [e]I have received your favors of the 4th 8th 17th and 18th Instants, your conduct upon every occasion meets my approbation, but in none more [f]than [g]your refusal to hold a correspondence with Arnold. By an account which I have [h]just received

a *see* ii. 374

b V *begins* Copy
c S *begins*
d BF *begin*
e S *omits to* Instants
f BV *insert* so
g S *reads* in your refusing
h B *omits* just

from New York, Gen[l] [a]Robinson goes to Succeed General Phillips. You may have something to apprehend from his age and experience but not much from his activity.[b]

In a letter which I wrote to Baron [c]Stuben on the 16[th] instant, I desired him to inform you, as I did not know at that time where you might be, that I had good reason to believe a detachment of between 1500 [d]& 2000 Men had sailed from New York a few days before. I now have it confirmed, and [e]I think you may either look for them in [f]Chesapeak or further Southward.

Your determination to avoid an engagement with your present force, is certainly judicious. I hope the Pensylvanians have began their March before this,[g] but I have no information of it. General Wayne has been pressed both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as much expedition as possible and extraordinary powers are given [h]to him to enable him to procure provisions.[i]

Upon your [k]intimation that Colonel Vose wished to return to the Northward, I ordered Col[l] Tupper to relieve him, and he had sat out before your Letter of the 4[th] reached me.[l]

I am with very sincere regard My dear Marquis Y[r] most Obed[t] and hble Serv[t]

(Signed) G[o] WASHINGTON.

Maj[r] Gen[l] Marquis de la Fayette.[m]

a BS *read* Robertson
b S *runs on*
c BS *read* Steuben
d B *reads* or
e B *italics to* Southward
f S *inserts* the
g S *inserts* time
h B *omits* to S *omits* to him
i S *ends* I am, with very sincere regard, &c
k B *reads* information
l F *ends* Je suis &c (Signée) Geo Washington B *continues on p* 506 *l* 17
m V *ends*

103B: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, 31 May, REPLY [107] *p* 171.
Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to the Marquis De la Fayette, dated Head Quarters, New Windsor, 31st May, 1781.
Same as No. 103 *with variations shown in margins pp* 503-504.

103F: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 153.
Copie d'une lettre interceptée du général Washington au Marquis de la Fayette, datée du quartier-général au Nouveau-Windsor le 31 mai 1781.
Same as No. 103 *with variations shown in margins pp* 503-504.

103s: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, 31 May 1781, 8 GW 60.
This extrac from No. 103 *is shown in margins pp* 503-504.

103v: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, 31 May 1781, Copy HL No 74.
Laid on the table of the House of Lords, 18 *February* 1782.
Endorsed Copy of an intercepted Letter from General Washington to the Marquis de la Fayette dated New Windsor 31st May 1781. Transmitted to Ld Geo: Germain In Sir Hy Clinton's of 9th June 1781 (13) R/ 12th July No 74.
Same as No. 103 *with variations shown in margins pp* 503 504.

104 WASHINGTON TO LA FAYETTE Copy PA 140/385.
REPLY [108] *p* 171.
Endorsed Private. Copy of an intercepted Letter From General Washington to The Marquis de la Fayette dated New Windsor 31st May 1781. In Sir Hy Clinton's (No 130) of 9th June 1781.[a] (14.) 75. 9.
Private. New Windsor, May 31st 1781.
[b]My dear Marqs., I have just returned from Weathersfield at which I expected to have met the Count de Rochambeau & Count de Barras, but the British fleet having made its appearance off Block Island, the Admiral did not think it prudent to leave Newport.—Count Rochambeau was only attended by Chevr Chattellux—Generals Knox and Duportail were with me.

Upon a full consideration of our Affairs in every point of View—An Attempt upon New York with its present Garrison (which by estimation is reduced to 4,500, Regular Troops and about [c]3,000 irregulars) was deemed preferable to a Southern Operation as we had not the Command of the Water—The reasons which induced this determination were, the danger to be apprehended from the approaching Heats—the inevitable dissipation & loss of Men by so long a March —and the difficulty of transportation—but above all, it was thought that we had a tolerable prospect of expelling the Enemy or obliging them to withdraw

a *see* ii. 374
b F *begins*
c F *reads* 5,000

part of their force from the Southward, which last would give the most effectual relief to those States.— The French Troops are to March this way as soon as certain circumstances will admit, leaving about 200 Men at Providence with the heavy Stores and 500 Militia upon Rhode Island to secure the Works.

I am endeavouring to prevail upon the States to fill up their Battalions for the Campaign; if they cannot do it upon better terms, and to send in ample and regular Supplies of Provision. Thus you perceive it will be some time before our plan can be ripe for execution, and that a failure on our part in Men and Supplies may defeat it; but I am in hopes that the States in this quarter will exert themselves to attain what has long been a favorite and is an important object to them.

a B *continues from p* 504 *l* 24

[a]We have rumours, but I cannot say they are well founded, that the Enemy are about to quit New York altogether.—Should they do this we must follow them of necessity, [b]as they can have no other view than endeavouring to Seize and secure the Southern States, if not to hold them finally, to make them the means of an advantageous negociation of Peace.[c]

b B *italics to end of* ¶

c B *ends* I am, &c (Signed) Geo. Washington

I take it for granted that your last dispatches inform you fully of European Affairs and that you can judge from them of the probability of such an event as I have mentioned taking place. As you have no Cypher by which I can write to you in Safety, and my letters have been frequently intercepted of late I restrain myself from mentioning many matters I wish to communicate to you.

I shall advise you every now and then of the progress of our preparations. It would be unnecessary for you to be here at present, and I am sure you would not wish to leave your charge while you are so near an Enemy, or untill you could deliver them up to General Greene, or to another Officer capable of exercising the Command which you are in. [d]You will always remember My dear Marquis that your return

d F *new* ¶

to this Army depends upon your own choice. And that I am with every Sentiment of Esteem reg[d] & Affect[n]

Y[r] most Obed. [a]Serv. (Signed) G[o]: WASHINGTON. [a] F *omits* Serv. (Signed)

P.S. My public letter contains an Answer to your Several favours. [b]We have just heard from New York that Gen[l]. Robinson is gone to Supply the place of Philips.[c] [b] F *new* ¶ [c] F *ends*

Maj[r] Gen[l] The Marq[s] de la Fayette.

104B: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, 31 May, REPLY [108] *p* 171.
As a continuation of No. 104B: *and headed* [Private.]
This extract from No. 104 *is shown in margin p* 506.

104F: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 155.
Copie d'une lettre interceptée du général Washington au Marquis de la Fayette, datée du Nouveau-Windsor le 31 mai. (Privée).
Same as No. 104 *with variations shown in margins pp* 505-507.

EMENDATIONS AND QUERIES.

[*Sir Henry Clinton's Manuscript notes, often written hurriedly, with interlineations, erasures and repetitions, many being in faded ink or pencil, were deciphered with difficulty for literatim 'copy.'*]

vol. i. page	7	note	8	line	34	*for* proposed *read* promised.
	33	„	14	„	4	„ but I should *read* that I should.
	69	„	5	„	2	„ Bayernin *read* Bay seeing.
	103	„	1	„	1	„ enable none *read* enable him.
	103	„	2	„	6	„ French Town *read* Trent Town.
	107	„	2	„	3	„ but most *read* and most.
	251	„	1	„	3	„ *blank read* southern.
	280	„	7	„	4	„ he there *read* for these.
	321	„	4	„	21	„ fruit *read* merit.
	479	„	5	„	2	„ distraction *read* destruction.

part of their force from the Southward, which last would give the most effectual relief to those States.— The French Troops are to March this way as soon as certain circumstances will admit, leaving about 200 Men at Providence with the heavy Stores and 500 Militia upon Rhode Island to secure the Works.

I am endeavouring to prevail upon the States to fill up their Battalions for the Campaign; if they cannot do it upon better terms, and to send in ample and regular Supplies of Provision. Thus you perceive it will be some time before our plan can be ripe for execution, and that a failure on our part in Men and Supplies may defeat it; but I am in hopes that the States in this quarter will exert themselves to attain what has long been a favorite and is an important object to them.

[a] B *continues from p* 504 *l* 24

[a]We have rumours, but I cannot say they are well founded, that the Enemy are about to quit New York altogether.—Should they do this we must follow them of necessity, [b]as they can have no other view than endeavouring to Seize and secure the Southern States if not to hold them

[b] B *italics to end of* ¶

always remember My dear Marquis that your return

to this Army depends upon your own choice. And that I am with every Sentiment of Esteem reg[d] & Affect[n]

Y[r] most Obed. [a]Serv. (Signed) G[o]: WASHINGTON.

P.S. My public letter contains an Answer to your Several favours. [b]We have just heard from New York that Gen[l]. Robinson is gone to Supply the place of Philips.[c]

Maj[r] Gen[l] The Marq[s] de la Fayette.

a F *omits* Serv. (Signed)

b F *new* ¶

c F *ends*

104B: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, 31 May, REPLY [108] *p* 171.

As a continuation of No. 104B: *and headed* [Private.]

This extract from No. 104 *is shown in margin p* 506.

104F: WASHINGTON to LA FAYETTE, Fr trans GERMAIN *p* 155.

Copie d'une lettre interceptée du général Washington au Marquis de la Fayette, datée du Nouveau-Windsor le 31 mai. (Privée).

Same as No. 104 *with variations shown in margins pp* 505-507.

END OF VOL. I.

PRINTED BY
CHAS. STRAKER AND SONS, BISHOPSGATE AVENUE, LONDON, E.C.;
AND REDHILL.

University of Toronto
Library
DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET
Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU